Editorial

Extending the Frontiers of Social Science Research

The year 2012 marks the beginning of a new Strategic Plan and a new Programmatic Cycle, both of which cover the same period, 2012-2016, for the first time in the history of CODESRIA. The new Strategic Plan is the result of a long consultative process involving successive Executive and Scientific Committees, members of CODESRIA and officials of some of CODESRIA's main funders that began in 2009. Key moments in that extensive consultative process were: a brain-storming workshop held in July 2009; a joint meeting of the Executive and Scientific Committee in July 2011; a Secretariat retreat in August 2011; CODESRIA's 13th General Assembly held in Rabat in December 2011; and a strategic planning workshop held in Dakar in June 2012.

The directions in which CODESRIA ought to be moving in the coming years, the changes and consolidation required in terms of priorities for research, programme development, and programme management, were discussed in all these key moments. The report of the external evaluation carried out during the first quarter of 2012 also contained important recom-mendations that were taken into account in the drafting of the Strategic Plan. Some of the original think pieces from these various meetings are published in this issue of the Bulletin under the general heading "New Directions and Priorities for Research in Africa: Some Think Pieces". Part of what makes the strength of CODESRIA is, we would argue, the active engagement of the community of scholars in reflections on the priorities for research in Africa, and for CODESRIA itself, and in the determining the best ways to respond to current challenges and anticipate new ones. The think pieces published in this issue are a good illustration of the not only the range of views expressed, but also the depth of the reflections and the commitment.

The 2007-2011 Strategic Plan was under the umbrella theme of *Re-thinking Development and Reviving Development Thinking in Africa.* As the presentation of the new Strategic Plan of CODESRIA in this issue of the Bulletin shows, "development is still a key concept in the thinking on social transformation that translates into greater freedom and enhanced well-being of the peoples of Africa. The understanding of development that has now become widely shared among members of the CODESRIA, and African research community is the result of a combination of post-structuralist, ecological, gender and southern critiques of the dominant modernization and development paradigms, and years of re-thinking development both as a concept and as a socio-historical process. As Amin has argued, development, for us, is not so much about "catching up", but "an invention of another kind (…), a process of inventing a new civilization" (Amin). The new civilization being referred to must be founded on core universal values, and it has to be humane, democratic, "ecological", and based on the respect of human and peoples' rights, justice and equity, particularly gender justice and equity. The research agenda will therefore include the exploration of the various ways in which the development policies take on board the new thinking on development and the alternative pathways through which African countries are trying to bring about development under the current global conditions. The range of issues to be explored during the new Plan period is therefore very diverse.

The debates section of this issue of the Bulletin start with 'Marikana and the politics of Law and Order after Apartheid' by Suren Pillay. He examines the recent events in South Africa that are reflective of the remaining work that must be done on the way to total liberation of South Africa. He makes the point, that "... as many of us are trying to make sense of the massacre at Marikana through the obvious dire economic conditions, wage rates, and inequality that these workers face. We should also try to make sense of it through the lineages of law, order and the new configurations of politics emerging in post-apartheid South Africa." He observes that the "dominant response to violence in South Africa, whether in its political or criminal forms, reveals a post-apartheid state relying more on other means to govern, than the anti-colonial and democratic idealism of its founding political and moral vision." He calls on us to reflect on the politics of law and order in their raw form after apartheid.

There are three articles reflecting on the crisis in the financial system, marked by the September-October 2008 collapses. Samir Amin, in his article 'Renewing Development Paradigms for 21st Century' says that it is "... indicative of the scope of forthcoming transformations." He goes on to say that "... this crisis implies a systemic re-assessment, especially regarding the reproductive patterns of accumulation and growth, modes of access to the natural resources of the planet and the management of their use." He notes that though the signs that this crisis was imminent were ignored because of a "... nearly fundamentalist double dogmatic of the 'market' conceived as the sole regulator of 'rational' economic life, and of 'multiparty electoral democracy' – conceived as an exclusive means to manage political life – contributed to the concealment of the importance of malfunctions, evading the challenge of 'thorny issues' through programme phrases such as 'good governance', 'fight against poverty'."

This is followed by two other articles on the same crisis, the first by Joseph E. Stiglitz entitled 'Market Failures in the Financial System: Implications for Financial Sector Policies, especially in Developing Countries' and the other by Mahmood Mamdani's response framed as 'Not how the State can Regulate the Market, but how Society can Regulate both the State and the Market'. Mamdani questions Professor Stiglitz's definition

of the problem, as one of 'market failure'. His view is that "... the process requires a more a comprehensive definition of the crisis, from the point of view of society and not just the state and market binary."

In the article 'The Outstanding Issues between the two Sudans: A Way to Peace or Conflict' Prof. al-Tayib Zain al-Abdin examines the problem between Sudan and South Sudan. He observes that "... it is not unique in Africa but it is more complicated because of internal and external factors, and a long history of confrontation." He notes that the civil war between the North and South in the Sudan started in August 1955 before the independence of the country. "The reasons behind the war are complex and intermingled between external and internal factors. He argues that the British laid the foundation for the crisis by separating the two regions for three decades; secondly he observes that "... the missionary propaganda inflamed the feelings of southerners against the Muslim Arabs in the North." These were coupled with the long military rule in Khartoum that chose war as the solution to the southern problem rather than opting for a political solution that would give the South an acceptable federal system.

In her piece 'Economic Change in Africa and Prospects for Business: An African Perspective', Dzodzi Tsikata examines Africa's economic performance. She observes that although Africa's economic growth has been consistent at an average rate of above 5 per cent since 2002, these high growth rates have been fuelled in many cases by only a few sectors, natural resources, infrastructure, energy and services. She calls for cautious optimism as the sources of growth need diversification to be sustainable.

In 'The Discourse of 'Africa's Turn'?' Moses Khisa takes a look at this growing discourse on 'Africa's turn' "... the turn to turn the corner, to exorcise the twin evils of social deprivation and economic backwardness. In a word: the turn to muster socioeconomic transformation. The discourse trumpeting 'Africa's turn' is unmistakably palpable. It echoes debates during the so-called 'decade of hope' – the 1990s – predicated on structural adjustment programmes." He notes that the rhetoric from the Western capitals appears to have changed, "... a change occasioned by China's conspicuous presence on the continent: 'We want a relationship of partnership, not patronage', declared US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, speaking in the Tanzanian commercial capital, Dar es Salaam." He concludes that "... the turn might be here, but the transformation is by no means foregone. Africa has been there before and has stumbled. For the pessimist, stumbling again is not far-fetched."

'Archives of Post-independent Africa and its Diaspora Conference' by Brenton Maart is a report on a conference that brought together theorists and practitioners to examine archives of seemingly different forms, times and places, which collectively describe a dynamic terrain, which according to him is in continual flux. He observes that a conference on archives requires presentations from a divergent range of hitherto traditionally unrelated disciplines. It was an occasion to discuss "... contemporary methodology that is part science and part humanities, part factual and part interpretative, part irrefutable and part conjecture, part documentary and part fiction, part rhetorical and part substantive, part public and part civic, part summative and part formative, part contemplative and part performative, part ethereal and part tangible, part analogue and part digital. This was a potentially incoherent and discordant amalgam of instruments, which, through careful curation, was conducted into a high-drama opera by the clear and simple power of that motif called imagination."

James Murombedzi, in 'Where Do We Go from Rio? The Implications of the Third World Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+ 20) for Sustainability and Environmental Governance in Africa' notes that because of the failure to address the structural causes of unsustainability, 20 years after Rio the environmental crisis is more acute, and each and every one of the problems described in the Brundtland report is now far more severe. "As a result, the commoditization and privatization of the environment have accelerated. This is evident from increased 'green grabs', land grabs, new forms of land and resource expropriation through carbon sequestration, water privatization, and the creation of new protected areas on lands expropriated from the poor and marginalized, and the suppression of indigenous forms of production and consumption. According to him this amounts to the privatization of nature – under an ideology that the market is the best mechanism for managing the world's natural heritage." He notes that this is equivalent to expropriating the basis of life and livelihood for most of the world's people in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The debates in this issue conclude with Prakash Kashwan's article 'Democracy in the Woods: The Politics of Institutional Change in India's Forest Areas' which is about the same issues as RIO+20. He observes that "... natural resources are among the prime sites where struggles to define the contents and meanings of democracy and citizenship are waged in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Claims and counterclaims over land, water and forests, rooted in competing interests in and ideas about resource governance, are mediated by a variety of institutions." The article offers a comprehensive approach to understanding and analyzing institutional change in the context of the management of natural resources such as land, water and forests.

Ebrima Sall
Executve Secretary

Alex Bangirana
Head, Publications

New Directions and Priorities for Research in Africa: Some Think Pieces

Extending the Frontiers of Social Science Research and Bringing Social Research to Public Issues

Background

CODESRIA's main mandate is to promote social science research in Africa. The Council does this through a broad range of programmes aimed at supporting research, strengthening the capacities of African researchers and research institutions, publishing and disseminating the results of research, advocating for a socio-political and economic environment that is more conducive to social science research, and defending academic freedom. Being a membership organi-zation, in order to fulfill its mandate, CODESRIA has had to be responsive and accountable to its constituencies. It has also had to be proactive in its attempts to serve the African social science research community, and the larger African 'development community' that the research community is both part of and accountable to. In the 39 years of its history, CODESRIA has played a leading role in setting the agenda for research on the African continent, through a participatory process, and the Council successfully developed programmes and instruments that enabled it to intervene on priority issues for the continent in ways that complement and move forward the work of African universities, research institutes and centers, research NGOs and other knowledge producing institutions on the continent.

Changing Context

The problems that those who met in 1973 to set up CODESRIA tried to address through research were those of the absence of freedom for Africa, the poverty, dependence and low level of development of the continent and, as a consequence of these problems, the marginalization of Africa and Africans (including the scholarly community), in global affairs, all of which were largely due to the centuries of domination and plunder that Africa had been subjected to through colonialism, trade (including trade in humans), and

Ebrima Sall
CODESRIA
Dakar, Senegal

other mechanisms through which natural, human and intellectual resources of the continent were taken away, forcefully or otherwise, thus leaving the continent's people poorer, poorly governed, and deprived of independence and freedom. Policy making for development, regional integration and greater freedom and international presence was not only difficult, but also not really informed by African research. Many of the leading higher education institutions such as Dakar University and Makerere University had hardly ceased to become extensions of French and British universities, and the curricula and research were dominated by Western paradigms, concepts and theories. African scholarly voices were hardly audible at the global level. The geopolitical fragmentation of Africa, together with the multiplicity of boundaries of a geopolitical, linguistic and disciplinary nature, made it impossible for there to be a an integrated, self-aware, pan African scholarly community that could effectively produce knowledge and interpret social realities in Africa and in the world around us from African perspectives, and inform public decision making (including at the regional level) with the research it is doing.

The context in which CODESRIA will be celebrating its 40th anniversary (in 2013) is characterized by a number of contrasting phenomena and contradictory trends indicating both the persistence of huge challenges and the emergence of new ones, on the one hand and, on the other hand, many positive developments and the availability of many opportunities.

Internationalization in higher education (HE), and the infusion of a market logic in the sector, the commoditization of higher education services, and the marketization of the social sciences themselves have reached unprecedented levels (Zeleza); the gulf between world class universities and the vast majority of the universities in Africa – whose numbers are growing very rapidly with the creation of hundreds of new public and private universities — is huge. As the leading universities such as Harvard and Oxford are trying to find ways of consolidating their positions at the top of the global HE pyramid in the face of China's attempts to 'buy' the best professors and researchers for its universities, the risk that many African universities will become mere consumers of course modules and course materials developed elsewhere is very real (Mustapha). This poses enormous challenges for social science research in Africa, and for CODESRIA in particular; one possible consequence is a widening of the "knowledge divides" highlighted in the World Social Science Report 2010.

The African community of scholars has grown, with a much broader and more diversified institutional base that includes many more public and private universities and other research institutions, but also more think-tanks and research networks; and many more researchers and public intellectuals. Beyond the numbers, the African social research community is also more self-aware, more self-confident, and less "defensive" in its relationship with the rest of the global scholarly community (Mkandawire; Macamo); It has succeeded in "bringing the production of knowledge about Africa back into the continent" (Boulaga) and, in so doing, "the division of labor once criticized by Paulin Hountondji that pitched empirical material collected in Africa against theorizing

carried out in Europe has been made to loosen its grip on African studies. Many African scholars established themselves in the eighties as competent theoreticians and are widely quoted in relevant fields" (Macamo). However, the dominant epistemological order still favors Western scholars and the study of Africa (including by African scholars them-selves) is still dominated by theories and paradigms developed in Europe and North America (Mudimbe; Zeleza). Furthermore, as some of the "competent theoreticians" from Africa are nearing retirement, the emergence of new "compe-tent theoreticians" has been more difficult, partly because many African universities are struggling to maintain high standards despite the massification, loss of good academic staff to the rising numbers of private universities, brain drain, the consultancy syndrome, and lack of resources for academic research.

Africa is a politically fragmented continent in which the institutions of many of the states are, in some strands of the literature, classified as "fragile"[1]. The splitting of Mali into two during the first quarter of 2012 and occupation of more than half of its territory by forces whose commitment to democracy or to the territorial integrity of the country is questionable, the conflicts in Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire and in other countries are all indications of political fragmentation, itself often being a consequence of the denial of the rights and freedoms and insecurity of citizens.

What Mkandawire calls the "unholy trinity of poverty, ignorance and disease" (Mkandawire) that all African nationalists have been seeking to eliminate is still a major challenge. Decades of structural adjustment and neoliberal globalization have significantly reduced the developmental role of African institutions, particularly the African state, and liberalized trade in ways that make the prospects for industrial development seem dimmer. The extreme vulnerability to global and local hazards that Africa is facing; and the asymmetries in power, wealth and influence make the challenge, for African countries, of having to develop under less than optimal global conditions no less formidable today than it was nearly 40 years ago.

We live in what Amin calls a "polycentric" or "multi-polar" world (emergence of the BRICS, etc. see Amin), a world that is very different from the world of the Cold War years. Some of the emerging powers are actively engaged in what has been called a "new scramble" for Africa and African land, mineral, and intellectual resources; at the same time, the engagement of China, and the BRICS with Africa has also created policy space and led to the significant developments in infrastructure that have been going on over the last ten to twelve years.

Climate change is a major global challenge. However, responses to the challenge have also entailed the commoditization of part of the commons, such as forests, and the transfer of costs to the South, paying little attention to issues of sustainability and the involvement of local communities in the South in the programmes that are supposed to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change and facilitate adaptation.

However, since the beginning of the New Millennium, some African economies have also been among the fastest growing economies in the world (UNCTAD Economic Development in Africa report 2012; UNECA-AU 2012; IIAG Report 2010). The challenge, of course, is for growth to translate into genuine, sus-tainable development and the increased well-being of all the peoples of the continent. There has been significant progress made in terms of infrastructure development and provision of education and health services. Life expectancy has been increasing. There are many positive new developments in and around the African Union (AU), and the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), indicating awareness of the need for, and renewed interest in moving towards greater regional integration. There has been great progress towards the institution or consolidation of democratic governance (the Arab Spring; Ghana; Senegal; South Africa; Botswana…) and, in a few cases even, democratic developmental governance (as in Cape Verde ; and Mauritius). Growing citizen awareness and engagement, particularly of the youth, as could be seen in movements ranging from the Arab Spring, to the *Y'en a Marre!* [We are Fed Up!] Movement led by young rap musicians and journalists that played a major role in the struggles for peaceful and democratic change in Senegal in 2011 and 2012. The ICTS revolution and the creative use of new technologies and social media in trade, industrial and agricultural development, research, teaching, etc. and in social and political action have also created new opportunities for research in and on Africa.

The context in which CODESRIA operates in the second decade of the 21st Century is therefore quite different from that of the early 1970s when the Council was set up. However, the challenges of deep and massive poverty, extreme vulnerability to global and local hazards that Africa is facing (i.e. those of having to develop under less than optimal global conditions) and the fragmentation of research may have taken new forms, but they are no less formidable today than they were 39 years ago. Put differently, the existence of CODESRIA is as justified today as it was when the Council was just being established. If anything, new challenges have emerged that make the need for a robust pan-African research Council and a networked research community that transcends disciplinary, linguistic, gender, generational, regional and other barriers to knowledge production, as important for the African social science research community today, as it ever was.

Over the years, CODESRIA has also grown and gone through deep trans-formation which, in effect, is a demonstration of its capacity to adapt and renew itself, and renew its programmes and operational mechanisms. The CODESRIA journey has, of course, not been smooth all the way. The Council has also had, on a few occasions, to live through difficult times. The turn of the Millennium was one such period, which was followed by a period of recovery, consolidation and renewal. The last five years have been years of further consolidation and renewal for CODESRIA. It was also during these years that the world was shaken by a financial crisis whose repercussions were felt by all African countries, and by the research community itself. The crisis therefore became a major issue for both research and policy that CODESRIA has tried to address in various ways.

Interpreting the CODESRIA Mandate: Stages in CODESRIA's Development

CODESRIA was first a council of directors of social science research centers and institutes in Africa. Membership was later extended to deans of social science and humanities faculties of African universities. Until 1992, when the 7th General Assembly amended the Charter to allow

individual membership, CODESRIA membership was exclusively institutional. This broadening of the constituency and the membership of CODESRIA was a reflection of the growth and diversity of the social science research community, and the multiplicity of sites of knowledge production as well as the mobility of the researchers.

The 7th General Assembly also changed the name of the Council from 'Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa', to 'Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa', in acknowledgement of the importance of covering all the social and human sciences if there has to be a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of social realities and development.

Basic research has been, and still is the main type of research that CODESRIA is engaged in. However, policy oriented research gradually became more important in CODESRIA programming. Over the years, research themes and the range of potential users and audiences of research have also become much more diversified, and the near exclusive focus on issues related to the state, both as a research object and as a potential user of research gradually shifted as the demand for research-based explanations of the challenges and complexities associated with globalization, governance and development – emanating from social movements and civil society actors – became more pressing. The range of issues covered by the 2007-2011 Strategic Plan is a good illustration of the different ways in which CODESRIA has been trying to respond to the complex demands coming from its various constituencies.

From within the research community itself, successive generations of scholars have been joining CODESRIA programmes in growing numbers, both as part of an almost normal career development process, and as a result of the crisis of higher education. One impact of the crisis of higher education in Africa has been the weakening and impoverishment of research and of outputs from research carried out in many universities. CODESRIA's research training programmes have therefore been among the Council's fastest growing programmes, partly in response to the growing demand for training and mentoring from the third and fourth generations of scholars.

Addressing the policy challenges of the African continent directly has always been seen as important. However, it is in the New Millennium that the effort to engage the policy communities became more important, and more systematic. This came at a time when the social sciences were increasingly challenged to demonstrate their 'relevance' (that was mainly defined in market terms), and when major shifts were also going on in the donor community.

Re-thinking Development, and "Running Where Others Walked"

The main objective of the Strategic Plan for 2007-2011 was to move CODESRIA forward, towards realizing its vision of becoming one of the first rate social science research institutions in the world. The research part of the Plan was under the umbrella theme of *Re-thinking Development and Reviving Development Thinking in Africa.* Research training and capacity enhancement were geared towards enabling various sections of the CODESRIA community (particularly the younger generation of scholars) to participate in the re-thinking of develop-ment and revival of development thinking, particularly through greater mastery of social science concepts, theories and paradigms, and of social science research methodologies, scholarly writing skills, etc. and encouragement to engage in critical thinking.

During the Plan period, a broad range of new and 'old' research themes were explored, dominant theories and paradigms challenged, and serious attempts made to begin to systematize and highlight Africa's contribution to the development of the social sciences and humanities in Africa. Part of this was done in partnership with other institutions of the Global South or of the North.

For a time, the identification of priorities for research and institutional development was carried out by the General Assembly; and the Secretariat, under the guidance of the Executive Committee, developed programmes for the Council based on the priorities identified by the General Assembly. The process was later improved with the preparation of proper strategic planning documents.

Earlier this year, CODESRIA also went through an evaluation process. Although the main focus of the evaluation was the 2007-2011 period, the evaluation dealt with a number of strategic issues that CODESRIA has been trying to address over the years. The report of the 2012 evaluation also under-scored the importance for CODESRIA to think about the outcomes/impact that CODESRIA research has had, not only on teaching and on scholarly debates but also on policy processes, on social movements. It therefore examined the relationships that CODESRIA has developed with the African Union, the UNECA, African RECs, and the social movements as a first step towards ensuring that the research and publications do have an impact. All this is in the spirit of 'Results Based Management' that is now increasingly being taken for good practice in organization management, including the management of scholarly institutions.

Preparations for a new strategic plan began way back in 2009, with a brain-storming workshop on 'New Directions and Priorities for Research', held in the context of the transition that had just occurred at the level of the Secretariat. In July 2011, the Executive and Scientific Committees held a one-day joint workshop on the priorities for the 2012-2016 strategic plan period. This was followed by a two-day Secretariat retreat in August 2011 in order to further reflect on the medium- and long-term research and institutional development priorities of the Council.

The theme of the 13th General Assembly of CODESRIA (held in Rabat, Morocco, in December 2012) was: 'Africa and the Challenges of the 21st Century', with particular focus on constraints and opportunities. Most of what would be the strategic issues for research over the coming years were discussed. (See CODESRIA Bulletin, 1&2, 2012).

Development remains a key concept in the thinking on social transformation that translates into greater freedom and enhanced well-being of the peoples of Africa. The understanding of develop-ment that has now become widely shared among members of the CODESRIA, and African research community is the result of a combination of post-structuralist, ecological, gender and southern critiques of the dominant modernization and development paradigms, and years of re-thinking development both as a concept and as a socio-historical process. As Amin has argued, development, for us, is not so much about "catching up", but "an

invention of another kind (…), a process of inventing a new civilization" (Amin), a civilization that is founded on core universal values, and is necessarily human and humane, democratic, "ecological" , and based on rights, justice and equity, particularly gender justice and equity. Put differently, development is "a response to the many challenges the continent has faced over the years and still faces today" (Mkandawire).

However, there has also been, and there still is today a widely shared conviction among African nationalists, scholars, policymakers and activists, from the early days of independence to now, that in the search for responses to the many challenges facing Africa, *time* is of essence; i.e. that the responses have to be found *urgently*. In a speech he gave in the early sixties, Mwalimu Nyerere said that Tanzanians and other Africans "have to hurry up". Nyerere is also quoted saying that Africa will have to "run while others walk" (cited in Mkandawire). This contrasts with the notions that "there are no shortcuts to progress" (Hyden), and "no short-cuts to democracy" (Copans). The Burkinabe historian Joseph Ki-Zerbo also reminded us more than two decades ago that there is no "read-made development" (*développement clefs-en-main*) that could be bought or easily transferred from one part of the world to another, and that the key to development is in the people, their cultures, values and worldviews (*développement clefs-en*-tête; Ki-Zerbo).

The great interest in what is going on in China, India and Brazil that exists today among many African scholars, policy makers and development practitioners is partly due to the fact that China and other countries such as India and South Korea (and, to a lesser extent, Brazil and Turkey) seem to have found the answers to some of the problems of mass poverty and development that Africa is facing and,

in the process, demonstrated that it is indeed possible to accelerate the development process. Therefore it is important for African research examine ongoing attempts as well as alternative pathways towards social transformation and development, and the successes and failures, not only at the level of individual African countries, but also at the level of the Regional Economic Communities, and at the continental level. One of the major challenges, it could be argued, is certainly that of understanding how Africa could move out of the margins or periphery onto the centre stage in matters of global trade, knowledge production, development and global governance without compromising the rights and core universal principles and democratic values that we share. The question of how to overcome the obstacles and take advantage of the opportunities for democratic governance and sustainable development that exist under the current global system has for a long time been a major subject of research; so is the understanding of the challenges and opportunities for sustainable democratic development associated with global environmental change;

Under the framework of the new strategic plan, research will seek to uncover and understand the strategies for developing Africa in sustainable, ecologically and gender balanced ways through which citizens become empowered, and states become capable and effective, but also accountable to their citizens (Olukoshi, Ouedraogo & Sall).

The following have thus been identified in the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan as themes and issues on which CODESRIA research should focus:

* Higher Education, the ICTS and Internationalization: The changing landscape of higher education and research; neo-liberalism, its evolution and African responses to it;

* Climate Change, Resources and Development: The new scramble; agrarian transformation and agricultural development; value addition and industrial development;

* Politics and Governance: Human Rights; Citizenship; Social movements and New Forms of Civic Engagement; Peace, Security and Rule of Law;

* Gender, Youth, Culture and Transformative Social Policy;

* Regional and Continental Integration, Mobility and the African Diaspora

* Contemporary Forms of African Engagements with the Rest of the World: African encounters with globalization; the study of other regions of the world; South-South Relations; the emerging powers; and the comparative study of historical experiences of development and governance;

* Thinking About the Future: prospective studies; planning, and ways of dealing with uncertainty in Africa.

These themes and sets of issues form the core of the research agenda for CODESRIA under the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan. They are the main themes around which the main research programmes will be developed. Ongoing research programmes on higher education leadership, gender, children and youth, environ-mental politics and governance, etc. will be revamped and new ones developed. Many of the research vehicles (such as the national and multinational working groups and comparative research networks) will be improved and maintained, but there will also be new kinds of research activities.

Note

1. The notion of state fragility is highly contested; The European Report on Development 2010, for instance, classifies 27 out of the 53 African states as "fragile".

Historical Research with Historical Depth: Africa, Human Rights and Citizenship

Mahmood Mamdani
Makerere University
Uganda

The social sciences and the humanities in the contemporary African university are marked by a sharp dichotomy between research and writing. Very little writing is research based. The norm for university-based scholars is to recycle old research in response to new consultancy demands. Our first need is therefore to promote fresh research in response to intractable problems.

Secondly, history departments in African universities are in a deepening crisis. As a rule, consultancy writing is strongly driven by immediate problems and has little time or inclination for historically informed research. Because history has been cut off from contemporary research, history departments now tend to focus more and more on teaching, and less and less on research. At the same time, social sciences tend to look at social problems outside of their historical context, instead of looking for turn-key solutions.

Most research on African history is located in universities outside Africa, mainly in the West. Its focus is increasingly either Diasporic (therefore outside Africa) or trans-regional, where Africa tends to function as an adjunct to Europe. To the extent there is Africa-focused research, its focus is mainly contemporary, that is, on the colonial and the post-colonial.

The irony is that historical research on Africa tends to lack historical depth. Historians tend to work mainly on the margins of the European archive. They carry on with the assumption that African history cannot have a written archive of its own because it is more or less oral. This prejudice is so widespread that even progressive writings on Africa begin with a short comment on the pre-colonial, and then go on to focus on the colonial and the post-colonial. We can thus say that an entire range of scholarship on Africa, from the right to the left, has embraced the notorious thesis advanced by Professor Trevor-Roper, the Reagus Professor of History at Oxford in the post-World War II period, that 'African history really began when the white man first set foot on the continent'.

There are important exceptions to this observation, which is why there is hope. One such exception is Ousmane Kane's CODESRIA Green Book on 'Non-Europhone Intellectuals'. But, given the overall context whereby most research is so present-oriented that it tends to function as a kind of hand-maiden to a fire brigade approach, I suggest that our second need is to find a way out of our contemporary historical amnesia through a more historically informed endeavour.

Thirdly, I want to illustrate the importance of this shift by one example, that in the domain of politics and law, with specific reference to the associated questions of 'human rights' and 'citizenship'. The research agenda on human rights is mainly driven by international research NGOs like Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group. They share a common methodology and a common understanding of how to move forward. The methodological focus is to document atrocities, and to name and shame perpetrators. Their political demand is for a judicial process that will deliver punishment on behalf of victims.

The 'naming and shaming' model of criminal justice is based on the experience at Nuremburg, which has been turned into a paradigm, a model for criminal justice. It has been the dominant model driving human rights practice in most ongoing African political conflicts. The Nuremburg paradigm is based on two assumptions: first, that victory will create the necessary political basis for criminal trials; and second, that there will be negligible political costs, given the assumption that that yesterday's victims and victors will not have to live together; there will be an 'Israel' for victims.

Neither assumption obtains in contemporary Africa. Indeed, the African experience with conflict resolution points to another model with a different set of assumptions: that the opponent should not be criminalized but be treated as a political adversary. This may be said to be one of the key lessons of the transition from apartheid in South Africa (Kempton Park), Mozambique, and South Sudan. Our third need is to theorize the African experience, especially where it seems to contradict conventional wisdom.

Given this theoretical and historical context, key issues for research should include human rigths and citizenship. The thrust of the research should be less on documenting atrocities, and more on a historical understanding of key issues driving the cycle of violence in these conflicts. The overarching ambition should be to develop a theoretical critique and a political alternative to the 'naming and shaming' technology of human rights groups, because it ignores both context and issues.

African History / History in Africa:
Academic, Vernacular Histories and Area Studies

Mamadou Diouf
Columbia University
USA

The past of Africa has always haunted the future of the continent. Nowhere else has the past(s) of the future(s) so dramatically debated for many reasons. Africa is situated by particular traditions and histories in the understanding of history as a discipline and as a linear narrative of progress, development and modernization. Considered as a site within Enlightenment thought, Africa was excluded from, deformed or constantly invented in the records on which historical evidence is constructed and argued for.[1]

The end of history proposes a unique possible future of rationality and productivity with the triumph of the free market economy, in the era of globalization. In Africa, the landscapes of disease, poverty, violence and unfulfilled desire of consumption are blended with an unprecedented cultural and aesthetic creativity (music, fashion and painting), religious revivals and entrepreneurial experimentations imprinting African heritages and alternatives modernities on the world stage. They have been reconfiguring the imagining of the past and of the future, affecting both the traditions of sociabilities and the politics of memory, belongings, inheritance and generations.

The pre-colonial, colonial and nationalist-postcolonial moments are important inflexion points. They are used to rearticulate the meaning of past verities and recycle the resources of the past to reference the present and envision the future. From Conrad's Africa, history-less and devoid of a future, to the recognition of an African history before the Europeans and the agency of Africans in making their histories, narrating and reorienting them for specific purposes, the African 'historical inventory' has gone through many phases. The challenges, possibilities and limitations of colonial postcolonial situations were contested and negotiated. In the 1950s, Nkrumah announced the advent of a new era of "Black Power" and the inventions of new histories. A decade later, Ayikwei Armah announces the closure of the nationalist future in his novel *The Beautyful Ones are Not Yet Born.*[2]

In the global new world order, the meaning of history – the past, present and future – as well as notions of bounded spaces of identifications and interventions are under scrutiny. The conditions of production of history and of the past in academic and public spaces have undergone various transformations. The extent to which the pre-colonial and the colonial have largely shaped (or not) the present and the future of Africa is still debated, as well as the impact of the present and the imagining of the future on the reconstructions of the past. Among the issues, the nature of the various discursive economies of selecting and configuring the past(s) of the future(s) are prominent:

- Who is responsible for leading the project and for whom?

- Who is active for its production and dissemination?

- On which space will it be projected?

- What are the idioms of expression and representations?

- What sort of model(s) of the past are available?

- Which identities are formed in this process?

- Who must ask such questions, to whom must they be addressed and who must respond?

- How is the situation affecting the way intellectuals, scholars, artists, activists, politicians, religious leaders, donors… are reframing their intellectual and political projects?

Finally the investigation demands that we ask how the 'modern' (for a better word) and/or the contemporary is being (re)articulated in a time of African Renaissance (what period?), a time of crisis, expectations and hopes flourishing in pluralistic identities and manifestations.

I would like to begin this contribution with a detour, exploring the 'situatedness' of the knowledge we produce (through research) and disseminate (through teaching and publications), and the challenges we face precisely because of our location – outside the West. I focus on the production of history and the economies of knowledge, seduction and moral, social and cultural prescriptions (the traditions) associated with it in Africa. We must ask how locations and circumstances shape the ways in which narratives are constructed, discursive strategies are devised and languages are (re)fashioned to seduce a group or a community and produce a vernacular history. Vernacular history has been infiltrating African literature, musical and theatrical performances. It is unstable, open to negotiation and revision and, at the same time, it engages daily in reframing 'the literary imagination'[3] and identification emblems of a community. How do we write African history, outside or in dialogue (while preserving its autonomy) with 'World-History' or at the 'limit of World-History'[4] has been a critical aspect of historical inquiry outside the West. In the early nationalist phase, African history's main concern was to 'decolonize African history'. The focus was largely on oral traditions, and the knowledge economies of oral cultures conceived as alternative or complementary sources and resources for history writing.[5] How are the oral tradition approaches that were preoccupied by gathering and narrating a history relevant to nation or African unity building in the 1960s and 70s, engaging with the larger debates about oral history?[6] In addition, the new context (from the end of the 1990s onwards) is characterized by the discovery of written representation of histories and identities

by African actors (from the early phase of Islamization well into the colonial period) as well as the exploration of local histories (crafted along Islamic and Christian narrative formats) which have indeed open new territories for African historiographies, literature and cultural studies.[7] African literature, like history, has been continually preoccupied with exploring modes of representing history and trauma, in particular under colonial rule.[8]

How are African historians locating themselves in a discussion that considers historiography as an act of expropriation[9] by conquest and colonization? How do we 'recover their past' we were expropriated though historiographical operations that the terms of history and the mode of composition, recording and politics of history writing,[10] under the rubric of Reason[11] or in reference and accordance to the 'colonial library'[12] or the 'Racial contract'[13] and their modes of 'colonialist knowledge which ties historical narratives strictly to the state'.[14] Guha (2002) establishes a clear distinction between two paradigms: the West narratives which are issued from the narrator's initiative and those of the South which are from the listener's perspective, to define historicality considered as a narrative territory which, located outside the bounds of historiography, geography and authority of World-History, and which favors the proliferation of multiple narratives, in particular those outside the public affairs domain.

Issues

The first question I would like to raise is the intellectual, scientific, institutional and ideological consequences of the institutional framework and conditions under which we generate knowledge defined primarily as geographically situated (areas and cultures). It is not mainstream knowledge. It requires validation/recognition (intellectual and institutional), outside its territory and specific objects, languages, methods, etc., by disciplines that are today searching for quantifiable, measurable and generalizable evidence.

The second question that I will engage concerns the idea that 'history makes geography and not the other way around'. Such a statement needs to be complicated by addressing the following issues: (a) Histories and geographies are plural. Geographies are 'invented' and constan-

tly revised by intellectual, political and religious social practices and imaginations.[15] Which geographies inform (should inform) our scholarship? Histories are also constrained and reconfigured by actual/physical or invented geographies. Geography (and geographers) provided the model (along with and in concert with sociology) for the more important historiographical revolution, the Ecole des Annales (*Annales d'histoire économique et sociale*) and its Histoire totale agenda based on an 'appetite for interpretation, initiatives, experiences and confrontations'[16] and the exploration of almost tangible realities: a region, 'human groups', a landscape.

Two questions should be addressed in this context: Is it possible (productive) to explore the local within a discipline or is breaking away from the colonial library (Western universalism), the necessary condition for producing locally informed social sciences (humanities) studying particular places? Is geography central to our professional identity and how is such a concern reflected in CODESRIA? Is it possible to re-formulate the contours and theoretical concerns of the Council outside the geographical configuration which has defined it? How do we re-invent geographies outside the Cold War political economy of area studies? Is it possible to create a meaningful and productive intellectual dialogue between Africa, Asia and the Middle East in the humanities and social sciences?

Let us consider 'history-writing'. African history has always been the territory of confrontation between two conceptions of history writing: the 'academic' and the 'vernacular' history-writing.

Academic History

African academic history has always been characterized by the search for an archive of its own. In 1953, Roland Oliver, one of the British founding fathers of African history, at the inaugural conference of lecturers in African history, insisted on 'whatever one was dealing with – evidence from archeology or oral tradition or written documents – African history must from now on be Africa-centred.... Evidence drawn from metro-politan archives must be supplemented by that from local archives.... Most new research must be undertaken in Africa'.[17] In 1960, P. Curtin reissued Roland Oliver's

directive. He invited Africanist historians to work outside the comfort of metropolitan archives in Paris and London since 'they contained the history of European interests in Africa, rather than the history of Africa itself.... African History written from entirely metropolitan archives can no longer be considered valid'.[18] In 2005, the coordinators of the Aluka Project, aimed at digitizing the records of Southern African Liberation Movements, noted: "the task of digitizing should be viewed as an opportunity to reformulate the contours of the history of the liberation struggles".[19]

Vernacular History

Vernacular History-writing as a comparative and competitive tradition of history-writing could be compared to Tim Mitchell's 'research in the wild', and Partha Chatterjee's 'counter disciplinary move'[20] or Karin Barber 'tin trunk literacy'.[21] It could also include in its territory, Afrocentrism and 'romantic Egyptocentrism'.[22] The production of the 'vernacular history library' benefitted immensely from Muslim and Christian textual resources. Muslim and Christian texts have long provided the templates by which Africans (among other communities) came to see themselves as people. Adrian Hastings captures nicely this process (for Christianity), using the concept of 'literary imagination'.[23] meaning the consolidated African conceptions of divinity and giving, through the translation of the Bible, an identifiable shape to traditional religion. By analyzing the 'local' histories according to their place of origin, production and debate, it is possible to map new geographies and identify the influences that guided the construction of the specific historical narrative.[24]

In addition to the search for an archive, African history has been busy responding to the 'continuing "conceptual Eurocentrism" in the study of African history: the reliance on analytical tools derived from reflections on European or, by extension, "Western" experience'.[25] 'Third World' theoretical and ideological contributions have been enriching for African Studies. The main requirement for overcoming conceptual Eurocentrism in African history, in the interest of a more genuinely 'general' social science and 'global' history, is reciprocal comparison of Africa and other regions, or more

precisely, specific areas within Africa with counterparts elsewhere. Instead of rejecting the project of generalization (general models from European experiences), we probably need to work towards more genuine generalizations through properly comparative historical research.

How does CODESRIA situate itself within this collaborative framework? Under which conditions could it contribute to this conversation? What are the conditions under which it is possible to 'provincialize Europe'[26] or 'put Europe in the African Mirror'?[27] Under which conditions could we implement it, not only in history but also in political science, anthropology, comparative literature, etc.?

Another Genealogy of African Studies

Early Black historians made Africa a key focus of their studies. Africa became critical in the late 19th/early 20th century to represent African American, both individually and collectively. Study of Africa developed as one of the central tenets of black public life. African American scholars and activists reacted against the colonial library through (re)appropriating and subverting the 'colonialist/imperial' approach to history, geography and politics. They launched the struggle over the meaning of the past and of Africa, re-defining radically inter-war Black politics and public culture to: (a) produce counter narratives and document Black contribution to world history by linking the achievement of Ancient Africa (Egypt) to the contributions of Black slaves in the building of the US; (b) re-introduce Africa and Africans in World History; (c) build an intellectual field of African studies; (c) challenge Western conceptions of History, the discipline of history and historical practices by re-locating the origin of civilization; and (d) de-centering Western historiography and historical narratives. The new sciences of the late 19th and early 20th century – ethnology, anthropology, sociology, linguistics and cultural morphology – explained African cultures and argued that Africans were civilized. Another site of knowledge production – African American scholars and activists – turned Africa into a central issue in this quest. This was particularly true of DuBois, not only in *The Crisis* magazine, but also in his historical writing, including *The Negro* (1915), *Black Folk,*

Then and Now; An Essay in the History and Sociology of the Negro Race (1939),[28] and *The World and Africa: An Inquiry into the Part which Africa has Played in World History* (1946).[29]

New Intellectual Agenda[30]

I would like to conclude with a few remarks on area studies as both academic and policy territory configured by the particular histories of regions outside the West, formally colonized and under-developed or developing. The function of the new territories was to produce locally informed knowledge by devising instruments, methods and theories to account for their specific trajectories, their reactions to the encounter with Europe and modernity. The reaction to the exposure to 'area studies' in many non-Western societies has been the search of a *point fixe* outside Europe and the carving of an autonomous space of deployment by a daily engage-ment with European modernity and the Enlightenment library, the economies of knowledge that supported the invention of Africa as well as the singular histories of Africa (oral histories, histories of domination, transactions and connections).

African scholars worked hard to subvert area studies and de-link it from the Cold War agenda by: (1) raising the conditions under which meaningful (usable and productive knowledge could be produced and (2) addressing the consequences of their production on the disciplines and asking the following critical questions: (a) Is Africa worth a disciplinary treatment? (b) Are the disciplines (except, of course, anthropology) equipped to deal with African situations (the idea that Africa is outside of history and of the disciplines)? (c) What are the conditions (possibilities) of inserting Africa (or for that matter the Middle East and Asia) in the scientific discourse? (d) What are the limitations and flexibility of disciplines in accounting for areas outside the West? (e) Is it necessary to ask the disciplines to adjust or to interrogate their assumptions from local conditions? (f) Is area studies' knowledge contributing to disciplinary knowledge?

In order to better understand Africa's present-day location in the world, we have to re-open the debate regarding the genealogy of African studies, African's connections to other regions of the world (Saharan world; Indian Ocean corridors

and the Atlantic), to restructure the way we study Africa (continental Africa; sub-Saharan Africa, Black Africa [Hegel's Africa proper]; Pan-African intellectual geographies of Africa…). Taking a continental and global approach to African studies, I believe, is the most progressive move that we can make today as educators and scholars. The teaching and scholarly pursuit of Africa (primarily sub-Saharan Africa) as a discrete entity, as favoured within an area studies model, has served to re-create the marginalization of Africa, from the rest of the world, that was at the heart of the imperial project (and one of the lasting legacies of European imperialism), to section Africa off from the world, to see it as a continent absent of history, and as critically outside of human or world history (the history of humanity, human progress). One of the primary objectives of African studies should be to work towards the overturning of the idea of African studies as limited to sub-Saharan Africa, to re-incorporate North Africa into our understanding of African studies, and to insist on Africa's location in the world.

As we attempt to revisit our understanding of Africa and its location in the world within the academic terrain, we are also changing the way that Africa is located beyond the academy. Can we imagine an African studies research and teaching agenda that takes, at its core, the following principles: that (a) culture and politics are inseparable; they must be re-situated and studied within new frameworks of analysis that privilege interconnectivity and the formation of new academic geographies; (b) disconnecting Africa from the rest of the world re-creates the imperial vision of Africa; (c) privileging African-authored texts – popular and literary texts, scholarly articles (from all time periods), art and film – is imperative, and (d) understanding African history as connected to the African diaspora, that encourages the study of pan-Africanism, is indispensable.

Notes

1. James Wilkinson, "A Choice of Fictions: Historians, Memory and Evidence", *PMLA* 111, 1996 (80-92).

2. London, Heinemann, 1968.

3. Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood. Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997.

4. Ranajit Guha, *History at the Limit of World-History* [Italian Academy Lectures]. New York. Columbia University Press, 2002.

5. Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History*. London, James Currey, 1985 et *Living with Africa*. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1994.

6. Marcel Detienne, *L'invention de la mythologie*. Paris, Gallimard, (1980); Philippe Joutard, *Ces voix qui viennent du passé*. Paris, Hachette, 1983 et Eric Havelock, *Introduction to Plato*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963.

7. Axel Harniet-Sievers (ed.), *A Place in the World: New local Historiographies from Africa and South Asia.* Leiden, Brill, 2002 et Karin Barber, (ed.), *Africa's Hidden Histories: Everyday Literacy and the Making of Self.* Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2006.

8. C. H. Kane (*L'Aventure ambigue*. Paris, Plon, 1963) captures the colonial situation as an "ambiguous" adventure for the colonized subject and Titsti Dangarembga, (*Nervous Condition*. London, the Women Press, 1988) as a "nervous condition" following F. Fanon and).

9. R.Guha op. cit. p. 2.

10. Idem. pp. 1 and 2 and Hans Kellner, *Language and Historical Representation: Getting the History Crooked*. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.

11. R. Guha, op. cit. p. 2.

12. V. Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa*. Bloomington, University of Indiana Press, 1988.

13. Charles W. Mills, *The Racial Contract*. thaca, Cornell Univeersity Press, 1998.

14. R. Guha, op. cit. p. 5.

15. (V. Y. Mudimbe, op. cit et François Hartog, *Le Miroir d'Hérodote. Essai sur la représentation de l'autre*. Paris, Gallimard, 1980.

16. Jacques Revel, "introduction", J. Revel & L. Hunt (eds.), *Histories. French constructions of the Past. Postwar French Thought*. Vol. I. New York, the New Press, 1995, p. 12.

17. R. Oliver, "African History: SOAS and Beyond", A. Kirk-Greene (ed.), *The Emergence of African History in British Universities*. Oxford, Worldview Press Publications, 1995, pp.22-23.

18 "The Archives of Tropical Africa: a Reconnaissance", *Journal of African History*, 1, 1, 1960, (129-147).

19. Allen Isaacman, P. Lalu and T. Nygren, "Digitization, History, and the Making of a Postcolonial Archive of South African Liberation Struggles: the Aluka Project", *Africa Today*, 52,. 2, 2005.

20. Partha Chatterjee, *The Politics of the Governed. Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World*. New York, Columbia University press, 2004.

21. K. Barber, "Introduction", op. cit.

22. See for example W. J. Moses discussion of the "limitless range of opinion […] attached to the term Afrocentrism by authors across the political spectrum, most of whom are less interested in scholarly investigation of African American cultures and historical traditions than in forwardly myriad of political agendas" (*Afrotopia. Thr Roots of African American Popular History.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 9) and of his belief that sentimental Afrocentrism and romantic Egyptocentrism are usually harmless and inoffensive, if sometimes extravagant, folk traditions. They are whimsical, entertaining, and often charmin fantiasies developed by nineteenth-century journalists, preachers, novelists and vernacular storytellers", idem, p. 17.

23. Adrian Hastings, op. cit.

24. Axel Harniet-Sievers. "Introduction", op. cit. p.

25. Gareth Austin, "Reciprocal Comparison and African History: Tackling conceptual Eurocentrism in the Study of Africa's Economic Past", p. 1.

26. D. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000.

27. Stefano Fenoaltea, "Europe in the African Mirror: The Slave Trade and the Rise of Feudalism", *Rivista di Storia Economica*, 15, 2, 1999 (123-165).

28. Edited by H. Aptheker, 1924

29. W.E.B. DuBois, *The World and Africa*: *An Inquiry into the Part which Africa Has Played in World History*. New York: International Publishers Company, 1965.

30. This section is largely influenced by the ongoing discussion on the future of African studies at Columbia University conducted within MEALAC and the Institute of African Studies with the contribution of Africanist and non-Africanist colleagues. I would like to mention in particular my colleagues, Jinny Prais, G. Mann, H. Mokoena, S. B. Diagne and Mahmood Mamdani.

Transformative Social Policy

Introduction

This paper is about meeting what I have called 'the Mafeje Challenge': addressing the 'big questions' of our time. I will focus on what I believe will be a major area in which, as the neoliberal project comes to its dead-end, a range of extra-territorial agencies will try to shape Africa's post-neoliberal future. Unlike the crude discussion that state equity-holding in companies that required massive bailouts equals socialism or the triumphalist tone of the 'Marxists' who went the Polanyian in the preceding past twenty years (who now see socialism around the corner), Neoliberalism represents only a very extreme form of the diversity of forms that capitalism can take. There is no guarantee that, simply because Neoliberalism has become disreputable, we will get anything close to a more humane, solidarity driven, social-market outcome; much less a more emancipatory outcome. The death of a king is no guarantee of what the new king portends.

The second aspect of my discussion is more 'disciplinary' in its bias although it can be cast more widely; it speaks to a segment of African gender discourse that has effectively been shut out of the work of the Council.

Research Priorities of Rethinking Africa's Post-neoliberal Future: Transformative Social Policy

Rethinking Africa's development has featured in the last two cycles of CODESRIA's strategic research priorities. It marks the Council's capacity to remain at the cutting edge of the intellectual and policy priorities for our continent; effectively looking ahead around the corner. As important as this agenda is, we have not been as successful in matching the identification of this priority into a library of works that define our concerns, and mark our space. An executive secretary and executive committee may soup up the priorities; it takes the community to convert these into delive-rables and outcomes. While the priority agenda on the Council's last two cycles of strategic plans, the organising priority of rethinking development has often been

Jimi Adesina
University of the Western Cape
South Africa

overwhelmed by other (perhaps equally important) research priorities.

Today, the key intellectual and policy challenges for shaping Africa's post-neoliberal future will be around the issue of Social Policy. It is hardly possible to wear the badge of 'free market triumphalism' of the early 1980s anymore; it is hardly possible to insist on retrenching the state further in Africa when those in the North are bailing out their private sector, using tax-payers and sovereign funds of 'less developed countries'. But that tells us little about what the post-neoliberal context itself will look like; it is never given. Salient to this are the links between the economic and social policies. What ethos will shape economic growth (and development) and what is the feasibility of inclusive and equitable social outcomes. At the moment, important extra-territorial agents are shaping this in the way they are framing Africa's social policy agenda; the stampede just picked up recently. From the 'Poor Law' driven social policy frame-work, to the male-centric Bismarckian model, and the accent on fragmented and individualised, private social funds (pension funds being one example), three things will be vital over the next five years: our capacity to (a) engage with this debate intellectually; (b) mark out a more human-centric, developmentally inclusive and democratic approach to this field, and (c) effect a positive impact of (b) on the African policy landscape.

The days of arguing that the Council should be averse to anything with the word 'policy' on it should be over by now. Just because we refuse to engage with it does not mean it will not happen. The link between scholarship and 'policy work' is not in when scholars become policy merchants or get into politics. Ideas matter and it is the responsibility of a Council that define Africa as its primary.

home to contribute towards the shaping of ideas through its work. The field of social policy will be the crucial grounds for intellectual and policy hegemonic project over the next five years and the Council needs to make this a critical research priority within the wider framework of 'Rethinking Africa's Development'. I am convinced that we have a better conceptual handle on the area, in terms of the agenda of a 'transformative social policy' approach, than the range of policy and ideas mongering that are currently being deployed to shape Africa's intellectual and policy future. The idea itself emerged from the global research programme that Thandika Mkandawire led at the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), which was in turn inspired by his re-reading of the African experience. What emerged from this programme of work, for which the work of the Africa Research Group was coordinated by Jimi Adesina, is not only the historical root of this approach in Africa's immediate post-colonial experience but how the more emancipatory and developmental aspects of the agenda was degraded over time. The transformative impact of social policy can be seen in the transformation of gender relations, generational roles and the 'nation-building' impact (social cohesion). Similarly, both economic development and social policy share the same normative concerns of social solidarity, and the mutually reinforcing impact of economic and social policies.

The long-term impact for Africa and the sharp inter-country (or even intra-country) contrasts could hardly be starker when we look at those who pursued an embryonic transformative approach to social policy in the late 1950s and early 1960s and those who did not. It is easy to take for granted the degree of social cohesion in Tanzania – relative to a less ethnically heterogeneous Kenya – and not reflect on the TANU/CCM social policy under Mwalimu J. K. Nyerere. The same can be said of the economic and social outcomes in Western Nigeria in the context of the policies pursued by the devolved regional government from the

mid-1950s to 1961. The use of social funds for supporting infrastructure development and industrial policy, and publically funded education and health-care were to be positively reinforcing with economic policies. These were not necessarily state-centric projects; they involved interesting community/state partnership that gave strong control to people at the level of the communities and strengthened the quality of outcomes. Within the field, these are not normally understood as 'social' policy because they do not fit into the 'welfare state paradigm'.

The current agenda of extra-territorial forces is going to trap Africa in an almost exclusive anchoring of social policy to social protection, and the idea of social policy as something for addressing market failure. There are important intel-lectual and policy consequences. The intellectual handle that the idea of Trans-formative Social Policy offers is a major tool for confronting and shaping the chal-lenges of Africa's post-neoliberal future.

I have made this a central focus of my work over the next decade because I am convinced that this is where the next round of breaking and making Africa will take place. Some may see self interest in pushing this as a priority area for the Council; my sense is that each milestone in the Council's seminal impact on the African and global intellectual landscape has involved people working in certain areas, signalling these areas as worthy of the Council's attention. It is about 'futures studies' for the Council, seeing around the corner. The Council needs to make social policy a priority area within the ambit of 'rethinking Africa's development'.

African Gender Scholarship: The Neglected Seminal Works

The neglected seminal works in African gender scholarship, in the work of the Council, is an issue that I have raised in the past. Efforts to infuse gender priorities in the work of the Council have been long-running and commendable. Nonetheless, this is a work-in-progress, with rooms for improvement and scaling up, to avoid the Council's gender work getting into an impasse. An important area of impro-vement, *inter alia*, is overcoming the neglect of the seminal works of some of Africa's most brilliant intellectuals in the area. I will highlight only one aspect and the enormous sociological and conceptual implications.

Emerging from the works of scholars like Ifi Amadiume and Oyeronke Oyewumi is the 'recovery' of the concept of 'matri-focal' nature of many (by no means most or worst still all) African societies. I contrast this with 'patrifocal societies'. In several cases, the reaction to the idea is the assumption that to talk of matrifocal societies is to suggest that these societies were not patriarchal; a short step from the charge that such works undermine – the struggle for gender equality and against gender-based oppression. It may explain some of the intense hostilities to these works that I have come across. These are understandable but ultimately flawed readings of these contributions to African gender scholarship.

While we do not have to agree with others, or find their personalities agreeable in order to acknowledge their works, the refusal to acknowledge these works and make them part of the intellectual dialogue that we desperately need is to play very close to intellectual censorship.

As a sociologist, I can see the immense conceptual and practical implications of these works. All knowledge, Archie Mafeje often told us, is first local; the imperative of carving the distinct space for the African intellectual community is fulfilled in the core requirement of pur-suing endogeny – and overcoming 'extra-version'. Paulin Hountondji, who spent the first part of his intellectual work being sceptical about such claims, would, in the second segment of his intellectual history, acknowledge the imperative of such pursuit of endogeny. For all that can be said against them, the works of Amadiume, Oyewumi, and Nkiru Nzeogwu (to name just three) represent immensely seminal works of such displacement of extra-version; they represent distinct ventures in endogeny.

The concept of 'matrifocal societies' offers an intellectually robust handle on a range of theoretical and practical political issues. Intellectually, even if patriarchy can be applied to all societies, the works of these and other African scholars cast doubt on the extent to which we can transpose the 'effectivity' of patriarchy across time and space. 'Patriarchy', it would seem, functions differently in a matrifocal society than in a patrifocal society. This is an important intellectual issue and in need of further research. Also, the concept has enormous implications for the sociological study of

'identity'. Identity functions differently in matrifocal societies relative to patrifocal societies. A Wolof adage says, 'the only parent of a child you know is the mother'; it may also explain why a Walter Sisulu could grow up in South Africa a Nguni child rather than a 'coloured' and remain comfortable in his Africanness – as are his children. His patrimony was not a fundamental issue for his mother's people – he was 'a child of the compound'. We have research works being done on identity within the Council, completely oblivious of the intellectual framing that 'matrifocality' offers.

Finally, the implications for gender equity and struggles are important. When a Swazi colleague tells me that all the criticism of the Mswati's reed dance bride selection is Western feminist attacks on 'African culture', it is easy for me to point out to him that, north of Swaziland in Malawi, he would have been the one married by the woman and he would have had to move into her compound – matri-lineal and matrilocal; this is also an 'African culture'. The 'Africanity' (in a futile search for a better word) of matrifo-cality offers important handle on gender struggles as well. Significantly, none of the leading scholars in this field could remotely be described as submitting to 'traditional female roles'; their lives and scholarships are self-evident rejections of contrived notions of the roles of 'tradi-tional African women'. Indeed, Oyewumi has shown eloquently how the social and political aspects ('effectivity') of matri-focality were undermined by Victorian colonial norms; but never that matrifo-cality suggests the absence of male power in those societies or an idyllic past. The path to the future is in embracing the 'useful past'.

It is high time we engaged with the neglected works of these scholars purely on an ethical intellectual ground – that is, overcoming subliminal censorship. It is equally important in identifying areas of research priorities in the new Strategic Plan. The only effort at engagement – other than Ifi Amadiume's association with the Council in the 1980s and early 1990s – was in the proceedings of one of the Cairo gender conferences. The Council has a responsibility to reflect, in its research priorities, the works of the Africa-driven and Africa-focused scholarship of all of African scholars, whether we agree or disagree with particular strands of such scholarship.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

The two areas identified above for the Council's research priorities are not about a radical re-making of the 2007-2011 Strategic Plan, nor were they absent from that plan. The plan was the outcome of extensive work and consultation; it also marked the recovery of the Council and evidence of its administrative and intellectual integrity. My sense is that we need to constantly scan the horizon for the urgent areas of intellectual priorities that can further strengthen the Council's voice and hands as Africa's oldest surviving and largest social science research council. Social Policy will be the leading area of attempts to mould Africa's intellectual and policy landscapes in this new dispensation. We cannot afford to cede either space.

A more embracing approach to the African gender scholarship – ethical in terms of open and embracive epistemological agenda, salient in acknowledging the seminal works being done – is important for the integrity of the Council's work. Some of the most exciting works being done in the field of Sociology, globally, is in this area. It has direct implications for knowledge production in the fields of Political Studies, Economics, Anthropology, Legal Studies, Philosophy, and History, to mention a few.

Challenges Facing Africa and those Facing the Social Sciences

This brief note considers the challenges facing Africa, the challenges facing social sciences and priorities for CODESRIA. It mainly focuses on the challenges facing Africa and identifies those challenges or problems as different manifestations of the continent's underdevelopment. It links CODESRIA's past with its future commitment to contribute to the resolution of Africa's problems by providing quality research that influences policy making for the betterment of continent. So, there is need for emphasis to be placed on development research**.** With the intention to set out CODESRIA in a new direction in order to better serve the continent and contri-bute to the resolution of its problems, this short note takes five inter-related issues of priority significance for discussion: 1) the development challenges facing Africa; 2) the development issues and the re-organization and consolidation of themes; 3) policy relevance; 4) issues of methodology; and 5) partnership, policy relevance and networking.

Challenges Facing Africa: Manifestations of Underdevelopment

The 2007-2011 CODESRIA Strategic Plan provided a wide coverage of almost all issues and dimensions. After narrating and describing the way CODESRIA has functioned to achieve its goals of serving African social science researchers and the continent for the past few years, it sets out ambitious goals for the future. In addition to expanding its activities, the attempt to carve out a new direction for social science research in Africa was the major feature of that strategic plan. The

Khalid Ali El Amin
University of Khartoum
Sudan

shift from mere cross-disciplinary dialogue to multi-disciplinary development research undoubtedly marked a turning point in CODESRIA's long history of serving the continent.

Various African problems which represent challenges to social science researchers are, in fact, different manifestations of the same problem of development and underdevelopment. Thus, most problems facing the continent are organically inter-related and not easy to separate from one another. Poverty, inequalities in access to resources, conflict, forced population movements, bad governance, corruption, environmental degradation, authorita-rianism, lack of grassroots participation, militarization, waste of resources on military and security spending, spread of infectious diseases, food insecurity and malnutrition are all intimately interconnected and inter-related; manifesting the undercurrent malaise of underdevelopment.

All these issues are covered, in that strategic plan, under the sub-title Research Themes for 2007-2011, set to be covered in future research activities. The research themes seem to be numerous and finite resources dictate some kind of prioritization that could imply omission, addition, reorganization and consolidation. As commitment to addressing the continent's problems; particularly those facing the marginalized, is one major guide for CODESRIA's future research activities, then no better organizing principle than development and underdevelopment challenges to consolidate, reorganize and prioritize research themes.

Development Issues

If the development challenges facing the continent could be the fixing principle for selecting and prioritizing themes, some topics within themes could either be omitted for the time being or given lower priority. Some other suggested additional research topics relevant to Africa's development challenges could be considered.

a) Rural and urban poverty, poverty and health, food security, education;

b) Hunger, famine and food security;

c) The informal sector and urban livelihoods (providing employment and income for millions of poor urban Africans);

d) Conflict and drought driven population movement (displacement and displaced conditions);

e) Agrarian forms, agrarian transition and transformation;

f) Participation, grassroots organizations and training in democracy;

g) Indigenous African mechanisms for reconciliation and conflict resolution;

h) Forms of tacit resistance to authoritarianism;

i) Forms of decentralization, indigenous local structures and modern government;

j) NGO's and Development;

k) Information Technology and Development;

l) Forms of public spending and development (expenditure on the military, the security machines, health, education, water, etc.);

While this would consolidate CODESRIA's shift in the new direction that would enhance its relevance to the continent's problems, emphasis in research on development issues simulta-neously would add more to CODESRIA's capacity to influence policy making.

Policy Relevance

In Africa, as elsewhere in the periphery, a gulf ensues between most social researchers, social science research and policy making. Most policy makers ignore critical social science research, and while the best quality of social science research is critical social science research, unfortunately this same attribute which gives critical social science research its distinctive character; and value is what draws a gulf between it and policy making. Political conditions either forced many to isolate themselves from political proces-ses or politicians ignored critical social science research because it does not fit into their political agenda and political frames. With all attendant difficulties, the involvement of African scholarship and, subsequently, African research in African development problems – that is, research on African development issues that suggests practical alternative solutions to pressing African problems – is likely to make such research a good candidate for influencing policy making.

Although politics and power relations are the root of African development problems and the adoption of certain policy options depends on power configuration. Sub-sequently, critical social science research (forms of the state, power, class interests and relations for instance) is mostly unlikely to influence current policy directly but could inform actors, agents and forces of change and map out alternative development paths for the future. However, some forms of develop-ment research that deal with urgent African problems and towards which policy makers in African states might feel less apprehension (e.g., indigenous African mechanisms for reconciliation and how these could be re-fashioned to resolve current African conflicts) could make some influence on current policy making. Thus, different forms of research on different topics appeal differently to

policy makers. Because of its importance for relevance and for meeting the challenge, for CODESRIA, of providing viable practical solutions to the problems facing Africa, the modalities and the ways in which the gap between research and policy making could be bridged without compromising commitment to principles need to be contemplated, discussed and perhaps be made subject for research.

Methodology

Related to the above two issues (develop-ment and policy relevance) is the question of methodology, which perhaps needs more discussion and consideration. Assuming that an appropriate theoretical methodology suitable to African con-ditions and African reality is developed and adopted, there is a need to place emphasis on micro-level empirical field research that captures Africa's complex reality and the diverse forms in which the same development problems unfold or manifest themselves in different parts of the continent. The necessity of micro-level field research is imposed by the complexity and heterogeneity of forms that defy generalization and perceived conceptions.

Micro-level field research raises the problem of empirical methods for discus-sion in terms of choice of the qualitative versus the quantitative methods of data collection and analysis. Developments in the sophistication of quantitative methods accumulated over the years, compared to qualitative field research, have produced innovative and elaborate criteria of measurement indicators to approximate socio-economic reality. Although qualitative research methods have only recently started to gain increa-sing importance, they are perhaps the most appropriate to investigating Africa's realities, particularly in the initial phases of research. Considering the majority of communities on the continent as being communal rather than individua-listic (and for which the extended family, reciprocity and mutual support are highly valued), the quantitative methods and the mea-surement criteria developed elsewhere may not be suitable. Tailoring quantitative indicators developed elsewhere in the light of the particular African reality under consideration, which qualitative field research methods could uncover and capture, provides opportunities for innovative development research and understanding African realities from the

bottom up. The impor-tance of this arises from the need to avoid over-generalization, capture African reality that in many instances challenge straight-jacket theorization – African reality as it exists, not as theorized. This is key to addressing the continent's deve-lopment problems and issues to remain relevant. While qualitative and quantitative methods are not necessarily mutually exclusive and, in fact in many instances they could complement one another, there is a need for more discussion and perhaps training in empirical research methods.

One example to support the argument for studying African reality at the micro-field level and from the bottom up is the tribe and the way it has been rejected by social scientists and Africanist social scientists for genuine ideological reasons. The fact is that the tribe has not gone away simply because social scientists did not accept it as a category for analysis. Instead of understanding what the tribe is and what tribal identities mean in different African contexts; why tribal identities have persisted; what socio-economic contents do tribal identities embody; why the tribe has not vanished despite decades of nation-state building and advocacy of national identity; and why the tribe has remained, and under what conditions, as a robust, mostly covert, rallying force for many Africans communities. The study of tribal loyalty and identity, whether parallel to or a competing force with the state and national identity, has been neglected for quite some time and treated as if it does not exist. But the tribe has potently resurged in many parts of the continent – in forms of internal conflicts – more deadly and tragic than inter-state ones. Studying the tribe through thorough micro-level field research, understanding the conditions for its persistence and exploring ways to defuse the conditions for its existence would have done good to the continent and its people.

One more point to add on appropriate empirical research methods is the question of policy relevance. Apart from stating the obvious – that the nature of the topic dictates the kind of data needed for analysis and subsequently the methods to be adopted for data collection – pressing development topics and research methods that capture reality at the micro level are more likely to appeal to policy making for adoption. Policy options recommended on the basis of thorough

scrutiny of reality and on issues relating to the marginalized and their livelihoods would most likely get acceptance, if not from governments, perhaps from many other actors, act and work with the poor and marginalized, with whom partnerships could be forged to better serve the continent and its people.

Policy Relevance, Partnerships and Networking

In and outside Africa, there are numerous organizations that deal with development issues and development problems in Africa. Many international inter- and non-governmental organizations on the continent are directly involved in tackling the problems of poverty, food security, conflict and conflict resolution, mass displacement, democratization, human security and environmental degradation, to mention only a few areas. There is scope for CODESRIA's already established relations with international organizations, in and outside the continent, to be made more effective through partnership based on mutual concerns related to development problems, policy oriented research and the dedications to improve the livelihoods of the marginalized. Building on CODESRIA's extensive web of connections, such organizations could provide avenue to influence policy actions that impact on the lives and the livelihood of millions on the continent. Moreover, such organizations could form a valuable capacity building resource base that further empowers CODESRIA and reinforces its ability to meet its goals. This issue could also be a subject for further discussion, to come up with practical ways of how priorities could be set to meet these organizations's action-oriented research needs without compromising CODESRIA's commitment to producing quality research.

Historical Thinking and Inter-disciplinarity

We recognize the importance of fostering our research institutions and researchers on the continent; hence our gathering in an organization like CODESRIA. We recognize the great unevenness in the quantity and quality of our institutions: we have 'world class' researchers and institutions but also those that barely manage to stay open. We recognize the extraordinary political and economic conditions under which we have to do academic and intellectual work on the continent. In some places, academics can live on a decent salary; in others, only multiple jobs keep them in a university office. Some can criticize the state without fear; elsewhere, they have to remain reticent or leave their homeland. There are institutions emerging out of conditions of civil war, needing urgent assistance to have them and their researchers re-connect with the scholarly world. Finally, we recognize the brain-drain and the extensive talents in the diaspora. We have to harness, and use to the benefit of the research communities on the continent, those who have left but still remain committed to the development of the continent. My vision would thus entail the following elements:

To begin with, we need an audit or assessment of the social science and humanities institutional and research situation in various parts of the continent. We have to know where the strongest institutions and where the weaker ones are. The stronger ones in a region could be used

Shamil Jeppie
University of Cape Town
South Africa

to provide opportunities to the weaker ones. We have to know in which fields there has been growth or are potentials for growth and where specific disciplines hardly exist anymore. I would be particularly keen to know about the discipline of history and its cognates. We can divide the continent into regional groupings (or linguistically or any other way) in this investigation. The aim would be to know what to concentrate on in which region, in terms of fostering certain disciplines or certain types of research; or whether to intervene at all. This is potentially a labour-intensive and exhaustive exercise. We could begin with a few regional case-studies and collaborate with other pan-African bodies such as the Association of African Universities. Has CODESRIA attempted to work with the African Union and could this be a means to use the AU mechanisms? With some indications of the shape and human profile of the humanities and social sciences, we should be able to project priorities for the longer-term future of our research institutions and, therefore, for CODESRIA itself. Will there be any sociologists or historians in country A in ten years time? What should be done to reverse the situation? More-over, what is the content of the various disciplines? Are they keeping abreast of theoretical or methodological developments internationally and/or in the global South?

The above exercise will look at personnel or human resources in various disciplines. It will also look at scholarly outputs, productivity, fields of study and so on. It is also crucial to have a good understanding of the actual institutions that make research possible: the research libraries and archives. Thus, we should investigate the quality and accessibility of our research libraries and archives. I know of a few very good ones and many really poor ones on the continent that are not serving the purpose they are meant to serve. Excellent research resources are fundamental to maintaining and cultivating a relevant and high-quality research environment. Therefore, we should try to provide the opportunities for insti-tutions to be able to develop collections and upgrade levels of conservation in and accessibility to archives and libraries. Furthermore, ideas about what an archive means needs to be extended so that much more gets collected and conserved and many more non-official sites, artifacts and collections are included in understandings of it. Virtual libraries are advertised as a means of addressing some of the problems but we have bandwidth problems on the continent. Yet, we need to look at all these options so that our researchers can have access to what is absolutely necessary to work productively.

Furthermore, we should find ways of demonstrating to our governments and others the relevance and importance of the social sciences and humanities for the future of African societies. Development economics and political economy would be the most obvious fields where African scholars could be both constructive and critical. We have to provide ways of promoting these fields to further research agendas that could address African problems with innovative approaches developed out of local realities. A series of training workshops for younger scholars, 'sounding-board' meetings and conferences on pressing themes of economic transformation may stimulate these areas.

Far too often, research on poverty and related topics are undertaken by and for NGOs with no organic connection to the societies in which they are located. But such fields could be even more productive if placed in an inter-disciplinary context. We have to promote inter-disciplinarity; economists could benefit from historians and sociologists and vice versa. We can here also draw in some of the natural scientists. For instance, on the question of solutions to poverty, the relevance of climate change to livelihoods and agriculture is clear. In the field of history, it is unthinkable to approach materials only as sources of transparent data to string together into a historical narrative. Every step of the way, there are multiple possibilities opened to how to approach materials and, indeed, the whole idea of what constitutes a historical source and archive has been both expanded and problematised. It is therefore important that we push our researchers into the frontiers of historical thinking and inter-disciplinarity.

Also, we should draw on advances already made, in other parts of the global South, in contemporary humanistic research. We could launch a few pilot South-South projects in specific fields. Areas such as how to deal with growing impoverishment and of economic development are productive ones to compare across the South. How to open-up the field of historical studies to greater inter-disciplinarity and new fields of research (medicine, sexuality, etc.) are also possibilities. Perhaps we need a period of familiarizing more and more of our researchers with the advances in social science research in, say, India and Latin America through a series of short 'encounters' or 'sounding-board' events that could, over time, lead to more fully–fledged research collaborations. This would be a good way to proceed.

Finally, we should continue to innovate in the ways to work with Africans working outside the continent, to strength the research capacities on the continent. On the other hand, we should be using our resources to develop the study of African histories and societies in countries with large populations of African-origin and with a growing number of researchers among them intent on raising the levels of study of Africa. I am thinking here of Brazil where, in 2003, a law was passed so that African history can be taught at every level of the curriculum in that country but where the resources for this is rather undeveloped. CODESRIA could play an invaluable role in this issue and also cultivate its roots in Lusophone Africa.

The African Library Project and the 'Big Ideas'

The issue of research priorities is closely linked with our collective intellectual history, the history that we have been saying, for the past eleven years or more, that we must document. I remember attempts being made to commission Aminata Diaw and the late Archie Mafeje to write the 'intellectual history' of CODESRIA. The issue of priorities is also linked to the mandate of CODESRIA and how we interpret it at every given moment.

The African Library

That what Mudimbe calls the 'colonial library' has not been the only 'library' that ever existed in and with regard to Africa, has been sufficiently demons-trated. There is a 'Muslim', as well as a larger 'non-Europhone' 'library' (Ousmane Kane). The social sciences, as we know them today, came to us through the encounter with the West. Our ambition and our struggle have been to build an African library. Part of the difficulty we were, for a long time, faced with as a commu-

Ebrima Sall
CODESRIA
Dakar, Senegal

nity, was that our community was fragmented in many ways. CODESRIA, in trying to build a 'networked community of scholars' has so far mainly focused on, and deployed efforts to transcending the linguistic, gender, gene-rational, regional and ideological divisions.

One of the biggest and most fundamental dividing lines, however, has been the one that disconnects us 'modern' scholars from both the extremely rich and vibrant intellectual traditions that Africa has had in the past (see Jeppie and Diagne's *The Meanings of Timbuktu*, and Kane's *Les intellectuels non-europhones*, for instance, one co-published by HSRC and CODESRIA, and the other by CODESRIA), and from the 'non-europhone intellectual traditions' of today. It has been argued by Kane, Thiam and others that Africa has had its own 'enlightenment', perhaps with its own downside too, as was the case with the European enlightenment. The reconnection with, and reclaiming of that part of our history has begun, and I believe CODESRIA is well placed to take that process forward.

The second major difficulty has been that of trying to build our own library, the 'African library', using borrowed concepts, theories and paradigms, reading the social dynamics in our societies and interpreting our experiences by analogy, and not even using our own money, but by using other people's money, because, with a few notable exceptions, African governments have largely refrained from funding research and investing in knowledge production. The struggle of CODESRIA since its creation is the struggle for autonomy – the 'indepen-dence of thought' – as stated in earlier versions of the Charter, or, simply put, academic freedom. Beyond the narrow definition of academic freedom, what we have been

really talking about is the capacity of the African scholarly commu-nity to conceptualise / theorise, rather than leave all that and more to 'experts' on 'African affairs'. Not so much because there can ever be something remotely resembling what could be called an 'African science', given that science is universal, but because we must know, we must go into the global repository of concepts, theories and methodologies, and take, own, use as is what we can use as is, but also re-cast, where possible, or throw away what we cannot use or re-cast because it is inappropriate, and replace that with what is more suitable for us. We ought to be able to contribute our own narratives, and contribute to the increase of knowledge produced at the global, regional and other levels. In the long history of the Council, I think we have covered a lot of ground. But we still have a long way to go.

The third major difficulty has been to 'free' the 'African library' that we (African scholars) are trying to build, from the risk of its constituent elements being dominated by outputs of what, elsewhere, Jean-Bernard and I called 'command science' (*la science du commandement*) – that is, science in the service of the dominant powers and the dominant order, whose approach is to read society from a rather externalist point of view, and whose aim is to decipher, categorise and name or label, and map social groups, phenomena or dynamics in a process that is more or less part of a state project consisting of what James Scott calls 'making societies legible', in order to make them controllable (or 'governable'). The CODESRIA project, as I understand it, is a fundamentally emancipatory project. But we have not yet systematized our approach in the way that the Subalterns Studies, for instance, have been systematized, even with all the limitations of an epistemological and political nature. The best examples of 'command science' are in colonial ethnography and ethnology. I would argue that the literature on governance is replete with modern forms of that kind of 'science' which, these days, exist in all guises. (See Michel Foucault's writings on governmentality).

The 'Big Ideas'

I borrow the notion of 'big ideas' or 'big pictures' from Mahmood Mamdani, Abdul Raufu Mustafa and Jimi Adesina, and I call 'big ideas' the major themes that we have been researching and debating in Africa since the early sixties. Mamdani, is partly in agreement with Shamil Jeppie and Jimi Adesina when it comes to the periodisation of the post-independence intellectual history of Africa, much of which was centred on CODESRIA since the birth of the Council in 1973. There are also periodizations of the history of higher education (Zenebeworke Tadesse, Tade Aina, Thandika Mkandawire, N'Dri Assie-Lumumba ...). I quote the following from a recent communication from Mamdani, referring to the think-pieces written by Jimi, Shamil and Samir for the meeting on CODESRIA's new Strategic Plan:

"I outline below my understanding of the periodization of CODESRIA's intellectual project since its inception and conclude with a suggestion of the big ideas that need to drive the current endeavour.

1. The first phase focused, as Jimi says, on the question of 'development'.

2. I mark the beginning of the second phase with the 1984 General Assembly where there was a critique of the overly economic character of CODESRIA's intellectual project and a decision to launch a multi-national research on social movements and democratization (followed by a Green Book). In my view, the second phase has been marked by two big ideas: (a) critique of the neoliberal project (as Jimi says); and (b) the democratic struggle and social movements.

3. We are at the cusp of a third phase, which needs to be driven by multiple ideas. I suggest the following: (a) development in the post-neoliberal era (as Jimi suggests and Samir agrees.This point has also been made by Issa Shivji); (b) citizenship and rights in an era of state and civil crisis (as formulated in my contribution); and (c) re-thinking African history, philosophy and social thought in light

of the Timbuktu archive (I am thinking of the joint contributions of Ousmane Kane, Suleymane Bachir Diagne and Shamil Jeppie)."

Mamdani's periodization overlooks the years of debate on Structural Adjustment, that is, on the very process of liberalization that occupied African scholars for two decades or so. These also were the years of political liberalization, during which conflict also reached unprecedented years. Mahmood's third phase therefore ought to be considered the fourth, and it is the phase that the 2007-2011 CODESRIA Strategic Plan, under the umbrella theme "Re-Thinking Development and Reviving Development Thinking" covered.

Beyond Neoliberalism

The search for ways of responding to, and rolling back neoliberalism seems to me to be one of the single most important issues and challenges for CODESRIA. The recent global financial crisis has led to a partial rehabilitation of neo-Keynesianism and some new interest in social democracy. However, in the social sciences themselves, neoliberalism has led to a high level of marketization which has resulted in increased fragmentation, as Burroway has argued, rather than their 'opening' and greater unification that the Gulbenkian Commission Report (authored by Wallerstein and his team) seemed to have observed. In the context of the African academy, the forms, manifestations and consequences of the marketization of the social sciences themselves is yet to be fully understood – we have spent much more time and efforts in studying the marketization of higher education, than that of the social sciences, which is where we perhaps ought to have started from.

For CODESRIA, therefore, understanding the pervasive logic of neoliberalism in a whole range of domains, from trade to the environment, is crucial. The objective that we should not lose sight of, is that of 'building a united Africa of emancipated citizens and communities, one in which life has value and is valued, rights are respected and enjoyed, and social bonds are strong'.

Research, Knowledge and Policy

Lloyd M. Sachikonye
University of Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe

Introduction

The scope, opportunities and challenges in social science research and policy-oriented work in Africa are immense. It is a difficult enterprise to single out which ones should be accorded greater priority. This is why strategic plans of social science institutions are indispensable as guides and road maps. The 2007-2011 CODESRIA Strategic Plan provides an important point of departure.

Changing Context and Focus

The world in which 21st century Africa finds itself in is not quite the same as the bi-polar world of the 1970s when CODESRIA was founded. It is now a world prone to periodic crises and turbulence. Globalization might have led to greater integration of economic, trade and cultural aspects but it has also resulted in marginalization and vulnerability of most developing countries. Crises that have been generated by globalization, such as the current financial and economic crisis, and before it the 2008 food and fuel crises, cannot be predicted with certainty. While precautions can be taken against them, most developing countries, including those in Africa, are often caught unprepared. This is similarly the case with contemporary epidemics, such as HIV-AIDS.

However, the periodic crises add on to long-standing structural issues, such as what has been termed the development impasse, dependency and internal conflicts, such as civil wars. The combi-nation of these crises and structural deficits leads to various results, such as the dependence by almost half of African states on official development assistance (ODA) or simply 'foreign aid' to support their national budgets. Other manifes-tations of the crises include a weak agricultural base which leads to depen-dence on food imports and aid. Internal conflicts generate their own negative impact on develop-ment, state capacity and social cohesion. Resources which ought to be invested into the develo-pment process are poured into armaments, armies and destruction of infrastructure and disruption of services.

The social sciences in Africa are expected, not only to conceptualize this litany of crises and structural issues but also to contribute to their resolution. The prio-rities need to be plausible and pragmatic. Not every research or policy theme is of equal value or urgency. In our view, amongst the pressing priorities are those that relate to:

- Agrarian and Industrial Transitions: The development impasse will only be broken if there is a successful and sustainable agrarian transition that results in increased productivity, food self-sufficiency and overall accumulation that leads to investment in significant industrialization (note that between 70 and 80% of Africa's population is in the rural sector). Africa's resources should be largely benefi-ciated/processed on the continent to add value to them as well as to exports. Without these twin transitions, the development impasse will not be broken.

- The Human Skills and Livelihoods Base (ranging from literacy and skills for employability to basic health and nutrition): Literacy and basic education require significant investments. Without a strong education base, development will remain elusive.

- Governance, Peace and Security: Governance in the shape of sustained democratic transitions that draw from representative and legitimate political systems are indispensable for a viable social contract, peace and stability. As long as the democratic transitions remain reversible (in the form of coups and dictatorships) and unsustainable, conditions of stability and peace will also remain elusive, thus impeding the development process.

- Regional and Continental Integration: The majority of African states are small (some have less than 1 million inhabitants) with limited markets and resources. They would stand to benefit from an equitable integration process at regional and continental levels.

These four themes could form the core of a priority research and policy agenda.

Relevance and Impact on Policy and Society

CODESRIA's comparative advantage lies in its significant contribution to higher education and academic research in Africa. While higher education insti-tutions have experienced a crisis in most countries on the continent, CODESRIA has provided a useful service in spon-soring research, nurturing young scholars and providing research funding and fellowships to senior scholars.

However, given the enormity and complexity of the above-mentioned crisis, some of the following questions could be asked:

- To what extent does CODESRIA-sponsored research have an impact on policy at various levels (national, regional and continental)?

- Should research be undertaken and applied so that it has such an impact?

- Is it adequate for research to be disse-minated in such form as theses, reports, journal articles or mono-graphs? Is knowledge fully utilized if it is confined to these formats? Or should knowledge also be processed into policy briefs, policy papers and strategy papers?

In a continent with such limited resources, including research and policy expertise, it could be argued that there is an element of waste if knowledge remains confined to the academia. For instance, regional institutions such as Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and continental ones such as the African Union Commis-sion, regularly address key issues and themes like food security, employment, social policy framework, migration and health strategy, to mention a few. These themes are taken up at experts meetings, ministerial meetings and even Heads of States summits. It should be one of the aims of a pan-African organization like CODESRIA to contribute its knowledge

and expertise, and that of its networks, to these regional and continental debates and forums. Most of such debates result in specific policy strategies or frameworks. Regional institutions such as ECOWAS and SADC, and continental ones like the AU Commission would welcome inputs and contributions from CODESRIA.

In addition, these institutions have compelling needs, such as policy analysis, monitoring and evaluation to which institutions like CODESRIA could contribute by identifying expertise from its networks and rosters to carry out these out these tasks. In view of the limited capacity in Africa's national, regional and continental institutions, it is a form of waste of resources if such organizations

as CODESRIA, with an extensive knowledge base and academic networks, cannot develop (amongst their niches) one for policy-oriented research. Just as we observed above that there is need for a beneficiation of raw material resources on the continent itself to add value to them, so also is there need to beneficiate knowledge to add value to policies, strategies, programmes and capacity of African institutions. In our view, this is currently a missing link in most countries in Africa – the link between research, knowledge and policy.

Parallel Processes or Synergy?

Drawing from the above observations, despite past constraints, institutions of learning and research in Africa should seek innovative ways in which they can

share their resources (knowledge and expertise) with state and civil society institutions. There is no single model under which this can be done. Some experimentation may be necessary. But the current parallel or silo processes are expensive and unsustainable in the long term. Possible synergies should be explored whereby CODESRIA's research and academic resources could be made 'user-friendly' to RECs, AUC, CSOs, etc. In turn, opportunities could be explored whereby these same institutions could be facilitative to the work and agenda of institutions such as CODESRIA. The crises in Africa are so immense and the resources to address them so limited that synergies and economizing of resources should be sought at every opportunity.

Gender, Migration and Social Policy

The 21st century opened with renewed attention and focus on intellectuals and knowledge production in Africa, after more than two decades of neglect of institutions and a massive exodus of academics from the continent. The epistemic communities which had developed after African independences and formed self-referential groups in several countries had largely dissipated, to be replaced by academics engaged in churning out graduates at the same time as many were pursuing livelihoods in several enterprises, often in the private universities that have sprung up over the continent, or in the centres outside the institutions. Beginning with the 1980s, a consultancy culture has blossomed across Africa, with dire consequences for a sustained culture of basic and long term research, whether in the social or natural sciences. The rapid appraisal of African issues and problems also resulted in short-term policy measures which have largely failed to stem the tide of African drift and increased dependence.

To some extent, attention has been devoted in the first decade of this century to fixing some of the technical problems – whether of space, infrastructure, staffing, conditions of service and governance of institutions. The forced merger of institutions in South Africa to address bantustanization of higher education, increased attention by donors who had

Takyiwa Manuh
University of Ghana
Legon, Ghana

stayed away from the continent over two decades, and internal debates across Africa about higher education and the public good or the production of the next generation of scholars (the Association of African Universities, CODESRIA), have succeeded in focusing some attention on these problems. In a few institutions, some attention is also beginning to be focused on the content of education and on knowledge production generally, and on increasing both the intake of graduate students as well as ensuring the timely completion of their programmes.

CODESRIA has an enviable record of sustaining a small but influential epistemic community that provides African viewpoints, explanations and perspectives on Africa. It has sought to bring scholars isolated by decades of conflict and war into this community. Its increasing publication catalogue is helping to highlight African intellectual production which is often neglected in indexes of global knowledge production.

In the next decade, it should aim at strengthening and expanding this community, and popularizing and increasing its pub-

lication output. It should aim at strengthening its links with continental and other organizations of scholars across the global South. In that connec-tion, CODESRIA's ongoing collaboration with CLASCO should be extended to the Indian sub-continent and to Asia generally. Links with scholars in the Caribbean should also be deepened and mutual exchanges developed.

Specifically, in terms of research, CODESRIA has developed several mechanisms for initiating and supporting research, often on topics that few other organizations are interested in. Its documentation of ongoing democra-tization efforts in Africa, through its publications series, provides a counter-weight to the journalistic and often sensationalist accounts that pervade discussions of Africa. But CODESRIA could do more in popularizing its outputs and engaging with policy makers at both the continental and national levels, in collaboration with national associations of researchers,

Undoubtedly, there are several directions in which CODESRIA and African research, more generally, could focus on over the next five to ten years. While there is a danger of a shopping list approach, I would like to lay emphasis on three areas that should be focused on and strengthened over the next decade. These areas are as follows:

1. Gender Research in Africa and its Diaspora
2. African Migrations
3. Social Policies in Africa

To my mind, there are several synergies among these areas, in addition to their salience and policy relevance; both social policy and migrations are deeply gendered, although this is usually ignored in scholarly research and policy. While CODESRIA has fostered gender research in Africa, understanding and ongoing debates as well as teaching on gender in several institutions needs to move away from an instrumentalist, under-theorized and uncomplicated narrations to confront its ambiguities, nuances and contestations. A fruitful area of collaboration with our South American colleagues in CLASCO and elsewhere would be research on understanding recent developments and social policy in South America, a continent which bore striking similarity to Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. The area of migration offers several sub-topics for exploration, as well as bearing directly on new and old African Diasporas.

CODESRIA should also aim at finding answers to the following questions:

- How should research agendas be developed?

- What is the role of the private sector in developing research?

- Which actors are involved in knowledge production and utilization?

- How can the dialogue between researchers and decision-makers be improved?

Methodology of Integration Between Cognitive Systems and Comparative Studies

Since it was established in 1973, CODESRIA has been a serious cultural and scientific project. This has brought the Council a great deal of independence, and led many cultured people and competent scientists to cooperate with it. Its seriousness has also attracted young researchers who aspire to pursue serious research.

For a while, CODESRIA has been interested in the methodology of integration between cognitive systems and comparative studies on a continental level. Paying attention to meeting of generations and to gender is a very important element to earn the respect of collaborators, donors and international organizations. It is also important to mention that more involvement and cooperation with outside organizations and outside sources of funding, in conducting research vis-à-vis the African agenda, is also worth considering.

CODESRIA pays much attention to addressing the major issues that face the African nations and issues that have international implications. This point should be kept in consideration. Such issues include:

- Facing the mechanisms of hegemony on the socio-economic level, the so-called structural adjustment policies, conditionality and the concepts of democracy; and

- Paying attention to how nations face the conditions and mechanisms of globalization. This is done through

Helmi Sharawy
Arab and African Research Center
Cairo, Egypt

studying the activities of national sovereign conferences, as well as studying the collapse of the racist regimes and its impact, human rights issues, African conceptions of gender, and social and political consequences of pauperization policies.

It is worth noting that CODESRIA has to pay attention to general issues that could be considered the 'essence' of plans and strategies rather than just being parts of research. These issues are in different areas and include:

- The Pan-African Movement, and the current political debate about it;

- The factual tendencies and policies toward pan-Africanism in vast regions like West Africa, and the possibility of their occurrence after the Abuja Peace Agreement, etc;

- Islamism and Islamophobia in the Arab North Africa, not to mention the religious heritage itself and its impact on social and political issues;

- The ongoing crisis in The Horn of Africa (North-East Africa), and the collapse of state in Somalia;

- Post-apartheid in southern Africa;

- Cultural considerations that impact

politics and social development in many ways;

- The new protest movements in response to impoverishment and despotic regimes across the continent.

Thinking about future plans does not mean that we should dispose of much of the previous plans. Yet, as we plan for a new phase, we should focus on the new issues that have become urgent priorities due to the unstable situation in Africa. We should also develop new methods to follow up global events. In this concern, we should stress the following:

- Political Thought: This is active now by the rapidly-changing reality concerning pan-Africanism. The light should be shed on the future of these movements on the continental or regional level which is not predictable, as well as their impact on the current different political stances which came from new territories (North and West Africa for example).

- Social, Economic and Cultural Human Rights: This concept has expanded to include issues related to citizenship, minorities, hegemony, social exclusion and its effect on immigration and the situation of women, children, retirees, the disabled and foreigners.

How does all of this relate to social thought about comprehensive change and reform? This point is also related to studies on the efficiency of social move-ments and

protest movements in acquiring social rights, apart from political organizations.

Background Issues

Obviously, the following issues will assist CODESRIA in effectively ordering its priorities in the new research agenda:

- Some phenomenon are more common in a region than another within the continent, such as Arabism and Islam in the North, the Anglophonic and Francophonic conflicts or completion in western Africa, immigration within Africa and to Europe, and water in the Nile basin.

- From the political dimension, there are certain issues related to the situation and definition of political parties, democracy, political and social powers. Is the political opposition only displaying democracy? What about the local communities, sub-languages, and the excluded rural areas in the democratic process?

- The impact of the growing influence of new big powers in Africa, especially with the shift in the course of globalization after the world economic crisis, and the impact of all that on the national, regional and international policies of the continent (the growing influence of China, Japan, Malay, Turkey, Russia, etc).

- The cooperation between Africa, Asia and Latin America, and how it impacts the independence movement in Africa, and the ability of its nations and peoples to have a significant weight on the international level).

Necessary Mechanisms

Besides the important research studies, books and reports which CODESRIA publishes, and besides the specialized summer institutes, the following are recommended for inclusion in CODESRIA's new priorities:

- Focusing more on regional meetings, and their scientific and cultural product and public influence (that is, to study and track regional activities more closely;

- Issuing an African Strategic Report, which will lead to better understanding between countries. This will enhance the role of the institutes and conferences organized by CODESRIA. Besides covering all the relevant phenomena, the report will cover the activities, cultural product and the abstracts of research studies on different regions. The report should be published in these regions in their respective languages.

Bridging Gap(s) Between Theory, Policy and Practice

The challenges facing Africa must be viewed in tandem with the immense opportunities for innovation and change that are also available to the millions of the continent's inhabitants. In the new millennium, the number of educated Africans is much greater than in the past. Paradoxically, this increase in the number of those who are engaged in the production and dissemination of knowledge is accom-panied by a decrease in the levels of Africa-centered production and documentation of research activities. Three major gaps exist which should command our attention: (1) production of knowledge in classrooms and the socio-economic and political realities of African states and societies; (2) the politicization of knowledge production, especially about economic development and democratic governance, the unfor-tunate consequence of censorship of African intellectuals, leading to a 'braindrain'; (3) the absence of viable pan-African institutions with the capability to engage in formulating solutions – beyond theorizing – about stemming both Africa's 'braindrain' and the export of the continent's youth to

Ruth Iyob
University of Missouri
USA

serve as cheap sources of labour in the Mediterranean and across the Atlantic.

These three inter-related phenomena need to be viewed not as discrete research agenda 'items'

But as outcomes of deeply embedded socio-economic and political deficits which urgently need the combined attention of African educators, intellectuals, and policymakers. We have all been aware of this problem for a major part of the last century but what is required now is a concerted effort to: (1) assess the levels of knowledge production and dissemination in 21st century Africa; (2) analyze the social, economic and political impacts of the 'brain-drain'; and (3) craft transnational policies that go beyond rhetorical acknowledgement of the continent's loss of major sources of both skilled and unskilled. Looking at the interface between 'continental' and 'trans-continental' panAfricanism may provide us with new pathways towards the resolution of a very old problem.

The most salient barrier to the production of both theoretical and reality-based knowledge in Africa is the absence of bridges between curricular programmes and applications of classroom knowledge to the dynamic realities of 21st century African states and societies. Knowledge about Africa continues to be produced outside of its borders and the continent's intellectuals – facing censorship, restrictions and, at times, threats to their existence, trek to Europe, the Americas and Asia in pursuit of asylum and gainful employment. True, this is not a new challenge but it is one that may require us to re-consider and re-examine ways in which this enduring problem of the 'brain drain' can be repatriated to the continent. In light of the imperatives of sovereignty and non-interference in other states' affairs, it is understandable that some African leaders are discomfited with raising the issue of exodus of skilled and unskilled Africans, since it may pertain more to some countries and less to others. Nevertheless, the inability or unwillingness of post-colonial African states to concretely address this problem has now led to an expansion of the 'brain-

drain' to include youth who have become 'transnational migrants', producing 'remittance economies', trekking across the Mediterranean and crossing inhospitable desert areas to offer their skills and labour to benefit societies of the our former *metropoles* and distant capitals. I would like to suggest that we consider examining the empirical realities of the 'brain-drain' on the continent – both from a research point of views as well as a policy that would require a pan-African perspective. With refugees flowing outward from the DRC, the Horn of Africa, Lusophone Africa, the Maghreb and West Africa to all corners of the earth, examining the social, economic and political impacts of this flow(s) of populations requires concerted efforts to understand this phenomenon.

Where to begin? Maybe identifying the gap between the rhetoric of governments as well as societies who decry the 'loss of our youth and our professionals' need to be reconciled with the existing particular realities – economic, social and political – which fuel these population flows.

To focus on the realities on the ground in Africa does not mean that we need to ignore the importance of research. The contemporary crossings and (re)crossings of Africans across the Mediterranean and the Atlantic have captured the attention of western societies, reexamining the impact of the flow of Africans into their countries. While some point out the inhumane treatment of the *sans papiers*, others join the crescendo of a chorus denying contemporary Africans a sense of belonging to this sea which once had enclosed the Afro-Mediterranean world.[1] The Berlusconi-led excoriation of Neo-Fascists against the 'black peril' in Italy, the growing tensions between the inhabitants of the *banlieux* and the citizens of the *Republique Françoise* are examples of the need to engage in the production of knowledge that gives voice to Africa's narratives. The absence of an Africa-centred production of knowledge has wider repercussions for the success of continent-wide efforts such as the African Union's advocacy of 'African Solutions for African Problems'

Note

1. Voices countering the shrill anti-immigrant propaganda can be found in the reasoned, scholarly discourse focused on accessing the memory banks of the Italy's colonial period – a time when the Afro-Mediterranean world became symbolically visible – can be found in Andall, Jaqueline and Derek Duncan (eds.) Italian Colonialism: Legacy and Memory, Oxfordd & Bern: Peter Lang, 2005.

On the Question of Theory

A Brief Summary of Some Points Made in Relation to the Question of Theory

Some of the suggested themes of interest for future research direction include global change, environmental change, social policy, knowledge, emerging powers, indigenous knowledge, women; all with Africa at the centre, and a multidisciplinary approach without compromising the disciplines.

ome of the general discussion points made in relation to the above themes, besides questions of administration and funding, also appropriately address the important question of theory. CODESRIA needs to respond to two important issues – theoretical work and publication; and to aid this, putting in place a Visiting Scholars programme (Mohamed Salih). To re-focus and improve on these issues of theory and publication, should CODESRIA be thinking of establishing a policy-working group to replace the existing training methodology workshops? (Ebrima Sall). CODESRIA is limited by the state of universities in Africa, and should decide whether to be a CODESRIA of the masses or of the elites (Aminata Diaw). For this reason, its work is not just training, but to nurture excel-

Ifi Amadiume
Dartmouth College
USA

lence; not just books, but the content of these books, hence a need to re-organize training for manageability, relevance and critical thinking.

For the work of theory, a research institute is different from a think-tank, and knowledge production should be linked to the purpose of social transformation – contributing to a new episteme. How do we create enduring knowledge in a constantly changing world? If theory is to be African focused and African driven, where do we locate it? In indigenous knowledge production and conserved within that knowledge, and this should be a major project for CODESRIA. Endogeneity is how to theoretically approach Africa's development in the post-neoliberal context (Jimi Adesina). CODESRIA needs a critical series to record what theoretically is being said at each period, that is, a programme of an anthropology/sociology of knowledge or a social science of knowledge in Africa and around the world. Such a programme would record our ability to analyze and understand Africa as well as the world; analyze epistemic ruptures in theory, new ways of doing things, understand African realities for African relevant theories, and redress the problem of an increased theoretical marginalization of Africa and greater social dispossession, toward a better understanding of new changes. In this way, CODESRIA can be locally grounded and globally relevant.

On theory and policy in bringing research to policy and to public issues, the local, cross-boundary, and global again seem relevant, especially in being able to overcome the limitations of the nation-state in even dealing with the overall Africa (Manthia Diawara). Also in this context is the ghettoization of gender (Sylvia Tamale), and CODESRIA should work on bridging the gap between academic and policy institutions. For example, CODESRIA and ECA, the largest think-tank in Africa should complement each other, and should note the difference between consultancy and policy advising. While consultancy responds to a codified industry, policy-making can make a transformative impact; therefore, research and think-tank should both be

for debate and critical thinking. We should be aware of the commoditization of research as a symptom of neo-liberalism, and therefore the research agenda of CODESRIA should not be negotiable. CODESRIA is for a better world for humanity.

My Thoughts and Proposal on the Question of Theory

Due to the technological revolution, there is a lot of emphasis these days on the easy availability of new ICT, online media and social media and the accompanying access to an immense volume of research and academic material, leading also to an over saturation with information, sometimes called information overload. An aspect of this information bom-bardment relates to the question of selective reading in academic research, without one feeling left behind or lagging behind. There is a difference between following the trend to be 'current' in quick response, no matter how rushed and disconnected the linking of ideas and research, and the slow and steady picking of one's steps in a continuous path, without the pressure of the immediate here-and-now of a quick response to current events and demands. This is often at the expense of a deeper genealogy or a longer trend of ideas in a theoretical path. Scholarly methods require organizing research material and making a contextual sense of it all, often involving many years of tedious research work and writing. This process seems, to me, quite distinct from the work of quick response. The present challenge might be how to recognize and weigh the merits of these two trends, and if and when necessary to separate or combine them to strengthen the scholarly tradition of advancing and enriching knowledge. These two trends of a deeper knowledge tradition and an immediate quick response pattern can be related to points made and questions raised by our colleagues:

On a Long-term Vision of Where to Take CODESRIA in the Next Period

Fatima Harrak – on the side of a deeper knowledge tradition and continuity – is concerned with what has been achieved, and what to pass on to the new generation, especially new insights. I understand this to mean an assessment of major works and milestones achieved in major thematic projects, and current new insights – certainly building on existing works. This, to me, is the key concern that

contextualizes the work of CODESRIA, and around which all other discussions revolve. It demonstrates knowledge of and confidence in the work that has already been done, and that CODESRIA is poised to test new ideas. This is the core scholarly and intellectual aspect of its work. Other issues can then be compartmentalized and related to this core base or foundation. In this business of academia, we don't really just chance on such an amount of research, but work and build toward a more knowledge-informed and better future.

Some of the other issues are about the material and infrastructural conditions in which research work is done in Africa, compared to global standards. Abdul Raufu Mustapha raises a major concern about where African universities are digitally compared to top universities in the West, particularly in light of increasing market-driven processes of internationalization. Here again, there is the question of CODESRIA defending its core base of knowledge production, while gladly embracing, more and more, the new Information Technology and social media. But then again, the question can be raised about how the speed of this new social media generates more of the quick response pattern at the expense of a deeper knowledge tradition. There is also the problem of influence and accoun-tability in relation to dealing with private businesses and corporations who own and control the new IT and media. A counter-argument might be to strive for more accessibility and openness. Either way, it raises a concern about the politics of knowledge.

The other problem related to poor conditions of research in Africa that perhaps determines the choice of research traditions is addressed by N'Dri Assie Lumumba, who reminds us of the efforts that scholars elsewhere are making to overcome the limitations imposed by poor institutional infrastructure. Cuba, for example, is also facing the problem of neglect of academic institutions, but with resourcefulness is doing well with what it has. Cuba chooses to put her efforts in the kind of research tradition that involves critical thinking. Latin America has, and continues to be a source of inspiration to progressive democratic traditions in the South and the non-aligned movement for self-determination. A bottom-up peda-gogy was a core ideological lesson learned

from Latin America. This national approach to popular education and conscientization is different from the national structural deficiencies in African higher educational institutions to cause a research institution like CODESRIA to do basic writing and research training. It is a great source of deep worry and concern to know that all of Africa still does not have free primary education, when we thought that in the twenty-first century, we would be boasting of free secondary education. This is in the category of 'first-things-first', so that our researchers and intellectuals can focus on their work. The effort and energy that CODESRIA puts into this level of training needs to be re-assessed within the process of deciding a future direction in the next period of its work in this competitive climate. It involves making a political and strategic decision about its own history; what strategies to carry over, what to discard, and new beneficial challenges to tackle and incorporate in its plans for moving forward in the context of all the issues being raised about the present national and global climate of research work.

Ebrima Sall says that CODESRIA has been a pacesetter. There is no doubt about the cutting-edge work that has been done in CODESRIA. However, I would not agree that the development period has come to an end; hence, a need to reflect and plan a long-term vision of where next to take CODESRIA in the next period. We can give a straightforward answer by providing a list of thematic projects as listed above. There is also the more challenging question of re-setting the ideological button to provide a guideline and direction to maintain the tradition of CODESRIA as a pacesetter. This current period of energized assertiveness, globally articulated in diverse ways, seems to be quite ripe for a renewed independent and cutting-edge vision. A major challenge involves a discourse about theoretical paradigms and their implications within a broad framework. Here, I have in mind, under the global internationalization, the limited regional epistemological libraries within Africa itself that inform our work.

It was a big deal some years ago when Anglophone intellectuals began to check out the works of Francophone intellectuals, and vice versa, and Lusophone African intellectuals to some extent. We can see this interest in the variety of the

ten journals produced by CODESRIA. There is *Africa Development*, a quarterly bilingual social science journal that focuses on issues of the development of society – perhaps the strongest and more frequent of the ten journals. The other journals are mostly published biannually on a variety of subjects that include history; identity, culture and politics with ethnic studies; anthropology; review of social science methodology; sociological review; international affairs; review of books; media review; higher education; and selections for social sciences. All of these journals emphasize a focus on Africa, even when international or co-produced with other research centres elsewhere. Besides topical interests, even extending to the new Asian powers, especially China in Africa, there are provisions for more analytical, critical and theoretical works.

CODESRIA provides a website of thematic bibliography on themes from research workshops, conferences and publications. Roughly, these works can be arranged under two categories to illustrate my point about a deeper knowledge tradition. By this, I mean issues of long-term concern, requiring strategic, continuous deeper reflection, constantly re-visiting the perennial questions, in view or in the context of new social manifestations. The other category is what I refer to as immediate quick response – meaning issues of immediate concern. Under the big theme of secularization, we have:

1. Economics themes (Capitalism, Dependency and Structural Adjustment);

2. Democratization themes: The State, Governance, Social Movements, Conflict Resolution (talking or fighting), Human Rights;

3. Modernization and Development.

All of these themes are dealt with in relation to the state and civil society in African nations, even when examining the questions of Labor, Youth, Citizenship, Intellectuals, Women and Gender. I would think that these are the themes of the big theoretical questions, with a long history of engagement with the theories of secularization that all are still globally grappling with, regardless. A continued focus on these big theoretical questions with a deep history of research in CODESRIA could mark the difference between CODESRIA and the more recent research institutes and centres.

In the second category of quick response are the more recent targeted themes dealing with specific and immediate policy needs, it seems to me. These themes, under a quick response approach, mostly deal with under-funding, bad management, etc., as for example, Migration, Health, Sports, The Media and ICTs, Higher Education, Sexualities, Music and Art, Security.

What is further needed for where to take CODESRIA in the next period are more empirical and theoretical inputs from a broader framework of regional epistemological libraries within Africa itself? Our works are dominated by the Western Anglophone libraries and intellectuals, and less by the Francophone libraries and intellectuals. There are now calls to incorporate African Arabophone libraries and intellectuals, Lusophone libraries and intellectuals, the global pan-African libraries that include the diasporic extensions of Africa, especially the Caribbean, African American and Latin American libraries and intellectuals, and most importantly the indigenous libraries and intellectuals. How marginalized seasoned scholars that are versed in these other areas of knowledge production that relate to Africa must feel!

A discourse about theoretical paradigms within, between and across these examples of a broad framework of libraries of knowledge production indicated above would be useful if undertaken by the network of scholars associated with CODESRIA. This can be approached through an assessment of individual works done so far, the organic theoretical developments and the journey of these theories – in other words, further application of these theories to new topics and themes, and perhaps more interestingly to interdisciplinary challenges. I can illustrate from my own work by first posing some relevant questions of 'what' and 'how' of theory. How do we go about developing long-lasting theories from non-Western and non-Eurocentric perspectives for something new and different? How would we go about doing this: a) within disciplines for the depth of knowledge? b) Between and across disciplines (interdisciplinarity) for the insights and the excitement of discourse? c) What do we mean by a progressive-informed scholarship, as opposed to what? Would this mean as opposed to being politically informed? Is a progressive-informed scholarship the same as a politically informed scholarship? These are the sorts of useful and self-directing questions that we periodically need to pose and address, especially during periods of historical change, re-alignments and transformation.

There is a difference in works that test, challenge and advance the demands and ideals of social change and social justice. This is as opposed to works that marginalize and further disempower. With a progressive consciousness, there is a different level of engagement, after the basic work has been done. There is more openness and more freedom of analysis and comparison – all done with an open mind, focus and anticipated excitement of engagement. Can we say that this is where CODESRIA is at this time in history in its present work for African ideas and perspectives for Africa's self-propelled development and future, and in excitedly anticipating where next to take CODESRIA in the next period? In response to some of these issues, I do think that the question of theory is very much linked to a search for a new paradigm.

In relation to theory and paradigm, I am, certainly, constantly revisiting, further developing my own theoretical positions, and relating them to the works and ideas of other scholars. I can briefly illustrate this from aspects of my work with networks of scholars that are associated with CODESRIA. One aspect of this work is related to the theme of social movements and the place of women in this research and theories. Critiquing both the history and character of the inherited post-colonial state in Africa also involves a re-examination of the composition of civil society in relation to marginalized structures and organizations of traditional societies. This is what has led me to the structural function of gender analysis, and both the history and structural roles of indigenous women's organizations in Africa, and their central place in theories of gender and social movements. It puts to shame the non-inclusiveness and inadequacies of the contemporary state, its colonially defined structures of governance and its narrow notions of civil society. Similarly, an interrogation of paradigmatic theories of Social Justice and

God-biographies, that have a patriarchal bias, and therefore raise questions of gender marginalization and inequality, and necessitates working on uncovering counter-patriarchal principles and theories that are implied or hidden, if not sometimes glaring, in my ethnographic data. Following a long engagement, interrogation and analysis, this has resulted in the theoretical challenges of providing an alternative analysis in flexible gender, paradigmatic opposition, matriarchal principles and relational matriarchal principles, matriarchy and the alternative of an overarching broad framework of a progressive matriachitarianism that captures all these trends.

It is obvious that I have been addressing some of the relevant questions of 'what' and 'how' of theory that I posed earlier. In this, the keyword is inclusiveness in proposing progressive theoretical visions of where to take research and society in the next period. There is no need to further marginalize and disempower sections of society, partner nations and other human beings – some might even add other natural elements to human beings, arguing that this is how we ought to be thinking now, and what we ought to be doing way into the 21st century. In this context, I would like to sound a note of caution, especially on the search for a more inclusive paradigm by marginalized areas of research. Some of the publications are beginning to address the question of the neglect of research in Arabophone Africa, in spite of the massive existing literature in Arabic or Ajami (Arabic written in an African language script, not a translation). Here is certainly where Francophone and Arabophone scholars can work together with Anglophone scholars, especially in West Africa. But then, we have the whole of North Africa, the Maghreb and the Sahel; and as Nouria Remaoun of Algeria points out, social sciences in the Maghreb needs to link up with work in other parts of Africa – as for example, in the history of anthropology, sociology to address the question of modernity. However, I would expect that these researchers would not lose sight of

the questions of imperialism, colonialism and patriarchal oppression that researchers and scholars of Africa address in relation to encounters with and presences of other regions of the world. I would also expect that Africa remains the focus of such research and scholarship in a positive way, especially in seeking to propose a paradigm of text as a milestone of civilization that does not consider the hieroglyphics originated in ancient Egypt. We should not lose sight of the anteriority of Egypt. We should also not ignore the work of Sheikh Anta Diop on this question and more.

The huge question of indigenous people and the indigenous library and intellectuals is closely linked to the search for inclusive paradigms by marginalized areas of research. James Murombedzi of CODESRIA spoke with sincerity and palpable passion in proposing that Environmental Research be given a central stage. This, in my view, is a topic that could be approached on the two levels of a deeper knowledge tradition and a quick response. The two themes of the struggles of indigenous rights and the struggle for social justice both call for a continuous theoretical engagement, and also immediate policy research on issues of natural resources, peasants and rural populations. Murombedzi points out the fact that environment or environmental issues are marginalized in theory and the social sciences, despite the fact that issues of environment are central to the daily lives of ordinary Africans, although acknowledging a new Climate Change programme in CODESRIA.

Knowledge about the daily lives of ordinary Africans is about the indigenous library and intellectuals. If we were not so focused on playing catch-up in agendas set elsewhere, this is a major area that needs deep research and theoretical proposals for an on-going analysis and discourse. It is interesting that the hegemonic Eurocentric focus on environment is panic disaster and catastrophe-driven, due to the accesses of capitalist exploration and exploitation. However, when environment is examined within the

landscape of indigenous knowledge and its people, the picture changes, and we are faced with different theoretical questions from both synchronic and diachronic holistic approaches. Sometimes, I have used the terms symbiotic or cyclical to describe this relationship in which both take and give back to each other – in which the marching forward of civilization sees the humbling imperative of renewal coming from the infinite environmental landscape. In the capitalist thinking of neoliberalism, development pursuit is unidirectional, and environment fits into this same equation of continuous encroachment, exploitation, contami-nation, pollution, over-use and eventual depletion. This is the reason for the panic and concerns driving the environmental movement.

How can we come up with counter-capitalist theories in indigenous libraries? On the one hand, we say that the global system is falling apart (Samir Amin). On the other, we sound an alarm about 'ferocious globalization'! (Olukoshi, Ouédraogo and Sall). All of this points to the importance of theoretical works on Africa-informed alternatives. In this context, I would like to invent a term such as 'decapitalization' and 'decapitalism' for the study of conscious reverse thinking and approaches in social thought and social practice. One approach to 'deca-pitalism' is the study of the indigenous library for an abstraction of theories embedded within, or implied, in order to bring indigenous voices and thoughts into contemporary discourse. The other approach is an alternative theorization of 'decapitalism' (slowing down and rever-sing course for another better pathway) within contemporary discourses from an interdisciplinary perspective. Both these approaches – in which Africa can look at itself and take its cue from within – need not be mutually exclusive, as I demon-strate in my recent work on theoretical progressive matriarchy, and the discourse of social text from the perspective of an indigenous social library.

CODESRIA, in my experience with it, is a place of research and scholarship, but also of affect and nurturance, all of which are important in producing excellence.

DEBATES

Marikana and the politics of Law and Order after Apartheid

Suren Pillay
University of Western Cape
Cape Town, South Africa

With their *pangas*, and machetes mixed in with ethnic regalia, the striking mine workers at Marikana have become 'spectacularized'. It is a stark reminder that the mineworker, a modern subject of capitalism, is in this part of the world also the product of a colonial encounter. Many of us are trying to make sense of the massacre at Marikana through the obvious dire economic conditions, wage rates, and inequality that these workers face. We should also try to make sense of it through the lineages of law, order and the new configurations of politics emerging in post-apartheid South Africa. The dominant response to violence in South Africa, whether in its political or criminal forms, reveals a post-apartheid state more and more relying on law, order and administration to govern, and less on the anti-colonial and demo-cratic idealism of its founding political and moral vision.

A few years ago, when I was doing research on criminal violence at the Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa, we decided to visit Bogota in Colombia, to learn more about the innovative policies that two successive Mayors introduced into that city, which seemed to have effective and dramatic results in lowering crime rates. On the trip, we also visited Sao Paolo and Rio in Brazil. In Bogota, we met with the former Mayor Antanas Mockus, and we learnt about an approach which emphasized less force and punishment. In the Brazilian favelas, we witnessed the opposite – the militari-zation of a war on gangs who themselves act like military organisations. What we heard and saw in Bogota encouraged us to think differently about criminality and violence. Mayor Mockus, a former university president and philosophy professor, had argued that in countries of the South, like Bogota, the most effective and sustainable trans-formation required to reduce violence would be to produce a self-regulating citizen who chose to act in a particular way, not out of fear, but out of social and self-regulation. While Rio turned to militarized policing, Bogota hired creative artists and drama students from local universities as key members of its crime fighting team. What seemed more than eccentric turned out to be just the opposite, reflected in declining levels of aggression and homicide during the periods in which these policies were allowed to come to maturity. We decided to invite the former Mayor of Bogota, Antanas Mockus to visit South Africa. In meetings in Cape Town and Johannesburg, his ideas were met with much enthusiasm and interest. But familiar habits are difficult to change, and our policy makers demurred on the opportunity to govern creatively rather than punitively.

We can track with alarm the growing faith in retributive law in order to change practices considered inappropriate to civic and communal life in post-apartheid South Africa. In Cape Town, the Democratic Alliance, for example, draws more and more on the discredited policy of zero-tolerance policing which emerged from the United States, an approach widely associated with the criminalization of racial minorities like African-Americans and Latinos, who make up the bulk of the offenders in US jails today. The Premier of the Western Cape renewed a call last heeded under the State of Emergency of the 1980's, for military troops to be sent into townships, this time to deal with gangsterism. And the President has authorized the deployment of military troops inside the country from September to January. We have to be concerned with the proliferation of punitive actions to transform social behaviour. We have to ask ourselves if this is the guiding ethos of a new form of citizenship we want to cultivate? Up to now, we could take cynical comfort in the lack of capacity to implement the bulging phalanx of regulatory laws and administer them efficiently. This tended to ensure that their bark could never really become their bite, beyond certain geographical spaces in the city. Then came Marikana.

Whilst law is celebrated as the highest form of civilization, we should also recall that the history of law is entwined with colonial conquest and rule. This complicates the legitimacy of certain legal traditions in most of the formerly colonized world. Law was not only an expression of the codification of order, but also the expression of the imposition of liberal conduct, and of liberal paternalism. The rule of law and constitutionalism, the scholar James Tully tells us (drawing on the Australian experience), is not a culturally neutral set of ideas, but is rather the hegemonic imposition of a set of norms which originate in colonial conquest and are imposed on subject populations in order to transform their behaviour to produce what we might call good modern subjects. The early justifications of colonial rule were based on doing good for the native by, for example, outlawing 'barbaric practices' in India and Africa in order to 'civilize' us. My point is not to celebrate these outlawed practices, but to point out that liberalism has historically relied on the force of law to enact its paternalism on populations in order to transform conduct into what is seen as the good subject and good citizen, who acts and thinks in a particular way. Apartheid was, after all, a legal policy.

In 2001 the respected legal historian Martin Chanock observed with some consternation:

> As it had been nearly a century earlier, South Africa was colonized in the 1990s by a new kind of internationally sanctioned state: this time, not the 'Westminster system' but the 'Cons-titutional State'. A form of political liberalism that had notably failed over the whole history of the South African state to attract significant support from any segment of the population,

found its philosophy entrenched at the heart of the new constitution. The constitution inflated the role of law, and the political power of judges, in an attempt to remedy the faults of the previous state's version of the 'rule of law'.

If the injustice of apartheid was the violation of human rights on a large scale in the past, then justice in the future would be thought of as the commitment to the elevation and protection of human rights in the present. We should have some reservations about what happens when the terrain of justice and freedom becomes saturated by law and rights talk, and when law and rights talk becomes the hege-monic discourse through which we are can legitimately articulate political questions.

In our present context, liberal freedom is now revealing its ever present flipside – liberal paternalism, which now seems to be running rampant as the only way in which political authority thinks it can reliably transform our conduct. This encourages more rules, not debate and dialogue designed to transform us through alternative modes of self-regulation. If political authority only relies on the wagging finger, it quickly comes to rely too much on the wagging stick.

Its worth reminding ourselves that, in the constitutional order of post-apartheid South Africa, the grassroots mass has been transformed from being seen as a source of activism to being seen as a population to be transformed, as a target. The developmental state views the population through the lens of administration. It brings to bear experts who devise technical solutions to socio-economic and political problems. The re-casting the mass as an object of development has meant that majority rule has been interpreted by the state to mean rule 'on behalf' of the majority not rule 'of' the majority. Given the legacy of apartheid, this is not suprising, since most black South Africans – the majority of votes – make up the same majority living in poverty and are the target population of developmental upliftment. In other words, they have become, in the eyes of many in government, 'the problem' to be solved, not the majority to be repre-sented. What we are witnessing now is a growing divide between majori-tarianism and the popular. Understanding the majority as 'the problem' has brought out the liberal paternalism of the state and, along with it, the growing tendency to wave the wagging finger. And the more it wags its finger, the more it loses command over the popular. The battle over the popular is becoming a babbling scene of contention, where rival unions, expelled youth league leaders, and new political leaders on the ground battle for hegemony with the traditional ruling party figures of the tripartite alliance – the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions.

When these populations start asserting themselves as they are doing now, they quickly shift from being considered objects of development to targets of repression. They are easily labeled and named – as impatient and ungrateful, auto-matons of external interference, 'third forces', counter revolutionaries or political opportunists – everything but citizens asserting legitimate political expression, simply because these are expressed in increasingly illiberal forms and repressed more often now with illiberal methods. When those populations upon which rules are imposed, already historically suspicious of law, start to find its developmental paternalism offensive, authority slides into authoritiarianism. Liberal colonial occupation and the massacre have never been far apart in history. When subject populations resist the liberal gift they are supposed to express gratitude for, the historical response has been to reveal the ultimate authority that gives law its power – violence.

Marikana is its most ferocious recent expression, and might henceforth be the symbolic name we give to that event which revealed the disjuncture between law, politics and people in post-apartheid South Africa. The German political theorist Hannah Arendt was of the view that a turn to violence signaled the end of politics. For Arendt, politics is a process of agonistic engagement with contending ideas, and the moment one resorted to violence to do the work of politics, politics has vacated the building. A reliance on violence, and the punitive aspects of law, as the only way in which we transform social conduct, signals a failure of the imagination, and of political thinking. Are our political leaders, who can rightly claim to be the proud inheritors of a radical tradition, and of a liberal tradition, really be so bereft of their sensibilities to govern that they are already resorting to violence to do the work of politics?

Renewing Development Paradigms for 21st Century

The "Development Issue" in the Face of 21st Century Challenges

The world Has Entered a Phase of Profound Transformations, and the Conception of Structures that Will Govern the 21st Century Societies is Still Indefinite

The crisis in the financial system, marked by the September-October 2008 collapses, is indicative of the scope of forthcoming transformations. Yet, this crisis implies a systemic re-assessment, especially regarding the reproductive patterns of accumulation and growth, modes of access to the natural resources of the planet and the management of their use (the 'ecological issues'), modes of organization of societies (democratization, gender issues, issues concerning respect for diversity, those concerning the necessary progress of participatory forms of political and social democracy), the geopolitical balances and issues related to the security of peoples and nations.

The challenge of current transformations has been taking shape since a few decades, and the accumulation of distortions in political, economic and social societies was visible. Nevertheless, the nearly fundamentalist double dogmatic of the 'market' conceived as the sole regulator of 'rational' economic life, and of the 'multiparty electoral democracy' – conceived as an exclusive means to manage political life – contributed to the concealment of the importance of malfunctions, evading the challenge of 'thorny issues' through programme phrases such as 'good governance', 'fight against poverty'. This crisis makes it necessary to frontally address these 'thorny issues'.

The time for major changes in the organization of our world has come from now on. The futures (plural) are varied and ill-defined. 'Another world is possible' some said. 'Another world is already under construction', we say. But what will it be? Will it really be 'better'? This is far from certain. The responsibility of thinkers and actors of change is, under these conditions, crucial. It is no longer possible to deal with problems on a daily basis, separately from one other, having confidence in inherited theories and knowledge.

Samir Amin
Third World Forum
Dakar, Senegal

The necessary renewal of "development' concepts and paradigms is part of this effort, which calls for a renewal and deepening of the theoretical thinking and a reopening of the debate on possible and desirable alternatives.

"Development" is a Societal and Historical Concept

Development cannot be reduced to the dimension of economic strategy, which is itself defined by growth, be it associated with policies of social distribution of income that are deemed acceptable ('social justice'). It cannot either be considered as a juxtaposition of these economic strategies and 'political' projects like that of democracy. Development is a societal concept, which integrates all dimensions of social life into a coherent set.

'Development' has always been conceived in relation to objectives set by societies – where do we want to go? And these objectives have always been historical in the sense that their conception has evolved from one phase to another of the globalized trans-formation, has been different from one region to another of the global system.

A glimpse at development, as it was conceived and implemented since the end of World War II, helps to measure these societal and historical aspects of the paradigms that commanded the formulation of objectives and means. As a first step, which covers the first three or four decades after the war, three families of 'development' models were conceived and implemented: the Welfare State model, developed in the West (because it was indeed a model of social development); the model of 'actually existing socialism' (Soviet and Maoist), and that of Asia and African countries which have regained their independence (the

'Bandung model') and Latin American countries ('desarrollismo' and the dependence theory).

The latter is the origin of the 'decades of development' formulated by the United Nations and all national and international development agencies (a term then reserved for the South). The paradigms of this family of models were the product of interactions between, on the one hand, universalist concepts associated with the globalization under construction; and, on the other, formulations of State powers in charge of the reconstruction and 'modernization' of Asian, African, and Latin American nations.

Development in Bandung Era

Although the results of these interactions have obviously produced specific economic, social, political strategies that are specific and different from one southern country to another, it is not impossible (and unnecessary) to draw up an 'important common background'.

These implementation concepts and strategies legitimized the ambitions of southern nations to 'modernize' and 'become industrialized', but not necessarily to 'become democratic' (whatever the definition on this subject).

The building of inward-oriented national economies was the common goal, although the range of means could have been initiated. The framework was then that of the nation, whether it was the size of a continent-size country, or modest and even small States. The objective met the requirements of 'inward-oriented development', called here 'self-reliant' and differently there. It was associated with social changes that powers wanted to implement and control, whether they were more or less radical reforms (agrarian reform, nationalization and/or creation of a public sector), or progress in social services (education and health in the first place).

The imagined inward-oriented constructions were not 'autarchic', but open to globalization (trade expansion, capital and technology import), which nevertheless seemed to be negotiated. The work and

interventions of UNCTAD illustrate this multipolar ambition at that time.

Decades of development have produced large-scale transformations in all Southern countries. It is now easy to measure its limits and shortcomings. First, the democratic deficit: in varying degrees, strategic programmes implemented were conceived from the top (by regimes of 'enlightened despotism'?), the base being mobilized to support, but not to conceive. In this context, the response to major challenges has been excluded from the strategies implemented, in particular women's rights (gender issues) and long-term ecological concerns. But it is equally wrong to erase the 'positive' aspects of the achievements of the time – an upwards social mobility which helped the formation of new, or almost previous, middle, non-existent classes in southern countries, the opening to aspirations to have respect for human rights. It is not casual that countries, which have mostly made progress in the Bandung era – among others, through a more marked control of their inward-oriented development – are currently in the ranks of countries now called 'emerging', while others are relegated to the 'Fourth World' category wrongly qualified as marginalized. The former participate – or aspire to participate – in building the future of the world, and the latter are forced to passively adapt to it.

In Latin America, ECLAC, under Raul Prebish, played a decisive role in initiating the contemporary development theory. Its proposals known as 'desarrollismo' have widely been discussed and criticized, particularly by the dependency school.

This Page in the History of "Development" was Definitely Turned from the 1980-1990s

The erosion and collapse of development models in previous decades created conditions favorable for a general offensive that took the name of 'neoliberalism, globalization and financialization'. The Cancun conference in (1981), dominated by Reaganism and Tatcherism, marked the implementation of the return to 'market fundamentalism'. All thorny issues were cleared up by the free affirmation that 'markets' will solve, by themselves, all problems. The (necessary and useful) openness to global markets was reduced to 'free trade'. As it was impossible to promote regulated international trade,

favouring the progress of the weakest, the globalized integration of monetary and financial markets (double deregulation of currency exchange rates and interest rates) has brought this dogmatic to the extreme (or has deliberately ignored that methods invented to reduce the risk of individual agents, increased by the double deregulation, and accentuated the collective risk). Conventional economists were mobilized to legitimize this dogmatic of markets.

The dogmatic of markets was made in frameworks that required the full submission of political and social demands. The nation was considered as a 'vestige of the past', allegedly exceeded by 'globalization' (expressed in general and vague terms), and the State's intervention as 'irrational' by nature. 'Democracy' was formulated in a 'blue-print' valid in all places and all circumstances, reduced to the adoption of the principle of electoral multi-party system, whether it was accompanied by the declaration of a few human rights. It was decreed that the expansion of markets ('neo-liberalism'), based on over-privatization (including public services), would strengthen, by itself, the aspiration to the adoption of the proposed Democratic formula.

The facts – that is, developments of the real world in the decades of neoliberalism, globalization and financialization (from 1985 to 2007) – did not reinforce, in any way, the statements of the implemented option. The malfunctions, already visible in post-war development models, were not reduced by the adoption of liberalism, but worsened on the contrary.

'Development' in the best sense (humanist) of the word must be 'inclusive', that is, produce results that must benefit all peoples concerned (particularly those from popular classes) at each stage of their deployment. Or what the liberal, globalized model has produced is – in the best case – an 'exclusive' development. GDP growth, high though it was (in countries called emerging), fully bene-fited a minority (20% maximum), putting the vast popular majority on the sideline, victims of stagnation and even regression of their living conditions.

The word 'development' has been erased out of the dominant rhetoric. It was assumed that this word was synonymous with market development (itself liberalized without limits) as they were supposed to

solve all problems. Dysfunctions inherent in the implementation of adopted principles generated a deepened political and social crisis. The Democratic formula was associated – when it was implemented – with social regressions and not with social progress. It eventually lost its legitimacy and favoured popular withdrawals on other illusions nurtured by para-fundamentalists called 'religious' or 'ethnic'. Theocracy or ethnocracy replaced the aspiration for democracy.

No doubt, during the last two or three decades, new proposals, whose positive potential can not be ignored, were introduced. They include the visible strengthening of claims in terms of gender equality, awareness of the dangers posed to the planet by the waste of natural resources (the adoption of energy-eater production models in particular), and the affirmation of human rights and civil society rights in the face of State powers. Yet, they yielded only poor results because of the obstacles that liberalism posed to their progress. The established facts recognize that poverty and insecurity affect more women than men, reducing by the same token, progress in gender issues for middle-class women.

Dysfunctions whose effects h ave been observed were not reported to the essence of the imposed model, but for adjacent reasons unrelated to it. Thus, parallel speeches were developed, nurturing 'modes' in the most trivial sense of the word. So, the speech on 'poverty reduction' ignores the fact that the liberal model is the cause of growing inequality (observed) and even of the increase in exclusions. Thus, the 'ecological' speech limited itself to seeing degradations and threats and to sounding the alarm without relating them to the reproduction logics of the system. Consequently, the observation of the decline in democratic demand and the increase in rallies to political strategies involving terrorist action has not led to the questioning of proposed democratic models. The same for speeches on 'good governance' (and the denunciation of corruption), which have not raised the issue of the social nature of the powers of 'bad governance'. None of these speeches is satisfactory by itself, for failing to articulate the issues it raises about the deployment of the logics of the so-called liberal and globalized model implemented.

Yet, despite the evidence observed and the aggravation of real problems, which were considerable, the 'globalized neoliberal' model described itself as a 'final solution', the 'end of history'. Its untenability – not only for reasons given by ecologists (in fact, perfectly correct) but also for a set of political and social reasons associated with the deployment of the system's economy – was not envisaged. The collapse of the financial section of the system is not casual. The globalization of liberalized monetary and capital markets was the vulnerable heel of the model as a whole. This collapse, predictable and foreseen (but not by conventional economists), underscores the necessary examination of the systemic dimensions of the crisis. It is in this context that the debate on the 'development issue' should be opened again.

The programme under consideration is aimed, from the identification of major themes that needs to be opened up to research and debate, at making critical proposals to them. Of course, the programme does not start from scratch in the research and critical thinking on the experiences of the past (the time of Bandung and desarrollismo), the recent past (structural adjustment) and the present (current policies in emerging countries, new trends in Latin America). TWF and WFA are already engaged in such criticism, like other centres of thought and researchers, not only in Africa, Asia and Latin America but also in the United States, Canada, Europe, as in some institutions (e.g. UNRISD). The originality of this project lies in the fact that it offers a more systematic synthesis of all themes (see the next section) and Southern regions, which enables it to move up to the general and compre-hensive visions like what is proposed by the major institutions of the international system (OECD and World Bank, Compe-tent Departments of the European Union and major international cooperation agencies).

Programme Proposed by Research and Debate

The research and debate networks in partnership with the Third World Forum (TWF) and the World Forum for Alternatives (WFA) organized in recent years' meetings that helped to identify the blocks of problems which, taken together, cover the main challenges the current societies are confronted with.

Although these challenges are to some extent 'permanent' in modern times, their expression has always been renewed due to the world's evolution. For developing countries, these challenges that can be seen as development challenges cannot be taken up through a 'return to past solutions' (those of the Bandung era in 1955-1980 for Africa and Asia). There cannot be a Bandung 'remake' even though the same challenges to which appropriate responses have not been brought are still arising, but in the system's structures and the transformed conditions of its reproduction. Social movements in the last decade basically faced these problems. The experience of their struggle could not be scorned, but should be subject to a critical examination of the explicit or implicit strategies implemented by these struggles and to the underlying theoretical support.

The project is not aimed at making a catalogue of those movements' claims and protests. It has a more ambitious goal: addressing 'thorny issues' for which neither the theoretical support necessary for their examination nor the practice of the proposed responses has a status of 'convincing speeches'. The plurality of analysis, underlying theoretical proposals, as well as those requiring strategic responses to challenges, is essential.

The definition proposals for the research and debate areas have been directly inspired by the work conducted by TWF and WFA during the last 1997-2007 decade as follows:

Democratization Combined with Social Progress, as Opposed to the Democracy Formula Dissociated from Social Progress

It is understood that, democratization, considered as an endless process – not to be reduced to a permanent formula – concerns all aspects in social life, its bases within the family (gender issue), the company (workers' participation), community (decentralization of authority), national State, regional economic groupings and the world. Democratization embraces the identification of individual and collective rights, the definition/invention of institutional forms necessary to bring them into reality, the organization of political authorities, economic management (of the company to the nation and to the world), and the identification of cultural and ethical values.

How can we structure all issues raised by democratization to the economic and political strategies guaranteeing universal social progress?

Reconstructing the Labor Force's Unity

The transformations in the work organization, combined with techno-logical innovations under deployment (computer science in particular), have made obsolete the organizational and struggling forms of the working classes that were efficient at that time (powerful centralized unions, political parties sharing workers' claims, strikes, demonstrations and elections). Through the fragmentation of the working classes' status, high rate of employment and job insecurity, the 'informal sector', some renewed challenges have been identified. While formal policies implemented by liberalism managed to take advantage of the situation, particularly through delocalization, putting in competition workers from different regions of the world. But beyond this, the objective changes in the work organization are of concern to unions and political parties.

The assumption underlying the identification of this problem area is that the authority systems can only integrate the objectives of social development if and when working classes are able to impose them.

New Agrarian Issue

Farmers in the three continents of the South make around half of humanity. Beyond the diversity in the status and the production and trade conditions, it should be noted that the expanding modernization through the 'market' produces by its own process, the disintegration of farming societies. And this disintegration was sped up in the last decades to the delight of the liberal project. The result is nothing but an impoverishment (the majority of the poor and the malnourished are made of rural populations) and the high unbearable migratory pressures. Urbanization in the South greatly results from these pressures, leading to a relentless 'suburban' overdevelopment. The migratory pressure is also expressed by the desperate attempts to travel towards developed countries (boat people whose tragic lot has become a matter in the daily life of hundred thousands of candidates in Africa).

The response to the challenge implies considering from the start an indispensable specific objective of genuine development policies: ensuring land access (in the slightest possible inequality) to all farmers in the world. Considering this objective requires a definition of appropriate macro-economic strategies and democratization policies.

The agrarian issue has always been at the centre of the challenges faced in the 'modernization' of African, Asian and Latin American societies. However, the challenge does not appear in the same shape from one region to another. In some regions, history has produced the big latifundium property – the emergence of modernized and grown rich farming societies by the side of poor microfundium owners without any resource, and landless and often jobless farmers. The access to land and resources for its efficient farming and the capacity to offer farmers decent and constantly improving income, slow though it would be, requires reforms of various nature (land, cooperatives reforms) combined with macro-economic policies regarding credit and marketing, coherent with industrialization policies. In the major part of sub-Saharan Africa, the agrarian issue arises in different terms. In itself, land access is not necessarily a major pre-condition. The main line of this challenge is the lack of access to resources for land farming which remains insecure beyond survival. The response requires both imaginative rural development policies and macro-economic policies coherent with the former.

The agrarian issue is a 'new' one in the sense that the very general responses given by the triumphant liberalism of the last decades are nowadays subject to reviews imposed by visible disasters, such as food crisis and massive crop defection.

Negotited Economic Globalization

The so-called liberal economic globalization that was implemented by international institutions established to that end – WTO in particular – ignores development requirements.

These requirements impose a definition of the issues to submit to the global negotiation, used as a supplement to the social negotiations conducted (or to be conducted) in national and, possibly, regional contexts. Likewise, they require the identification of those who should participate in negotiations – governments, professional organizations (farmers for example as regards international trade of agricultural goods and food products), society civil organizations (consumer organizations, nature's rights) and others.

Democratic and Multi-Centrist Political Globalization

The geopolitical, or even geostrategic and military dimension could not be excluded from the prospect for building 'another better world'.

The conceptions commanding the international community's political organization, defined by the UN Charter, international law, practices in conflicts management, have been questioned in the last decades, among others by the 'militarization of globalization'. As a matter of fact, the results are closer to chaos, locking up entire countries in tragic impasses, than a consensus reorganization – which implies negotiation. The analysis of the strategies implemented by authorities, those of dominant powers, and those of others, the definition of international law goals (that some people would reduce to business law) and procedures ensuring their implementation, is undoubtedly the essential precondition to the construction of a global system authentically multipolar and potentially democratic.

Regionalizations to Build a More Balanced, Multipolar and

Democratic System

Regionalization is often presented as a positive asset in itself and in all circumstances. This is not obvious. Regionalization is good or bad, depending on the conceptions of the global system for which it is articulated. There are forms of regionalization, which are hardly constitutive blocks of the neoliberal, financial globalization in place (now in crisis). Can we propose other forms of it, consistent with the development objec-

tives set by the paragraphs above (inclusive development, paving the way for democratization associated with social progress, articulated on a negotiated globalization in this spirit)?

The regionalization projects to be discussed in this context cannot be 'strictly economic', that is, they have to organize the principles of trade within the community and between the community and the rest of the world. They also need to be consistent with political projects of the concerned States that are at least convergent if not unique.

Political Strategies of Transformation and their Development Stages to be Considered

Transformation involves both the internal organization of national societies and that of the global system. It can only be seen through a succession of stages that involve the identification of immediate, short-term objectives and long-term civilization prospects.

The short term begins with the review of responses to be given to the crisis (financial, but general) of the so-called neoliberal system whose page is being turned. These are the responses of peoples and especially of popular classes, the desirable responses of State powers. Can we, in this spirit, set strategic objectives that are convergent with one other?

The long term cannot be excluded from the debate. Which humanist civilization do we aspire to? The diversity of theoretical concepts concerning the evolution of societies, the diversity of cultural values and the imaginary civilization find their place in an unavoidable debate. Is convergence in respect of this diversity possible?

The Role of Intellectuals

The debate on the role of intellectuals (creative) in the real history of societies (our responsibility) is not unimportant, modest though it may be. Intellectuals did not fail, in Africa and Asia (and elsewhere), to meet the challenge in the past. It is not possible for them, at this moment of global transformation, for better or worse, to evade their responsibility.

Market Failures in the Financial System: Implications for Financial Sector Policies, Especially in Developing Countries?*

Joseph E. Stiglitz
Columbia University
USA

Throughout the world, banks and the financial sector more generally have become widely criticized. They didn't do what they were supposed to do, and they did what they weren't supposed to. I have likened the financial sector to the brain of the economy: it is central to the management of risk and the allocation of capital. It runs the economy's payment mechanism. It intermediates between savers and investors, providing capital to new and growing businesses. When it does its functions well, economies prosper, when it does its jobs poorly, economies and societies suffer. Unfortunately, there is a growing sentiment that in recent years, banks in many countries – including the US and Europe – didn't do their job well. The resulting losses are enormous – in terms GDP alone, in trillions of dollars.

Regulators have been blamed, but mainly for not doing their job of preventing these abuses. For this, there is no excuse, as there have been periods (notably in the decades beginning in the mid-30s) in which regulation worked. But then, interests and ideology combined to push an agenda of deregulation and liberalization. Even before that, ideology had become fashionable in the 1980s, economic science had explained why markets in general (and financial markets in particular) were, on their own, neither efficient not stable – a perspective reinforced by a wealth of historical experience.

Recent scandals throughout the world – entailing bankers engaged in predatory and discriminatory lending, abusive credit card practices, market manipulation (the libor rate) and a host of other misdeeds have led to the view that there is a moral deficiency, a culture of corruption. In each instance, the bankers attempt to claim that there were a few rogue actors (a few rotten apples); but the pervasiveness and frequency of the problems reinforces the view that there is a systemic problem. While banking may attract those that are more motivated by financial rewards than, say, the intrinsic rewards of public service or the pursuit of knowledge, the fact is that my students who went into banking did not seem that different from the others, to have this evident lack of a moral compass. The answer, it would seem, is that there have been incentives and opportunities that have led to this kind of behaviour.

This then is the key point: we need regulations to oversee the financial sector, to make sure that private incentives are better aligned with social returns. This alignment hasn't happened on its own, and it won't happen on its own. It is only when private rewards equal social returns that markets are efficient, that Adam Smith's "invisible hand" has any chance of working.

When I was chair of President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers, I was charged with reviewing the regulatory structure of the US financial system, asking what we hoped from our regulatory system, why we had these regulations, and if we could design a system that achieved its objectives more efficiently. Later, as chief economist of the World Bank, I confronted similar issues. Much of this was before the rash of scandals over the past decade. But even then, there was a concern that banks weren't necessarily doing what they should be doing. Too many seemed more focused on investing in government bonds or speculating on foreign exchange than providing loans to local enterprises. More recently, they have found it easier to make money lending to consumers than to businesses.

Too many seemed to be enjoying the good life, taking in deposits at low interest rates, and relending the money to government at high interest rates. IMF policies, insisting that these banking activities be undertaken by the private sector, but, in the effort to fight inflation, leading to high interest rates, meant a transfer of large sums of money to the private banking sector. These transfers could not be justified in terms of a distinctive service that they provided, but were rather evidence that markets weren't working the way they should – with competition, the spread between the lending rate (especially to the government) and the deposit rate should have been minimal.

With the near collapse of the global economy in 2008, there is an increased awareness of the importance of market failures, those circumstances in which markets fail to act in an efficient and stable manner, in the way that they are supposed to. I already suggested one of the fundamental reasons for these market failures – a misalignment between private rewards and social returns. Nowhere are market failures more pervasive or more important, with such profound consequences for our economic system, than in the financial sector. In this lecture, I will provide taxonomy of these market failures and how regulatory and other policies can help overcome them. But rather than providing a simple list of the key market failures – from imperfections of competition, asymmetries of information, incompleteness of markets, coordination failures, externalities – I approach the subject from the perspective of the taxonomy of interventions – the key areas in which governments, all over the world, have intervened in financial markets, to help make them serve the public interest better.

Safety and Soundness

Depositors put their money into banks, in the expectation that they will be able to get their money out when they need it. Banks, of course, don't leave the money idle. They know that they can 'use' the money to earn returns – and in a competitive world, those returns (less charges for managing the money) are returned to the depositors. There are two difficulties: (a) the bank may not invest the money well, in which case there won't be any money to repay the depositors; or (b) the best use of the money is long term

investments, but individuals may demand their money before the projects reach maturation. Other investors may not have confidence in the project(s) the bank has undertaken, and so it cannot sell the project for what it had hoped to get. This latter problem is known as that of maturity transformation – short term funding for long term projects. The inability to get funds is referred to as a liquidity problem, as distinct from the solvency problem (where the bank has, say, squandered the money). But the distinction between liquidity and solvency is somewhat artificial: if everyone could agree on the value of the long term project, presumably there would be someone to whom the bank could sell the project to reap the long term returns now.[1]

Ensuring Safety and Soundness

There are several ways that regulators can deal with these problems. Unfortunately, banks have often used their political influence to ensure that regulators do not use the full set of possible instruments, so that the problems of safety and soundness appear even in seemingly well-regulated banking systems – as evident in the US, when the entire banking system faced collapse in 2008. Here is a short list of some of the key regulations:

(a) They shut down banks that are undercapitalized. They want to make sure that the owners of the bank have substantial sums at risk, including the franchise value;

(b) They restrict connected lending;

(c) They attempt to ensure that bank owners (and managers) are 'reputable';

(d) They restrict excessive risk taking. This includes restricting excessive leverage, imposing a variety of other liquidity and capital constraints, and restricting lending practices (e.g. imposing minimum standards for mortgages, for instance on the size of the downpayment, and other restrictions on the form of mortgages);

(e) They restrict the incentive structures of bank officers, so that they do not have incentives for excessive risk taking and excessively short sighted behavior;

(f) They prevent banks from becoming too big to fail, knowing that such banks have an incentive to engage in risk taking, since taxpayers are bearing part of the downside risk;

(g) They prevent banks from becoming too intertwined to fail, or too co-rrelated to fail, knowing too that banks have an incentive to do so, knowing that then taxpayers will have to bail them out;

(h) They insist on transparency and good accounting standards, so that market participants – and not just regulators / can exercise oversight, and make judgments about the viability of the institutions;

(i) They attempt to restrict conflicts of interest (such as those which arise when the same bank issues securities and makes loans), realizing that this both undermines confidence in capital markets and increases the likelihood of bad lending.

From this brief list of what regulators 'could do', it is apparent that many regulators don't use the full panoply of instruments. For instance, in the US, regulators have been lax in capital requirements, not adequately restricted incentive schemes, done little about the too-big-to-fail banks, have allowed banks to use flawed accounting standards, and have not insisted on adequate transparency. Consider, for instance, the issue of transparency in CDS's and other derivatives. Not even the ECB was able to forecast the consequences of what would happen in the event of a deep restructuring of Greek debt, or to assess the differences that might arise from a voluntary or involuntary restructuring. It was lack of transparency that contributed to the freezing of the interbank market after the collapse of Lehman brothers, and it is lack of transparency that is contributing to the weaknesses in that market today.

Because it is so hard to control the behaviour of banks directly (it's hard for regulators and supervisors to observe and monitor every transaction), regulators have regulated not just organizational and individual incentives, but also the structure of the banking system itself. The separation of commercial and investment banking helps avoid some conflicts of interest, and avoids contaminating commercial banks (which are supposed to invest the savings of ordinary households safely) with the risk taking culture of investment banks. Moreover, at least in the United States, after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act which separated the two kinds of banks, concentration in the banking system

increased rapidly, and the problem of too-big-to fail became much worse.

Market Failures and Safety and Soundness

The underlying 'market failure' is, of course, that of imperfect information. If depositors could perfectly observe (and evaluate) what the bank was doing with its money, then the moment it did something that might put the depositors' money at risk, they could and presumably would withdraw their money; and this would exercise effective discipline over bank officers. But bank officers know that they have considerable discretion. Similarly, the 'agency' problem that arises from distorted bank manager incentives arises because the bank (and ultimately, the banks depositors, shareholders, and bondholders) can't perfectly monitor what the bank managers are doing, the riskiness of the loans, etc. What can be monitored (if only imperfectly) are things like leverage, connected lending and, most importantly, the incentive structures.[2]

That is also why it is important to ensure that there are appropriate 'organizational' incentives; for if there are perverse organizational incentives, there is a risk that such incentives will get translated in subtle ways into the behavior of managers. That's why there has to be regulations preventing the growth of too-big-to-fail banks.

But there are two further subtle market failures. The first is that because of the implicit guarantee for too-big-to-fail banks, they are subsidized, and they grow at the expense of others not necessarily because they are more efficient or provide better services, but because they are more subsidized. Unless government takes action to offset this implicit subsidy, financial markets will be distorted.

The same thing is true, of course, in looking at banks from different countries, as is increasingly becoming apparent in Europe. A country's banks are backed by its government, but the strength of that implicit guarantee depends on the fiscal strength of the government. American banks are thus the beneficiary of a larger implicit subsidy (an implicit subsidy that was made explicit in 2008-2009). Within Europe, German banks are the beneficiary of a differential subsidy. Inevitably, there is no level playing field. If we are to have an efficient financial sector, governments

have to 'level out' this playing field. This is especially important because there are biases in the patterns of lending of large banks and of foreign banks (which I will discuss at greater length later). Large banks tend to lend less to small and medium sized enterprises, and more to governments and large enterprises; and so to for foreign banks – except that, in addition, they have a preference for firms from their own country or multi-nationals more generally.

Because with banking crises, there will inevitably be bailouts, and markets know this, there is an incentive, as we have noted, for banks to become too inter-twined and too correlated to fail. They have an incentive to create systemic risk problems, and these incentives are exhibited at the individual level as well: when managers follow the herd, and the herd fails, they are not likely to be puni-shed. "Everyone else did it". "Who could have foreseen these problems?" These are the refrains that one repeatedly hears.[3]

Size is easy to observe. 'Intertwining' is more difficult. Correlated behaviour is often hard to observe, but even when observed, harder to prevent. While intertwining is difficult to observe, some of the worse forms – those that impose the most systemic risk – can easily be stopped: the buying and selling of CDS's on each other.

Correlated (herd) behavior characterized the stampede into subprime mortgages in the last decade, and into Latin American loans in the 80s, and into East Asia in the 90s. The creation of universal banks has, I believe, made matters worse, as had the increasing prevalence of short term investors. All are pursuing the same short sighted goals and all face the same opportunity set. Creating a more diverse 'financial eco-system' – with some firms specializing in housing, others in insurance, others in long term investments, others in commerce – has not only benefits from specialization (returns to scale in gathering and processing information), but in creating institutions that have different objectives and face different constraints and opportunities. While there is some loss of diversity 'within' the institution, there is still full diversification within the economy, and it is that which matters most. Investors who want to diversify their risks still can. While the probability of some firms going bankrupt might increase, the probability

of systemic risk would decrease. The system as a whole would become more resilient, especially to large shocks (e.g. macro-economic disturbances).

But the information market failures are multi-layered. Not only can't regulators monitor banks well, neither can shareholders and depositors. Nor is the record of the credit rating agencies very credible. The notion of capital market discipline is largely a myth. If a regulator who has carefully pored over the banks books and its loan portfolio can say that a bank is in fine health and, a few weeks later, it goesbankrupt, how can shareholders and depositors hope to appraise what is going on. Non-trans-parent derivatives have made a difficult matter impossible. Without knowing not only the holdings of these securities, but also the counterparties, and the balance sheets of the counterparties, there is no way of really assessing the bank's position. Even apart from this, accounting standards in many countries have made matters difficult. In the US, even non-performing mortgages don't have to be marked down, as the US, in an attempt to avoid bank recapitalization, switched from marking to market to marking to hope – hope that perhaps these mortgages would eventually be repaid. 'Mark to market' accounting has been confused in other ways: a bank that faces a higher risk of bankruptcy receives an uplift to its valuation, because of the decrease in the value of its debt. An accounting system designed to help equity and bond investors appraise the value of these securities has been misused by regulators.

There are some important corollaries of these information and agency problems, which I simply list here:

1. Good corporate governance needs to be part of the regulatory regime – ensuring, for instance, that banks are not run just for the interests of managers, and that shareholders have say-in-pay;

2. But regulators can't rely on good corporate governance. There have to be restrictions particularly on the design of incentive pay systems;

3. There is a need for better accounting systems, and more careful thought about the appropriate use of accounting systems and their interaction with the regulatory system. Mark to market accounting can, on its

own, be pro-cyclical, which is why it has to be accompanied by macro-prudential regulations.

Leverage

A major reform in the aftermath of the crisis is to require banks to have more capital. They have resisted this. I suspect, though, that not even Basle III has gone far enough. The proclivity of banks to take on excessive leverage has been a subject of extensive discussion. There is one obvious reason: the higher the leverage, the greater the implicit 'bail-out subsidy'. But this is not, of course, the banks' argument. They seem to believe that it is more efficient for banks to have highly leveraged. The most important insight of modern financial economics is that of Modigliani and Miller (for which they received the Nobel Prize). They observed that when a firm takes on more leverage, the equity becomes riskier, and thus the price of equity should rise, so much so that (ignoring taxes) the value of the firm remains unchanged, even though the cost of debt is seemingly lower than the cost of equity. There is no such thing as a free lunch. They also ignored bankruptcy costs. But with bankruptcy costs, as banks take on more leverage, there is a higher probability to default – a fact that should have been obvious before the crisis.There is some debate about the rationality of capital markets. Do investors really realize this? If they don't, then bank managers can take advantage of investors' ignorance of risk by increasing leverage. But of course, what is going on here is really a hidden redis-tribution – from uninformed investors, who don't realize the risk that they have undertaken, to the banks' managers. But overall societal efficiency is reduced, because of the additional expected bankruptcy costs.

Macro-economic Stability

The objective of safety and soundness is closely related to that of systemic risk and macro-economic stability. When a small bank fails, we may be concerned about the depositors, but the ripple effects will be limited. But when a large bank fails – or a large number of medium sized banks fail – it has macro-economic effects. The deepest and longest lasting downturns are related to bank failures (though sometimes the causality runs the other way – deep and long downturns will inevitably be reflected in bank failures).

By the same token, if the government has to bail out a small bank, the costs are easily managed. The costs of systemic crises can be huge, amounting to a significant fraction of a country's annual GDP. That is why it is especially important for the government to prevent systemic risk. Interestingly, before the crisis, few governments paid attention to this issue, though a few academics (Allen and Gale 2001; Greenwald and Stiglitz 2003) had done so. I have already discussed one of the policies that is essential for preventing systemic failures: avoiding too-big-to-fail, too-correlated-to-fail and too-intertwined-to-fail banks.

But 'macro-prudential regulation' is designed to ensure that the financial system does not contribute to cyclical fluctuations, and in so doing, reduces the risk of systemic failure. Credit bubbles have been a major source of economic volatility since the beginning of capitalism. An increase in credit fuels a bubble, which increases the value of collateral, which leads to further credit expansion. Banking regulations, strictly enforced, have often contributed to this credit cycle. When the bubble breaks, bank net worth is greatly reduced, and banks are forced to contract their credit greatly. The contraction of credit contributes to the economic downturn. There is an obvious way to try to tame the credit cycle: when the economy is in a boom, increase capital requirements, which dampens the availability of credit. Tightening mortgage standards directly dampens a housing bubble; increasing margin requirements may dampen a stock market bubble.

Market Failure

The key market failure is that there is an important extenality from the collapse of the financial system. Just like toxic wastes pollute the environment, America's toxic mortgages polluted the world's financial system. Obviously, individual banks don't take this into account in deciding how much leverage to undertake, or how intertwined to become with other banks. In fact, they want to maximize the externality – because that increases the likelihood of a bail-out. There are other market failures that are essential to understanding the necessity of government intervention. If equity markets worked well, a bank that lost capital as a result of a bad event (the collapse of the

real estate market) could easily recapitalize itself. But, because of information asymmetries, equity markets do not work well. There is what Greenwald and I call 'equity rationing'. The cost of raising new equity is so high that banks would rather contract than pay the cost – the dilution of shareholder value – unless they are ordered to do so by the government (and even then, it may not be possible).

Access to Credit and Allocation of Credit

A major responsibility of the financial sector is to allocate credit. From a social point of view, what matters is social return. From the bank's perspective, the question is what returns it can extract, related to the interest rates it can charge and the likelihood of default. Or that would be the case if (a) managers' interests were well-aligned with that of the bank; and (b) the bank bore all the costs of failure. As we noted earlier, there are major failures in both individual and organizational incentives that lead to excessive risk taking and short sighted behavior. But it similarly can lead to more lending for speculative real estate and consumption than for productive investments in, say, manufacturing or employment generation, or to increase productivity in agriculture. The gap between social and private returns has always been there, but it may be getting worse, and may be worse in developing countries. Development entails large developmental externalities, which banks typically don't take into account. Moreover, development requires long term credit, but banks have traditionally focused on short term lending (which can itself be explained by information imperfections). But changes in corporate governance in recent years have encouraged them to be even more short-sighted.

Foreign banks' interests and information exacerbates these problems. Key to job creation, employment and enterprise creation in developing countries is lending to SMEs, but that requires highly specific information, in which foreign banks may be at a comparative disadvantage. Recent empirical evidence shows that foreign banks do indeed lend (proportionately) less to SMEs, and this, in turn, helps explain why developing countries, where foreign banks play more important role, have grown more slowly. The problems are further exacerbated by

the greater concern that foreign banks may have, that the governments may expropriate or take other actions that will reduce their capacity to 'extract rents' from the country. This induces the firm to have an even shorter term horizon. There are three ways of dealing with this problem. The government may impose constraints on lending – minimums (e.g. to underserved sectors, like agriculture and SMEs) or maximum (real estate). It can use such restraints to reduce consumer lending. Secondly, the government can attempt to lower returns on categories of lending where social returns are less than private returns (as in speculative real estate), by imposing higher capital adequacy requirements or deposit insurance rates. Thirdly, the government can set up specialized development banks. In the hey-day of the Washington Consensus, countries were told that development banks would inevitably fail. Banking was an activity to be reserved to the private sector. What has happened since then has forced a rethinking. On the one hand, America's private banks performed dismally – the waste of resources, now in trillions of dollars, is greater than that of any democratic government. On the other hand, Brazil has had an extraordinary successful development bank, which has played an important role in that country's economic success. It is a bank that is twice the size of the World Bank. The failure of some development banks provides a note of caution. But appropriately structured, with appropriate oversight, development banks can be an important source of needed long term finance.

It is clear, looking at patterns of lending, in both developed and developing countries, that prevalent patterns of lending do not reflect social returns. Too much goes to land speculation, too little to job and enterprise creation. In general, in credit markets, private and social returns are not well aligned. The lender only cares about the returns he is able to appropriate. The dollar returns from speculation may exceed those to real investment, and if so, that's where the money will go. Moreover, banks, like other private sector firms, are short sighted; development, on the other hand, is long term.

It is hard for government to micro-manage lending, and that's why interventions have to be limited to the broad interventions described above. But it is important

to note that there may be social as well as narrowly defined economic objectives. Banks, on their own, for instance may engage in discrimination and red-lining (not lending in certain areas). Regulators may ban this kind of discrimination, and impose stiff penalties when they detect it. Consumer Protection In almost all countries, governments have taken an important role in protecting both depositors and borrowers.

Protecting Depositors

Depositors have to be protected, because there is no way that the typical depositor can be sure of the financial position of a bank – as we noted earlier, even the regulators haven't been able to do a very good job. Deposit insurance is motivated by three market failures: first, an information market failure. Because of asymmetries of information, banks may take advantage of unwary depositors, putting their money into investments that are risky. Without deposit insurance, there would be a lack of confidence in the banking system, particularly in difficult times. This leads then to the second market failure: this lack of confidence in banks could lead to a run on the banks, with large systemic effects.[4]

But some critics of deposit insurance argue that deposit insurance actually creates its own moral hazard problem: depositors don't have any incentive to monitor banks, and thus banks have an incentive to undertake risky lending, which allows them to pay higher interest rates. But, as we have noted, there is in fact no way that depositors could effectively monitor banks; but even if they could, monitoring is a public good. It is inefficient to have every individual engaged in monitoring. Monitoring should be done by a public body. Regulators have to be attentive to the incentive effects that insurance gives rise to – just as any insurance company needs to be attentive to moral hazard. In this case, it should look carefully at any firm paying high deposit rates: is it doing so because its transactions costs are lower (i.e. because it is more efficient) or because it is undertaking more risk.

Given the frequency with which banks fail, we now have a much better understanding of some of the factors that contribute, and again, regulators need to be attentive to these: excessive risk taking, excessive leverage, lack of transparency – and perhaps most importantly, excessive expansion (especially in the aftermath of market liberalization initiatives).[5]

Protecting Borrowers Banks around the world have learned that they can greatly enhance their profits by engaging in predatory lending and abusive credit card practices. This is not the place to provide a catalogue of the ingenuity that the banks have demonstrated. Banks often try to be deceptive about the interest rate and fees charged, including overdraft fees, and there has been an ongoing battle in the United States and other countries to elicit greater transparency, and to ensure that the fees are disclosed in a way that the borrower understands. A potentially important step forward in the United States was the creation of a financial products safety commission, to ascertain whether the financial products being sold do what is claimed that they do, whether they have 'disguised' risks – are they safe for human consumption? Other countries should follow this example, but developing countries should perhaps go further. Many of the new financial products are simply designed either to circumvent regulations or to fleece borrowers. Making markets simple will also make them work better – in a more competitive way. Thus, it makes a great deal of sense to standardize mortgages, e.g. fixed rate mortgages of 20 or 30 year duration, or at least mortgages with fixed payments and of long duration. Governments may go further by redesigning parts of the financial system. The Danish mortgage bond system has worked well for that country for more than 200 years – far better than the American system, which has failed massively twice in under two decades, and remains dysfunctional, with the government now underwriting almost all mortgages.

Competition

There is one more important reason for government intervention in the financial sector: to maintain competition. In many countries, the banking sector is highly concentrated, and even when it is not, banks often act in ways which suggest tacit collusion. It is hard to explain otherwise the persistently high returns – far in excess of competitive levels. Occasionally, we see evidence of strongly anti-competitive behavior. The credit card companies Visa and Mastercard (originally owned by the banks) set the interchange fees (the fees they charge merchants) at an extra-ordinarily high level, far in excess of the competitive level. It should take but a fraction of a penny to move money from the consumer's bank account into that of the merchant; it simply entails the movement of a few electrons. Yet, the banks and the credit card companies charged amounts that were ten, a hundred, a thousand times more. One grocery company was, in effect, splitting its profits almost 50-50 with the credit card company on credit card sales: for moving a few electrons, the banks/credit card company got as much as the grocery store got for all of its efforts in managing the complex operation of buying and selling fresh food. The credit card companies were, in effect, levying a tax on all of these transactions, a tax which however did not go for public purpose, but simply to enrich the coffers of the banks and the other owners of the credit card companies.

The scandals that marked the beginning of the century involving the bank analysts – touting stocks that they knew were 'dogs' – was so universal, and the cooperation they exhibited in a system that took advantage of uninformed investors to enrich themselves and corporate CEO's so pervasive that it is natural to suspect that there may have been tacit or explicit collusion. So too in the case of the recent LIBOR scandal. The remedy here is straightforward: stricter enforcement of the anti-trust laws (and stricter enforcement, with more criminal penalties for the fraudulent and manipulative behaviour that they have used to enhance their profits.) Breaking up the too big to fail banks too might create more competition. Financial and Capital Market Liberalization and Market Failure: A Review I want to end this piece with a brief discussion of capital and financial market liberalization – a reassessment based on the analysis of market failures in the financial market. An important part of the advice given to developing countries (e.g. by the Washington Consensus) was that they should liberalize their financial and capital markets, removing a whole variety of restrictions, including on foreign investment, sectoral allocations, etc. Regulation was stripped to minimal instruments, namely capital adequacy requirements. Universal banks were encouraged (with restrictions on securities transactions removed) and development banks discouraged.

The promise was that this approach would deepen financial markets. This would make financial markets more competitive; transactions costs would fall, funds for development would increase, and growth would increase. To put it mildly, this approach has failed in achieving the promised outcomes. Recent research has shown that those countries that took financial market liberalization further did get more foreign banks, but none of the ultimate or even intermediate objectives were achieved. Spreads in banking did not come down. Credit to small and medium sized enterprises went down. More broadly, credit to productive investments went down. More credit went to consumers and housing. One more, somewhat unexpected effect: large flows of money from the banking sector abroad, a repatriation of profits, the rents of the financial sector, larger, in Africa for instance, than ODA and FDI. Not surprising, the result was that growth was lower in countries that liberalized. Capital market liberalization too has not brought the benefits that were promised – it didn't bring higher growth, but it did bring more volatility.

The 'liberalizers' also advocated moving away from bank financing to 'markets'. The increased reliance on markets (as opposed to bank finance) too didn't work out as the markets advocated expected. I wrote, more than twenty years ago, that I was worried that the advocates of securitization had overestimated the benefits: they hadn't taken into account how the lack of accountability that would arise from securitization would lead to poorer mortgages (the moral hazard problem); they had underestimated the extent to which the returns would be correlated, so they had overestimated the benefits of diversification; and they had underestimated the risk of price declines. All of these problems were evident in the failure leading to the Great Recession.

Of course, for many developing countries, markets didn't develop in the way that its advocates hoped. The reason should have been clear: providing capital to new enterprises is information intensive, and markets are not good at doing this, at least with respect to small and medium sized enterprises. Until very recently, even in

the United States, only a small fraction of new investment is financed through 'markets'. It was foolish to think that thick and efficient markets would develop quickly in most developing countries. Rather, the focus should have been on strengthening the banking system, its ability to assess risks, and to provide credit to sustain growth and employment.

The countries in East Asia that were successful used financial markets to advance their development. They realized that unrestrained financial markets are neither efficient nor stable – and do not advance the country's development agenda. They were aware of the dangers of financial repression, the

problems that arise when there are, for instance, very negative real returns. They engaged in what I call financial restraint. They governed and shaped financial markets, and especially the banks, so that they served the country, and not the other way around. They realized that resources were scarce, and they couldn't be squandered on real estate speculation or fancy cars. The country needed real investments if it was to grow.

The Washington Consensus ideology has inflicted a high cost on developing countries, especially in Africa. In Asia, to a large extent, it was ignored. Latin America was richer. For two decades, it contributed to their slow growth, but they managed to keep poverty from soaring.

The Crisis of 2008 provides a moment for reflection, on the key importance of the financial sector, and of how ideology – flawed ideas about markets – led to a global disaster. In this lecture, I have attempted to review some of the lessons. It is clear that we needed better regulation. But more than better regulation is required. The government must take an active role in providing development finance.

I have attempted to provide some insights into why financial markets so often fail – fail to serve the economy in the way that they are supposed to – and into what kinds of policies can mitigate those failures. America is a rich country, but even it cannot really afford losses of the magnitude that its failed financial sector has inflicted. For developing countries

there is no choice: they have to make sure that their financial system serves their development agenda.

Notes

* This article was first delivered as Joseph Mubiru Lecture, Bank of Uganda, 16 July 2012, Munyonyo Conference Centre, Kampala. Also available at: www.bou.or.ug/ export/sites/default/bou/bou-downloads/press...

1. There is a macro-economic liquidity problem, where the Central Bank has so tightened credit, in an unexpected way, that there is simply no one able to purchase the project. Our focus now, however, is primarily on a liquidity problem facing a particular bank, not the financial system as a whole. The incentive, in the absence of oversight, for banks to take individuals' money and not repay is enormous. Even when there is not outright fraud, if they lend to their friends and family at low rates, without adequate scrutiny, they can walk off with profits when the gambles pay off, with depositors bearing the losses when things don't go well. The problems are even worse for undercapitalized banks, for the franchise value – the value of the firm as an ongoing enterprise – is then diminished, and it has incentives to gamble on resurrection.

2. In my judgment, it is scandalous that regulators allowed banks to provide their officers with – compensation schemes that incentivized excessive risk taking – and didn't even succeed in increasing shareholder value.

3. See Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983.

4. There are other contractual designs, e.g. a mutual fund, which would not (likely) give rise to such runs. But there are distinct advantages to the debt contract. Runs are, of course, related to the problem of maturity transformation, that the bank's assets and liabilities differ in maturity. This too, in principle, could be avoided, but only at a high cost. Long term investments yield higher returns, but short term deposits provide some discipline against the bank's misuse of funds (Rey-Stiglitz 2012).

5. The failure of the credit agencies has demonstrated the deficiencies in the purported alternative, private sector solution. Elsewhere, I have argued that these failures are not only repeated, but inherent.

Not How the State can Regulate the Market, but How Society can Regulate both the State and the Market*

Mahmood Mamdani
Makerere University
Kampala, Uganda

In response to Professor Stiglitz's discourse and its propositions, I shall focus on four issues and I will ask four questions. The first concerns the Clinton years. The second is about Professor Stiglitz's definition of the problem, as one of 'market failure'. The third question focuses on the contemporary global crisis; I call for a more comprehensive definition of the crisis, from the point of view of society and not just the state and market binary that frames Professor Stiglitz's discourse. Finally, I ask that Professor Stiglitz situate our own crisis – the crisis of Uganda and East Africa – within an expanded frame.

The Clinton Years

Deregulation of the financial system in the US began with the Clinton administration's repeal of key sections of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. That Act had separated commercial and investment banking since the Great Depression era. The repeal of that Act was key to the deregulation of derivatives. In 2008, Clinton denied responsibility for refusing to regulate derivatives. He changed his mind in 2010, then blaming his advisors, among whom were Treasury Secretaries Robert Rubin and Larry Summers and the Chair of his Council of Economic Advisors, Joe Stiglitz. Larry Summers went on to become President of Harvard University. Joseph Stiglitz went on to be Chief Economist of the World Bank and then professor at Columbia University. Summers showed little remorse for his role in the deregulation era. Joe Stiglitz, in contrast, became the best known critic of deregulation.

My first question is not new. Academic reviewers of Stiglitz have often wondered when he saw the light: Did Professor Stiglitz oppose deregulation at the time or change his mind when its consequences became clear? Should we understand his critique of deregulation as foresight or hindsight, foresight in 1996 or hindsight after his time as Clinton's senior policy advisor?

Professor Stiglitz addressed this issue in a book he wrote on the Clinton era, titled *The Roaring Nineties:(A New History of the World's Most Prosperous Decade*. The question I am interested in was posed by an academic reviewer of the book, Robert Pollin (of the Department of Eco-nomics at University of Massachusetts at Amherst. Let me quote Professor Polin:

> ... at what point did Stiglitz, in his role as a senior Clinton policy advisor, become convinced of the severe damage that would result from deregulation? ... As one important example, the general tenor of the 1996 Economic Report of the President, written under Stiglit's supervision as Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, is unmistakably in support of lowering regulatory standards, including in telecommunications and electricity. This Report even singles out for favourable mention the deregulation of the electric power industry in California — that is, the measure that, by the summer of 2002, brought California to the brink of economic disaster, in the wake of still more Enron-guided machinations.

Why is the question important? Like the rest of us, Professor Stiglitz has a right to change his mind. The reason for asking him this question is to have some information about how his thinking has evolved on this subject. As the reviewer asked: "Was there a moment of epiphany, like Saul of Tarsus falling off his mule? How many possible disaster scenarios did he really anticipate, and how much has he realized only more recently, after observing and ruminating with hindsight?" Did the crisis authored by the Clinton administration, of which he was a leading member, just confirm his intuition or did it also teach him something new? The answer to this question would tell us something about his intellectual journey. That would allow us to pose a more contemporary question: Should not the present global crisis lead Professor Stiglitz to develop his thought further? My point is that this question is not just one that

should interest Professor Stiglitz's biographer; it is of theoretical significance. Let me explain in terms that a lay person can understand, which will also allow me to pose my second question.

Why Call it Market Failure?

Professor Stiglitz's theoretical work is on the economics of information. Traditional economics, both classical and neoclassical, has been dominated by two related assumptions. The first is what Adam Smith called "the invisible hand" – the assumption that free competition leads to an efficient allocation of resources. The second is a related assumption in welfare economics, that issues of distribution should be viewed as completely separate from issues of efficiency. It is this methodological 'separation' between growth and distribution which allows economists to push for reforms which increase efficiency, regardless of their impact on income distribution. It is the methodological basis of what we know as the "trickle down" school in economics. Professor Stiglitz's great contribution has been to challenge both these assumptions. As he has shown, asymmetric information is a pervasive feature of how real-world markets operate. The free market is an ideological myth. In the real world, imperfect information makes for imperfect markets.

For Stiglitz, this means that governments need to strongly and effectively regulate what goes on in markets. The point is to level the information field as much as possible so that markets may function with a modicum of efficiency and fairness. I have simplified the matter but I think it gives you an idea of the contribution for which he justly received the Nobel Prize.

In the three decades that preceded Stiglitz, economists had identified important market failures, but in limited areas, such as externalities like pollution, which require government intervention. But the case they had made was for limited government intervention in limited areas. Professor Stiglitz made a more general case. He showed that markets are always imperfect since they are always charac-terized by

imperfect information, why government intervention has to be a constant presence in the market.

Here then is my second question: Why call this "market failure"? The term "market failure" suggests that markets normally function properly and that "market failure" is an exceptional occurrence. It is an appropriate term to describe the thought of pre-Stiglitz economists who focused on externalities like pollution to call for government intervention in select fields. But it hides the real significance of Professor Stiglitz's contribution, which is to redirect our thinking away from failure as an excep-tional occurrence to imper-fection as the normal state of markets. Like its twin term "state failure", the term "market failure" focuses our attention on the exception rather than the norm. But we are not talking of an occasional lapse in how markets function; rather, we are talking of the regular state of markets, of how imperfect markets are when they function the way they are supposed to function. Information is always imperfect, and so are markets. What is involved here is a methodological shift from the exception to the norm. This is a shift of paradigmatic significance. "Market failure" is an unfortunate term because it hides the fundamental character of this shift.

The Problem is Not Just Economic

Before discussing its limits, I will summarize Professor Stiglitz's response to the problem he calls "market failure". Professor Stiglitz attributes "market failure" to "lack of transparency". He has several recommendations on how to check market failure. The first is that government needs to bridge the gap between social returns and private returns, both to encourage socially necessary investment as in agriculture and to discourage socially undesirable investment as in real estate speculation. Second, the government may set up specialized development banks. In support, he cites the negative example of America's private banks and their "dismal performance" alongside the positive example of Brazil's development bank, a bank twice the size of the World Bank, and its "extraordinary success" in leading that country's economic transformation.

Finally, Professor Stiglitz cautions against liberalizing financial and capital markets as advised by the Washington Consensus. He reminds us that African countries that followed the Washington Consensus, like so many faithful converts, paid the price for not thinking on their own. To quote Professor Stiglitz: "Credit to small and medium sized enterprises went down. More broadly, credit to productive invest-ments went down. ... Not surprising, the result was that growth was lower in countries that liberalized". The countries that succeeded were those in East Asia; unlike African countries, they regulated financial markets in the interest of their development.

Professor Stiglitz says that the Washington Consensus is an ideology. He has a term for it: he calls it "free market fundamentalism". It was "ignored in Asia" but "has inflicted a high cost on develo-ping countries, especially in Africa". He says the crisis of 2008 provides a moment for reflection, on the key importance of the financial sector, and of how ideology – flawed ideas about markets – led to a global disaster". The lessons are two-fold: first, "more than better regulation is required"; second, "the government must take an active role in providing development finance".

I am not an economist, but I have been forced to learn its basics to defend myself in the academy and the world. Like you, I live in a world where policy discourse has been dominated – I should say, colonized – by economists whose vision is limited to the economy. Professor Stiglitz derides this as "free market fundamentalism" and I agree with him. Like fundamentalist generals who think that the conduct, outcome and consequence of war is determined by what happens on the battlefield, the thought of fundamentalist economists not only revolves around the market but is also limited by it. Just as war is too important an activity to be left to generals, the material welfare of peoples is also too important to be left to economists alone.

I salute the work Professor Stiglitz has done to show the havoc caused by what he calls "free market fundamentalists". But I have a critique. I have already argued that his definition of the problem as that of "market failure" is inadequate. I will now argue that, in light of the challenge we face today, his response to the problem is also too limited.

To illustrate how deep and pervasive this crisis is, I would like to sketch some key developments starting with the Clinton years. Let us begin with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, the Clinton administration urged on Russia what it called a "shock therapy", a cocktail of recipes first perfected in African countries in the 1980s, and baptized as Structural Adjustment by the Washington Consensus. That policy practically destroyed essential consumer industries, from pharmaceuticals to poultry, and led to mass poverty in Russia. Fully backed by the Clinton administration, Yeltsin and his fellow conspirators were happy to implement this "shock therapy" as a way to acquire property at the expense of democracy. In the words of a moderate Russian paper, *Literary Gazette*, the "shock therapy" tur-ned Russia into "a zone of catastrophe". We may note that none of the architects of this policy in the Clinton administration – neither Larry Summers, nor Jeffrey Sachs nor former President Clinton himself – has ever publicly apologized for this.

My second example is more current. The Eurozone was created as a single currency for Europe but without constituting Europe as a democratic polity. The result was that monetary policy was formulated outside the framework of democracy. The states in Europe have done to their own people what the

Washington Consensus did to African peoples in the 1980s. Unelected governments rule Europe; the EU ruling phalanx is not accountable to anyone. By all technical standards, what is taking shape in Europe is dictatorship. Not only are essential mechanisms of democratic systems being eroded or discarded, democracy is rapidly losing credibility. For the third time in a century, Germany is looking to turn Europe into its backyard. Germany is now achieving with banks what it failed to achieve with tanks in World War I and World War II. It is even more interesting that it is Germany that should now propose a democratic solution to the crisis of the Eurozone, calling for a political unification of Europe.

Historically, capitalism – and the market – have been kept in check by democracy. Both the Russian and the European cases show us what happens when you do away with the democratic process in the interest of economic efficiency.

In both the Russian and the European cases – and one could multiply examples – the problem has not been the absence of state activism. If anything, states have reinforced the havoc wreaked by market forces on society. Society is the missing term in the state-market equation that has defined the debate on "market failure" among economists. The tendency of the market, like that of the state, is to devour

society. The challenge is to defend society against these twin forces.

Here is my point: The antidote to the market was never the state but democracy. Not the state but a democratic political order has contained the worst fallout from capitalism over the last few centuries. The real custodian of a democratic order was never the state but society. The question we are facing today is not just that of market failure but of an all-round political failure: the financialization of capitalism is leading to the collapse of the democratic order. The problem was best defined by the Occupy Wall Street movement in the US: it is the 99 per cent against the 1 per cent.

Thus, my third question: Does not this empirical acknowledgement need to be translated into a theoretical insight? Does it not call for a revised theoretical apparatus – one beyond a focus on "market failure"; one that does not limit the frame to the market and the state; one that is more interdisciplinary and more focused on the intersection of the economic, the political, and the social, both to illuminate the depth of the crisis we are faced with today and to shift focus from the state and the market to society?

Lessons for Us in Uganda, East Africa and Africa

I have little doubt that the readers want us to go beyond questions of economic theory, beyond a discussion of the global crisis. I am sure they would like some discussion of the Ugandan crisis. I will ask my fourth and last question on behalf of the readers: What are the lessons for Uganda, East Africa and Africa?

My first observation is that the Ugandan crisis is not really exceptional if you look at the rest of the world. In his more public and less academic observations, Professor Stiglitz has remarked on the depths of the problem in "much of the world". Take an example from 2007 when Professor Stiglitz wrote of globalization on Beppe Grillo's Blog in2007: "For much of the world, globalization as it has been managed seems like a pact with the devil. A few people in the country become wealthier; GDP statistics, for what they are worth, look better, but ways of life and basic values are threatened. ...This is not how it has to be".

It would be a shame if our readers are left with a message that the problem is just one of "market failure" and that the solution is a robust state that regulates markets and provides development finance. Is the lesson of the Structural Adjustment era simply that we need strong states to defend ourselves from the Washington Consensus? Or does the experience of the SAP era also raise a second question: What happens if developing countries are forced to push open their markets before they have stable, democratic institutions to protect their citizens? Should we be surprised that the result is something worse than crony capitalism, worse than private corruption, whereby those in the state use their positions to privatize social resources and stifle societal opposition?

Social activists in Uganda increasingly argue that the state and the market are not opposites; they have come together in a diabolical pact. Like in the US where the state feeds the greed of the banks, the state in Uganda has become the springboard of systemic corruption. The use of eminent domain clause to appropriate land – from tropical rain forests to primary and secondary schools – is done in the name of development. Even parliamentarians who discuss the oil issue complain, almost on a daily basis, that instead of leveling the information field, the state uses all its resources to keep information secret and muzzle public discussion on how public resources are used. The question is simple: What happens if it is the state, and not just market forces, that hoards information?

I want to broaden our focus to the East African community. The political class in Africa is weak. Often, its vision is clouded by a single-minded preoccupation with the question of its own political survival. The result is a singular lack of imagination, marked by a tendency to borrow solutions from the West. The AU named itself after the EU. The East African Community adopted the European process hook, line and sinker: first a common market, then a common currency, before any political arrangement. Here is my question: Will the pursuit of this European recipe – introducing a common East African currency without first creating a common political framework for East Africa, without first solving the question of sovereignty, whether through a federation or a confederation – not invite a Europe-type crisis?

Conclusion

Let me conclude with two observations, one theoretical, the second political. When I was a graduate student, my economics professor asked me to read a great postwar classic, Karl Polanyi's "The Great Transformation". Polanyi was the first to point out that self-regulating markets are bound to lead to a social catastrophe. Polanyi began with the observation that the market is much older than capitalism. It has been around for thousands of years. Markets have coexisted with different kinds of economies and societies – capitalist, feudal, slave-owning, communal, all of them. The distinguishing feature of all previous eras has been that societies have always regulated markets, set limit on their operation, and thus set limits on both private accumulation and widespread impoverishment. Only with capitalism has the market wrenched itself free of society. A consequence of this development has been gross enrichment of a few alongside mass poverty. A corollary of this process, we may say, is that regulation is now seen as the task of the state, and not of society. That solution is rapidly turning into a problem. Not only has the market wrenched itself free from society, the state is trying to do the same. Not only do market forces threaten to colonize society, the state too threatens to devour society. Free markets are not a solution for poverty; they are one cause of modern poverty. State sovereignty is not a guarantor of freedom; it threatens to undermine social freedom. The challenge is not how the state can regulate the market, but how society can regulate both the state and the market.

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The Outstanding Issues between the Two Sudans

Introduction

The civil war between the North and South in the Sudan, which started in August 1955 before the independence of the country, was the longest in the history of Africa. The reasons behind the war are complex and intermingled between external and internal factors. The closed district policy of the British administration in the Sudan laid the foundation for separating the two regions for three decades, the missionary propaganda inflamed the feelings of southerners against the Muslim Arabs of the North, the long military rule in Khartoum adopted the course of military solution to the southern problem, and the weak democratic governments did not have the time or the political will to give the South an acceptable federal system. General al-Bashir, like Nimeiri before him, was compelled to accept a political solution with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army(SPLM/A) based on a semi-independent federalism and right for self-determination. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) reached between the two parties, the National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM/A), in January 2005 under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), was a result of long negotiations that dragged on for more than three years in Kenya. The outstanding issues came to the political arena in Sudan as a result of southern Sudan referendum and its consequence, the birth of the Republic of South Sudan.

The CPA

The detailed Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is divided into six chapters: Machakos Protocol, Power Sharing, Wealth Sharing, Abyei Conflict, Southern Kordofan & Blue Nile, and Security Arrangements. The Machakos Protocol, which was signed in July 2002, set the following basic principles: self-determination for the people of South Sudan through a referendum, right of legislations based on Sharia for the North, the border of North-South is that of January 1956 as incorporated in the Declaration of Principles adopted by the IGAD, and an interim period of six years

al-Tayib Zain al-Abdin
University of Khartoum
Sudan

before the referendum. The Power Sharing gave the South a semi-independent rule; the allocation of seats in the national assembly before the elections was divided as follows: 52 per cent of the seats to the NCP, 28 per cent to the SPLM, 14 per cent to other northern parties, 6 per cent to other southern parties. In the national executive, the incumbent president shall continue while the chairman of the SPLM becomes the first vice-president. The offices of the national executive will be divided in the same ratio asthat of the national assembly. In the legislature of southern Sudan, the SPLM shall be represented by 70 per cent, the NCP by 15 per cent and other southern political forces by 15 per cent; the executive in the South shall be divided in the same way as that of the legislature. The state legislatures (15 in the North and 10 in the South) shall be comprised as follows: the NCP is to hold 70 per cent in the northern states and 10 per cent in the South, the SPLM will take 70 per cent in the southern states and 1 per cent in the North, the other political forces in the North and South shall divide the remaining 20 per cent among themselves. The state executive in the North and in the South shall be divided among the political parties in the same way as the state legislature.

However, the arrangement for Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile is different. For Abyei, its executive council is shared by the two parties to the CPA and appointed by the presidency, which is comprised of the president and his two deputies. In the case of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, the legislature and the executive is divided only between the two partners, 55 per cent for NCP and 45 per cent for SPLM. The three regions were given some form of self-autonomy and promised financial assistance, enabling them to reconstruct their damaged infrastructure, as war affected zones. A special commission is established to

define the boundaries of the disputed Abyei which was transferred by the British administration to Kordofan in 1905. It is called Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC). Another commission is to be formed by the presidency to conduct a referendum among the residents of Abyei, to decide whether they want to retain their special status in the North or be part of Bahr el Ghazal in the South. The two other northern states were granted the right for 'popular consultation' to give their opinions, through the elected legislative assemblies, on their status as agreed in the CPA and how it is implemented in the interim period.

The wealth sharing formula is as follows:

1. The net oil revenue extracted from wells in southern Sudan (75% of Sudan oil is located in southern Sudan) shall be divided equally between the government of southern Sudan (GoSS) and the national government (50% to each), after giving out 2 per cent to the region in which the oil is produced.

2. The national government, the government in the South and state governments are entitled to legislate, raise and collect taxes as listed in the CPA.

The security arrangements allowed the two armies, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLA, to continue as separate forces, the first will be deployed in the North and the second in the South. That was a big concession to the SPLM, which allowed it later to go smoothly for secession. A Joint Integrated Unit (39,000 soldiers) will be formed from SAF and SPLA and be stationed in the South, southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Khartoum. A Joint Defense Board (JDB) under the supervision of the presidency shall command the integrated units. The provisions and principles governing the ceasefire, disengagement and redeployment are written in meticulous details.

The international community hailed the agreement as a model of peaceful resolution to the longest conflict in Africa. The agreement was signed by the presidents of Kenya and Uganda, witnessed by senior representatives from

Egypt, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, United States of America, the African Union, the European Union, IGAD partners, Arab League and United Nations. The signing ceremony was an impressive occasion that took place in the national stadium of Nairobi on the 9th of January, 2005.

Implementation of the CPA

The real challenge to the CPA was its implementation in a serious and honest way that would maintain the spirit of cooperation which marked the long negotiating process that led to the conclusion of the agreement. The challenge proved to be difficult and sensitive because of the following obstacles: the lack of trust between the two partners, especially after the sudden demise of John Garang de Mabior, the chairman of SPLM/A; the economic difficulties which faced the government of Sudan after the loss of half of the oil revenue coming from the South, in addition to the failure of the international community to fulfil its financial promises to the government. The American sanctions against the North put more pressure on the economy; the support given by each government to opposing group against the other eroded the trust between the two partners. The limited clashes between the armies of both governments in Abyei and Malakal showed a growing hostility between the two parties which incited small extreme groups within both governments to advocate confrontation. The relationship between the two partners during the interim period was mostly tense, suspicious and quarrelsome. The issues of Abyei boundary, its referendum commission, the delimitation of border between North and South, the population census, the actual oil revenue, the referendum laws for the South and Abyei, etc., were all questions of disagreement and dispute between the NCP and the SPLM which, under frustration, withdrew for some months from the Government of National Unity (GoNU) and parliament. As a matter of fact the SPLM acted during the interim period as an opposition party to the NCP rather than a partner, allying itself most of the time with the opposition parties in the North. However, the major steps in the CPA were completed, although later than envisioned in the agreement: the power sharing in the federal and regional governments, the withdrawal of SAF from the South, a partial withdrawal of SPLA from the North, the equal sharing of the southern oil revenue, the passing of the referendum laws, the mid-term election and the implementation of the referendum on self-determination for the South and the acceptance of its harsh secession outcome. However, some important issues which should have been dealt with during the interim period were not settled; they were shifted to after the referendum. The postponement of settling important issues like Abyei, oil, the North-South border and nationality, caused many problems to individual citizens in the other state–pastoralists, cross-border traders – and economic difficulties to both governments which threaten peace and security in the country. The GoSS insisted on having the referendum of the South on time at any cost. The western powers supported that position and put much pressure on Khartoum to accept the demand, irrespective of its serious consequences. The crisis between the two parties at present is a logical outcome of the hurried way the implementation of the CPA was completed.

A strong criticism is directed by many political observers and analysts to the CPA, that it was a convenient settlement between two armed groups who were fed up with fighting, and those who hoped for real change in the governance of the whole country were disappointed. Many sympathizers and supporters of the SPLM in the North were frustrated that the liberation movement, which called for a 'new Sudan' and promised to work for the unity of the country, easily opted for secession. The SPLM leadership did not show much interest in the affairs of the North nor in the system of good governance. The First Vice-President, Salva Kiir Mayardit, was absent from his office in the Republican Palace in Khartoum most of the time. The objectives of 'democratic transformation', 'the bill of rights', the freedom of expression and association, all enshrined in the CPA and in the transitional constitution were not respected by either government in its domain. The whole exercise of the CPA looked like a division of power between the two armed groups; the NCP continued its grip on the North while the SPLM took its share of power in the South.

Nevertheless, the CPA brought a long-awaited peace to the country and had, in its first few years, many defenders. The Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC), established by the CPA to monitor the implementation, said in its final report: "It has been a unique experiment in peace-building, of unprecedented scale and complexity. Some of the outcomes could not have been clearly foreseen when the Agreement was drafted. Lessons can, and should, be learnt from the problems that arose. But the overall achievement of the CPA as described in this and earlier AEC reports remain something that Sudanese, north and south, can view with pride – not least the act of self-determination, promptly accepted by all, which has brought a new member into the community of nations". Although the government of Sudan was disappointed at the outcome of the referendum, President al-Bashir attended the celebration ceremony of the independence of the Republic of South Sudan on the 9 of July 2011 in Juba, and addressed the crowd, saying that the will of the people of the South has to be respected and promised full cooperation with the new state.

The Outstanding Issues

The Southern Sudan Referendum Act 2009, passed by the National Assembly on 31st December 2009, stated under article (67) some substantive issues that would be negotiated by the two parties to the CPA, and witnessed by the organizations and countries who are signatories to the CPA. They were left over from the interim period, during which they should have been negotiated and settled. It is possible that the GoSS wanted to discuss these issues as an independent country instead of a junior partner to the hawkish Inqaz regime. The issues are the following:

a) Nationality;

b) Currency;

c) Public service;

d) Position of the Joint Integrated Units, national security and intelligence;

e) International agreements and covenants;

f) Assets and debts;

g) Oil fields, production, transport and export of oil;

h) Contracts and environment in oil fields;

i) Water;

j) Property;

k) Any other issues to be agreed upon by the two parties.

There are other issues which are part of the CPA but were not settled before the secession and thus have to be negotiated later: Abyei question, the North-South border, security arrangements, and popular consultation in the Blue Nile and southern Kordofan states.

The first meeting between the two parties (NCP & SPLM) to discuss the outstanding issues took place in Mekelle of Ethiopia from 21 to 22 June 2010. It was a successful meeting at which the two parties signed an MoU containing the following points: that the negotiations will be conducted by a joint team of six members from each party. The African Union High Implementation Panel (AUHIP) chaired by Thabo Mbeki shall be the facilitator, supported by IGAD, the UN and IGAD partners. The negotiations shall be supported by a full time joint technical secretariat of six members that coordinate and liaise with AEC which will provide administrative support. The parties agreed to cluster the negotiations into four working groups to address the following issues: citizenship; security; financial, economic and natural resources; international treaties and legal issues. The substantive negotiation on these issues was to commence on 19 July in Juba. It was a promising start for a difficult and complex job.

Another important meeting was convened later, in November 2010 by AUHIP in Khartoum, for the two parties (NCP& SPLM) to negotiate a framework document relating to the implementation of the various outstanding issues. The parties committed themselves to work for the successful conduct of the southern Sudan referendum and pledged to respect its outcome. They agreed to continue negotiating the future of Abyei at the highest level; to hold the popular consultation in the Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan and respect its outcome; to demarcate immediately the North-South border; to maintain 'soft border' allowing peoples' movement, economic activity and social interaction. They accepted that decisions taken on citizenship will not adversely affect the rights and well-being of ordinary people. In this context, the two parties agreed to adopt the policy of free movement of people, goods and services, monetary and fiscal policy, the management of oil and water resources. On the question of security, the parties undertook that neither would take any action, nor support any group that would undermine the security of the other. They recognized that each post-secession state would conduct its foreign policy mindful of the need to achieve the objective of two viable states which would cooperate for mutual benefit. The Panel was greatly encouraged by the determination of the parties to address the challenges ahead through peaceful negotiations. However, things did not go as smooth as agreed upon, especially after the result of the referendum showed that the overwhelming majority of southerners wanted secession from the old Sudan.

1. **Obstacles on the way:** An important change in the attitude of the government of Sudan came after secession became a reality on the 9 of July 2011; it drew harsh criticism from the northern opposition and political analysts to the government's handling of the CPA and its consequences. The agreement, which the government considered as its greatest achievement in the political history of the Sudan, turned to be its worst liability in the eyes of the Sudanese political elite. It resulted not only in the loss of one-third of the country, but also of about 40per cent of the government annual revenue and almost 90 per cent of its foreign currency that used to come from the oil extracted in southern Sudan. The government reacted in an emotional way by dismissing the southern members of parliament after the declaration of the result of the referendum. Even workers, civil servants, soldiers and army officers from southern Sudan were summarily sacked from their jobs before the end of the interim period. The joint integrated units were dissolved untimely before 9 July, which partly contributed to the eruption of conflict in southern Kordofan. Strong statements by government officials and media campaign against the presence of southerners in the North created fear among numerous southerners who no longer felt secure, could not find means of transport to the South and could not keep their jobs in the North. The armed forces invaded the whole of Abyei region in May 2011 after one of their withdrawing units was attacked by the army of the South, despite the fact that the unit was accompanied by UN officials and using UN cars. It was an example of undisciplined soldiers deciding the course of engagement on their own, which caused real damage to the precarious relationship between the two countries. The flare up of conflict between Sudan Armed Forces and the SPLA-North in southern Kordofan in early June 2011, and later in September in Blue Nile was a serious development that worsened the relationship between the GoS and the GoSS to a new low level. The GoS accused GoSS of encouraging and supporting the rebellion in the two states. The southern army should not have been in the North long time ago, and the northern units in that army should have been disarmed and demobilized. Lack of progress on the oil issue, led the GoSS to close the oil fields in the South in February 2011, accusing the government of Sudan of 'stealing' two shipments of its oil. The government defended its action by saying that it did not receive any payment for its facilities and transport of oil since the secession on 9 July; thus what it seized is what it deserves for its services in the last seven months. However, the quick attack on Heglig by southern soldiers in the last week of March 2012, and later on 10 April by several SPLA divisions, planned on the highest military command, was the most serious violation of the CPA. It could have led to an outright war between the two countries, thanks to the inter-national community which intervened quickly, condemning the aggression and putting pressure on the GoSS to withdraw its troops, which it did. The Sudan Armed Forces felt humiliated, and so attacked the withdrawing army, to avenge its early defeat. As a consequence of Heglig attack, Sudan closed its border with the South, preventing all forms of trade and transport. This serious event led to the intervention of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSCAU), on a complaint from Khartoum, which adopted, on 24 April 2012, a comprehensive decision on the situation between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan. Later, the UN Security Council passed a detailed Resolution 2046 (2012) on 5 May, supporting the PSCAU decision on the matter. The Heglig event may be a blessing in disguise!

2. **The Contents of the PSCAU Decision:** The Council condemns the violation of the human rights of non-combatants, the damage of oil installations, the inflammatory state-

ments from both sides and the threat of hostile action. It reaffirms its commitment to respect the territorial integrity of Sudan and South Sudan and the inviolability of their border as existed at the time of independence on 1 January 1956; taking into account the disputed areas as agreed in the deliberations of the Technical *ad hoc* Boundary Committee. It expressed deep concern at the failure of the parties to implement agreements that they had freely entered into, particularly the Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of Abyei (20/6/2011), the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM) (29/6/2011), the Border Monitoring Support Mission (30/7/2011), and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Non-Aggression and Cooperation (10/2/2012). Then, the Council adopted a roadmap in order to ease the current tension and facilitate the resumption of negotiations on post-secession relations. It included: the immediate cessation of all hostilities within 48 hours; the unconditional withdrawal of all armed forces to their side of the border; the activation within a week of all border security mechanisms agreed upon; cessation of harbouring or supporting rebel groups against the other state; cessation of hostile propaganda and inflammatory statements in the media; taking full responsibility for the protection of each other's nationals; implementation of pending aspects of Abyei agreement, namely the redeployment, within two weeks, of all Sudanese and South Sudanese forces out of Abyei; unconditional resumption of negotiations by the two parties within two weeks, under the auspices of the AUHIP, to reach agreement on: oil, status of nationals in the other country, border disputes, and status of Abyei. The negotiations were to be concluded within three months, otherwise the High Panel should submit a comprehensive report on the status of negotiations, which includes detailed proposals on all outstanding issues, to be endorsed as final and binding solutions to the post-secession relations. The Council sought the endorsement of the UN Security Council of the same, which it did on the 5 of May. The Council urged the Government of Sudan and the SPLM-North to reach a political negotiated solution on the basis of

the Framework Agreement on Political Partnership between the NCP and SPLM-North, and Political and Security Arrangements in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan states (28/6/2011). Both parties should extend full cooperation to the AUHIP and the Chair of IGAD to reach a settlement. It requested the government to permit humanitarian access to the affected population in the two areas.

The two governments accepted the PSC decision and started acting upon it: they withdrew their armed forces from Abyei, and accepted the invitation of AUHIP to a meeting in Addis Ababa on 29 May, to start the negotiations.

3. **Resolved Issues:** Some of those outstanding issues were resolved as *de facto* situation or by a common understanding after the secession on 9 July. These include 'public service', position of the 'joint integrated units' and 'property'. Each government acted on its own right to decide the future of workers from the other state within its public service. The majority of those were working in the North, mainly in the army and police. The government sacked all of them, although majority of them got their pensions and after-service claims. The joint units in the South and in Khartoum were easily dissolved before the end of the interim period, the only problem was that of the northerners from southern Kordofan and Blue Nile who were part of the SPLA, and who waged a rebellion in the two states against the government. This problem still exists and will surely be discussed in the Addis Ababa negotiations as decided by the PSCAU and UNSC. The question of property was left to concerned individuals who owned plots of land or houses in the other state; most of the southerners in the North sold their property in a private way while the northerners in the South were not in a hurry to do that. The three issues were not a topic in the rounds of negotiation after secession.

On the 'currency' issue, the two parties agreed before the secession to use the old currency in the new state of South Sudan for a period of six to nine months, then it would be gradually exchanged on agreement between the two central banks of both countries. However, each country was secretly printing a new currency of its

own before the fixed period was over. The Central Bank of Sudan introduced the new currency earlier than South Sudan, leaving the old currency in the South without value. At present, each country is using its own new currency, but the store of old currency in the South has to be compensated for in one way or another. It was an example of mistrust and lack of commitment, on the part of the two governments, to their agreements.

The issue of 'international agreements and covenants' was also not considered important. The two parties agreed that the predecessor state (Sudan) should continue bearing the entity of the old Sudan with all its international and regional agreements while the successor state (South Sudan) will make its own new international and regional treaties.

On the 'assets' and 'debts', the two parties accepted the geographical principle of dividing the assets according to their location in the country where they exist: what is in the North will go to the North and what is in the South will go to the South. The foreign assets shall go to the predecessor state which will also bear the responsibility for the foreign debt (about 40 billion US dollar).It was based on the understanding that the international creditors will write off all possible debts; the two parties shall work together to convince the creditors to forgo their debts on the old Sudan. Otherwise, the parties shall share the debts and assets in foreign countries according to the recognized international standards.

4. **Partially Resolved Issues:** These include 'nationality', 'North-South border' and 'security arrangements'. At the beginning, the government of the North was strict about giving its nationality or residential concession to the hundreds of thousands of southerners living in the North, while the government of the South was ready to do that to a far less number of northerners in the South. The two parties agreed to give nine months, after secession, to the nationals of the other country to leave or regularize their stay according to the laws of the country where they want to stay. The period expired on 8 April 2012, but besides some strong statements in the media, the government of Khartoum did not attempt to enforce the decision against the over-staying

southerners. The government of the South never threatened to push northerners out, they were only asked to get a residential permit, which is easily given for 100 US dollars. Eventually, a breakthrough was reached in the negotiations at Addis Ababa on 13 March 2012. The parties agreed to allow the nationals of the other state to enjoy the freedoms of residence, movement, economic activity, and ownership of property. A joint high level committee would be established to oversee the adoption and implementation of the agreed measures relating to the status and treatment of the nationals of each state in the territory of the other state. The two states shall negotiate an agreement to elaborate the four freedoms mentioned above.

On the 'delimitation and demarcation' of the boundary between the two states, a joint technical committee had been established since the beginning of the interim period to draw the border between North and South, as left by the colonial administration on 1 January 1956. The process should have been finished before the referendum of the South took place, but it dragged on till the secession. The joint committee agreed to about 70 per cent of the border between the two countries, which consequently the presidency affirmed. According to the committee, only four regions were disputed: 1) Jodah or Dabat al-Fukhar, a rich mechanized agricultural land between Upper Nile and White Nile; 2) Megenis Mountains between Upper Nile and South Kordofan; 3) Kaka town which lies between Upper Nile and South Kordofan, a small piece of land but strategically important for its access to the Nile and to oil producing areas; 4) Kafia Kinji, a rich area between South Darfur and Western Bahr al-Ghazal. The delegation of the GoSS asked JPSM, by the end of 2010, to add a fifth area – Safaha grazing area, which extends 14 kilometers south of Bahr al-Arab; it lies between South Darfur and Northern Bahr al-Ghazal. The presidency accepted the inclusion of the new area. In the late negotiations of 29 May in Addis, the South delegation demanded the inclusion of five areas to the disputed regions that includes Heglig, Abyei and almost all the oil-producing fields in the North. It came with a self-drawn map, including the claimed areas, asking that it should

be considered as the reference map. But it was immediately rejected by the Sudanese delegation. That was a non-starter position which practically led to the failure of the first round of negotiations after the SC Resolution 2046. The High Panel tried a compromise by proposing a new map, but that was refused by the GoSS delegation. It seems that the South delegation was seeking a bargaining position against the North by increasing the number of disputed areas. The GoS accused the GoSS of avoiding to settle the question of border before secession in order to take the whole issue to international arbitration, which may rule in its favour or seek a compromise settlement between the two countries. A complicating factor to the issue of border is that the two parties, like all African governments, accepted the territorial boundary as left by the British colonial administration on 1 January 1956, but the British left no map on that date to show the exact border. Moreover, the British administrators used to shift certain regions, for security or administrative reasons, from one province to another irrespective of the ethnic group living in that area. This happened in the cases of Abyei, Heglig, Kafia Kinji, Kaka and others. The GoSS claimed Abyei, not on the basis of its location in January 1956 but on the ethnicity of its population in 1905, when it was transferred from Bahr al-Ghazal in the South to Kordofan in the North. However, in the agreement between the two parties on the demarcation of boundaries, in Addis Ababa on 13 March 2012, the parties affirmed the definition of the agreed boundary in accordance with the physical description and delimitation, and corresponding recommendations of the Technical Committee for the 1st January 1956 border line demarcation between North and South Sudan, which was affirmed by the presidency of the Republic of the Sudan prior to the secession of southern Sudan. In the March 2012 meeting, the parties also agreed to establish a Joint Demarcation Committee, a Joint Technical Team, and a Joint Border Commission in order to finalize the question of border between the two countries. It is strange that in the first round of negotiations at Addis Ababa (17 May to 7 June 2012) the border line created much disagreement between the two

delegations. I have the feeling that the real interest of GoSS is to have Abyei at any cost, thus it might be hoping to swap the disputed areas for Abyei. It is worth mentioning that all the borders of the old Sudan with its eight neighbours have never been demarcated and most of them have not yet been delimited since independence till today!

The question of 'security' was much complicated by the fact that the SPLA included many units from southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, which fought under the leadership of southern Sudan for many years until the signing of the CPA. It was not easy to terminate that comrade relationship after secession, the GoS accused the SPLA as still supporting and controlling the 9 and 10 army divisions which started the mutiny in southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The GoSS also has its accusations against the government of Khartoum for supporting rebel army generals against the elected government of the South. In a number of previous agreements, since before secession, the parties promised not to threaten the security of the other state. In the negotiations round of 7 November 2010, facilitated by the AUHIP in Khartoum, the NCP and the SPLM undertook that neither of them would take any action, nor support any group, that would undermine the security of the other. Instead, the North and the South would continue to cooperate and share information that would enhance their capacity to deal with internal and external threats as well as trans-border crime. The MoU between the two parties, reached on 10 February 2012, on non-aggression and cooperation, affirmed similar statements. It clearly said that neither country will harbour, arm or train militia or other entities against the other. This is why the PSCAU, in its decision on 24 April 2012, expressed its deep concern at the failure of the parties to implement agreements that they themselves had freely entered into. It seems that the real problem is not to find the theoretical solution for any issue; rather, it is the political will to implement in an honest and serious manner what the parties have agreed upon. That is a question of political culture rather than a legal position towards a certain issue. It is understandable that the GoS, being threatened in the regions of Darfur,

Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and the border with the South, insist on first discussing the issue of security arrangements in the last Addis Ababa round. It was agreed that each army should withdraw 10km from the border within its territory. This agreement has not been implemented because the borderline between the two countries was not agreed upon.

5. **Unresolved Issues:** These include 'popular consultation', 'Abyei status', 'oil' and 'water'**.**

The issue of popular consultation in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile was part of the CPA. The people of the two states are supposed to give their opinion on the status granted to them in the CPA and how it was implemented during the interim period. The consultation in Southern Kordofan never took place because the state election was delayed till May 2011, then the armed conflict started immediately in the next month. In the Blue Nile, the process started but was not completed because the state joined the conflict in Southern Kordofan in September of the same year. An attempt was made to solve the conflict peacefully by the Framework Agreement on Political Partnership between NCP and SPLM-N signed by the leaders of the two parties, Nafi A. Nafi and Malik Agar, in Addis Ababa on 28 June 2011. However, the leadership of the NCP was quick to reject the agreement, thereby allowing the conflict to drag on till today. The other side sought to broaden the rebellion against the government, by allying itself with another militia group 'the Justice and Equity Movement' of Darfur under the name of Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). The aim of the new organization is to overthrow the NCP government by political and military means. The decision of the PSCAU required GoS and SPLM-N, in cooperation with AUHIP and the Chair of IGAD, to reach a negotiated settlement for the two states on the basis of the Framework Agreement mentioned before. The issue of popular consultation became entangled with the questions of peace, security, the North-South border, and the wider issue of good governance in all the Sudan.

The Abyei status remains to be the most difficult and complicated issue, even reaching a temporary arrangement and implementing it proved to be impossible. The inclusion of Abyei in the CPA was against the principle of the border, according to the January 1956 status. The American senator John Danforth played an important role in trying to resolve the impasse between the two parties by authoring the problematic and vague protocol of Abyei as it exists. The first dispute between the two parties was about the area of Abyei which they took, after much wrangling, to the PCA in The Hague, the second was about the person who is eligible to vote in the referendum to decide the future of Abyei, whether to remain in the North or join the South as SPLM wants. The SPLM defended the right of Dinka Ngok, being the original residents of the region, to decide its future; the NCP argued that the protocol defined the residents of Abyei Area as: "the members of Ngok Dinka community and other Sudanese residing in the area", and that allows the Misseriya nomads who had lived up to eight months in the region to take part in the voting. That was unacceptable to the SPLM, because it simply means that the Misseriya who are the majority in the area will surely keep it in the North. A number of proposals to solve the problem were advanced by the American envoy and AUHIP, but none of them got the approval of both parties. Two serious clashes took place in Abyei between SAF and SPLA which led to the displacement of the majority of its population. The PSCAU, in its late decision, asked for the implementation of the Agreement on Temporary Security and Administrative Arrangements for the Abyei Area, in particular the redeployment of all Sudanese and South Sudanese forces out of Abyei. The local administration was to be formed from the two communities in the region under the protection and supervision of the Ethiopian force introduced by the United Nations (UNISFA).

The issue of 'oil' in the South and the service facilities being in the North should have been a factor to encourage both poor countries for closer economic and interdependent relationship. However, the opposite was the case, as it became a dividing factor because of the extreme demands proposed by either party. This eventually led to the closure of the oil fields in the South, pushing the two governments to go around begging for foreign financial loans or assistance. A number of proposals were put forward by the AUHIP to bridge the gap between the exaggerated demand of GoS for its oil facilities and services and the poor offer given by GoSS, but none of them was accepted by both parties. It seems that each side wants to break the other, thinking that it cannot stand the pressure of deprivation for long. However, the deadlock cannot continue for a long time because both governments are in a desperate economic situation. The World Bank analysis of the economic and social impact of the shutdown of oil in the South (March 2012), gives a bleak picture for the economic situation and its repercussions in South Sudan.

The question of 'water' is puzzling. It is mentioned in the Southern Sudan Referendum Act as one of the outstanding issues to be negotiated by the two parties. It has never come up in any of the many rounds of negotiations between the GoS and the GoSS since July 2010. It is GoSS which holds the leverage on the question of water, because it is not in need of water at present but it has a legal right to divide with Sudan its share in the Nile water which amounts to 18.5bqm. It is likely that the government of the South wants to keep this card under its sleeve to use it at the right moment. Sudan can hardly afford sharing this amount of water with the South, unless new sources of water is developed like the Jonglei canal.

The Way to Peace

It is not in the interest of either party to go to an outright war because of failure in resolving the outstanding issues. Neither of them is ready for that eventuality from a military, economic or political point of view. They showed in a number of cases that they do not wish to go to a full-fledged war, in the cases of Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Heglig. They may be aware, by now, that neither of them could, by military means, defeat the other and, even, this would not mean that they would not still continue their political brinkmanship, which may plunge them into small scale conflicts. As pragmatists and self-centred politicians, the NCP and SPLM leaders know where to stop the game before it endangered their fragile regimes. In order to follow the way to peace, the two sides have to broaden their vision for a long-term strategic rela-

tionship because it is to their mutual benefit to do so. The negotiations on the outstanding issues should be based on that strategic outlook. The global community should help them to adopt such a broad and long-term vision. Despite the obvious differences between the two countries which partly led to the painful secession, there are many common features between their people which make them closer to each other than to the Africans in the south or the Arabs in the north. Besides the social and cultural linkages, the two countries have vital areas of common interest: oil, Nile waters, long tradition of cross-border trade and cattle grazing, and rich agricultural land along the border. The systems of education, civil service, judiciary, military, police, medical care, etc., are similar; the new-born country in the South may benefit from the experience and technocrats in the North in all these areas better than expatriates from other countries. Strange enough, the two parties recognize this common interest which they mentioned in a number of their agreements; but when they disagree on something, they seem to completely forget about it and behave like enemies. It may be for internal politics, each party needs a 'common enemy' in order to galvanize popular support behind its ill-confidant government!

The resolutions of both PSCAU and UNSC (under Chapter 7), will put a tremendous pressure on both governments to behave themselves and reach agreements on time. It is unlikely that either of them would dare to oppose the two important bodies headlong. The quick withdrawal from Heglig and the beginning of negotiations on time in Addis Ababa prove this assumption. The AUHIP, as usual, was quick to take the lead and facilitate the negotiations between the two parties in Addis Ababa. This time, it is armed with a comprehensive and detailed resolutions from the PSCAU and UNSC (under Chapter 7), which requires "any or all of the parties have not complied with the decisions set forth in this resolution, to take appropriate additional measures under Article 41 of the Charter as necessary". Sudan, before the voting on the resolution, was hesitant to accept it; but after consulting with the Russian government, it found out that it would get no support if it refused the resolution. The resolution was passed by consensus in the UNSC. In order to prevent prolonging the process, the resolution gave fixed dates for the various actions which are supposed to be implemented by the two parties, including the conclusion of the negotiations on all issues within three months. In the event these negotiations fail to result in an agreement, it asked the Secretary General in consultation with the AUHIP, the Chair of IGAD, and the Chairman of AU Commission to report within four months of the resolution, including detailed proposals on all outstanding issues. This means that the UNSC is considering enforcing its own solutions for the problem of Sudan and South Sudan. It may be a good idea for the AUHIP to involve, in the coming rounds of negotiations, some political forces other than the two ruling parties, some active civil society organizations and neutral experts. One of the obvious shortcomings of the CPA is that it was a closed club for the NCP and the SPLM; and whenever they disagreed on something, they had to take it to a third party outside the country. Surely, the big powers have other concerns and problems to care about than stick themselves to the North-South endless conflict. Involving other Sudanese and South Sudanese would broaden the popular base of the agree-ment, give a better guarantee to the fulfillment of what is agreed upon, and assure each party that its political rivals would not exploit the unpopular parts of the agreement against it. The approach to negotiate the issues should be in the form of a package deal rather than on single issue basis. It is not necessary that all outstanding issues should be solved at once. Some of the sensitive and complicated ones, like Abyei status or the disputed areas, may be postponed to a fixed time in the future. Both parties should be given tangible incentives by the international community on the conclusion of a peaceful settlement. The fixed dates given in the SC resolution should not be taken literally, as long as positive progress is achieved.

However, without real change in the spirit and political will of the two parties, it is not likely that they will reach a comprehensive settlement on the various outstanding issues. The international community may use the present economic crisis in both countries to press for a change of attitude, on a firm commitment that it will help them in solving their economic difficulties. It may even go a step further to encourage and support all forms of economic cooperation between the two quarreling states. In the past, the financial promises of the international community to the parties have not been honoured; so, it is time that it shows something in advance.

Conclusion

The problem of North-South Sudan is not unique in Africa but it is more complicated by internal and external factors, and a long history of confrontation. The eventual peaceful solution in Sudan will be an example for others, as happened in the case of South Africa. If not, it will have disastrous consequences for most of its neighbours. The two parties alone cannot easily solve their problems, as has been demonstrated since the beginning of negotiations on the CPA. The inter-national community has to be actively involved, but it has to act in a fair and neutral way in order to achieve sustai-nable peace and cooperation between the two new countries. The African Union and the AUHIP are the best bodies to facilitate and lead the negotiation process, till the desired settlement is successfully concluded. There is a strong suspicion within the NCP, shared by the majority of northerners, that the big western powers are pro-South and against the North. This charge can easily be used to mobilize people against western proposed solutions. The western governments should therefore be more sensitive to such accusations in dealing with North-South relations. The economic crisis in the two countries is an opportunity for the west to attract the two parties for positive cooperation, in return for eco-nomic incentives. It may be a good idea to use close neighbours, like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to influence Sudan; Kenya and Uganda, to persuade South Sudan. The resolutions of the PSCAU and UNSC should be used to the maximum in order to reach a fair and peaceful set-tlement to all outstanding issues between the two obstinate countries.

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Economic Change in Africa and Prospects for Business: An African Perspective*

Dzodzi Tsikata
University of Ghana
Legon, Ghana

More than ever before, it appears that we are presently in a period of great optimism about Africa, based on its consistent growth rates over two decades and on the fact that Africans appear to be learning the rules about how to change government peacefully. Perhaps this optimism is justified, given Africa's fortunes between the late 1970s and the end of the millennium, when it constantly made the headlines for famine, war and poverty. In any case, no continent has been so scrutinized, even by its own people. Obviously, no continent has been the subject of as much music and poetry as Africa, beloved continent and the cradle of humankind.

However, it is pertinent to point out that a range of influential voices in Africa, from the academia to policy circles and civil society, have been expressing disquiet about the cyclical swings in the pendulum of opinion about Africa, from extreme pessimism to extreme optimism. As Mo Ibrahim said of the decision by the prize committee of his Leadership Award this year not to award the prize for the third time in six year, "it has become fashionable to talk about Africa Rising. The Hopeless Continent has become the next investment frontier, as investors consistently make returns impossible elsewhere. Amidst all this optimism, it has become deeply unfashionable to talk about some of the less favourable trends on the continent". The Africa Progress Panel (a group of 10 eminent world leaders led by Kofi Annan) is the latest to raise this caution in its 2012 edition of the Africa Progress Report. The report, which is titled "Jobs, Justice and Equity", raises questions about these three aspects of Africa's condition today. These questions should temper our optimism about Africa's present economic growth and its future sustainability. I will briefly discuss these issues.

It is interesting that a conference themed "Africa Works", which speaks to 'optimism', chose for its keynote speaker, Stephen Ellis, one of Africa's harshest critics, whose views have enjoyed robust commentary in several CODESRIA circles, and who perhaps reflect the pessimism of past years. It suggests to me that the conference wants to strike a note of realism or cautious optimism, as correctly (in my view) recommended by the Africa Progress Report.

Why do we need to be cautiously optimistic, and not either extremely optimistic or pessimistic? Africa's economic growth is consistent, and has been above 5 per cent on average since 2002, except in 2009 when it was below 4 per cent. It is therefore the case that some of the fastest growing economies are in Africa and seven out of every ten people in Africa live in countries that have gown, on average, over 4 per cent between 2005 and 2009. As well, inflation is down – in 1996, 13 African countries had inflation figures above 20 per cent; since the mid-2000s, only 2 are in that category. The high growth rates are on account of factors such as strong export demand as a result of diversification of exports, rising commodity prices, and growing domestic demands. These are factors which are not under the control of African governments and can change if the global economy continues to be in crisis.

Also, not every country is enjoying these high growth rates and the growth has been fuelled in many cases by only a few sectors (natural resources (1/3 of growth, infrastructure, energy and services). Although, there is evidence of some diversification of the sources of growth in Africa; for different countries, the picture is not so diverse. Ghana for example grew by 12.2 per cent in 2011 mainly because of the start of commercial oil exploitation, and different countries continue to depend largely on their extractive sectors. The main problem with this is that Africa's continued growth may be slightly less dependent on world commodity prices, but its fortunes will still be decided by this factor. Thus, for example, the Eurozone crisis is said to be harmful to many African economies, particularly if it continues into the future. Europe remains Africa's most important export destination and source of capital, in spite of the 7.5 per cent of FDI from China, as well as ODA, and all these three areas are under stress.

Even more critical, Africa's agrarian transformation is still pending; that is, the continent is still agrarian in the sense that a significant amount of its GDP (30%) comes from agriculture and the majority of continent's people continue to depend on smallholder agriculture for their survival, except in South Africa and North Africa. While agriculture's share of the economically active population in sub-

Saharan Africa has dropped since 1980, it is still significant, at 53.1 per cent in 2010, down from 60.3 per cent in 1995 and 71.9 per cent in 1980. This would not be a problem if it was not that high, and if agricultural employment and self employment translated into value added production (processing and manufacturing) and decent work.

Manufacturing is considered to have the most potential for promoting sustained growth, employment and poverty reduction. Various factors account for its strategic role in development. These include its role as the main source of technology and innovation, the route through which new technologies are introduced to other sectors of the economy. Manufacturing also provides very strong linkage and spill-over effects for other sectors like banking, transport, insurance and communication services, and agriculture. Manufacturing also contributes to domestic investment, employment and output in the economy. An increase in manufacturing therefore translates into export market expansion (UNCTAD/UNIDO 2011). Unfortunately, Africa's growth has been accompanied by de-industrialization. Africa accounts for a very low share of global manufacturing. While Africa's share of global manufacturing exports improved slightly from 1 per cent in 2000 to 1.3 per cent in 2008; in low- and middle-income countries in East Asia and the Pacific, it grew from 9.5 per cent in 2000 to 16 per cent in 2008. Furthermore, in low and middle-income countries in Latin America, it fell from 5 per cent to 4.5 per cent over the same period. This suggests that African countries have not been able to take advantage of the opportunities offered by manufacturing for growth and development.

Relative to other developing regions, manufacturing in Africa plays a very limited role in African economies. In particular, the share of manufacturing value added (MVA) in Africa's GDP is small. In both developing Asia and Latin America, the picture was different (UNCTAD/UNIDO 2011). The share of African manufacturing in GDP rose from a low level of 6.3 per cent in 1970 to 15.3 per cent in 1990. It then began a significant decline from 15.3 per cent in 1990 to 12.8 per cent in 2000 and 10.5 per cent in 2008. This decline in the contribution of manufacturing to GDP since 1990 was a feature of all African sub-regions, though not to the same degree. Hence, over four

decades of economic restructuring has been accompanied by a poor employment creation record in many African countries.

Through self help, Africa's small businesses and enterprises have created jobs. Through their efforts, Africa has some of the highest rates of labour market participation in the world. However, most of these jobs are casual, precarious and offer very poor terms and conditions and few prospects for skills development and upward mobility, what is classified by the ILO as indecent work. This has translated into troublesome income statistics and poverty. In 2005, the UNECA has this to say about joblessness in Africa in its flagship report:

> Poverty in Africa is substantially higher than in other developing regions. More enigmatic is that poverty in Africa is chronic and rising. The share of the total population living below the $1 a day threshold of 46 per cent is higher today than in the 1980s and 1990s – this despite significant improvements in the growth of African GDP in recent years. The implication: poverty has been unresponsive to economic growth. Underlying this trend is the fact that majority of the people have no jobs or secure sources of income (UNECA 2005, p. 1).

What the UNECA describes in 2005 has not changed fundamentally, in spites of some improvements in poverty statistics. According to the 2012 Africa Progress Report, Africa still accounts for a rising share of poverty, accounting for 21 per cent of world poverty in 1999, and 25 per cent in 2008. However, it is also the case that, according to the World Bank's most recent estimates, the share of Africans living on $1.25 a day has reduced from 58 per cent to 48 per cent. This figure is not comforting when the same statistics reveal that 30 per cent or 246 million people in Africa live on an income between $1.25 and $2.50 and only 4 per cent live on more than $10 – and it is this 34 per cent that commentators these days call "Africa's rising middle class". What exactly can you purchase with $2.50 dollars in Bamako? In Accra, it would buy you one meal and some change to get back home from work, but will not be able to buy the ingredients to make soup or cook a meal for your family. Using a range of $10 – $100 to define global middle class, Brookings Institution finds that Africa accounts for 2 per cent of the world's middle class population, with 1 per cent of its purchasing power.

Income inequalities are growing and sharp differences in consumption can be observed from Cape Town to Cairo and from Dakar to Mombasa; but also in the figures on access to basic services such as health, education and water. The social development deficits in Africa remain quite striking, and can be seen in the MDG achievements of African countries. The prevalence of undernourishment fell from 31 per cent in 1990 to 27 per cent in 2008. In 2009, 35 per cent of Africa's children were found to be stunted while child mortality, maternal deaths and primary education have all seen improvements, but have fallen short of MDG goals, which are in themselves quite modest.

Africa also still suffers from serious deficits in the practice of democracy and citizens participation, not to mention the capacity, resource and leadership challenge of African institutions across the board. For example, the lack of data on some of the most development indicators is a serious challenge to policy making. Its growth notwithstanding, Africa's marginality in world Affairs and in the major global policy institutions continues. This is the Africa which has many initiatives started on its behalf, while its own priorities do not receive robust support.

From the foregoing, I hope I have at least drawn a picture of different sides of Africa's changes in the last ten years. They provide opportunities and challenges to business in Africa. The fact that Africa is demographically young is both a challenge and opportunity as is the labour stock the continent has. The recog-nition of the private sector's role has been an important part of the discourse on Africa's development. Unfortunately, this is more rhetorical than concrete in many countries; and where there is action to attract business, it has been more costly than the gains have warranted, a good example being the race to the bottom by African countries to provide the best terms for mining companies. Business has also tended to focus on quick return areas- services (financial, ICT and rites of passage) and distribution of imported goods, and much less on investment in Agriculture.

The recent foray of businesses into agriculture, in the form of speculative land grabbing is a worrying trend. There is widespread agreement that foreign investment in production in agriculture can be beneficial, and continental blue

prints such as the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) are encouraging such investments. However, speculative activity in the land sector will only displace smallholders and fuel landlessness and the loss of common property resources which are very valuable to the poor.

In the short and medium term, African governments have to ensure that their citizens benefit more from the exploitation of Africa's natural resources. Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative Statistics, such as Zambia earning $50m from mining royalty revenues in 2009 despite the industry generating £5bn in sales, and yet earning $450m from corporation tax from other areas and income and other consumer taxes should be a thing of the past, and the search for FDI should not become a race to the bottom. That beauty contest has not been a positive experience for Africa.

African countries also have to apply some of their increased revenues from growth more seriously to basic services and economic infrastructure, to enable poor people to make a living. Also, they need to create the conditions which promote the creation of more jobs and enable more resilient livelihoods, so that poor people can contribute to economic growth – what the Africa Progress Report describes as "produce their way out of poverty and secure a greater share of the benefits from growth". Areas of labour intensive growth, such as private sector employment, small holder agriculture, rural household non-farm enterprises and the urban informal economy, need concerted

and committed support in infrastructure, financial services, technologies, skills development and regulatory environment, to create an easier climate for business and also protect the rights of workers to a decent living. Employment in manufacturing has proved to be a useful component of the livelihood portfolios of both rural and urban households, with benefits to the economy as a whole. Manufacturing has a higher potential for employment creation than agriculture and traditional services. This is not to suggest that agriculture is dispensable or should be replaced by manufacturing in policy priorities. A thriving agricultural sector is the bedrock of a healthy manufacturing sector in providing raw materials and other inputs, markets for manufactures and foreign exchange. Both agriculture and manufacturing need to be taken seriously to maximise their synergies. The tiny middle class needs to expand to strengthen production and consumption, and business would benefit from this.

However we describe it, the message is that the benefits of the growth Africa is enjoying now have to be shared more equitably to sustain the trend. It is only then that it can translate into further economic growth and good social indicators and the reduction of the inequalities that threaten Africa's peace and stability. This provides a good basis for Africa's structural transformation and diversification of its economies, to reduce its vulnerability from cycles of growth and stagnation linked with global economic conditions. If not, no amount of optimism or pessimism

will change Africa's predicament as the continent which much showed promise, but failed to deliver for its peoples.

* This contribution from the Vice President of CODESRIA was first presented during the Opening Plenary of the Conference "Africa Works: 21st Century Trends" held on 29 & 30 October 2012, in The Netherlands

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
The Discourse of 'Africa's Turn'?

Moses Khisa
Northwestern University
Evanston/Chicago, USA

In the spring of 2012, two prominent figures spoke at the campus of Northwestern University in Evanston/Chicago: the eminent pan-African crusader and public intellectual, Horace Campbell, and Samia Nkrumah. Nkrumah is a daughter to Ghana's founding president, the late Dr. Kwame Nkrumah while Campbell is professor of Afro-American studies and political science at Syracuse University, USA. Samia Nkrumah is a Member of Parliament representing Jomoro District (Kwame Nkrumah's home district) and heads the Convention People's Party, a political organization founded by her late father.

Both Campbell and Nkrumah spoke about 'Africa's turn', albeit with varying perspectives and at different occasions. The latter was visiting Chicago to participate in a three-day 12th World Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates. The Program of African Studies at Northwestern Univer-sity and the University of Chicago took advantage of this visit to invite her to give a lecture on 'Democracy and Develop-ment in Ghana'. Campbell was at North-western, at the invitation of the Program of African Studies, to deliver a keynote address in commemoration of sixty years of *Toward Freedom*, the anti-colonial, justice, and freedom advocacy newsletter founded in the United States by William Bross Lloyd Jr.

Campbell's was a somewhat lofty and grandiose portrayal, reminiscent of old Marxist hyperbole. He spoke of 'revolution and transformation in Africa', and the fact that a 'quantum leap' in politics and economics was underway. It had all started with Taheria Square, he averred. I challenged Campbell about what was revolutionary with events in Egypt, considering his own definition of a revolution as 'an overthrow of the existing socioeconomic and political order'. Well, he had a simple and straightforward answer: a revolution is not an event, it's a process. I pressed on: but until the revolutionary forces and processes have finally overthrown the old order, how can we plausibly proclaim, *a priori*, that a revolution is underway? 'We wait and see', he said.

Nkrumah had a more cautious perspective, shedding light on the challenges political leaders face in a poor and economically backward society like Ghana. A member of parliament, she noted, is not just a legislator; s/he is also a philanthropist, a developmentalist, and contends with the needs of the people s/he represents. Nkrumah took occasion to underline her father's dream for the continent: 'From slavery to colonialism, to post-independence global economic marginalization, the vision of Dr. Nkrumah was one of restoring the human dignity and uniting the African peoples'.

Samia Nkrumah spoke with a mix of candor, optimism and passion. Yet, her speech was evidently laced with trepidation. Her remarks were greatly measured and highly nuanced. She spoke of Africa's potential but did not sound oblivious of the difficulties at hand, especially in the global scheme of things. For one, she bemoaned Africa's poor representation at major trade negotiations and resultant 'bad deals' for the continent as a whole.

Both Samia Nkrumah and Horace Campbell's remarks bespoke of the growing discourse on 'Africa's turn' – the turn to turn the corner, to exorcise the twin evils of social deprivation and economic backwardness. In a word: the turn to muster socioeconomic transformation. The discourse trumpeting 'Africa's turn' is unmistakably palpable. It echoes debates during the so-called 'decade of hope' – the 1990s – predicated on structural adjustment programs and re-ignited mobilization of aid for Africa, championed by world celebrities. From the policy circles in Western capitals to leading research universities in the Euro-American academe; from the corridors of prominent international financial institutions to the boardrooms of leading multinational corporations; among the elite sections across the African continent and those in the diaspora, talk of a new era for Africa is ripe and ubiquitous.

But what's new that should lead anyone to talk of 'Africa's turn'? Apparently fundamental changes have been taking place on the continent, both economically and politically. We have some economic figures, to which I return below. The figures underline substantive developments, we are told. The rich but poor (and cursed?) continent continues to remain the source of much sought after natural resources and new discoveries are made, principally oil and gas. The latest, in a long list of oil producers and potential producers, are two East African nations – Kenya and Uganda. Then, there is the issue of new markets (Marx must be restless wherever he is!), new opportunities for investment, etc.

Economic reforms – to wit – privatization of state-owned corporations, market liberalization and financial deregulation have, to use the old cliché, 'unlocked the potentials' of free private enterprise, innovation and investment. Politically, electoral politics and the subordination of public power and authority to popular will and citizen accountability, the widening of respect for civil rights and political freedoms, have converged to reconfigure the African political scene in a fundamental way. 'These policy alterations', writes Anne Pitcher in the May 2012 issue of *Current History,* 'have provided the foundations for increased investor interest in the continent.'

Satellite cities have sprung up. Business is booming in downtown Kampala and Accra. Several African economies are among the top fastest growing economies in the world. Consequently, trade and investment have slowly overtaken paternalistic foreign aid. 'Whereas aid from donors such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Scandinavian countries has financed large infrastructure projects such as hydroelectric dams and major road corridors, or provided budget support to cash-strapped African governments for education and health care,' concludes Pitcher, 'private investment has surpassed overseas development assistance (ODA) in importance'.[1] She further notes that, despite the current economic downturn,

inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) were $60 billion in 2009 and about $50 billion in 2010.

However, arguably, the most vaunted factor at the center of the debate is the aggressive entry of a rising global power – China, which has heightened the stakes and caused anxiety among the traditional Western patrons. China is the biggest player in the astronomical economic figures that many commentators cite. As of 2011, total China-Africa trade had reached an unprecedented $166 billion while Chinese Foreign Direct Investment to the continent stood at a record $15 billion.

With China's conspicuous presence on the continent, the rhetoric from the Western capitals appears to have changed. 'We want a relationship of part-nership, not patronage', declared US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, speaking in the Tanzanian commercial capital, Dar es Salaam last year.[2] Ms. Clinton was on a continent-wide tour of Africa to streng-then American presence on the continent, considering the stakes in the 'war on terror'. 'We don't want to see a new colonialism in Africa', she concluded, undoubtedly making a veiled refe-rence to perceived exploitative Chinese pene-tration of markets and control over sources of raw material across the continent.

The alarmist reaction to Chinese presence in Africa betrays an ahistorical mindset, for China's involvement with the continent dates back many decades. China's first post-war presence in Africa can be traced to Premier Zhou Enlai's tour of the continent in 1963-4. Later, China took an active role in the 1960s and 1970s, supporting liberation movements in several African countries. As Alex Thomson notes, China gave aid to socialist-leaning nations to build stadiums, hospitals, railroads and other infrastructure.[3] This early engagement also included signi-ficant aid in the form of infrastructure, scholarships for African elites to study in Chinese universities and the deployment of teams of doctors.

But the current industrial needs of the world's producer, China, have neces-sitated a more aggressive penetration of Africa. That said, while China's economic needs, ranging from oil and other raw materials to new markets for its manu-factured goods, are at the heart of its engagement with Africa, China is also providing much needed foreign invest-ment and access to cheap consumer goods, thus making China a preferred economic partner than Western countries and their transnational corporations. The ubiquity of Chinese aid, trade and invest-ment entities in Africa is striking – mining in Zambia, DR Congo and Angola; oil exploration and refining in Angola, Sudan and Uganda; road constructions in Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda; power generation in Angola and Uganda; developing the tourism industry in Sierra Leone; mobile phone networks services in Kenya and Nigeria, etc. The list goes on.

The turn might be here, but the trans-formation is by no means foregone. Africa has been there before and has stumbled. For the pessimist, stumbling again is not far-fetched. The enthusiasm of the imme-diate post-independence decade soon gave way to a cold-blooded and callous politics that held Africa back for long. The hype of the 1990s delivered little substance.

Samia Nkrumah, perhaps with dreams from the father, appears to have a better grasp of the task at hand for African leaders – to craft a national agenda borne of a con-sensus politics, and to engage the outside world, especially China, on Africa's terms. As matters stand now, there is little to show that African gover-nments are enga-ging the rest of the world with a coherent and sustainable agenda geared at long-term socioeconomic transfor-mation. Without setting its own terms and agenda, Africa will continue serving as no more than a conveyor belt. That many African economies remain largely domi-nated by foreign investors and multina-tional corporations, who may have little interest in long-term socioe-conomic trans-formation, points to the need for caution.

Notes

1. Anne Pitcher, "Lions, Tigers, and Emerging Markets: African's Development Dilemmas," *Current Issue,* Vol. 111, No. 745, May 2012, pp. 163-8.

2. "Hilary Clinton Warns Africa of 'New Colo-nialism,'" *The Huffington Post,* June 11, 2011.

3. Alex Thomson, An Introduction to African Politics, Third Edition (London and New York: Routledge, 2010). See also Drew Thompson, 'China's Soft Power in Africa: from the "Beijing Consensus" to Health Diplomacy,' China Brief. 5, 21 (2005).

Negotiating the Livelihoods of Children and Youth in Africa's Urban Spaces
Négocier sa vie : les enfants et les jeunes dans les espaces urbains d'Afrique
Michael Bourdillon with with Ali Sangare

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This book deals with problems facing children and youth in African cities today. African populations have high growth rates and, consequently, relatively high proportions of young people. Population growth in rural areas has stretched resources leading to urban migration and a rapid growth of cities. Economies have not grown apace with the population; and in some countries, economies have even shrunk. The result is a severe lack of resources in cities to meet the needs of the growing populations, shown in high unemployment, inadequate housing, poor services, and often extreme poverty. All the essays in this book draw attention to such urban environments, in which children and youth have to live and survive. The title of this book speaks of negotiating livelihoods. The concept of 'livelihood' has been adopted to incorporate the social and physical environment together with people's responses to it. It considers not only material, but also human and social resources, including local knowledge and understanding. It, thus, considers the material means for living in a broader context of social and cultural interpretation. It, therefore, does not deal only with material and economic existence, but also with leisure activities, entertainments and other social forms of life developed by young people in response to the dictates of the environment.

Archives of Post-independent Africa[1]

Brenton Maart[2]
University of Cape Town
South Africa

There can be no transformation of the curriculum, or indeed of knowledge itself, without an interrogation of archive – Professor Njabulo S Ndebele

I love conclusions, not because I'm lazy or expedient, but because at the end of it all my friends, Biddi and Karen (aka *Built like a dress*), composed songs and performed them – shamelessly incongruous, suddenly impromptu and brashly uninvited – in ignoble public places to crowds whose numbers were delimited by, say, the size of the balcony or the capacity of the car. A verse from one of my favourites goes: '…Calling for the waiter, they leave politics till later, as another day goes by… Post-modern man has a shower that runs backward, leaves him dry...'

The second reason I embrace, where possible, the chance to cut to the quick, is because a fridge magnate I remember from years ago urged the following: 'Life is uncertain. Eat dessert first.'

So, in celebration of the generous gift of hindsight, this report begins with the presentation by Percy Hintzen (Florida International University/University of California, Berkeley, USA), which brought to a close the conference on Archives of Post-independent Africa and its Diaspora. Hintzen's summary of the pitfalls that beset the field of contemporary archival practice demonstrated that the hazards lurk neither in 'knowing that you don't know', nor in 'not knowing that you do know'. Instead, he warned, the deadliest snare (that mine in the maze) is found in the condition of 'not knowing that you don't know'.

One way to circumvent this danger is to call in three of the world's leaders as conference conveners. The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), founded in 1973 and based in Senegal, is a non-governmental organization best described by a skim through its academic journal publication list – *Africa Development*; *Identity, Culture and Politics*; *The African Anthropologist*; *African Sociological Review; African Journal of International Affairs; Africa Review of Books; Africa Media Review*, *Journal of Higher Education in Africa*, and *Afro-Arab Selections for Social Sciences* –

guided in form and content by research programmes, conferences and networks.

Their outputs, along with an extensive book publication list, stimulate scholarship that insists – against the protestations of international studies of Africa – that 'there is no fatality about the condition'. In his opening address at the conference, CODESRIA's Ebrima Sall underlined the importance of African scholars positing questions, designing research and formulating conclusions. It is the lived experience of African scholars of African modernity that will allow for a new form of critical understanding – generated as much by academic scholarship as by affect – of the particular and contextual relationships between the state of the archives, the situation of the countries, the variable conditions within the continent and its loaded affairs with the rest of the world.

The other two convening bodies were the African Studies Centre, founded in 1947 at Leiden University, and the African Studies Multi-Campus Research Group, founded in 2008 at the numerous campuses of the University of California. Together, they represent three continents which themselves were (and continue to be) participants in the disruptions that defined (and continue to define) the pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial and independence periods of African countries. Today, these three territories are shaped as much by their entangled histories as by their contemporary Diasporas.

The conference, hosted on the former Senegalese slave island of Goree from 20 to 22 June 2012, brought together theorists and practitioners to examine archives of seemingly different forms, times and places, which collectively describe a dynamic terrain in continual flux.

Curatorial readings of interdependence created surprisingly new understandings that question the flow of influence and power, redirect complicity and challenge

dogmatic binaries established during the parallel growth of modernity. More importantly, the compound views presented by case studies came together in an attempt to understand the histories of the archival sector, map their contemporary shapes and plot their forward trajectories. Finally, the conference facilitated a network that uses hypothesis and analysis as a stimulus for productive archival activism.

A conference on archives requires presentations from a divergent range of hitherto traditionally unrelated disciplines. Five themes were proposed to provide structural cohesion. Often, however, themes crossed over into one another, thus revealing a sector that has been one of the forerunners in the development of a contemporary methodology that is part science and part humanities, part factual and part interpretative, part irrefutable and part conjecture, part documentary and part fiction, part rhetorical and part substantive, part public and part civic, part summative and part formative, part contemplative and part performative, part ethereal and part tangible, part analogue and part digital.

In short, the conference was a case study in the application of a methodology that traverses within and across disciplines to provide readings of archives that, five years ago, would not have been possible. This was a potentially incoherent and discordant amalgam of instruments, which, through careful curation, was conducted into a high-drama opera by the clear and simple power of that motif called imagination.

The avaricious demarcation (the 'founding'), so loved by Western hegemony, locates the origin of the theme of 'Administering the archive' with the preservation of bureaucratic government archives (beginning, of course, with colonial records). Fortunately Anaïs Wion, (Centre d'Etudes des Mondes Africains & Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, France), in "Electronic Publication of Ethiopian Manuscript Archives: Methods and Issues of an Electronic Management", noted the early use of archives in the service of laws, policies and traditions.

This theme also looked forward, from colonialism as its point zero, to include more recent archives of social, union and other movements, records of private organisations, genealogical maps, personal and family 'tin-trunks' of manuscripts, religious texts and their commentaries: documents that move beyond the textual.

Audio records, too, started to resonate in this theme, as did the cognitive potential of the visual (through photographs and other forms of imagery), thus partially, and thankfully, displacing the disproportionate emphasis on what James Elkins terms 'those beautiful, dry and distant texts' (the next step would be a theme that explores more expansively the sensual properties of the archive, and their potentially generative role in constructing new understandings).

A political concern in administering the archive is the shift from analogue to digital, where the privatisation of information clashes directly with the utopian ideals of open access. Although Sylvester Ogbechie (University of California, Santa Barbara, US) appreciates the value of curating the digital archive as a process of intellectual synthesis, his paper titled "Archiving Africa Across the Digital Divide: The Ezechime Archive Project" interpreted the digitisation of archives as a replication of an earlier colonial paradigm. His analysis of this 'new scramble for Africa' postulated as to the value of African cultural knowledge (produced in Africa, using African resources, or extracted from Africa for processing elsewhere) within a global economy, how international digitisation of African archives convert this value into economic currency, and why the benefits of these processes do not accrue within the continent itself.

Francis Garaba (University of KwaZulu-Natal, SA) emphasised this anxiety when he asked of the digitised archive: 'Who shows it? Who vets the information? Who has access?' His paper titled "The Digital Revolution and its Implications on Liberation Struggle Archives" envisaged the digitisation of African archives and their subsequent use by Western scholars as acts of neo-colonial capitalism.

In antithesis to the archive as a traditionally inanimate repository, presentations on the theme "Performing the Archive" drew attention to how contemporary live performances are able to personify the past and present these to a contemporary audience with immediacy, relevance and advocacy. Case studies of music, dance, theatre and arts festivals showed how this embodiment of the archive is put to political use by shifting colonial stereotypes to the benefit of nationalist post-colonialities.

It is especially in its capacity to subvert the tropes of ethnography that performance is central in enacting, and understanding, the conversations that arise through the Diaspora. Mirjam de Bruijn (African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Netherlands), in her report on the research by Walter Gam Nkwi (University of Buea, Cameroon), titled "The Status of Memory in Family Photo Albums in the Bamenda Grassfields of Cameroon" described how personal photographic archives were transformed through nuanced, sensitive reading and mediation via the making of a film into an analysis of the aspirations of mobility. Of the range of curatorial methodologies applied here, one of the more powerful was the role of affect in creating new readings, meanings and understandings. Of special interest was the manner in which the research directed a possible future for the physical object, a future that continues to define a path quite different from that of the digital highway.

Performance case studies led into the power shifts that define post-independence and its public statements. Here, attention was focused on the built edifice or monument, which functions as an emblem of nationalist identities in an era in which heritage has become a product. Presentations on the theme, "Spatialisation of the Archive"*,* addressed the irony of packaging the social imperative of liberation movements for capitalist consumption. In an extreme example, Olutayo Adesina (University of Ibadan, Nigeria) in "Archival Documents and the Gatekeepers in the Twenty-first Century: Reconfiguring Nigeria's National Archives" drew similarities between Nigerian and South African national archives, with their removal of support and destruction of records. In the case of Nigeria, however, the trend is toward the creation of a black-market situation through the commercialisation of archival practice and privatisation of records. The consequence is that working with Nigerian records is becoming a very costly undertaking for scholars, preci-pitating a move toward research that does not require the use of these commercial archives.

In both colonial and post-independence regimes, traditional forms of video and audio played pivotal roles in political power plays and shifts. Their initial and often short-lived deployment in propaganda put to use the sector's greatest asset: that of the seemingly one-way flow, where information generated and disseminated by the group in power reached an audience rendered as passive consumers without the means to register their critiques.

This scenario also came to define the early stages of the digital era. More recently however, enhanced digital functionality – with its proliferation of user-friendly social media – challenges this unidirectional flow of power. Now, the means to choose, generate, selectively reproduce, alter and redistribute mass media broadcasts results in a practice that is often beyond the control of the state.

It is this public ownership of rhetoric (optimistically called the democratisation of media) that was explored by scholars within the theme "Post-independence Media Formations". In his paper, titled "Is Google Good for African History?", Jonathan Cole (University of California, Berkeley, US), outlined the technical realities where digital archives can be applied as both a tool of the state and a threat to the state, a notion that Peter Bloom (University of California, US), highlighted in his opening address, stressing that ideologies create archives and, reciprocally, archives themselves create ideologies.

As the field of archival practice advanced into new terrain, explorers who started their investigations at state-administered, centralised archives went in search of alternative repositories. The first port of call yielded abundant treasures within individual government departments, supplemented by the holdings of non-governmental organisations ('surrogates of the state'), and also private corporations and foundations. Although many of these archives were located within the colonised territory itself, others were formed and/or located outside of national borders, becoming important in studies of Diasporas. The dispersal of archives, along with the inherent temporal and dynamic nature of the archive, highlighted an important reality: gaps were inevitable. Simply put, building a complete archive is an impossible task.

This is what the fifth and final conference theme, "Archival Absences and Surrogate Collections of the African State", interrogated, with case studies that invented novel methodologies to make sense of ruptures in the archival body. The first of two very different approaches extended on the traditional practice by using available archival fragments (what was there) to fill the gaps (what was not there), in a bid to construct a more complete and coherent narrative. By using tools of historiography and anthropology (and more recently 'anthro-history'), these studies relied on extrapolation.

Certain projects applied a scientific logic to formulate and test hypotheses, a method akin to conjecture and refutation. Here, proof is never absolute, and the narrative is continually refined and channeled towards the realm of the increasingly probable (the possible). Eventually, this scientific approach reaches a tipping point where no further claims may be generated. It is here where a more unorthodox approach is taken up, with the application of a contemporary literary technique, one that merges the documentary (evidence) with fictional construction (invention).

This practice, termed 'documentary fiction' or 'fictional documentary', extends archival fragments to close the gaps with a narrative approaching the realm of the plausible (the believable). This blurring of genres signals an influ-ential new direction in archival narrative construction, one that celebra-tes a rare tool in the scholar's inventory: that of productive imagination.

Both of these approaches – the scientific and the fictional – use the fragment as material to fill the gaps. In "Shadow Archives and the Contingencies of Postcolonial History Writing: Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana, 1957–1966", Jean Allman (Washington University, USA) discussed the challenges of working with archives of the colony and the post-colony not located within the nation state itself, and highlighted the limiting effects of the 'illusion of the national archive'. One way around this difficulty was to follow the threads of a number of 'shadow archives' in collections across the globe, a process marked by dislocation, dispersion and a lack of cohesion.

An initial frustration later matured into a more productive question as to the possibilities of how the lack of a national archive could lead to the writing of a new history.

From another perspective, Allman's work may also be read as an approach that negates the importance of the fragment. Instead, her study may point to an invitation to focus on archival fissures as a new, as yet unexplored, body of material. These absences may then be read – not in their traditionally linear relationship to fragments – but as an independent archive with its own structure, history and function. Allman's project is not an attempt to read between the lines, nor is it the identification of a palimpsest (both of which would continue to posit the fragment narrative as the dominant discourse). By denying these 'missing pieces' their traditionally abject status, Allman may be generating a radical methodology, one that endeavors to decipher, incredulously, an archive of absence.

Notes

Non-Europhone Intellectuals
Ousmane Oumar Kane

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The history of Arabic writing spans a period of eight hundred years in sub-Saharan Africa. Hundreds of thousands of manuscripts in Arabic or Ajami (African languages written with the Arabic script) are preserved in public libraries and private collections in sub-Saharan Africa. This 'Islamic Library' includes historical, devotional, pedagogical, polemical and political writings, most of which have not yet been adequately studied. This book, *Non-Europhone Intellectuals*, studies the research carried out on the Islamic library and shows that Muslim intellectuals, in West Africa in particular, have produced huge literature in Arabic and Ajami. It is impossible to reconstitute this library completely. As the texts have existed for centuries and are mostly in the form of unpublished manuscripts, only some of them have been transmitted to us while others have perished because of poor conservation. Efforts toward collecting them continues and the documents collected thus far attest to an intense intellectual life and important debates on society that have been completely ignored by the overwhelming majority of Europhone intellectuals. During European colonial rule and after the independence of African nations, Islamic education experienced some neglect, but the Islamic scholarly tradition did not decline. On the contrary, it has prospered with the proliferation of modern Islamic schools and the rise of dozens of Islamic institutions of higher learning. In recent years, the field of Islamic studies in West Africa has continued to attract the attention of erudite scholars, notably in anthropology and history, who are investing in learning the languages and working on this Islamic archive. As more analytical works are done on this archive, there will be continued modification in terms of the debate on knowledge production in West Africa.

Where Do We Go from Rio? The Implications of the Third World Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+ 20)

James Murombedzi
CODESRIA
Dakar, Senegal

On 14 September 2012, the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) adopted the Arusha Declaration on Africa's Post Rio+20 Strategy for Sustainable Development. The Arusha Declaration outlines the commitments, actions and programmes that will facilitate the implementation of the major decisions of the Rio+20 Summit in Africa. *Inter alia*, AMCEN undertakes to initiate an African 'green economy' partnership, to facilitate coordinated support for member-states and implement the global partnership for action on the 'green economy'; review the African 10-Year Framework on Sustainable Consumption and Production (10YFP on SCP); strengthen and consolidate commitments to promote sustainable development. Flagship programmes to be initiated under the Arusha Declaration include: Ecosystem-based Adaptation Programme for Africa; African Programme on Sustainable Energy Development; Integrated Waste Management Programme for Africa; Africa Integrated Environmental Assessment for Sustai-nable Development Planning; a sustainable land management and desertification programme in Africa; African Programme on Biodiversity and Ecosystems; and African Partnership for Capacity Building, Technology Transfer and Skills Development (Mukazi, 2012). The Arusha Declaration on Africa's Post Rio+20 Strategy for Sustainable Deve-lopment is an unconditional endorse-ment of the outcomes of Rio+20. What does all this mean for sustainable develo-pment and environmental governance in Africa?

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), inaugurated at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, took place at a time which is historically significant for Africa. First is the context, in historical perspective. To resolve the first crisis of industrial capitalism at the end of the 19th century (the great depression from 1873 onwards), European factory owners desperately required new markets for their manu-factures, and wealthy entrepreneurs were in search of new enterprises to invest in.

The newly created but out-of-work working classes (peasants, having lost their lands in the enclosures movement, and now also unemployed as factory jobs dried up during the crisis) desired new locales to migrate to (Alden Wily 2012). The stage was set for the concentration and globalized expansion of capital, expressed in the first wave of accu-mulation by dispossession in Africa (Amin 2011), first formalized into the General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa (1885) and later culminating in the carving up of the continent in a process designed to create new markets and provide cheap land and labour for the colonizing powers.

Segue to the present. In 2012, the second systemic crisis of capitalist accumulation, starting in the 1970s and leading to the financial meltdown of 2008 (Amin 2011) has left major investors with trillions of dollars on hand and in a desperate search for new ways to make the huge returns that characterized the 1980s and 90s. As with the previous crisis, 'capital res-ponded with a double movement of concentration and globalization' (Amin 2011). This restructuring of capitalism in response to the systemic crises of accu-mulation has several features: 1) the inten-sification of the imperialist globalization process, with capital moving out of national markets and uncom-petitive fixed national investments; 2) a growing shift out of productive capital into speculative financial capital; 3) fixed capital invest-ments and acquisitions, including through privatization) in the developing world; and 4) the re-definition of the state to reduce taxes and increase the capacity to push through neo-liberal reforms (Cronin 2006). This has seen a shift from an economy based primarily on the production of goods and non-financial services to one characterized by finan-

cialisation, and the growth of a shadow industry of hedge funds, private equity firms, and financial innovations such as derivatives (Tabb 2012).

Many investors see increasing scarcity in a number of natural resources as an opportunity to reap those large profits and have begun to take over food, energy and metal markets. Not satisfied with these essential markets, investors are working with national governments and international agencies to create new markets for other aspects of nature. Water, land, carbon, species, habitats and biodiversity markets are being created, not so much to protect natural resources, but to provide new ways for the financial sector to profit (Murombedzi 2012[forthcoming]), and because they are not produced for sale in the first place, they can only be fictitious commodities (Polanyi 1944).

This then is the context in which Rio+20 was convened, after the financial meltdown of September 2008 and at a time when the new wave of appropriation of the resources of the global South to support consumption by the citizens of the North is increasing exponentially. The 'market' is increasingly represented as the solution to contemporary environmental problems and the challenges of 'sustai-nable development'. Rio+20 was typical of this trend and is representative of a deep seated transformation in international environmental governance favoring 'market forces'. This is in keeping with the established trends in the UNCED. The Rio Earth Summit of 1992 was the culmi-nation of a 1983 UN General Assembly decision to create the World Commission on Environment and Development (The Brundtland Commission) to analyse the planet's environmental situation and its relationships to development goals in response to the global ecological crisis. The Commission's report, "Our Common Future" (Brundtland 1987) provided the basis for negotiations at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. Important outcomes of the Rio Earth Summit included the 'Rio Prin-ciples', landmark conventions on climate change and biodiversity and commitments on poverty eradication and social justice.

The Brundtland report documents the environmental problems facing the planet and concludes that every single life supporting system – the biosphere – is in decline. 'Our Common Future' recognizes that the neo-liberal context of contemporary development models is the principal cause of unsustainability, but its proposed solutions do not transcend this model, proposing instead a response that emphasizes more growth The report also introduces the concept of sustainable development, a type of development through which it would be possible to maintain and increase growth without placing future generations at risk. Sustainable development would make it possible to eliminate poverty and re-launch economic growth in a sustainable way through technological trans-formations that would enable production with less and less material and energy input (Lander 2012).

Since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, a series of United Nations conventions, aimed at stemming the environmental crisis, were adopted on biodiversity, desertification and climate change. However, none of these purported solutions addressed the root of the problem in the hegemonic model of civilization and its logic of limitless growth. Instead, the solutions proposed through the UNCED process embraced and promoted neoliberal strategies and inexorably led to the commodification of nature with its attendant problems which will be explored below (Amin 2011; The World Rainforest Movement 2012). To be sure, the concept of sustainable development continues to be a major political and ideological success in that it 'provided new legitimacy to neoliberal globalization, which began to present itself as sustainable, despite its overwhelmingly devastating dynamic' (Lander 2012).

Because of the failure to address the structural causes of unsustainability, 20 years after Rio the environmental crisis is more acute, each and every one of the problems described in the Brundtland report is now far more severe. Conservative estimates show that industrial gas emissions have increased by almost 50 per cent; more than 300 million ha of forest have been cleared; many communities in developing countries have lost rights and access to lands and forests to large multinational corporations acting in collaboration with national governments;

although poverty has been reduced in a few industrializing countries, nearly 20 per cent of the world's population remains in absolute poverty (Watts and Ford, 2012; Global Race Equality Action Trust, 2012), and more continue to be impoverished through land and resource expropriations Journal of Peasant Studies, 2012).. The commodification and privatization of the environment has accelerated. This is evident from increased 'green grabs', land grabs, new forms of land and resource expropriation through carbon sequestration, water privatization, and the creation of new protected areas on lands expropriated from the poor and marginalized, and the suppression of indigenous forms of production and consumption.

'The economy, the wealth of nations, social services and nature are public goods. Yet the developing world's forests, pastures, and farmlands are being given and sold to private interests – right out from under the feet of the poor. Farmlands are being purchased by industrial economies to ensure their long-term food supply. Forests are being turned into the private carbon storage bins to enable industrial nations to burn away the world's fossil fuels. Our first decade of the new millennium is witnessing a surge in the privatization of nature – under an ideology that the market is the best mechanism for managing the world's natural heritage. These enclosures are expropriating the basis of life and livelihood for Asia's, Africa's and Latin America's poor' (Murombedzi & Ribot 2012).

The Rio+20 Earth Summit was convened to declare a 'pathway for a sustainable century'. At Rio+20, the concept of 'sustainable development' was repackaged as the 'green economy', a concept developed by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 2008 which advocates switching to renewable fuel while maintaining the same systems of production, trade, finance and consumption (World Rainforest Movement 2012). The main issues under negotiation at Rio+20 included the mechanisms of transition to the Green Economy; the development of associated Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) out of the MDGs; sustainable production and consumption (SPC); the status of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) within the UN system, rights, fossil fuel subsidies, a High Commissioner for Future Generations, the future of the

Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), the Means of Implementation and the Rio Principles.

The main outcomes of the summit include proposals for a transition to a green economy, a plan to define Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and statements of intent with reference to issues such as the resource rights of the poor, and reaffirmation of the Rio Principles of sustainable development. Unable to agree on the themes for the SGDs, the summit agreed instead to create an 'open working group' of 30 nations to define the SDGs by September 2013, in time for subsequent integration into the MDGs in 2015.

Campaigners such as Greenpeace, GREAT Trust, Council for Afrika International and Afrika Liberation Society, among others, have condemned the 2012 Earth Summit as 'a failure of epic proportions to the world's majority citizens, to whom it must be transparently accountable' (Global Race Equality Action Trust 2012). The final outcome document of the Summit, "The Future We Want", is a plan to set global sustainable development goals and other measures to strengthen global environmental management, promote a 'green economy', improve food security and enhance the conservation of ecosystems. Reflecting the deep divisions between the developed and developing countries, the lack of agreement and leadership (including the absence of most of the G20 leaders from Rio+20), the outcome document has been described as a wishy-washy document, lacking unequivocal national, regional and global leadership and without clear resource commitments. 'It is not a declaration, or even a "road map", but simply the "Rio+20 Outcome Document" (Griffin 2012).

'The Future We Want' has been criticized by civil society, developing country governments and indigenous peoples for 'pandering to corporate interests, being seriously shortsighted in its understanding of the scale and urgency of environmental and development crises, and lacking in ambition and detail to address these challenges' (Griffin, 2012). As with the Rio Earth Summit before it, Rio+20 failed to address the terminal crisis of the neo-liberal hegemonic pattern of civilization by failing to question the global operation of the dominant political and economic relationships, but instead, continuing to view the sustainability

crises as 'market failures'. As with the Rio+10 Summit in 2002 and the Durban COP 17 Climate Summit in 2011 (Bond, 2012), Rio+20 re-emphasizes the market and accelerated growth as the solutions to these 'markets failures'. It introduces the concept of 'Green Economy'to define a new development framework which replaces the failed sustainable development.

Through a transition to the green economy, it will be possible to re-launch the global economy with rates of growth far higher than the current model (UNEP, 2008; Lander, 2012). It will be possible to create more and better employment, reduce poverty, reach greater levels of equality, and meet the millennium objectives. These outcomes would be achieved in a sustainable way that recognizes the value of nature and reduces greenhouse gas emissions. This in turn would reduce pressure on the natural environment, allowing it to recover, while at the same time creating new and profitable areas of investment that contribute to a resolution of the global crisis of capital (UNEP 2008).

The UNEP position (the UNEP report was the basis for the draft text negotiated at Rio+20) is decidedly pro-market, a historical and apolitical. It completely ignores any consideration of the significance of the extraordinarily unequal power relations that exist in today's world, and the interests that are at play in the operation of this global system (Lander 2012). The green economy proposal benefits the large capitalist economies and offers an opportunity for corpo-rations to resume the accumulation of capital and reap greater profits through both productive and speculative activities, with investment redirected towards nature ('natural capital'), the 'carbon emissions market', as well as new, supposedly clean technologies. The Green Economy thus seeks to create space for corporations to explore new techno-logical solutions to the climate and other environmental crises. The efficacy of these so-called solutions – which include carbon capture and sequestration, biochar, solar reflectors, algae blooms and 'clean energy' sources (such as nuclear energy, 'clean' coal, natural gas, hydro-power, biofuels, and biomass and so on) – has been questioned, with many of them already demonstrated to be 'unclean' (Bond 2012).

This 'green economy', defined by UNEP as 'an economy that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities…which is low carbon, resource efficient and socially inclusive', was the subject of contentious debates at Rio+20. Developing countries wanted a $30bn per year fund to help in the transition to sustainability, which developed countries, wracked by the accumulation crisis, could not concretely support (Global Race Equality Action Trust 2012). Further, the summit was characterized by the ever present skepticism and suspicions of eco-imperialism among the countries of the global south , who felt Europe was pushing this agenda on the developing world in order to stimulate the economies of its member states. Consequently, there was no agreement on the pathways for a transition to the 'green economy', with the final outcome being simply an encouragement to all countries to find their own ways to a green economy.

The 'Green Economy' agenda is to expand the reach of finance capital and integrate nature into the market by putting a monetary 'value' or a 'price' on biomass, biodiversity and ecosystems functions – such as storing carbon, pollinating crops, or filtering water – in order to integrate these 'services' as tradable units into the financial market. The concept of payments for environmental services, operationalized through a UNEP initiative, The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), is instrumental in assigning an economic value to biodiversity. 'Environmental services' and 'trade in environmental services' play a key role in the 'green economy', and will result in greater commodification and privatization of nature and ecosystems, through the integration of their functions (defined as 'services') into financial markets'(World Rainforest Move-ment[WRM] 2012).

Carbon markets are a major initiative in this financialization of nature. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) mandated by the Kyoto Protocol is a framework that enables companies that reduce emissions to sell them, as bonds, to other companies who find it more advantageous to use these pieces of paper as a license to continue polluting (see WRM 2012). Through the CDM, limits to carbon emissions have been placed on nations. Those that exceed their quota are then able to take up the slack of those who have not utilized their quota. However, the end result is that total pollution has not been reduced, as those responsible for the bulk of green-house gas emissions have been able to continue doing so by purporting to be polluting on behalf of those who would otherwise have not released extra carbon into the atmosphere.

By 2010, much of the growth in the volume of trade in carbon happened in the secondary carbon derivatives market. The carbon trade industry is controlled by financial markets and the major players are the Buldge Bracket investment banks. The Buldge Bracket refers to the world's largest and most profitable multinational investment banks, including Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, Barclays Capital, Rabobank, BNP Paribas Fortis, Sumitomo, Kommunalkredit, Cantor Fitzgerald (WRM 2012). Financialization has meant that the benefits of the carbon markets have accrued to financial institutions in the form of profits, largely failing in their *raison d'etre* to reduce carbon emissions.

Clearly then the 'Green Economy' agenda is a manipulation of the ecological and social crises to create new opportunities to extend the reach of capital into nature (Lander 2011). Rather than addressing the real structural causes of inequality and injustices, capital is using 'green' language to launch an aggressive new round of consolidation and expansion, in alliance with governments. Corporations and the financial sector need governments to institutionalize the new rules of the 'green economy' to safeguard them against risks and to create the institutional framework for the financialization of nature. In this regard, a genuine green economy will not be possible without political domination based on the projection of military strength and power (Lander 2011; Bond 2012).

The tendency towards a market oriented green economy based on corporate securitizing, commodifying and financializing of nature deviates from the intended meaning of green economy by de-emphasizing the 'green' idea of environmental consciousness while emphasizing the 'economy'(Angbazo 2012).While the Rio+20 agreement urges nations to develop mechanisms to place a higher value on nature, including alternatives to GDP as a measure of wealth that account more for environmental and social factors, and efforts to assess and pay for 'environmental services' provided by nature, such as carbon sequestration and habitat protection (Watts and Ford

2012), such an approach would only serve to buttress the environmental markets ideology. Moreover, there was no agreement regarding the Means of Implementation (MOI) of the transition to the green economy. The outcome docu-ment may, in fact, represent a step backwards from the original Rio summit on the issue of technology transfer to developing countries.

It is necessary to subject the concept to class analysis in order to understand the political processes and forces pushing for market-based solutions. In particular, political analysis needs to take account of the democracy implications of the global re-constitution of power between states, the corporations and markets, and civil society. The Environmental Justice Organizations, Liabilities and Trade (EJOLT) statement, condemning the Green Economy outcomes typifies the cynicism of civil society: 'The promises are striking: conserving nature, overcoming poverty, providing equity and creating jobs. But the means and philosophy behind it look all too familiar' (Joan Martinez-Alier and Joachim Spangenberg, in Bond 2012).The faith in markets to regulate industrial gas emissions has already been shown to be misplaced. In the few months after COP 17, the Green Climate Fund, the design of which included mechanisms to incentivize private sector and market mechanisms to fund climate change responses, is practically empty. The $100 billion in Copenhagen has not materialized beyond some minor commitments made by South Korea, Germany and Denmark. The emissions trade is failing. In Europe, the ETS has all but collapsed (Bond 2012). The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is not working. The international market in CDM credits collapsed in 2009 and 2010. The value of primary CDM credits traded fell to US$1.5 billion – the lowest figure since the Kyoto Protocol came into force, in 2005 (*REDD Monitor* 2011).

Another Kyoto Protocol mechanism, the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), seeks to place a monetary value on the carbon stored in trees. This is designed to serve as an incentive for forest preservation in countries of the south, since it will be more profitable to keep trees standing than to clear them. REDD proposes that the emissions supposedly 'reduced' by preventing deforestation be traded on the carbon markets (WRM 2012). However,

REDD credits have still not been accepted by the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which currently accounts for 97 per cent of the existing carbon market. This means they must be traded on the unregulated voluntary carbon market, and mainly served to 'greenwash' the image of corporations (WRM 2012). REDD has created a situation where small forest communities are confronted by large corporations seeking access to forests for carbon sequestration. With the support of national governments, this has already led to the loss of rights, access to forests and livelihoods by many communities (Murombedzi and Ribot 2012). In Africa, the impacts of these 'green grabs' – land and forest expropriations for purposes of carbon sequestration or the production of agro-fuels – have been extensively documented (see e.g. *Journal of Peasant Studies* 2010).

In the year leading up to Rio+20, many developing countries and CSOs had vigorously campaigned for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), addressing the three pillars of sustainable development (society, economy and environment);to be defined and agreed on by the end of the MDGs era in 2015. The idea for new SDGs – including themes on climate change, water and sanitation, oceans and seas, energy, and sustainable cities – was proposed in 2011 by Colombia with the backing of Guatemala. The SDGs would apply to both developed and developing countries on the basis of the Rio principle on common but differentiated responsibilities. Although the SDGs are lauded as a key outcome of Rio+20, the outcome document does not identify any thematic areas for the SDGs, suggesting instead a plan to work towards the themes through an expert working group of 30 nations to establish, define and quantify the SDGs and determine the time frames to reach them. The groups report will be tabled in September 2013, and the resultant SDGs will be blended with Millennium Development Goals in 2015. As many observers have noted, these new goals will inevitably be a compromise between the interests of developed vs. those of developing countries. At Rio+20, the G77 group of developing countries' position was that the goals must include strong social and economic elements, including financing and technology transfer. This position attempts to give equal prominence to the three pillars of sustainable development.

The developed countries, on the other hand, sought SDGs that did not submerge the 'environment' in social and developmental goals. The G77 are thus seeking SDGs that are bolder than the MDGs.

Sustainable Consumption and Production(SCP),which has been on the international agenda since Agenda 21 (1992), identified unsustainable patterns of production and consumption as the major cause of the continued deterioration of the global environment. The 2002 Johannesburg Summit called for a ten-year framework of programmes in support of national and regional initiatives to accelerate the shift towards sustainable consumption and production (UN-DESA 2007). The 19th Commission on Sustainable Development (2011) in New York finalized negotiations on the 10-Year Framework on SCP. However, because the conference was unable to come to agreement on many issues, which included *inter alia* the management of wasteland chemical, the Framework could not be officially adopted. Understandably, SCP would have implied a comprehensive revision of the liberal civilization. The inclusion of SCP in the Rio+20 was accepted after vehement opposition, particularly from the USA. The nations at Rio agreed that 'fundamental changes in the way societies consume and produce are indispensable for achieving global sustainable development'. The American way of life will be put under greater scrutiny.

The Rio+20 outcome document recognizes that, in order to give all the three pillars of sustainable development equal standing in the global system governing development, the status and power of the United Nations Environ-mental Program (UNEP) would have to be elevated. UNEP will get a more secure budget, a broader membership and strong powers to initiate scientific research and coordinate global environ-ment strategies (Watts and Ford 2012). Rio+20 also established a 'high-level' forum to coordinate global sustainable develop-ment, though its format is still to be defined (Global Race Equality Action Trust 2012).While it had campaigned for a change in its status to a specialized agency, on the same level as the WTO and ILO, and a name change to United Nations Environmental, UNEP will only get universal membership in its governing body, greater financing, and a streng-thened hand for coordination within the UN system.

Fossil fuel subsidies promote the use of fossil fuels and create challenges for the transition to cleaner fuels. Demands were made at Rio+20 for the elimination of these subsidies and investing the savings to promote renewable energy as part of the global response to climate change. However, reflecting the dominance of the fossil fuel corporations in global environmental governance, the outcome document contains only has weak and largely symbolic language on the reduction of fossil fuel subsidies. All nations simply 'reaffirmed' commitments to phase out harmful fossil fuel subsidies. No financial commitments or time lines are put in place to facilitate this shift. This issue will definitely confront parties to the UNFCCC 19th Conference of Parties in Doha in November 2012.

The question of inter-generational sustainability was not completely resolved. To the extent that the current neo-liberal dispensation promotes unsustainable patterns of resource use, it constitutes a form of taxation without representation for future generations. In response to this challenge, the negotiation document proposed a High Commissioner or Ombudsperson within the UN system, who would be responsible for assessing the long-term impacts of current policies and advocating on behalf of future generations. Ultimately, however, the outcome document makes no reference to this High Commissioner for Future Generations. Instead, the UN Secretary General is invited to make a report on 'the need for promoting inter-generational solidarity for the achie-vement of sustainable development, taking into account the needs of future generations'.

One of the major outcomes of the original Rio summit in 1992 was the creation of the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), which has met every year since. The Rio+20 document brings that era to a close. It will be replaced by a yet-to-be-named high level political forum which will have the same mission as the CSD but be more action-oriented, have a larger role in bringing UN and other international multi-stakeholder groups to the table and ensuring coordination and cooperation between them, and produce a sustainable development report. This new mechanisms could provide opportunities for greater involvement of society in global environmental governance.

Although the outcome document reaffirms commitment to the Rio Principles, this represents watered down commitment. The Rio Principles, one of the most important outcomes of the 1992 summit, lay out in clear and concise language the mechanisms on which sustainable development should be based. At Rio+20, the most contentious debate (as at the COP 17 and in Copenhagen) (see e.g. Fuhr et. al 2012) was on the common but differentiated responsibility (CBRD) principle. Developed countries, always opposed to this principle, now also see it as an opportunity for emerging countries to blame them for the ecological crisis while shirking the burden which their own economies are placing on the environment. Developing nations, however, are adamant that the countries putting the greatest pressure on the global environ-ment should bear the biggest responsi-bility for changing their behaviour and contributing to efforts toward fixing the problem.

In a word, then, despite the promise in the lead up, Rio + 20 failed to challenge the hegemonic liberal order, and in many ways actually acknowledged and confirmed it. The outcome means that over the next decade, 'sustainable development' will continue to be informed by a neo-liberal logic of growth, this time increasingly emphasizing expansion into nature through privatization, commodification and financialization. The ever present specter of militarization will no doubt be pronounced. Weak communities of the global South will lose out to the powerful northern oligopolies. Climate change may reach catastrophic levels, and the fate of humanity may continue to be sacrificed for financial profit for a few. This is the settlement that the AMCEN meeting of 14 September 2012 endorsed.

What then Are We to Make of AMCEN's Arusha Declaration in the Light of these Outcomes and Where should Africa Go from Rio?

The main proposal of Rio+20, the 'Green Economy', is a remarkable paradox. Like 'Our Common Future' before it, it recognizes that the neo-liberal context of contemporary development models is the principal cause of unsustainability, and yet it proposes that the best way of responding to the challenges posed by the environmental destruction and poverty, is through more growth. It promotes further commodification of land and natural resource, and reinforces the current large scale alienation of land, forests and other resources occurring on the African continent today. The imple-mentation of neo-liberal measures has already worsened Africa's most serious problems of poverty, inequality and institutional fragmentation. Just as the 19th century enclosures in Africa stripped commoners of land and resource rights, the current dispossessions will similarly diminish the rights of rural populations to land and natural resour-ces, with implications for their livelihoods, for commons governance systems, and for development. As Sharan Burrow, General Secretary of the International Trade Union Confederation observed "If the current development model doesn't change, 'we are going to see economic dislocation greater than we are facing now. There will be more wars around water and energy, so we need labour and environment walking hand in hand' (Global Race Equality Action Trust 2012).

We are living through a reconfiguration of power on a global scale, producing new relations between states, markets and civil society. This new dynamic is playing out to the detriment of nature and resource-dependent people. In Africa and Asia, this is translating into a new scramble for nature, characterized by militarization and massive injections of capital into natural-resource exploitation based on the alienation of vast communities from public natural resources (Murombedzi and Ribot 2012). Indeed, the 'Green Economy' as proposed at Rio+20 is the new Washington Consensus, the next stage of capitalism to recover lost growth and profits. This is definitely not the future that Africa wants!

To be sure, there is a counter movement to this dynamic, as societies organize themselves into social movements to resist market dominance and demand representation. The market allocation of goods and services away from the poor is being questioned. The privatization and commodification of nature is being contested in many locations Demands are being made for governments to ensure that social protections are put in place to prevent markets from over-exploiting nature and further marginalizing the poor. (see e.g. Murombedzi and Ribot 2012).

The global crisis of accumulation reflects the growing power of the financial markets, of the increasing subjugation of any other social logic – be that democracy, equality, solidarity, or even the preservation of life, to single criteria: the maximization of short-term profits for

capital (Lander 2011). It is not possible to resolve these crises without altering the existing power structures, or the relations of domination and exploitation. Market mechanisms and technological innovations are not the solutions to the environmental and social crises. Indeed, the weak leadership shown at Rio+20, regarding addressing the global economic system, has prompted many in civil society to rethink their strategies.

Instead of the current production system that emphasizes market mechanisms to allocate the costs and benefits of nature, what is required is a social structure of accumulation that places economic justice over profit and, more practically, institutes an inclusive, sustainable model for growth (Tabb 2012).What needs to be done in the post Rio+20 period then is a 'valuation' of the environment and a pro-poor environmentalism based on the representation and rights of society. Representation will ensure democratic outcomes which guarantee the rights, needs and priorities of society over those of corporations (see Murombedzi and Ribot 2012). This will enable a re-focus on a green economy that promotes equitable, sustainable and efficient resource use, while also reducing the vulnerability of marginalized groups to environmental and economic crises.

As demonstrated in the UNEP report, there are many possibilities for altering patterns of production, industry, agriculture, the organization of cities, construction systems, and transport. The report also documents a wide range of rich experiences in alternative technology, renewable energy and new regulatory regimes that exist in different parts of the world. This shows that there are many processes around the world today seeking alternatives to the destructive logic of the hegemonic models of production and consumption. This should be recognized as an important contribu-tion made by the report to debates on alternatives (Lander 2011). However, no proposal based on completely ignoring contemporary geopolitical realities has any hope of making a significant contribution to the global struggles we face today (ibid).

COP 17 demonstrated, beyond any measure of doubt, the absolute control that the governments of the industrial north and the transnational corporations exercise over negotiations at the Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. As with the earlier conferences of parties before the UNFCCC, however, it was also an opportunity for gathering, mobilizing, articulating and protesting by a broad convergence of global movements (Lander 2011; Bond 2012). These movements call for radical measures to stop the destructive dominant dynamics and at the same time demand payment of ecological debt, equality, and justice. They reject responses such as carbon trading which – as experience has shown – far from reducing greenhouse gas emissions; have simply advanced the commercialization of the atmosphere and the creation of new sources of accumulation and speculation for finance capital (Lander 2011).

Observers of the Rio+20 summit noted that some strong initiatives and suggestions for responses to the crises of development were made, but mostly outside the negotiating halls. 'Significant agreements have been struck on investing in public transport, with commitments made to green accounting by corporations, and strategies agreed by cities and judicial bodies, on reducing environmental impacts'(Watts and Ford 2012). They further note that the 10-day 'people's Summit' and campaigns to reduce plastics in the ocean and create a new sanctuary in the Arctic provided dynamism to the process. 'There are real solutions to the problems governments have been unable to solve and those solutions have been on display all week in Rio, just not at the conference center' (Lidy Nacpil, director of Jubilee South – Asia Pacific Movement on Debt and Development, quoted in Watts and Ford 2012). It is imperative to support these campaigns and develop methods and mechanisms that link social movements with local, national and global policy making. Such linkages will ensure that environmental policies at all levels and scales are representative and accountable.

However, globalization implies that such engagement capable of taking into account issues of scale – that is the linkages between various levels of governing bodies, local, national, and global –will necessarily involve complex social interactions of actors and institutions in an interconnected policy regime. Methodologies need to be developed and refined to facilitate nuanced engagement between social movements, civil society, markets, state and supra-state actors in the design of responsive global environmental gover-nance policies that respond organically to the crises of the neo-liberal hegemony and address the needs of the people. Efforts are already underway in gover-nance research to refine the concept of multi-level governance (MLG). (Mwangi and Wardell 2012) In this interconnected context, democratic environmental governance schemes that are responsive to local needs and enable sustainable resource use and management are to be supported. This is possible through decentralization programmes that ensure representation and accountability in the implementation of environmental governance schemes such as REDD+ and other 'payments for environmental services' schemes, climate adaptations schemes and so on. Responsiveness will ensure that market dominance is tempered by accountable governance regimes that value local needs and capacities (Murombedzi and Ribot 2012).

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Democracy in the Woods[1]

Prakash Kashwan
University of Connecticut
USA

Natural resources are among the prime sites where struggles for defining the contents and meanings of democracy and citizenship are waged in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Claims and counterclaims over land, water and forests, rooted in competing interests in and ideas about resource governance, are mediated by a variety of institutions. This piece answers a key puzzle: Why do some citizens seek to claim rights recognized under the statute, while others sign on to the proposal for institutional change somewhat reluctantly, and still others continue to abide by the institutional regimes put in place by colonial governments? By bridging the scholarship on institutional analysis and power, the contribution offers a comprehensive approach to understanding and analyzing institutional change in the context of natural resources such as land, water and forests. While the empirical research was conducted in India, the findings are applicable to forested regions that scholars have referred to as social and political hotbeds.[2]

Few other pieces of legislation introduced in independent India have generated as bitter controversies as did the Forest Rights Act (FRA) of 2006. With regards to the text of the Act, the FRA seeks to undo 'historical injustices' committed against indigenous and other forest dependent groups. The injustices related to the sweeping 'nationalization'

by colonial forestry administration of the lands occupied and used in the past by forest dependent groups. In post-nationalization period, the earlier inhabitants of the lands were reduced to squatters. The property rights institutions that the colonial government put in place continued to be the bedrock of forest management in post-independence India. The enactment of the FRA by Indian parliament is the first comprehensive effort to recognize the private and collective rights apparently usurped by colonial and post-colonial governments. The FRA triggered passio-nate responses from actors concerned with the questions of forests and forest rights.

Some among the nature conservation groups dubbed the Act as 'probably the most dangerous act' of any Indian government since 1947, and its passing as Indian 'democracy's lowest hour'. These conservationists argued that the act would prompt 'vote hungry' politicians to encourage a land rush, threatening India's remaining forests. Such claims, which influential sections within media, political leadership, and governments supported, were the subject of television and YouTube commercials,

a first for policy advocacy in Indian history. The FRA supporters, on the other hand, hailed it as a landmark legislation that met the aspirations nurtured by generations of forest dwellers. However, the emerging empirical evidence, including the data collected under the dissertation, presents an intriguing picture: the levels of claim-making under FRA in most cases does not support the enthusiasm implied by either the activists or the conservationists. Despite extreme poverty and landlessness among the forest dependent groups, the political populism and the land rush anticipated by the conservationists did not occur, even in the highly politically competitive study regions. Indeed, for a variety of reasons discussed at length in the doctoral dissertation, which is summrised in this notemany apparently eligible claimants failed to put forth their claims.

Why did the FRA evoke such a muted response? What implications might this have for the distinct but equally important goals of environmental conservation and democratic institutional reforms? What might the FRA tell us about theories of institutional change? The dissertation seeks to answer these questions by developing and testing a research approach in the political economy of institutional change, focusing on the interplay of pre-existing institutions – the historically shaped rules, norms, and conventions – and the extant political economy relations. To analyze these

effects, the dissertation employs a carefully constructed comparative research design and a suit of quantitative and qualitative research methods. The statistical hypothesis testing, which draws upon a original primary datasets that were collected for the dissertation, is combined with a rigorous qualitative analysis of the processes and causal mechanisms leading up to the outcomes.

An analysis of the historical and the contemporary policy context shows that even in colonial times, intra-society and intra-community asymmetries were critical in shaping the extant distribution of property rights that the FRA seeks to alter. In post-independence, the democratic forces of electoral competition and social movements helped foster informal contestation of institutional status quo, eventually leading to the enactment of the FRA. However, social movements face significant barriers against their role as forest rights interlocutors. These challenges relate, among others, to a strong belief among some of the potential FRA beneficiaries in the authority of the state as the sole arbiter of property rights. Even so, the potential for social move-ments broadening the terms of political debates were most clearly visible in the regions with higher levels of electoral competition.

The effect of past forest protection arrangements on FRA claims in a community depended on the interests and actions of local 'forest leaders', that is, those leading the past forest conservation arrangements in a community, and represented on the locally elected forest rights committees, which coordinated the first tier of adjudication of the FRA claims. Forest leaders' presence on the locally elected FRA committee was the strongest negative predictor of the household forestland cultivation claims under the FRA. Qualitative inquiries revealed, with an eye on maintaining their stronghold, that forest leaders in many cases actively worked to prevent the eligible rights holders from claiming FRA rights. In other words, forest leaders worked against the mandate they sought as the elected representatives of 'local communities'.

The elected leaders represented at the provincial assemblies and nominated to the sub-district and district level FRA committees, often collaborated with and helped to secure the interests of public forest officials. Similarly, instead of getting into inter-bureau turf battles as suggested by the public administration literature, bureaus with apparently competing interests stood united in decrying the legitimacy of the rights that the FRA sought to impart to the citizens. These outcomes are attributable to the sediments of long-held prejudices among public officials against the forest-dependent groups, particularly the indi-genous adivasi groups. The subjective understanding of institutions and insti-tutional change that different actors brought to the table greatly shaped the actors' response to the institutional change.

The dissertation offers concrete evidence on the manner in which power relations shaped the FRA proceedings, often leading to counterintuitive outcomes. By implication, under conditions of power asymmetry, participatory forest conser-vation projects could reinforce historical inequity and injustices. On the other hand, the effects of local power asymmetries, reinforced through earlier rounds of 'participatory forestry programs', also permeated through the locally elected committees put in charge of implementing the FRA. The author, who is currently working on a book manuscript based on this research, hopes to engage with re-searchers with similar interests in ques-tions of institutional change, democratic representation and partici-patory reforms under conditions of power asymmetries.

Notes

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A pre-publication draft of the dissertation is available from the author, who may be reached at prakash.kashwan@uconn.edu.

How Europe Underdeveloped Africa
Walter Rodney

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
Few books have been as influential in understanding African impoverishment as this groundbreaking analysis. Rodney shows how the imperial countries of Europe, and subsequently the US, bear major responsibility for impoverishing Africa. They have been joined in this exploitation by agents or unwitting accomplices both in the North and in Africa.

With oppression and liberation his main concern, he 'delves into the past', as he says in his preface, 'only because otherwise it would be impossible to understand how the present came into being … In the search for an understanding of what is now called "underdevelopment" in Africa, the limits of inquiry have had to be fixed as far apart as the fifteenth century, on the one hand, and the end of the colonial period, on the other hand.' He argues that 'African development is possible only on the basis of a radical break with the international capitalist system, which has been the principal agency of underdevelopment of Africa over the last five centuries'. His Marxist analysis went far beyond previously accepted approaches and changed the way both third world development and colonial history are studied. Although first published in 1972, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa remains an essential introduction to understanding the dynamics of Africa's contemporary relations with the West and is a powerful legacy of a committed thinker.