Introduction and Methods of Inquiry

The 2002 Governance Institute was held in August in Dakar with 13 laureates drawn from 6 African countries in attendance. Five resource persons and two guest lecturers joined the laureates to tackle the theme of this year’s Institute: Intra-State Challenges to the Nation-State Project in Africa. From August 5th to 30th, this assemblage, along with three invited speakers from various political and civil organizations in Senegal, and members of the CODESRIA secretariat, discussed and debated the internal challenges to different African state-building projects. The Institute also greatly benefited from the attendance of Professor Amadou Aly Dieng, a veteran participant in all previous Institutes. Significantly, this year also marked the tenth anniversary of the Institute.

To set the ball rolling, I proposed that clarity in issues of methodology, theory and concepts was very important in exploring the intra-state challenges to the African state. We need to take account of a wide range of factors – historical, geographic, political, economic, and sociological – which have shaped the specific challenges faced, by each state. The challenge before the Institute was to encourage the development of dynamic analytical frameworks which incorporated these diverse elements, and which help to illuminate specific cases while at the same time contributing to our general understanding of the wider African picture. As a contribution to this quest, I suggested two very broad analytical approaches that may be considered as starting points of our individual endeavours: a systemic approach and an actor-based approach.

The systemic approach borrows from Baker [2000, 8] in placing emphasis on the broad political processes of the nation-state as a functional system with many interlinked components. At the core of that system is a problematic political authority that generates disapproval and intra-state challenges. The activities of this sub-optimal state affect various sectors of societal and political life: economic, cultural, constitutional, territorial, and institutional, resulting in different patterns and intensities of responses from different spheres of society. Some groups in society respond to the sub-optimal state at the core of the system by challenging it through engagement, thereby creating a mobilized ring around the core, while others respond to the same policies through disengagement, denoting economic, cultural, territorial or other forces in society which seek to escape as far as possible from the reaches of the state and its constitutive institutions and processes.

Within this systemic perspective, challenges to the nation-state project can take the form of either engaging with it to force changes on the state, or disengaging from it in order to reduce its reach and efficiency and thereby weakening its capacities. Sometimes, the same policy can elicit reactions of engagement, disengagement, or indifference from different groups within the same society. In different ways, engagement, disengagement, or indifference can constitute severe internal challenges to the)

state, and the intellectual task is to explore why particular sectors of society adopt particular strategies, at particular times. The central feature of this approach is that the dysfunction of the African nation-state is analysed in broad systemic and historical terms, well beyond the immediate challenge itself. Just as important is the problematization of the sub-optimal nation-state that is the core of the system and the source of the political disapproval. What specific historical and societal factors underpin its dysfunctionality? Implied in this approach is the need for a holistic approach in understanding and tackling the many challenges faced by various nation-state projects in Africa.

The second broad analytical approach is the actor-based approach that is derived, appropriately, from Hirschman [1970] who developed his groundbreaking ideas from a study of the dysfunction of the Nigerian Railways Corporation. Like the systemic approach, this approach also starts with a dysfunctional state system as a given. However, its analytic emphasis is not on that state as a system or process, but on the reactions of sub-systemic actors to the dysfunction of the state. Its emphasis is therefore on the actors within the system, rather than the system itself.

These two analytical approaches are neither exclusive of each other, nor are they exhaustive of possible approaches. They however suggest the need for Institute participants to avoid an excessively empiricist approach which merely chronicles and catalogues the many challenges to the African nation-state system.

Studying the African State: The Broader Context

The next set of presentations had the specific objective of sketching out the broader contexts against which the investigation of the African nation-state system can be more fruitfully undertaken. In the lecture on the African state as History, I sought to highlight the historical, geographic and cultural context of state formation in Africa. It is of vital importance that Africa’s own experience of state formation plays a crucial role in our theorizing of the contemporary political predicament of the continent. More often than not, Eurocentric models are implicitly or explicitly deployed without any effort being made at establishing and evaluating the relevance of a specifically African experience on the matter. On the other hand, the late Professor Abdullahi Smith, argued forcefully for the incorporation of Africa’s own history of state formation into its current efforts at nation-building [1987, 59].

Vision, Nationalism, and Agency

However, it was also stressed that much as historical and structural dynamics are important for the understanding of the long-run problems of the African state, we must be careful not to descend into deterministic modes of thought. In reality, the African state, in its colonial and postcolonial manifestations, is also the product of human imagination and human agency. My presentation on the theme of the African state as Vision sought to establish this point. In the early colonial period, the visionary impulse that shaped the African state could be seen in the
missionary zeal to demolish existing African spiritual universes and to replace these with a Judaeo-Christian outlook. African acquiescence or resistance to this missionary vision often had political implications of long-standing consequence [cf: Ranger, 1985; Whitaker, 1970]. Similarly, the positivist sense of mission of the colonial administrator in the African hinterland – the proverbial ‘man on the spot’ – his aristocratic inclinations and sense of unchallenged power, his unquestioned belief in Empire and the ‘civilizing mission’, all constitute the voluntarist repertoire of administrative practices which continue to be felt in many parts of post-colonial Africa. Can some forms of political and administrative practices in post-colonial Africa be traceable to the positivist, scientific-bureaucratic mindset of the colonial world which sort to re-order, re-shape, reconstitute, classify, and count African communities? How relevant is this inheritance of colonial ‘governmentality’ in the deformations of the post-colonial state?

Both the colonial and post-colonial situations in Africa have been marked by strong elements of both voluntarist and idealistic thinking. Few can forget Kwame Nkrumah’s advice: ‘Seek ye first the political Kingdom and everything else shall be added unto thee’. In a similar vein, Patrice Lumumba is reported to have declared ‘I am an idea’. More important than the colonial heritage, however, is the vision or visions implicit in African nationalism. African nationalism has had a profound effect on the evolution of the African state because, as Breuilly [1993] points out, nationalism is a form of politics with the state as its target. Secondly, African nationalism has marked, and continues to mark, the collective African consciousness. African nationalism is both a set of ideologies and a set of practices; it also led to the sedimentation of practices and ideas, which continue to influence the nature of the African state.

The African State and the World of Ideas

But representations of the African state are not limited to the ideational or programmatic productions of colonial actors and African nationalists. The African state has also been the target of formal academic and policy representations, particularly since the beginning of the crises of the 1980s. And through the IMF, the World Bank, and a host of bilateral agencies, these intellectual productions on the African state, often of western providence, have acquired a hegemonic hold on the activities of the contemporary African state. In the presentation on the African state as Idea, I explored the range of academic ideas that have shaped the understanding and functioning of the African state in the recent past. Modernization theory, dependency theory, and the more recent neo-liberal ascendency have all left their marks on the politics and practices of the African state.

Gender, the African State, and the Global Context

Professor Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo of Cornell University opened his contribution to the Institute by examining ‘The Présommatique of the African State, Its Mission, and Its Functions in International Relations and World Economy’. The lecture was about how one re-conceptualizes historically and philosophically the origins, structures, and functions of the African state and its relationship to other phenomena within the global economy. This problématique implies the identification, classification, and definition of the major problems related to, or associated with, the nature of the African state. Is it a vibrant entity in relationship to the African people?

There are methodological problems, conceptual issues, and functional aspects related to this state that must be raised and discussed if we were to ask the question of what kind of state for Africa. The presentation, which focused on general analytical perspectives, reflection on the colonial question, and the paradigmatic elements of the post-colonial state, argued that the modern state is a dynamic phenomenon. It is an organ that can grow. But the way African state was created may partially explain why it behaves the way it does. There was no bargaining mechanism between the African political agencies/agents and the participants of the Berlin Conference in 1884/85 in terms of how the states were carved. This state was set up with three major missions: (1) to disorganize the existing African political economy, social systems, and their values; (2) to create an agency of the international capitalism; and (3) to create an internal police agency for the European institutions and political elites. The presentation concluded that in its current forms, the African state cannot and will not be able to formulate progressive policies and politics needed for the development of the continent.

He followed this up with an exploration of methodological issues in the study of the African state by asking: what kind of social science research for Africa? At this juncture of unchallenged domination by liberal globalization, both at its market economic level and at the electoral democratic process, is there any theoretical, ideological, and political need to talk about social science research in Africa? What does social science research in Africa mean? Can/should Africa produce her own investigative research tools to deal with the dynamics of her environment? Lumumba-Kasongo emphasised the fact that research methodology is one of the most important components of the Institute’s work.

In his third presentation, Lumumba-Kasongo addressed the gender dimension of research on the African state. How important is it to incorporate a gender dimension to such a research agenda? Does gender matter in social science research in Africa? In the presentation it was articulated that gender matters in social science in Africa. Why and how is it so? He argued that the dominant perception according to which the issue of gender in social science research concerns mainly women is wrong. Gender, as a social science concept, is a dynamic concept. In the presentation gender was defined in relational perspectives. It deals with men–women and girls–boys relationships and how these relationships are reflected in the allocation and distribution of power and other resources. He asserted that these relationships are not static. They are constantly changing to reflect the dynamics that are taking place in societies or demands that are emerging from societies. They are also constantly changing to respond to concrete social class, institutional, and other societal demands.

He concluded that gender issues in social science research must take into account specificities and particularities of men–women’s relations in their specific ethnic and broader political contexts. And gender issues must also take into account African social history, social values, and worldviews. The current division of labour in which women are confined to some specific roles must be critically examined because it responds more to the imperatives of global capitalism than to the demands of democracy and development. He suggested that this is not necessarily a reflection of African cultures. Finally, gender equality has to be articulated within the framework of citizens’ and human rights principles and developmental paradigms. The
coalition of men and women against the dysfunctionality and sexism of the African state can provide an opportunity to advance a dialogical relationship based on the principle of complementarity. For issues of gender to succeed in Africa, it will be necessary to democratize ethnicity and the state, and articulate gender as a developmental imperative.

In his presentation on ethno-nationalism and the contradictions of global capitalism, Lumumba-Kasongo argued that ethno-nationalism is about the dynamic relationships between ethnicity and nationalism and their political and economic implications. Ethnicity, as nationalism, is a socially constructed phenomenon. It is not fixed. It should therefore be understood in relational and historical terms. Using historical structuralism and system’s analysis paradigms, he sought to define what ethno-nationalism is, to identify its dominant characteristics and their socioeconomic manifestations. He also tried to examine how ethno-nationalism has interacted with the forces of global capitalism. How have the contradictions of global capitalism and ethno-nationalism impacted on the African state?

In a presentation on ethnicity, nationalism, and regionalism, Lumumba-Kasongo focused on how these phenomena have affected the processes and/or mechanisms of state formation in Africa. Ethnicity, nationalism, and regionalism were defined from various schools, notably modernization, dependency, and third world perspectives. Why is ethnicity gathering renewed strength in Africa? Is ethnicity always an irrational phenomenon? And what should be done about it? Its objectives and functions were discussed.

Nationalism was defined historically and philosophically. Various approaches to studying it, based on the work of John Breuilly were discussed – the nationalist, the communication, the Marxist, and the psychological and functional approaches. The presentation also focused on the classification of various types of nationalism – reformist, separatist, accommodationist, and those strongly associated with Afro-Marxist traditions – that have been produced in Africa in the past 40 years or so. The major objective was to deal with the question of the impact of nationalism on the processes of state formation. Regionalism was defined in geo-physical, ideological, and political terms. Again, the concern was to examine the policy and political implications of regionalism in the context of state formation. Various issues related to the regional claims and demands of individuals and groups based on the imperatives of morphology and particularism of culture were raised and discussed.

**Nigeria: The longue durée and the burden of history**

After these broad-ranging presentations, focus shifted to country specific studies starting with a series of presentations on the Nigerian state. In my introductory presentation on the intra-state challenges to the Nigerian state, I pointed out that Nigeria remains one of the most turbulent countries in Africa. Its post-colonial history is characterized by: (1) a 30-month Civil War between 1967 and 1970 during which over 1 million people were killed; (2) difficulty in organizing a stable political order, leading to repeated military incursion into national political life and the resulting militarization of civil politics and the politicization of the military; (3) continuing sectarian mobilization and confrontation at many levels of society – ethnic group against ethnic group, region against region, community against community, and religion against religion. Despite its enormous wealth in human and material resources, Nigeria has failed to fulfill its promise as a nation-state precisely because of the numerous intra-state challenges it has had to confront. Indeed, the success of Nigeria is that it has managed, so far, to survive these numerous and repeated challenges whilst retaining a fairly coherent state system by African standards.

In my presentation, I sought to sketch out the broad historical and political context of these intra-state challenges to the Nigerian state, leaving two other presenters, Dr Cyril Obi and Kate Meagher, to examine two specific instances of intra-state challenges to the Nigerian state. I emphasised five issues: (1) the way in which societal cleavages were structured into the very heart of the colonial state in Nigeria; (2) the embedded inequalities within the Nigerian state, particularly the gapping disparities between the northern and southern sections of the country; (3) the conflict-ridden hegemonic drive that has characterized Nigerian political life; and finally, (4) large scale poverty as the context for intra-state mobilization.

On cleavages, I pointed out that the long-drawn politico-historical process of regionalism, statism and localism has led to a concentric pattern of 7 ethnic and political cleavages in Nigeria. On inequalities, I pointed out that some were the result of differential economic endowments, while others flowed from the consequences of often deliberate colonial official policy. While geography can be used to explain the higher economic and infrastructural development of the southern regions of Nigeria, the educational underdevelopment of the northern part was largely a reflection of official policy and local attitudes. The combined and cumulative effects of these inequalities, corresponding as they do with the cleavages already cited, have bedevilled Nigerian society to this day.

It is these cleavages and inequalities that have fuelled the politics of sectarian mobilization within Nigerian politics. And since the collapse of the First Republic in 1966, a lot of efforts have gone into attempts to contain the centrifugal forces so active at the heart of Nigerian politics. The creation of states, the quota system in distribution of resources, the reflection of “federal character” in appointments, the building of the new capital at Abuja, right in the middle of the country as a symbol of unity, and the effective centralization of political and fiscal power at the centre, may have sustained the state as a single unit without addressing the sectarian impulses that continue to challenge it.

As a result, intra-state challenges to the Nigerian state continue.

**Nigeria: Youths, Environment and Ethnic Militia**

Dr Cyril Obi, from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, focused his presentations on the challenges to the Nigerian state emanating from the conflict over resource control in the Niger Delta. In these presentations, he emphasised the critical factors of resources, environmental protection, youths and political conflicts. It is the dangerous cocktail of these factors in the context of a repressive military state that has defined the numerous challenges to the Nigerian state in the Niger Delta. In his first presentation, Obi provided a background to the struggles for resource control in the Niger delta, drawing on the dependent nature of the integration of the region into global capitalism and the Nigerian nation-state. The marginalisation of the region thus fed into the resurgence of ethnic minority agitation for self-determination, local autonomy and the restructuring of the nation-state.
Obi’s second presentation explored the nexus between inter-generational conflict and the struggle for resource control in the Niger Delta, particularly in the context of youth violence. He argued that the conflicts in the delta are not a simple Manichean world with the ethnic minorities on one side and the Nigerian state on the other. These conflicts are described as complex, with different minority ethnic groups and even different generations within an ethnic group and factions within generations assuming contradictory positions. These broadly show the influence of class and personal interests, within groups that are broadly seen as the Niger Delta ethnic minorities. These divergent reactions within the Niger Delta also reflect the impact of the tensions between a homogenising state project and the rights of the minorities to assert their control of oil.

In his third presentation, Obi focused on the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC) as case studies of specific challenges to the Nigerian state in the Niger Delta. He highlighted the role of the youth in both movements and their struggles, and concluded that youth activism is less of an inter-generational war, and more of a generational critique of the dominant power relations within Niger Delta societies and between them and the Nigerian state. Youth mobilization therefore challenged the erstwhile culture of accommodation that has characterized the attitude of Niger Delta elites with the state, and replaced it with a culture of confrontation and heightened ethnic mobilization that also created the unintended consequence of heightening intra-ethnic tensions within the Niger Delta. Youth mobilization also marked the transition from constitutional means, led by chiefs and elders, to extra-constitutional agitation. Emphasis shifted from the language of universal political rights, prevalent in the era of decolonisation, and accent was now put on local idioms and cultural revivalism. Long forgotten cults and rituals were excavated and reinstated as the vehicle for political mobilization. Nevertheless, power and resources, and not cultural exclusivity, were the driving force of this mobilization.

The local idioms continued to borrow selectively and heavily from foreign sources, particularly the ascendant languages of human and environmental rights, the networks of global NGOs, the language of genocide, and even mobilization at the UN.

Obi’s fourth presentation examined the external linkages to the struggle for self-determination and resource control in the Niger Delta. He looked at the extractive consequences of oil multinationals and western consumer-nations. He argued that the events in the Niger Delta could not be fully understood unless the region’s role in the global network for producing energy and profits for western multinationals and consumer nations is taken into account. It is this global network, in alliance with the Nigerian state, which extracts both oil and power from the inhabitants of the Niger Delta, leading to local resistance. Obi also examined the strategy of linking up with global rights movements and international non-governmental organizations (INGO’s), which has characterized the politics of groups like MOSOP. He drew attention to the factors that drive the politics of these global NGOs in the Niger Delta, and also noted the limitations of global rights movements in ‘empowering’ the forces of local resistance. The hanging of Saro-Wiwa showed the limitation of international rights movements in their support for MOSOP; it would seem that in both Nigerian and western governmental circles, the oil multinationals have more clout than the international rights movements.

In his concluding presentation, Obi looked at the implications of the Niger Delta conflict for the Nigerian state building project. He argues that Nigeria’s unity is fragile and contingent on oil revenues; oil threatens Nigerian unity and cements that unity simultaneously. The Niger Delta conflict draws our attention to the crucial question of revenue as an essential aspect of state building. At the same time, the ethnic complexity of the Niger Delta and its long-running ‘minority’ status draw our attention to questions of plurality and diversity within the African state. It is to be regretted, he concluded, that violence has become endemic, episodic and scattered within the Niger Delta. Will this lead to the collapse of the Nigerian state or its reconstitution? Whatever the outcome, he notes that youth power will remain a critical factor in the struggles in the Niger delta, as well as the quest for the restructuring of the Nigerian nation state.

One of the Institute’s guest lecturers, Ms. Kate Meagher, Nuffield College, Oxford, presented the second case study from Nigeria. Her focus was on the Bakassi Boys militia that sprang up in the southeastern Nigerian city of Aba in the 1990s. She pointed out that ethnic militias have become a prominent feature in many African countries; in Nigeria, prominent militia groups are the Yoruba-based Oodua People’s Congress, the Massob and the Bakassi Boys in the Igboland southeast, and the various Islamist Hisba groups that sprung up in the wake of the adoption of shari’a in the Moslem parts of northern Nigeria. She pointed out that in the literature on Africa, we now see an increasing accent on uncivil society and Africa is often portrayed as a theatre of perverse forms of civil organizations which undermine democratisation. Within this context, militias are often seen as either perverse or progressive in a simplistic way. She argued that the reality is often more complex.

Those seeing the militias as progressive often define them as springing out of the efforts of ordinary people to create their own security and protect their property rights. A second point of view suggests that the economic policy of liberalization tends to lead to perverse social organizations, which may tear society apart. A third perspective, she argued, sees the militia as instruments that are organized to meet social needs, but end up serving completely different ends as they become co-opted by other forces in society. She emphasised that militias should be seen, not as the organizational products of perverse cultures, but of perverse institutional settings.

**South Africa: Constructing a Rainbow Nation?**

The case study of post-apartheid South Africa was presented in a series of lectures by Professor Kunle Amuwo of the University of the North in South Africa. In his first presentation, he sought to establish the link between globalization, democracy and state building. He started out by arguing that whilst globalization is a complex process and phenomenon of antinomies: integrating and fragmenting the world; uniformity and localisation; increased material prosperity and deepening misery; homogenization and hegemonization, etc, it has meant, for Africa, at once marginalisation and ‘deglobalisation’ – one in which the structural context of choice is mired in a dialectical relationship between putative openness of global market and a real lack of state autonomy. As a process in becoming, globalisation’s coherence, reach and specificity are still in a state of flux. Furthermore, the nature of the nation-state calls for serious interrogation rather than merely pronouncing its decline. By favouring the worst kind of capitalism in modern
history - with rigged rules and unfair agricultural standards for Africa; an iniquitous WTO, etc. – globalisation imperils both democracy and state building.

Amuwo argued that a way has to be found around the negative characteristics of globalization – particularly the alliance between corporate business and the authoritarian state. He suggested that African perspectives/responses are needed, in the form of social democracy, so that state building is not left entirely to the market. The struggle for internal democracy by civil society organizations will have to include creating domestic citizens to complement the so-called transnational citizenship that globalisation has engendered. The struggle should also be for a type of democracy capable of eliminating inequality at the global, regional, national and local levels. Finally, it should aim at civilizing power and overcoming the latent violence of conflicting interests.

In his second presentation, Amuwo returned to the theme of expanding markets and retreating states under the current globalization. He argued that the South African and the Nigerian states have to be analysed in the light of their excessive dependence on 'advice' from a myriad of international financial institutions. How do we understand such states within existing theoretical frameworks? How much autonomy does such a state exhibit, particularly in terms of its domestic and international economic relations? A major argument for expanding the market in Africa is that the state is disarticulated and, to that extent, has a highly reduced capacity to address public problems; that it is too big, and too interventionist. However, as the state retreats and the market expands, the economic system tends to become more exploitative; democracy, more procedural and less social; citizenship more of a tenuous concept and the state itself more of a contested terrain. Furthermore, expanding markets under globalisation render the state less and less a viable source of political legitimation. The logic of the IFIs is that free politics needs a free and open market, but for whose benefit? Amuwo argued that the aim is apparently to discipline African political leaders who are said to put politics before economics. But pushed to its logical conclusion, the state, enmeshed in the calculus of providing the conditions for cheap labour for sweatshops, is caught between the imperative of social democracy and a technocratic/managerial imperative in tune with the demands of international financial forces.

In a presentation on citizenship and democracy, Amuwo argued that citizens are those who have confidence in, and hold allegiance to, the public institutions of a state and such a state can be said to be democratic if it seeks to enhance citizens’ trust and participation in government and in public life. Social rights and social obligations are different sides of the same coin. An important liberal concept, citizenship, is often articulated in a three-fold definition: civil rights, political rights and social rights. Citizenship and democracy are in a dialectical relationship and mutually reinforcing: to build a ‘democratised political culture’, there is the need for a particular kind of civil society to help legitimise the state in the eyes of citizens and help build a culture where citizens readily meet their obligations to the state. In post-independence Africa, particularly since the events of 1989 and the introduction of structural adjustment policies, citizenship has become more and more tenuous as states undergoing democratic reforms simultaneously face socially painful economic reforms.

On the contemporary challenges to transformation and citizenship in South Africa, Amuwo posited the intriguing possibility that there could be states without citizens. Notwithstanding some giant strides in the country since 1994, Amuwo asserted that the country remains, like Brazil, a fundamentally unjust and unequal society. The South African transition was essentially an elite pact, rooted in race politics and with tinges of a class compromise. Whilst ‘diffuse pressures and forces in society’ within and outside South Africa facilitated the collapse of apartheid, to paraphrase Alfred Steppe, the nature and character of the transition was such that the structural and systemic problems of apartheid linger. The hopes of rapid political, economic and social change through liberal or electoral democracy were quickly dashed. He argued that the situation was worsened by the adoption by the ANC government of an essentially pro-business, market-friendly, macro-economic policy framework of GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) that advocated fiscal conservatism and free-market capitalism. Whilst not much positive change has resulted in the lives of millions of blacks, it is, however, not simply the old economic story of South Africa re-told.

Coming to the question of identities, Amuwo argued that in post-colonial African states, region and ethnicity often constitute two important boundaries of identity. Within these social constructs, group histories are idealized, myths are invented, and identities are constructed for political and related purposes. Electoral politics produces two sets of citizenship: a civic one, where, via public morality, all ethno-nationalities find expression and accommodation; and an ethnic one, driven by alienation, imagined or real, where the state is seen, in Dennis Austin words, as ‘an added affliction’. Amuwo contends that political ethnicity nourishes the politics of division, focusing as it does on the politics of difference. Ethnic violence seriously challenges the nature and character of the African state and the base of its legitimacy. Similarly, ethnic differences get converted into mutual antagonism. Amuwo argued that historically, South Africans were more engrossed in broad citizenship demands, than in ethnic mobilization. Self-determination, inclusive politics and civic citizenship were the major demands of the liberation struggle. Whilst apartheid was premised fundamental on the ethnic division of black South Africans, it ended up homogenising them. Amuwo suggested, however, that post-apartheid politics has witnessed the (re) emergence of the plurality of ethnic identities that were held in abeyance under apartheid. He asserted that in South Africa today, there is a growing consciousness of ethnic identity, captured by the so-called ‘Xhosa nostra’. Not unlike in the past, this ethnic ascendancy is rooted in the historical association of groups with economic advantage.

On the specific question of intra-state challenges to the South African state, Amuwo argued that states are often objects of contestation. Intra-state challenges are usually for two major purposes. One, states have to be mended, augmented, re-legitimised and renewed, as far as institutional-building is an endless process, always a work in progress. Two, there is the need for the construction of a totally revised political discourse and economic structure capable of dealing with, and satisfactorily addressing, structures and processes generating inequality. Challenges centre on economic and institutional issues and often involve significant programmatic and political trade-offs.
In conclusion, Amuwo suggested that in South Africa, apart from the limited experience of the ANC in policy matters, the sedimented legacies of apartheid tend to constrain development programmes. He stated that these constraints include inherited economic inequities, an unequal social and geographical distribution of resources and the underlying mechanisms of inequality by which a capitalist society operates. Challenges posed to the South African state include the management of race and citizenship, the unfulfilled expectations embedded in African and Afrikaner nationalisms, differentiated cultural voices seeking recognition and relevance, the re-insurgence and politicisation of ethnic identities, and the uneasy alliance between the market-friendly ANC, on the one hand, and its left-of-centre trade union and Communist Party (COSATU/SACP) partners, on the other.

The Great Lakes: Putting the DRC Together Again
A case study on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was preceded by an examination of the crises in the Great Lakes region as a whole. Opening the discussion, Lumumba-Kasongo pointed out that several colonial experiences could be found in the region: British, German, and Belgian. These experiences are germane to a historical and structuralist explanation of the crises. One needs to go beyond the events that took place between April and July 1994, where nearly one million Rwandans, the majority of whom were Tutsi, were murdered. He defined the concept of the Great Lakes Region as a combination of geographical, cultural, and political elements. Geographically, the Great Lakes Region is located more in the Greater Eastern Africa than in Central Africa. Morphologically, the region has some characteristics that can be described as physically unique; it has several major lakes. The countries that are directly related to these geo-political configurations include the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, and to a certain extent Malawi. Most of these lakes are located in the eastern part of the DRC.

The process of colonization produced in the Great Lakes Region some physically poor micro-states; Burundi, with a 2001 population of approximately 6,502,000 in a surface area of 10,747 square miles (27,834 square kilometers) and Rwanda, with a population of approximately 7,049,000 in a surface area of 10,169 square miles (26,633 square kilometers). These landlocked countries have higher population densities than any other country in the region. For instance, in 1958, the population density in Rwanda was 93 people per square km compared to 2 in the Equatorial French Africa, 3.5 for Angola, 5.6 for Belgium Congo, 9.5 for Tanganyika, 10.8 for Kenya, and 23.7 for Uganda. In 2001, the population densities per square kilometre in Burundi, the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda were 234, 22, 54, 302, and 102 respectively.

Lumumba-Kasongo also explained how, since the 1960s, this region has produced some notorious dictators such as Idi Amin in Uganda (1971–1979) and Mobutu of Zaïre (1965–1997). Additionally, in this region, three leaders of militia movements, Museveni, Kagame, and Kabila with different political ideologies, political profiles, and social agenda, gained state power in Uganda, Rwanda, and the DRC respectively. The first two tried to install friendly regimes with foreign invasions disguised as internal rebellions.

Lumumba-Kasongo then focused on the rise of Laurent-Désiré Kabila as an important factor in explaining the crisis in the region. He argued that Kabila’s association with local radical militias in Maniema such as Mayi-Mayi, Simba, etc., is central to understand the dynamics of the Kivu region. These militia were part of larger military and political movements that were characterized as the second independence movement in the DRC, a movement led by Pierre Mulele of the Kwilu province. Their goal was to establish a unified radical leftist nationalistic government in Kisangani. The movement was essentially anti-Mobutist, anti-West, and anti-imperialist. It was temporarily crushed by the direct military intervention of the United States, Belgium, France, and their African allies to save their client regime.

Widespread poverty is also a central aspect of the crises according to Lumumba-Kasongo. In light of the level of poverty and based on the view that peace is indivisible from real democracy, the kind of constitution to be recommended in the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda is the one that should promote a social democracy in which cultural diversity or cultural heterogeneity of people is given political, economic, and legal status in a multinational state. He argued that a long-lasting peace in the region needed the development of a collective security arrangement and also the development of a collective regional sovereignty scheme. Furthermore, he argued that a ‘consensual’ democracy combined with strong built-in social programs could protect citizenship rights and thus contribute faster to the advancement of emancipatory politics in the sub-region.

In his own contribution to the Great Lakes discussion, Amuwo stated that contemporary literature on violence and crisis identifies structural, political, socio-economic and cultural/perceptual factors as constituting explanatory schemas for the twin phenomenon. Theorists also see violence as part of a process of state building. By the same token, globalisation is said to exert considerable pressure on weak states, resulting in ‘post-modern conflict’. The latter is characterized by a wide range of actors bound together in local and external interactions and interests, including the use of novel warfare strategies: ethnic cleansing, child solidery, mass rape, banditry, the use of mercenaries, entrepreneurs and international capitalists.

He suggested that the foregoing certainly captures part of the tragedy of the Great Lakes. But it needs to be supplemented and augmented by a contextual analysis. Two major explicable schemas appear apposite here. One, the ‘philosophy of genocide’ in which extremist Hutus seek to use ‘Hutuism’ with a view to regaining lost ancestral land by literally killing every Tutsi. In military combat, the philosophy translates to making no distinction between civilians and soldiers and encourages a ‘pre-emptory strike’ policy. The second leg of this philosophy, Amuwo argued, is the use of selective assassination of the leadership of the Hutu majority by the minority Tutsi leadership. This policy of extermination is necessarily selective: leaders, elites and intelligentsia. The second explanatory schema is the representation of Africa by the West. For the latter, the Great Lakes crises are little more than a function of so-called mutual ‘ancient hatreds’ by the mosaic of ethnic configurations in that part of Africa. The crises are also perceived as a product of ill-behaved African ‘strongmen’ operating states that excel in ‘pre-modern’ tribalism. Such simplistic behaviouralist analyses often lead to the recommendation of ‘one man, one vote’ ‘democratic elections’ and nation-state building based on the Western experience. Instead of this culturalist perspective, Amuwo suggested that other factors have to come to the fore: Cold War interventionism; land-scarcity conflicts; a political economy
riven with ethnic conflict on account of the control of the military and security forces by the group in power; and extractive minerals that are of interest to the West and its regional surrogates.

Coming to the specific issue of the intra-state challenges to the DRC, Lumumba-Kasongo argued that the study of the intra-state challenges concerns the relationship between the state and the people or their reactions to one another. It includes the legitimacy of the state, its performance, its legal acceptance, its claims, its institutional foundation and people's participation (or lack of it) and integration (or lack of it) into the dominant system and their expectations. He asserted, however, that the most important challenge in the Congo is how to re-construct a state out of the extremely devastated conditions caused by war and several decades of dictatorship, human annihilation, and underdevelopment.

Lumumba-Kasongo stressed that the Congolese experience of state-formation in the ‘Congo Free State’ was characterized by a highly militarized, centralized, privatized, and personalized state. Leopold II’s autocratic style of governance and his ruthless methods of obtaining raw materials and cheap labour caused the death of about 10 million people between 1885 and 1908. This first genocidal action qualified Leopold II as a mass murderer though he was never indicted. However, the ‘Congo Free State’ was taken away from him and given to the Belgian State. And based on the principle of ‘pas d’élite, pas de problème’ (no elites, no problems) and strongly influenced by the doctrines of pacification as advanced by Christianity, the Belgian model of colonialism produced the ideologically weakest African nationalist elite. The challenges to the Congolese state must therefore be understood in this historical setting.

Lumumba-Kasongo argued that the intra-state challenges in the Congo grew out of: (a) the divided and weak political elite; (b) the confusion related to the first constitution/fundamental law, which was a carbon-copy of the Belgian Fundamental law; (c) lack of cadres or educated elite; (d) manipulation by the corporations of the internal weaknesses of the society; and (e) the intervention of foreign powers in the domestic policy and politics of the country.

The Great Lakes: Uneasy Peace in Burundi

The discussion on the Great Lakes region was brought to a close by a presentation on Burundi from the second guest lecturer to the Institute, Dr Patricia Daley of the School of Geography, Oxford University. She argued that the proverbial ‘ethnic hatred lens’ through which the crises in Burundi is often interpreted is far from correct. She analysed the changes in ‘ethnic hatred’ through which the crises in Burundi is often interpreted is far from correct. She analysed the changes in the Burundian state and its claims, its institutional foundation and people’s participation (or lack of it) and integration (or lack of it) into the dominant system and their expectations. She argued that the most important challenge in the Congo is how to re-construct a state out of the extremely devastated conditions caused by war and several decades of dictatorship, human annihilation, and underdevelopment.

Dr Alain Didier Olinga of Universite de Yaounde II in Cameroun presented the Camerounian case study. He started out by asking if indeed there was a nation-state project in Africa. Secondly, he asked if there is a model or a multiplicity of models for such a nation-state project. He asserted that the real power of the state is on the ground: its capacity to exert violence, and its bureaucratic presence. State power is very tangible, and so is its legality. The state has a social reality, but it is not without problems, one of which is that of intra-state challenges. History and political geography can illuminate the basis of such challenges. He argued that the state in Cameroun is not emanating from the nation, nor does it serve the nation. It seems to have and autonomous administrative and bureaucratic logic. And the project of state building may be quite different from that of nation building; the building of the state need not form the basis for the nation.

Olinga then turned his attention to history; how useful is the history of Cameroun for the understanding of the state? He argued that the colonial moment is the reference root of the forces whose sedimentation constitutes the state in Cameroun. German colonialism in Cameroun reflected the Bismarckian predilection for nation building through blood and iron. Emphasis was on administrative and bureaucratic instruments of control. This first phase of colonialism was also marked by missionary activities. The atomized, semi-autonomous entities in pre-colonial Cameroun were welded together bureaucratically, and Olinga emphasised the diversity of trajectories open to them. The end of World War 1 led to the break-up of German Cameroun into French and British Cameroun; conflicting administrative practices emerged.

Olinga argued that the salient intra-state challenges in the Cameroun are traceable to this history. Anglophone Cameroun developed a different culture and outlook, which constitutes a major fracture in the national fabric. In the plebiscite of 1961, the northern part of Anglophone Cameroun chose merger with Nigeria, leading to mourning by Ahidjo. Even the southern part of Anglophone Cameroun, which chose to re-unite with Francophone Cameroun, did not renounce the option of autonomy for the area. The unity of Anglophone and Francophone Cameroun was based on a federalist constitution which has since been abrogated; this imposition of a unitarist hegemony and the attempt to obliterate differences has led to strong Anglophone rejection of the state. Olinga is quick to add, however, that Anglophone secessionist agitation might best be understood as a resource in the hands of political entrepreneurs. Olinga argued that there are also regional and autochthonous challenges to the state.
particularly the case, he argues, in a situation where belonging has consequences, as there is an important relationship between the drive towards regionalization. He suggests that this change is closer at community level dynamics and this is what is fuelling this recognition. Olinga argues, however, that the Lamindates should not be seen in opposition to the state; there is mutual tolerance and mutual advantage between them.

Finally, Olinga raised the ‘Bamileke question’. He suggested that current thinking in Camerounian politics is that the Bamileke should concentrate on making money whilst leaving politics to others who are not tainted by the UPC past. He pointed out that it is often said that a Bamileke cannot be President. For how long can this dichotomy between economic and political power be maintained? And what are the consequences for the state of a Bamileke claim to the political sphere?

In his second presentation, Olinga focused on the issue of minority and autochthons claims within the state. These claims, he pointed out, are often seen as signalling a rift in the state and they often have implications for the democratisation of the state. He pointed out that in Cameroun, the recent period of ‘democratization’ has also coincided with the recrudescence of sectarian claims. As a result, the protection of minority and autochthons rights has gone up on the agenda. Some of the minority agitation surrounds the composition of electoral lists, particularly by the ruling party. Minority and autochthons groups argued that the electoral lists should reflect the sociological complexity of the various constituencies. The government, on the other hand, argued that a list with an overall ethnic balance was sufficient.

The debate over autochthonous rights is also closely tied to the issue of regional and territorial autonomy and citizenship rights. Who qualifies as an autochthon? Olinga argues that the constitution is silent on this crucial issue, leaving it to legal and political disputation. Nevertheless, strident claims by so-called autochthons affect people’s access to land, settlement rights and to citizenship. Being an ‘outsider’ Olinga argues, is fast becoming a badge of political exclusion as a result of regionalization and the reservation of some posts for autochthons only. ‘Mobile’ Camerounian groups like the Hausa and the Bamileke are therefore confronted with serious constraints on their citizenship rights.

In his final presentation, Olinga addressed the question of regionalization and the nation-state. He asserted that following French Jacobin administrative precedents, the unity of the Camerounian state is manifested in the centralization of the management of the country. Olinga argues, however, that it is becoming increasingly important for the African state to look closer at community level dynamics and this is what is fuelling the drive towards regionalization. He suggests that this change has consequences, as there is an important relationship between the form of the state and the organization of the state. This is particularly the case, he argues, in a situation where belonging to a territorial space and being subjected to the administration of that space is the first characteristic of being Camerounian.

**Does State Capacity Matter?**

After these case studies, deliberations returned to one question of general concern and applicability: the consequence of the intra-state challenges for the effectiveness and capability of the African state. Furthermore, the point was also made that more robust states may avoid or contain the challenges in the first place. My presentation on this theme explored the relevance of state capacity and leadership to the theme of the Institute, looking specifically at the works of Englebert [2000] and Samatar [1997; 1999] and the contradictory experiences of Botswana and Somalia. Leadership and vision emerged as the key to building state capacity in Africa. Activists and policymakers should address this question.

**Conclusion: Senegal and a Continuing African Dialogue**

I have tried to sketch some of the central arguments presented at the Institute. What I have not done is to reflect the intense debates some of these presentations generated. A laureate led the discussion of each presentation. Furthermore, apart from the presentations and their associated discussions and debates, the programme also contained six seminar presentations by laureates, covering a range of topics including a comparison of the role of Islam in Algeria and Senegal, the role of Libya, South Africa and Nigeria in the construction of a Pax Africana within the African state system, and the comparative impact of ethnic structure and public policy in the development of the Tanzanian and the Nigerian states. These seminars were occasions for the laureates to develop their presentational skills. A substantial part of the Institute’s work was also taken up in the presentation and discussion of the individual research projects of the laureates. Revised versions of these projects were prepared in the light of the peer reviews.

The final element in the Institute’s work was the consideration of the situation of our host state, Senegal, within the context of the theme of the Institute. For this purpose, it was decided to rely on active participants and observers within the Senegalese state system. The first forum on Senegal, attended by both Institute participants and CODESRIA staff, received presentations from Iba Ndiaye Djadji, Professor of Letters at Cheikh Anta Diop University, Dakar, and spokesperson for the trade union federation, SUDES/CSA. A second presentation was from Abdoulaye Elimane Kane, Professor of Philosophy at Cheikh Anta Diop and spokesperson of the former ruling party in Senegal, the Parti Socialiste (PS). Iba Djadji argued that Senegalese society and state faced an acute crisis manifested in the problems of the fishery sector, the then prevailing drought and its management, the management and remuneration of labour, and a general moral crisis in society. He argued that Senegalese trade unions and workers had mobilized support for the ‘change’ coalition led by the current ruling party, the PDS. The unions had hoped that the pronoumism and mismanagement of the PS would be addressed. Instead, Djadji argued, the ‘alternance’ or change of government from PS to PDS has not resulted in any change as far as ordinary Senegalese, particularly workers and peasants were concerned. He suggested that the trade unions would have to continue fighting for their rights if their needs were to be taken seriously by the state as merely voting parties in or out of office was not sufficient for taking care of their interests.
In his own contribution, Abdoulaye Kane sought to explain why the PS lost power in 2000 after 40 years in power. In the course of a wide-ranging presentation which touched upon the role of African culture in development, the difference between written laws and social practices, the role of marabouts in Senegalese politics, and the French presence within the Senegalese state system, Kane argued that the PS had tried very hard to manage a difficult economic and political situation, particularly before the 1994 devaluation of the CFA Franc. After 1994, the PS was actually recording some success in stabilizing the situation. The 2000 election was lost, according to Kane, not because of any failure on the part of the PS, but because of the extra-ordinary mobilization by the opposition in urban areas, largely fuelled by the vocal support of the private radio stations. Kane also highlighted the importance of a protest march by the opposition to the Internal Affairs ministry in the run up to the elections. In short, according to Kane, the PS lost the media war. Even so, the PS polled 42% in the first round compared to the 31% by the opposition candidate. Kane also concurred with Djadjji that the ruling PDS government is mismanaging the economy; he expressed the hope that a leaner and more principled PS can take the fight to the PDS government. From both presenters, it was obvious that constitutional means have largely become the means of resolving political confrontations in Senegalese public life.

The second forum on Senegal was devoted to the civil war raging in Casamance, a region where the apparent civility of Senegalese political life seems to have broken down. The presentation on Casamance was by Babacar Justin Ndiaye, a veteran journalist and author, currently on the staff of the Senegalese newspaper, Sud Quotidien. This was a highly informative and nuanced presentation. To cite only one example, Ndiaye pointed out the Casamance movement, MFDC, was formed even before the first incarnation of the PS was formed in the run up to independence. He highlighted the controversy surrounding the unwritten accord that was said to have promised the MFDC independence in Casamance in return for support for the Senghorian party that later became the PS. He also noted the increasing Wolofization of Casamance culture, and the cultural prejudices against the so-called ‘Nyaks’ or non-sahelian Senegalese, of which the Diola in Casamance are a prime target. He noted the increasing alienation of indigenous groups in Casamance from their land as a result of other Senegalese from the drought-prone northern parts moving there. In short, Ndiaye made a historical, economic, cultural and political case for the Casamance movement without necessarily endorsing its recourse to violence. He suggested that political negotiations could resolve the issues involved, but regretted that the majority of Senegalese society persisted in seeing the Casamance problem in terms of a military solution. The continued delegitimation of long standing demands by the bulk of the Senegalese population, he argued, lies at the root of the continued military challenge to the Senegalese state from Casamance. Professor Amadou Aly Dieng was an invaluable contributor to these and other debates.

**Bibliography**


Migration and Citizenship in Africa, Governance Institute
A review of the Governance Institute 2000 Session

Introduction

I was first contacted in June 2000 and invited to direct the Governance Institute. While I appreciate that there were special circumstances which delayed the appointment of a director, it is imperative that this position be filled early even if it means that an executive decision has to be taken. In my own case, I had a series of commitments which I had to fulfil including participating in a conference overseas. I also designed a course without the benefit of knowing the research strengths of the resource persons or the needs of the laureates. I stress that it is imperative that the director have some discretion in the appointment of resource persons. It is in this spirit and in the interest of meeting the intellectual goals and high standard of the institute that I was able to convince CODESRIA that Professor Pal Ahluwalia be invited to serve as a resource person. I wish to record that his participation in the last week of the institute has been most important.

Approach and format of the programme

In order to enable the six-week session of the Governance Institute to meet its objective of producing a collective book, the seminars were organised to maximise the laureates' opportunity to work effectively toward contributing to writing a high-quality chapter suitable for publication. To that end, it was decided that seminars should run each week from 9:00 to 13:00, thereby leaving the afternoons free for research and writing. In addition, it was agreed that one day a week be designated as a reading day. This was the norm, except for the last week when we met each day. This provided the laureates with an opportunity to meet on a one-to-one basis with both the Director and Individual Resource Persons. Each resource person contributed three seminars, except for the last week when there were two resource persons and they each presented two seminars. At this stage, the laureates were in the final stages of drafting their papers and the resource persons as well as the Director were involved in individual consultation. During the first five weeks, laureates presented either proposals or papers. This ensured that weekly progress could be monitored. In order to ensure that the sessions had coherence and relevance, I arranged that each laureate's presentation was made during the week that was most relevant to his or her specific topic.

In my first meeting with the laureates, I outlined the aims, objectives and goals of the Governance Institute. I presented a paper titled Migration and citizenship in Africa. This paper outlined the major questions that informed the direction of this year's institute. These were: Are Western conceptions of citizenship based on rights and obligations as well as the capacity to accommodate differences relating to the African condition appropriate? Are postmodernist, post-structuralist and post-colonialist approaches appropriate in examining the question of citizenship and migration? What is the role of democracy in protecting citizenship? How do refugees threaten state sovereignty and challenge notions of citizenship? What role does gender play in citizenship discourses? How do different modes of governance affect citizenship? What is the impact of internal displacement?

Types of migration: Theoretical considerations

Migration: An historical and contemporary overview
Resource person: Mehdi Lahlou

In my design of the programme, I thought that it was necessary to consider the issues of forced migration, voluntary migration and repatriation. In addition, I thought it necessary to outline an overview of current debates on citizenship. Mehdi Lahlou used the North African region as a case study to deal with the issues of migration whilst I dealt with the current debates on citizenship.

During the discussion, we examined the manner in which Africans are coming to terms with their post-colonial identity. Central to this task are notions of citizenship and subjectivity. In the current demands for democratisation, there have been renewed calls to make citizenship a meaningful and important part of political life. The presence of multiracial and ethnic societies along with the rise of nationalism has led to a crisis of citizenship, culturally and politically. The contestation over what it means to be, for example, a Nigerian or South African is a result of the exclusionary practices and minimalist notions of citizenship which have operated on the continent. The exclusion of migrants, women and minorities has rendered a crisis of citizenship.

Democracy, Nationalism, Rights and Identity

Resource person: Alice Adejumoke Afolayan

During this week, the resource person, Alice Adejumoke Afolayan, examined the question of democracy in Nigeria. She focused on the close affinity between democracy and citizenship. Additionally, issues that were addressed were the constitution of Nigeria, the rise of nationalism and the alignment of citizenship with the state.

In order to maintain the coherence and flow of the design of the course, it was necessary during the discussion to ensure that issues of displacement, movement and resettlement of masses of people be considered, specifically with reference to issues of nationalism and democracy. In particular, the shifting nature of rights, responsibilities and the processes of identity formation were explored. In this context, the issues of state sovereignty, international obligations as determined by conventions and regulations regarding refugees and also the changes experienced within specific polities as a result of both rural to urban and rural to rural migration were examined.

Refugee Crises and their Impact on Citizenship

Resource person: Tessy Bakary

Tessy Bakary spoke on the relationship between citizenship and good governance. His focus was on the definition of citizenship. In addition, he reviewed the literature in the field. In his second lecture, he dealt with notions of authoritarianism,
democracy, transition liberalisation and the consolidation of democracy.

During the discussion the issue of rights and responsibilities was examined. The question of political instability and the fragile nature of the democratisation process within Africa was considered. The issue of post-conflict societies and their problematisation of citizenship was a major focus of the debate. In addition, the complexities of the refugee crisis in a number of countries was examined.

**The Economic Impact of Migration and Its Implications for Citizenship**

*Resource person: Makhtar Diouf*

Makhtar Diouf presented a series of lectures on the political economy of migration. His first lecture was a general analysis of migration. The second concentrated on migration within Africa, and the third focused on migration policies and politics. These lectures provided a broad overview and grounding of the issues involved for the laureates.

In this discussion, the migration of people from one part to another part as an important aspect of everyday life on the continent was examined. Here the economics of migration were considered. In addition, the issue of remittances between, as well as within, countries was debated. The role of trading women between various parts of the continent was looked at in some detail. The impact of structural adjustment programmes and their differential effect on gender was examined as it relates to migration. The influence of the commercial sex industry and the social, economic and political costs and their implications for citizenship was raised.

**The Politics of Identity and Migration**

*Resource person: Simon Bekker*

In his seminars, Simon Bekker dealt with the issue of internal migration and the politics of identity specifically in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces in post-apartheid South Africa. These seminars were not only empirically enriching, but were also helpful to the laureates in terms of being exposed to social science methodology.

During the discussion, the issue of the migration of workers within the southern African region to meet the labour demands of the mining sector was considered. The impact and social dislocation of these workers were highlighted. More importantly, there was considerable debate about the current dispensation of democracy and new forms of citizenship that are currently evolving in South Africa.

**Citizenship, Subjectivity, Gender and the Crisis of Modernity**

*Resource persons: Abubakar Momoh and Pal Ahluwalia*

Abubakar Momoh presented papers on the pan-African orientation of citizenship in Africa. He focused on two issues that informed his notion of pan-African citizenship: the historical context and the theoretical context. The issue of development was raised as being fundamental to considerations of citizenship. To this end, he addressed the importance of democratisation and the failure of both the African state as well as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). In order to advance the thesis of pan-African citizenship he suggested that notions of judicial and organic citizenship, be developed.

Pal Ahluwalia examined Mahmood Mamdani’s book *Citizen and Subject*. He argued that while Mamdani aptly problematises binaries which dominate African studies, ultimately, he falls into the same trap by establishing a binary on which his entire project rests on citizen and subject. By deploying a post-colonial perspective, he showed how such a simple binary is rendered ineffective. He outlined the efficacy of post-colonial theory which brings questions of subjectivity to the foreground.

During week the discussion was lively and engaging, and was an extremely useful way of bringing the themes and concerns of the Governance Institute to a conclusion. These debates explored in some detail the manner in which citizenship is conceptualised theoretically in post-modernist, poststructuralist and post-colonialist discourse. The relevance of these theoretical debates was explored.

**Summary of Recommendations**

**Computerisation**

I am pleased to note that recommendations made by previous directors have been implemented. I wish to acknowledge the foresight of providing laureates with computing facilities. This has made the task of completing the first drafts substantially easier. A result of this is that most of the papers were submitted from the fifth week onwards. This has enabled me, with the assistance of resource persons, to provide each laureate with detailed commentary.

**Laureates**

The quality of the laureates was excellent, but I think that in the future more attention should be paid to achieving a regional balance. This year the composition of laureates was as follows: Cameroon (2), Kenya (6), Mauritania (1), Nigeria (4) and Uganda (1). One student had to drop out of the institute because of medical reasons. There were four female laureates this year. However, the absence of a Senegalese laureate itself was surprising.

**Selection**

I wish to emphasise the importance of appointing a director early so that he or she can participate in the selection of the laureates and resource persons.

**Theme**

I think that it is imperative for CODESRIA to ensure that the next Governance Institute follows on thematically from this year. This will give the institute some continuity as well as make a far greater impact on knowledge production. I have in mind that the next institute on Elections and Electoral Systems be theoretically rigorous and not simply a replication of mainstream Political Science methodology on these issues. This would ensure that CODESRIA will remain at the forefront of setting research agendas for Africa.

**Specific Recommendations**

a) The next director should prepare a course pack in consultation with resource persons so that the laureates have ready access to the major debates and issues which they would be expected to cover during the course of the institute. Once again, the imperative of an early appointment of the Director is evident.

b) It would be advisable to devise some way of providing the Director, resource persons and the laureates with e-mail accounts for the duration of the institute despite the existence of Internet cafes in Dakar.

c) One of the most important issues for the laureates is the continuation of networking and the development of research programmes which inevitably grow out of such an institute. It is important to devise mechanisms to facilitate this.
State and taxation in Africa, Governance Institute, 1999

Dakar, 2 August–15 September 1999

Introduction

The significance and relevance of the theme of the 1999 Institute, ‘State and taxation in Africa’, can be appreciated at two different levels.

First, the State is at the heart of the governance process and practice. Indeed, ‘governance’ is basically defined as the open and efficient way a regime, considered as a legitimate authority, which is responsive to the expectations of the governed people, and is accountable to and tolerant with the other public actors, manages public affairs. The state and its institutions, but also other institutions as well as non state organisations are the framework of governance.

Second, we must not forget that through its historical building process, the modern state is based on the dynamic building and articulation of a double monopoly: that of legitimate violence and taxation, as analysed, for instance, by the two German sociologists, Max Weber and Norbert Elias.

At a second level, the significance and relevance of the theme of the Eighth session of the Governance Institute lie in its articulation and link with the themes of the two previous sessions.

Indeed, the theme of the 1997 session (on the political economy of conflicts) and that of the 1998 session (on security, violence and public order) were related to the first founding form of State monopoly.

Logically, the theme of the 1999 edition, which is the tax system, deals with the second form of monopoly.

However, the relevance of the theme on “State and tax system” is not limited to a logic connection, which could have been a pure coincidence. It also lies in the significance, topical and permanent character of the tax system in every country, and particularly in the African countries under structural adjustment.

The fiscal history of a nation is closely linked to its very history, because the economic levying operated by the state, to cover its needs and the way this levying is used has a great influence on a nation’s destiny. Schumpeter insists on the fact that “the financial history of a people is an indicator of its level of civilization and social structure, as well as the goals it is striving towards as far as politics etc. are concerned”.

According to the Austrian economist, “the processes of financial history open a yet more enlightening perspective on the static laws and social dynamics, on the most significant factors of people’s destiny, and also on the evolution and succession of concrete conjunctures, particularly of the various forms of social organisation. Finances are an excellent basis for an analysis of mechanisms, in particular, but not exclusively of politics. This viewpoint is particularly useful for an analysis of historical milestones, that is to say, of moments where one can see one thing that used to exist turning into something new. When considered under their financial aspect, those changes in configuration always imply a failure of the methods hitherto used, not only as causes – since the state’s financial action is significant to any change – but as symptoms – since it is the whole process of change that reflects on finances”.

For a Fiscal Sociology of Politics in Africa

The intellectual and pedagogical project of the directorship of the 1999 Governance Institute is articulated around Schumpeter’s intuitions on the heuristic and explanatory properties of the tax system.

The general problematic is about the fiscal sociology or “financial history” of the processes of transition from authoritarianism to democracy, the analysis of the relationship between taxes and the construction of a new political order in Africa.

In order to explain this return to political pluralism, a “historical milestone”, through the “financial situation”, the theoretical and conceptual apparatus was built in the form of a tripod, from the intuitions of three authors: Joseph Schumpeter, Norbert Élias and Max Weber.

The works of the Schumpeter, namely those that are rather unknown, on “The crisis of the fiscal state”, enable us to set up a general framework for an explanation of the dynamic relationship between state and the tax system.

The analysis of the socio genesis of fiscal monopoly, by Norbert Elias is the second dimension of the theoretical and conceptual apparatus and helps understand the functions and significance of taxation.

Finally, the unknown works in economic sociology by Max Weber, namely those on the modes of financing of political domination, shed light on the financial bases of the processes of transition towards democracy.

The reading lists compiled from the texts of these three authors aimed at providing all participants with a basic conceptual and theoretical corpus, that is broad and relevant enough, and that needs to be further completed by the specific problematics formulated in the various research projects.

This reasoning, which aimed at bringing some coherence to the theoretical and conceptual bases of the various approaches used, seems to be a major innovation in the Institute. Some of the laureates, that were not very familiar with such an approach to collective work, thought that they were being imposed a unique theoretical and conceptual approach.

The Institute as an activity of CODESRIA

The Governance Institute was set up in 1999. This periodic meeting of African scholars does not seem to be well known, at least, as far as the participants to the 8th session are concerned. Indeed, more than half the participants surveyed (9 out of 14, 64.28.%) said they heard about the Institute five years after its creation. About the same proportion of them, 10 out of 14
(71.42%) received this information through CODESRIA Bulletin, and 4 (28.57%) through colleagues, and the Internet.

The fact that 8 laureates out of 14 (57.14%) were informed about the holding of the 1999 Institute in 1999, through the Bulletin (57.14%), through colleagues (35.74%) and the Internet (7.14%) reveals a lack of publicity around the Institution or a problem of dissemination of information. Additionally, 42.85% of the people surveyed found the announcement published very good and good, and only 14.28% found that it was not good.

A previous participation to CODESRIA’s activities seemed to have had a particular impact on the process of selection of laureates, since it is the case for half the participants surveyed, 7 out of 14, 50%.

Out of the 15 laureates of this 8th session, 5 (33.33%) benefited from a grant (Small Grant); however, none of them had ever published their work in one of CODESRIA’s review or work. It is probably due to the fact that the Institute’s programme is mainly designed for young researchers.

The very principle of holding these periodic meetings of scholars is considered as very good by 92.85% of participants, which almost represents the totality of the people surveyed. This general approval should encourage an improvement in the organisation and holding of the institutes.

**1- Significance and relevance of the theme of the 1999 session**

The theme of the 8th edition was of a great significance, according to 12 laureates (85.71%) and significant for 2 of them (14.28%). The unanimity over the theme “State and tax system” and the interest of laureates in this theme can be accounted for by the fact that they all wish that this theme should be further analysed in other reflection frameworks (National Working Groups, Multinational Working Groups). The roundtable organised on this theme the day of the Institute’s official opening showed the richness and topicality of the theme.

Almost all laureates (93.33%) find that the 1999 Institute’s objectives are relevant and clearly defined, which confirms the above-mentioned judgement of this session. We should particularly insist on the diversity and richness of the research themes presented by the laureates.

Various and interesting dimensions of this theme were covered, from the poll tax to the VAT, from fiscal insubordination to the Tuareg rebellion, through fiscal crime and corruption, from the impact of the political institutions on fiscal performances to the evolution of fiscal juridical production, and from colonial history to the topicality of the relationship between State and society, through the original problematic of gender relations in relation with the tax system etc.

The central idea lying behind all these themes is that the history and financial sociology of African countries can indeed be a perspective of analysis, whose heuristic and explanatory properties confirm Joseph Schumpeter’s intuitions.

However, it is regrettable that there are no problematics such as fiscal geography, the history and evolution of the African fiscal State and its crises with multiform consequences, as well as the relationship between fiscal issues and the processes of democratisation.

The risk of seeing researchers focusing on the same themes due to their fertility or topicality could be avoided, thanks to the work carried out by the selection committee. However, the level of participation by different parts of the continent show that there is the necessity of having a more balanced representation of certain areas of the continent such as Central and Southern Africa, even though the selection committee has no control over the number and quality of the proposals from the various countries.

The objective of improving the selection process calls for a more or less thorough reform around the following main elements: the setting up of a steering committee, a reorganization of the planning of activities, a policy of advertising and circulation of the information around the Institute that would be more efficient than the one hitherto set up.

**2- Organisation and objective of the Institute**

The previous sessions of the Governance Institute were dedicated to the writing of a research project. The Director and four resource persons were evaluated by the laureates over various points, among which the pedagogical content of their presentations and their contribution to the improvement of the research project and writing of articles.

Four resource persons, in the order of intervention, took part in the institute: Makhtar Diouf, Luc Sindjoun, Kayode Soremekun and Aly Mady Dieng. There were three Francophones among them (among which, two are bilingual), and one Anglophone, who are renown in their respective disciplines: economics (Makhtar Diouf, Dakar Cheikh Anta Diop University, and Amady Aly Dieng, from BCEAO) and political science (Luc Sindjoun, University of Yaoundé 2, SOA, and Kayode Soremekun, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria).

For this year, however, the intellectual, pedagogical and methodological project is fundamentally different. It consists rather in writing up and presenting the first draft of an article by the end of the Institute that is to be published in a collective book. This article will be written on the basis of the general and specific objectives of the theme defined by CODESRIA, on the one hand, and on the basis of the pedagogical project and the theoretical and conceptual framework put forward by the Institute Director, on the other hand.

This major innovation brought to the 8th session of the institute was considered as very good by 57.14% of the people surveyed and was seen as good by 42.85%. Interestingly, 50% found the duration of the institute (six weeks) sufficient, while 28.57% found it very sufficient. In order to implement it effectively, each laureate should be informed, through the letter announcing them that they were selected, that they must bring with them all the material they will need for the writing of the first draft of a chapter for the collective book.

If this innovation were to become the new mode of functioning of the governance institute in the years to come, its implementation would then require some changes as far as the following elements of its organisation are concerned:

**a) Setting up of a steering committee**

The Executive Secretariat as well as the department in charge of the institutes will define the number of members, as well as the committee’s powers. However, it is crucial that the committee should be responsible for the definition of the theme, selection of the institute’s director, resource persons and laureates.

**b) Planning**
On the basis of the existence of a steering committee with attributions, the institute’s planning will need to be changed on various points:

* The theme of the following session should be defined and the information related disseminated at the beginning of the institute of the current year, at earliest (for example, in July 1999, for the 2000 session) or at the end of the current institute, at latest (for example, September 1999 for the 2000 session of the Governance Institute).

* The selection and nomination of the institute’s director should be made in January, the year of the current institute, at the latest (for example, in January 2000).

* Selection of resource persons: the institute’s director should be totally free to choose the resource persons he wants, i.e., to choose the colleagues that will help him implement his intellectual and pedagogical project. As far as it is possible (and according to the theme), it would be a good thing that the director of the previous session be automatically should be selected as a resource-person or be involved in a way or another in the following session.

* Selection of the laureates: the institute’s director should be closely associated to the selection of laureates. This selection should occur much earlier than it is currently the case, i.e. in January, at the earliest, or in March of the current year, at the latest.

c) New information policy

As mentioned above, additional channels scientific reviews, weekly reviews and daily newspapers, Internet etc.) should be devised, in order to disseminate the information around institutes more broadly and efficiently.

d) Format of the Institute

The fact of dedicating the six weeks of the institute to the writing of the various chapters of a book also requires an adapted organisation of seminars, in order to enable laureates to work efficiently and reach the main goal set. As far as the weekly organisation of seminars is concerned, it was decided to hold daily seminars, from Monday to Friday, from 9.00 am to 1.00 pm. Afternoons are thus dedicated to research and writing. The work is organised as follows:

* Presentation and discussion of the research proposals: After the presentations of the institute’s Director, the first week of seminars was dedicated to the presentation and edition of the research proposals by laureates. It is thus possible to control each week the state of progress of the writing of the various articles.

* Weekly assessment of the state of progress of laureates’ works: Each resource person makes their presentation over three days (Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday) and dedicates the last two days of the week to discussions over the laureates’ research proposals, to highlight the importance of the themes dealt with for the improvement of the articles being written.

* In the fifth week, two days (Thursday and Friday), and one day at the beginning of the sixth week (Monday), will be free, in order to allow laureates to conclude the writing of the first version of their article.

* Presentation of articles with discussants: The last four days of the sixth week, there will be a mini-conference during which, all laureates will discuss an article, as for an ordinary symposium, after each presentation followed by the comments of a discussant. This should contribute to the improving of the article presented.

Family, Sexuality and Reproduction in Africa

Synthesis of the Executive Summary, Gender Institute, 2001
(18 June–13 July 2001)

In Africa, Western researchers mainly have long controlled the research on women and gender relations. It is mainly from the 1980s onwards that a larger number of African women started exploring this issue. One of the shortcomings of the studies carried out by African women was that their theoretical production was fuelled by attempts decolonization of the social sciences (Mama 1990; Imam et al. 1997).

CODESRIA got involved in this process of “genderization” and decolonization of social sciences in Africa very early, by supporting the work of researchers and organizing training activities with relevant approaches and methods. The CODESRIA Gender Institute revisits issues involving gender studies and feminist studies. The issues of the 2001 session were family, sexuality and reproduction.

The choice of this theme (family) can be accounted for by the fact that in Africa, the so-called “classics” of social anthropology had placed focus on the research on family and kinship systems (A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, D. Fordes…). Even in works involving other anthropological fields (culture, religion, politics, arts etc.), family and kinship were often used as central referents for the constitution of the analysis framework of these fields (C. Meillassoux). However, it is quite obvious that classical anthropology had barely used the approaches that made the construction of masculinity and femininity more visible and that allowed to integrate the social relationship and roles associated with each sex.

In the 1970s/80s, family studies became a privileged research field of demographical studies, which particularly studied issues related to fertility. Demographers mostly put focus on the issues related to demographical growth and the factors influencing changes in fertility (G. Pison, J. Caldwell). Problematics raising questions about the size of families, changes in the matrimonial systems, repartition of resources within domestic systems, changes in the mortality, impacts of the urban factor on demographical transitions, were often studied in a particular way.

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With the crisis and the new economic dynamics that occurred in the 1970s, sociologists, economists, or agro economists carried out some researches on households, incomes and social transfers (P. Antoine). However, these studies failed to highlight the inequities and gender relationships that have nowadays been identified through these issues. There was also a lack of analysis of the dynamic articulations with the cultural and social contexts. The methodological orientation of these works, that was often more quantitative than qualitative probably contributed to these shortcomings.

As for the studies on sexuality in Africa, although they appeared with the pioneer work of anthropologists, they were further developed with the appearance of the AIDS pandemic and the issues raised by the problematic of reproductive health. With the appearance of HIV/AIDS, there has been a shift from the quantitative studies on the knowledge of the attitude and behaviour towards sexuality and the risk factors of the disease, to the qualitative research on the social standards, representations and interpretations, on the trajectories and situations of vulnerability to the disease. The anthropological analysis of the AIDS phenomenon has contributed to enlarging the scope of issues related to reproductive health, by integrating factors relative to the culture of social relationships and to the political and economic context (B. M. Ahlberg). The work on AIDS also investigated the connections, interferences and interactions between the following topics: family, sexuality and reproduction. The analysis of these changing domains leads to an analysis of culture, economics, politics and gender relations. The reflection on health has contributed to bringing semantic changes, from the start. According to Lima, 'The shift from the concepts of women, population and development to those of gender, and from the concepts of maternal and child health to those of reproductive health has highlighted one problematic: the role and status of men and women, with regard to the law, decision-making capacity and responsibility. This was raised in Cairo, in a perspective of equality and equity”.

By focusing on this problematic, the new concepts of gender and reproductive health make a double questioning of the real meaning and general understanding of the issues related to reproduction, on one hand; and on the other hand, they also question the socio-cultural system that defines, manages and reproduces practices and behaviours, as far as this domain is concerned.” (Haudem 1998).

It is crucial to analyse the social, political and cultural contexts within which gender issues are raised in Africa. It is against this background that the contribution of Mohamed Khaled at the 2001 session of the Institute, should be read. It was entitled: ‘A gender perspective for the rethinking of development in post-war conditions; case study in Yei county, West Equatoria, Southern Sudan’. It highlights the extreme vulnerability of women in the context of conflicts, as well as their marginalization in post-conflict situations and perspectives. Mr Khaled put forward a method of analysis that integrates the gender approach in the methodologies of analysis of the impact of conflicts and also in the framework of analysis of post-conflict development.

Throughout the session, Akosua Adomako Ampofo ('Beyond Cairo, Gender, Sexual Behaviour, and reproductive Health. A Situation Analysis and some Epistemological Concerns”) and Funmi Soetan (‘Mothers and More: Changing perspective on Gender and Reproductive Health in Sub-Saharan Africa”) presented the issues of reproduction, and reproductive and sexual health. Akosua A. Ampofo’s starting point is the alarming situation of HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa, which he uses in order to analyse the progresses, as well as the conceptual shortcomings of the approaches used to deal with reproductive health issues, thereby using the Cairo 1994 Conference, as a historical landmark. She highlights the limits of the biomedical approaches and those of the approaches focusing on women, rather than on gender relations. Besides, Akosua Ampofo focuses on the irrelevance of the conceptual frameworks, on which the mainstream models of analysis are based. Most of these frameworks of analysis are eurocentric and eclipses aspects of gender relations that are significant, from a social, cultural and spiritual point of view and influence on sexuality, reproduction, health and disease in Africa.

Funmi Soetan made an analysis of the concepts and theories of the written works, from the Greek Antiquity and Christian Middle-Age to the mercantilist theories and Malthusianism, through neoclassical and Marxist theories. She also makes a critical analysis of the theories of democratic transition (Warren Thompson) and those of New Home Economics (NHE) of Gary Becker. In conclusion, the author also highlights the paradigms and limits of the gender concept, as used by the United Nations agencies.

The research carried out by Khoudia Sow, on gender relations, and the AIDS experience highlights the so called “feminisation of AIDS”. According to this perspective, the differences in epidemiological tendencies between men and women are not accounted for by biological differences only (the virus concentration in the sperm is higher than in vaginal secretions, and the risk of transmission from an infected man to a non infected woman is higher than in the reverse case), but also by socio economic differences as well as an unequal level of access to information. Generally, women’s level of education is lower than that of men; but studies tend to show that there is a linkage between low level of education and the risks of HIV infection. Women are also the most severely hit by poverty, which is a factor of vulnerability associated with the pandemic. Beyond the difference in socio economic conditions, the increase of HIV prevalence among women shows the unbalance in men and women relation to power. In Senegal, the majority of women living with HIV were infected in wedlock and had no other partner than their husband.

Khoudia Sow’s text focuses on the social impact of HIV/AIDS, which affects men and women differently. The author also shows that women’s matrimonial status has consequences on the AIDS experience. Khoudia Sow shows how AIDS discloses the social dysfunctions linked to social rules.

The study carried out by Ifeanyi Onyeonoru is an exploratory research studying the factors associated to the migration to Italy of women and girls involved in sexual commercial work. The research was carried out in Benin City, Edo State in Nigeria, which was chosen because previous studies had given this place a particular status, as a cross border place and an important market for sexual commercial work. This work is mainly based on interviews with key informants.

Ifeanyi Onyeonoru starts by a subsequent review of the literature that analyses the various dynamics and contexts of emigration in Nigeria and West Africa. The analysis of field data leads Onyeonoru to identify the following factors as being associated with sexual international migration: poverty, unemployment,
relative isolation, distortion of social relations, disorganisation of families, inequities in men/women relationships, and Nigeria’s macro-economic situation.

Marie Solange presents a wide range of ethnographical data on meeting places, chatting up methods, codes, power relations, models of partners and reference. She also explores conceptions of marriage faithfulness and virginity among youngsters. She also analyses sexual practices and behaviours, sources of information, as far as sexuality is concerned, the place and role of parents in the sexual life of youngsters, the language, reference models, as well as power relations that help understanding the identities of young boys and girls, as regards sexuality.

Bassirou Fall’s study makes an analysis of the sexual behaviour of pupils from a secondary school in Dakar (Senegal). He shows that sexuality is very important in the life of teenagers. It is often seen as the satisfaction of a desire, a biological drive, and the eagerness to discover the behaviour of people from the other sex. The media, and particularly, the television, play a significant role in the building of a sexual “culture”; this is also the case for reviews, newspapers and magazines.

Chinwe R. Nwanna’s work deals with the relationship between women’s status and child mortality in the state of Anambra, south-eastern Nigeria. The method used combines an approach based on community investigation, with surveys carried out within the family and direct environment of the victims of maternal mortality. On the whole, 1,400 men and women were interviewed; results show a high prevalence of maternal mortality, namely during delivery and pregnancy, particularly. A few cases occurring in the period following delivery were reported. The variables that are most strongly associated with maternal mortality are those indicating poverty, the lack of care by hospital staff, malnutrition and lack of rest. Pregnancies occurring later in women’s life, or in an early age, numerous delivering, and long periods of labour were identified as risk factors of maternal mortality. The analysis of Chinwe R. Nwanna raises interesting questions about women’s power of decision, as regards the ways they cope with their pregnancy and delivering. Men and the power relationship between men and women influences a great deal on decision-making processes regarding access to care.

Issac Settuba’s text is an analysis of the gender relations within the family; it also analyses sexuality in the feminine literature of the 1990s, in Uganda. The author is inspired by the fact that in Uganda, women write most of the literary work published. Women have thus brought in freshness to the literature of that country. They offer a variety of field data that can be interpreted through various levels of analysis and lead to new theoretical structures around the gender problematic in Africa.

Conclusion

The papers presented on the occasion of the 2001 session deal with various aspects of gender relation, in the context of family, sexuality and reproduction in Africa. The contributions of facilitators help to redefine notions, approaches and perspectives of analysis that were raised by the contemporary debate on gender, sexuality and reproduction.

The studies carried out by the laureates of the Gender Institute offer a variety of field data that can be interpreted through various levels of analysis and lead to new theoretical structures around the gender problematic in Africa.

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It is not an exaggeration to say that the HIV/AIDS pandemic threatens the very future of Africans and the African continent. Available statistics are staggering: many more people die of HIV/AIDS in Africa than in the world’s wars. The population of adults and children with the HIV/AIDS number 28 million in sub-Saharan African compared with 7 million in Asia, 2 million in Latin America and the Caribbean. More depressing, the total number of HIV/AIDS infected people in Africa is quite out of proportion to the continent’s total population in global terms. Thus, although Africa accounts for only 11 per cent of total world population, 70 per cent of all HIV/AIDS infections in the world are in the continent. Even if we query the veracity of these mind-boggling statistics, the fact remains that HIV/AIDS is real and continues to have devastating impacts on communities, families and individuals in sundry ways.

Because it cuts deep into every sector of society in Africa, HIV/AIDS continues to undermine in very fundamental and even irreversible ways, the continent’s growth, overall development, and its future. In many cases, the pandemic is threatening to reverse many of the important gains of the last thirty years in critical sectors such as health, education, and agriculture especially in the most affected African countries. Of particular concern is the fact that the disease strikes mainly the most active and productive sectors of the African society, the youths, and tomorrow’s leaders. According to Lamptey et al, young adults are at the centre of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. They are particularly susceptible to HIV infection, and they carry the burden of living with HIV/AIDS. More than half of all new HIV infections occur among people under the age of 25. Young people are vulnerable to HIV because they are more likely to engage in high-risk behaviour. It is this phenomenon, among others, that makes the disease such an important political, economic and health issue not only in Africa but the rest of the world.

Nonetheless, it is doubtful if some African countries take the disease as seriously as they should. For economic, political, religious and even cultural reasons, many countries continue to play down the prevalence rates of the disease among their populations. And even in countries where there are HIV/AIDS programmes, they are at best,Sheriff’s posses, halfhearted and even tokenish. In such countries, also, commitment to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic is more in the rhetoric than in concrete policies designed either to effectively cater for the needs of those already infected or to prevent the spread of the disease among the rest of the population. Ironically, the same countries and their governments spend millions of scarce financial resources on white elephant programmes that are not relevant to the immediate needs of majority of their people. Thus, the perceptive observer is sometimes compelled to question the raison d’etre of some states in Africa. For if the individual and collective well being of the citizens is not uppermost in their scheme of things, what else should such states be doing?

In short, then, while the ‘festivities’ continue and commitment to curbing the HIV/AIDS epidemic is largely rhetorical, Africa’s HIV/AIDS statistics remain depressing. Of the estimated 3 million adults and children that died of AIDS in 2001, for instance, 2.3 million were in Sub-Saharan Africa. Besides, many of the continent’s children and youth face what can be described ‘double jeopardy’, for not only are they themselves infected with the deadly HIV/AIDS virus, they are also losing their parents and close family members to the disease. Often, aged grand parents and relatives in the extended family are not only traumatized by the premature deaths of their own children, they are also burdened with looking after many of the HIV/AIDS orphans. In some cases, the death of the grand parents renders these children double orphans. The plight of children and youth in Africa in an era of HIV/AIDS is also located in deep-rooted cultural practices across sub-Saharan Africa: early or forced marriages, obnoxious widowhood practices, older men’s preference for younger women, the taboo that still surrounds sex and sex education in close family circles, etc. Added to these is the phenomenon in the most HIV/AIDS affected countries: the craze for young men by women who have lost husbands to HIV/AIDS, thereby complicating the fight against the disease in those countries.

Against this somber background, CODESRIA’s Second Child and Youth Institute Session in 2003 with the theme: The African Child and Youth in an Era of HIV/AIDS could not have come at a more auspicious moment. Designed to expose young African scholars and researchers to the latest discourses and methodologies on HIV/AIDS research, the Institute brought together 12 laureates from seven countries across Africa, all of whom are working on diverse aspects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic focusing on the African child and youth. Four Resource Persons plus the Institute’s Director, presented a total of seventeen thought provoking papers covering topics such as: ‘The HIV/AIDS Pandemic: Global and Regional Overviews and Perspectives’, ‘Theoretical and Methodological Issues in Children and Youth with HIV/AIDS Research in Africa’, ‘The Impact of AIDS on Core Family Functions’, ‘Students’ Sexuality and HIV/AIDS’, ‘AIDS, Orphans and Vulnerable Children in Africa’, and ‘Public Policy on AIDS in Africa’.

The presentations by the Laureates were equally as fascinating as they were diverse: ‘HIV/AIDS Education in Kenya’, ‘AIDS in Daily Conversations Among Handa Women in Angola’, ‘Girl-Children at Risk: Sexual Abuse of the Girl Child and Implications for HIV/AIDS Transmission in Ibadan, Nigeria’, ‘Prison Conditions and HIV/AIDS among Youths in Kinshasha, DRC’, ‘Gender, Masculinity and the Fight Against HIV/AIDS Amongst Youth in Botswana’, and ‘Cultural and Demographic Effects of the HIV/AIDS Pandemic: Changing Lives of Grandparents and orphans in Zambia’, etc. It is to the credit of CODESRIA that it brought together such a strong multinational team of young and promising researchers and resources persons to critically and frankly examine the varied dimensions and impacts of this latest
and deadliest challenge to the continent’s survival and future. The sessions were lively and intense; demonstrating the commitment of the laureates and resource persons to finding urgent solutions to a disease that threatens to decimate the largest, most active and productive sectors of the African population.

It is hoped that the selection process that assembled such a formidable team of young scholars would be retained for subsequent Institutes to be organized by CODESRIA. CODESRIA should also be commended for having the foresight to choose a theme that is fundamental to the continent’s future for this year’s Child and Youth Institute. Undoubtedly, the four weeks of intense academic debate and exchanges among laureates on the one hand, and between resource persons and laureates on the other, have contributed immensely to knowledge production in Africa, one of CODESRIA’s enduring mission mandates.

For those African scholars who are often compelled to look outside to quench their thirst for academic excellence, it is gratifying to know that CODESRIA offers an excellent environment for serious intellectual discourse that is comparable to those in other parts of the world. All the ancillary facilities: simultaneous interpretations, documentation, Library, photocopying, transport, etc, were at the disposal of all participants at the Institute. It is hoped that these amenities would be consolidated in the years ahead to make CODESRIA a haven for the serious academic who refuses to leave the continent in search of the proverbial ‘greener pastures’. Of course, the excellent services would not have made such an instant impact on the participants without the warmth and understanding of the staff at CODESRIA. The friendly smile on the faces of everyone staff—the human face of CODESRIA— that was approached by the Laureates, Resource Persons and the Director made the four weeks look like just seven days.

It is hoped that the next Institute and theme would be announced very early in the New Year so that there would be enough time to screen all applications and proposals. That way, successful laureates, resource persons and the director, would know their fate in good time to enable them process the necessary clearance from their respective institutions before leaving for Dakar. Finally, I would like to thank CODESRIA most warmly for providing me with the opportunity of sharing in such a highly rewarding academic endeavor. Bravo! Keep it up!!

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