A Giant Has Moved On

This 12th General Assembly is taking place exactly one year and nine months after the death of an illustrious member of CODESRIA, one most committed to the problematic of the public sphere in Africa. Wednesday 28 March 2007 will go down as a sad day among social researchers all over Africa and beyond. It was the day Professor Archibald M onwabisi Mafeje (fondly known among friends, colleagues and admirers as Archie) passed away in Pretoria, in what was a most quiet exit that has left very many of us whom he touched directly or indirectly, in a state of sadness and anger.

Archie Mafeje, the quintessential personality of science and one of the most versatile, extraordinary minds to emerge from Africa was, in his days, a living legend in every sense. His knowledge and grasp of issues—almost all issues—was breathtaking. His discourses transcended disciplinary boundaries and were characterised by a spirit of combative engagement underpinned by a commitment to social transformation. As an academic sojourner conscious of the history of Africa over the last six centuries, he rallied his colleagues to resist the intellectual servitude on which all forms of foreign domination thrive. He was intransigent in his call for the liberation of our collective imaginations as the foundation stone for continental liberation. In all of this, he also distinguished himself by his insistence on scientific rigour and originality. It was his trade mark to be uncompromisingly severe with fellow scientists who were mediocre in their analyses. The power of his pen and the passion of his interventions always went hand-in-hand with a uniquely polemical style hardly meant for those who were not sure-footed in their scholarship. This, then, was the Mafeje who left us on 28 March 2007, to join the other departed heroes and heroines of the African social research community. A great pan-African, an outstanding scientist, a first-rate debater, a frontend partisan in the struggle for social justice, and a gentleman of great humanitarian principles, Archie was laid to rest on Saturday 7 April 2007 in Umtata, South Africa.

Professor Archie Mafeje, South African by birth, completed his undergraduate studies and began his career as a scholar at the University of Cape Town, but like many other South Africans, he was soon forced by the apartheid regime to go into exile anywhere he spent the better part of his life. He obtained a PhD in Anthropology and Rural Sociology from University of Cambridge in 1966. In 1973, at the age of 34, he was appointed Professor of Anthropology and Sociology of Development at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague by an Act of Parliament and with the approval of all the Dutch universities, becoming the first African scholar to be so distinguished in The Netherlands. That appointment bestowed on him the honour of being a Queen Juliana Professor and one of her Lords. His name appears in the prestigious blue pages of the Dutch National Directorate.

Archie Mafeje’s professional career spanned four decades and covered three continents. From 1969 to 1971 he was Head of the Sociology Department at the University of Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania before moving to The Hague as a Visiting Professor of Social Anthropology of Development and Chairman of the Rural Development, Urban Development and Labour Studies Programme at the Institute of Social Studies from 1972 to 1975. It was here that he met his wife and life-long companion, the Egyptian scholar and activist, Dr Shahida El Baz. In 1979, he joined the American University, in Cairo, as Professor of Sociology. Thereafter, he took up the post of Professor of Sociology and Anthropology and Director of the Multidisciplinary Research Centre at the University of Namibia from 1992 to 1994. Mafeje was also a senior fellow and visiting or guest professor at several other universities and research institutions in Africa, Europe and North America. He is the author of many books, monographs and journal articles. His critique of the concept of tribalism and his works on anthropology are widely cited as key reference materials. He also did path-breaking work on the land and agrarian question in Africa.

Mafeje returned to South Africa several years after the end of apartheid where he was appointed a Research Fellow by the National Research Foundation (NRF) working at the African Renaissance Centre at the University of South Africa (UNISA). In 2001, Archie Mafeje became a member of the Scientific Committee of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and in 2003 was awarded the Honorary Life Membership of this Council. In 2005, Professor Mafeje was appointed a CODESRIA Distinguished Fellow in conjunction with the African Institute of South Africa, in Pretoria.

An Incarnation of Africa’s Intellectual Ideals and Struggles

Archie Mafeje was in many regards an epitome of the intellectual ideals that engineered the creation of CODESRIA in 1973, and that has fuelled and propelled the Council for the past thirty-five years. To Issa Shivji, he was a man of “great intellectual rigour and integrity” who did not compromise on ideas, and “whose ideas were so powerful that you instinctively felt you had known the man from time immemorial.” He was a rigorous and thorough researcher who, already in the early 1960s, impressed his professor and supervisor—Monica Wilson—with the quality and depth of his mastery ethnography in Langa (John Sharp). But, as his daughter, Dana, rightly remarked in reaction to the outpouring of tributes following his death, Mafeje was more than just an intellectual giant. He was above all a human being. “My father was critical but humane, fierce but compassionate, sarcastic but gentle, silly but brilliant, stubborn but loyal, but most of all, he was passionate.”

Indeed, it was this passion and compassion, this humanness that made him both appreciated and contested, leaving few indifferent in the face of his sharp, incisive, critical mindedness and love for debate in which he, metaphorically, did not hesitate.

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Indeed, it was this passion and compassion, this humanness that made him both appreciated and contested, leaving few indifferent in the face of his sharp, incisive, critical mindedness and love for debate in which he, metaphorically, did not hesitate.
to cross swords or draw blood. His debates with fellow African intellectuals in the pages of the CODESRIA Bulletin – which we have reproduced in this special tribute issue – were, in the words of Ali Mazrui (one of his intellectual adversaries), “brutal – almost no holds barred” Ali Mazrui, whose idea of ‘inter-African colonisation’ Archie Mafeje viciously savaged as an attempt at facilitating Europe’s recolonisation of Africa, regrets not having had “a formal intellectual reconciliation” with Mafeje before his passing away (Ali Mazrui). His utter forthrightness, razor-sharpness, brilliant turn of phrase, cynicism, polemical style, unwavering stances, and penchant for pushing arguments to, and even beyond their logical conclusions, made Mafeje to come across sometimes as “deeply embittered”.

However, there was reason enough to be embittered and saddened for someone at war against the intellectual hegemony of those who proclaim universal truth and wisdom, regardless of time or space, on a continent where many of his colleagues continue to embellish their references with irrelevant writers from the global North to prove their intellectualness (cf. Issa Shivji, Jimi Adesina). There was reason for bitterness and sadness for someone outstandingly critical of double-speak and other shortcomings of the African political and intellectual elite (Kwesi Prah), to realise that such dissemblance was far more deep-rooted and resilient than he initially imagined. And there indeed was reason for embitterment and sadness to be persuaded to return “home” to a post-apartheid South Africa where little in effect is post anything, and where, instead of closing ranks to win the battle of ideas, many are the black intellectuals who continue to be induced from academe into government, the corporate world and NGOs, where bureaucracy and making money matter more than knowledge production, social justice, truth and reconciliation (Eddy Maloka).

Despite his immense generosity of spirit and capacity to see the other side even when he disagreed with it, Archie felt more in exile back home in South Africa than he ever felt away from South Africa. According to Jimi Adesina, the relative intimacy he enjoyed within CODESRIA circles was brought home to Mafeje through the pain of his intellectual isolation in South Africa. “The tragedy for all of us,” Jimi Adesina writes, “is that Archie did not die of natural causes – he died of intellectual neglect and isolation. In spite of the enormous love of his family and loyal life-long friends, Archie’s oxygen was vigorous intellectual engagement. He lived on serious, rigorous and relevant scholarship. Starved of that, he simply withered.” Yet, as Maloka argues, instead of succumbing to embitterment and sadness, Mafeje should have used “his towering intellectual stature and his straight-shooting style, unwavering stances, and penchant for pushing arguments to, and even beyond their logical conclusions,” to help “make the case for a new democratic South Africa” (Kwesi Prah).

1968 it was an honour to be offered a post at UCT but in 1994 it was a heavy burden which only the politically naïve or the unimpeachable in the sense of disinterestedness could bear. Archie Mafeje viciously savaged as an attempt at facilitating Europe’s recolonisation of Africa, regrets not having had “an offer of an honorary doctorate and a formal apology in 2003. Only in August 2008, almost two years after his death, did UCT bring together 11 members of the Mafeje family at a symposium where a second apology was issued and an honorary doctorate awarded him posthumously. The Mafeje family agreed to overrule Archie Mafeje and accept the apology on his behalf, an apology in which UCT recognises that it “did not do nearly enough in the 1990s to make it possible for Professor Mafeje to return to UCT, and that this remained an obstacle to his reconciliation with his alma mater” (Lungisile Ntsebeza). Despite his immense generosity of spirit and capacity to see the other side even when he disagreed with it, Archie felt more in exile back home in South Africa than he ever felt away from South Africa. According to Jimi Adesina, the relative intimacy he enjoyed within CODESRIA circles was brought home to Mafeje through the pain of his intellectual isolation in South Africa. “The tragedy for all of us,” Jimi Adesina writes, “is that Archie did not die of natural causes – he died of intellectual neglect and isolation. In spite of the enormous love of his family and loyal life-long friends, Archie’s oxygen was vigorous intellectual engagement. He lived on serious, rigorous and relevant scholarship. Starved of that, he simply withered.” Yet, as Maloka argues, instead of succumbing to embitterment and sadness, Mafeje should have used “his towering intellectual stature and his straight-shooting style, unwavering stances, and penchant for pushing arguments to, and even beyond their logical conclusions,” to help “make the case for a new democratic South Africa” (Kwesi Prah).

UCT and the Game of Reconciliation: Too Little, Too Late

Following the end of apartheid in the early 1990s, instead of things getting better in the spirit of truth and reconciliation, relations between UCT and Mafeje only worsened, despite several attempts by Mafeje to return to UCT, including as the AC Jordan Chair in African Studies. Mafeje felt insulted and in certain cases described as “most demeaning” the reactions of the authorities of UCT to his efforts to return to his alma mater as professor. When it was announced to him that another candidate had been offered the AC Jordan Chair to which he, Mafeje, had not even been invited for an interview, Mafeje wrote: “In 1968 it was an honour to be offered a post at UCT but in 1994 it is a heavy burden which only the politically naïve or the unimaginative can face, without some uneasy doubts. I might be wrong, but only time will tell.” From then on Mafeje treated with disdain various overtures by UCT, including the proposed award of an honorary doctorate and a formal apology in 2003. Only in August 2008, almost two years after his death, did UCT bring together 11 members of the Mafeje family at a symposium where a second apology was issued and an honorary doctorate awarded him posthumously. The Mafeje family agreed to overrule Archie Mafeje and accept the apology on his behalf, an apology in which UCT recognises that it “did not do nearly enough in the 1990s to make it possible for Professor Mafeje to return to UCT, and that this remained an obstacle to his reconciliation with his alma mater” (Lungisile Ntsebeza).

Whatever the reasons for his rejection of overtures of reconciliation and recognition by UCT, Mafeje was seldom comfortable with honours, especially in his lifetime. In December 2003 when CODESRIA, on the occasion of its 30th anniversary celebrations, decided to honour him with a Life Long Membership of CODESRIA, on the occasion of its 30th anniversary celebration, he told the special panel CODESRIA had put together to celebrate him (Ebrima Sall). The challenge is thus for UCT to prove that its posthumous recognition of Archie Mafeje would bring glory enough to be recognised even by the late Mafeje, a man who was not comfortable with honours, and who had every reason to be bitter towards an institution that
Archie Mafeje’s bitter critiques of Ali Mazrui’s Africa’s self-demic freedom (Lungisile Ntsebeza; Teboho Lebakeng). of its post-apartheid identity in knowledge production and academic freedom (Lungisile Ntsebeza; Teboho Lebakeng). A Stauch Critic of Intellectual Colonialism Archie Mafeje’s bitter critiques of Ali Mazrui’s Africa’s self-colonisation and Achilles’ Mafhe’s “Africans Mates of Self-writing” are only fully understood in the light of his deep intellectual and political commitment to the total emancipation of Africa as a symbol of the pan-African ideals he shared and fought for in his scholarship, activities and pronouncements. Through his sustained critique of African anthropology as a handmaiden of colonialism and call for social history to replace it as a discipline, surfaces Archie Mafhe’s total discomfort with the epistemology of alterity and exogenously generated and contextually irrelevant knowledge produced with ambitions of dominance, especially when such knowledge is passively internalised and reproduced by the very people whose ontology and experiences have been carefully scripted out (sometimes even as fellow scholars – see the Archie Mafhe versus Sally Falk Moore debate) of this knowledge by misrepresentations informed by hierarchies of humanity structured, inter alia, on race, place, class, gender and age (Jimi Adesina, Helmi Sharawy, Dani Nabudere, Samir Amin, Teboho Lekang). As John Sharp argues below, what Archie Mafhe objected to about anthropology which he once described as his ‘calling’, “was not its methods of research or the evidence that could be produced by careful participant observation. Even at his most critical he took care to endorse the value of this form of inquiry relative to others.” He remained faithful to the fact “that any attempt to understand the circumstances of people in Africa required firsthand inquiry into what they made of these circumstances themselves.” What he objected to therefore, “was an anthropology in which particular epistemological assumptions were allowed to overwhelm whatever it was that people on the ground had to say about the conditions in which they found themselves.” If Mafhe objected to this kind of anthropology, it was “because anthropology was the discipline he knew best – the one he had said was his ‘calling’ at the outset of his professional career. Had he had cause to express himself with equal fervour in respect of other disciplines, he would have no doubt have found the epistemological premises of their liberal versions as objectionable as those of liberal anthropology” (John Sharp).

Fred Hendricks notes that Mafhe was committed “to combating the distorted images produced and reproduced about Africa from the outside”, and sometimes uncritically internalised and reproduced by Aficanis trained to mimic but not to question (Issa Shivji). Mafhe spent the best part of his life and scholarly contesting the racialised epistemological underpinnings of a system of social knowledge production into which Aficanis have been co-opted and schooled as passive consumers without voice even on matters pertaining to their own real lives and existence. In this regard, Mafhe’s unwavering pan-Africanism has always resonated with CODESRIA’s mission of increased visibility for African scholars, Apheric scholarship and Afican perspectives on Afican and global issues. Yet, his call for the valorisation of Africani, its creativity and innovations has not meant easy endorsement for all that claims to be Afro-centric. He has been especially critical of well-meaning but poorly conceived and even more poorly articulated attempts at affirming Africani such as “African renaissance” (Eddy Maloka). The extent to which African scholars buy these aspirations in principle and in practice would determine the degree to which Mafhe and CODESRIA have succeeded in making these battles and lofty heights truly collective and pan-African beyond rhetoric.

A chille M bembu, in a highly erroneous post-modern monologue – ‘African Mates of Self-Writing’, lumps Archie Mafhe together with those he dismisses as “nativists”, in opposition to his own supposed “cosmopolitan” experience, outlook and scholarship (Jimi Adesina). Fred Hendricks and others have also challenged Mafhe for freezing his intellectual gaze narrowly on sub-Saharan Africa, and for inadvertently reproducing ideas about “a disaggregated and dismembered Africa” in a pan-Africa that had little real room for North Africa beyond the fact of his considerably long period of stay in Cairo and being married to Shaida El Baz, an Egyptian and mother of his daughter Dana. But such criticism could be countered by the fact that he did not necessarily have to study Egypt or North Africa in order to consider the region as part of his pan-African project. In the absence of personal scholarship, Mafhe used other indicators to affirm his belonging to North Africa and esteem the region in his pan-Africanism. He probably felt more at home in Egypt than he ever did in South Africa, especially following his return under the post-apartheid dispensation, where he increasingly felt isolated and lonely, and indeed, where he died unattended (Jimi Adesina, Eddy Maloka). Was it a premonition of this lack of warm relationships in the land of his birth that made Mafhe less than enthusiastic about returning home to South Africa after 1994, preferring instead to stay on in Namibia as director of the newly established multidisciplinary Research Centre at the University of Namibia, even if he did not last long in the latter position (Kwesi Prah, Eddy Maloka)? Whatever be the answer to this and similar questions, to measure the fullness of Mafhe’s Africani and pan-Africanism, it is appropriate to go beyond scholarly declarations and appreciate the social relationships he forged and entertained in his life and away from a place called home, motherland or fatherland. According to Kwesi Prah, Archie Mafhe exuded an “effortless worldliness” that gave him a rare “vibrant and sublime cosmopolitanism”; and as a veritable cosmopolitan Africani, he was used to describing himself as “South Africani by birth, Dutch by citizenship and Egyptian by domicile” (Kwesi Prah writes of Mafhe’s impressive familiarity with Western literature, Dutch art, “sophisticated and totally uncommon knowledge of European wines”, and culinary skills and accomplishments. Just as “his often placid exterior belied a stridently combative spirit and expression” in debates, Archie Mafhe’s committed pronouncement and writings on pan-Africanism and the importance of decolonising the social sciences, often took attention away from the cosmopolitan that he was – leading to misrepresentations even by fellow Africana intellectuals. Far from being essentialist, Mafhe was a person to whom belonging was always work in progress to be constantly enriched with new encounters and new relationships, and never to be confined by geography or boundaries, political or disciplinary. His deep embitterment came and/or was exacerbated when those claiming him failed to demonstrate the nuances and sophistication that made of him the cosmopolitan intellectual and Africani that he was. As Jimi
Adebayo Olukoshi
Executive Secretary

Francis B. Nyamnjoh
Head, Publications
came across Archie Mafeje’s name and fame in the late 1960s during my student days at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, then a college of the University of East Africa. I do not remember having met him personally then. My memory may be failing and, regrettably, Archie is no longer with us to confirm. But Archie’s ideas were so powerful that you instinctively felt you knew the man from time immemorial.

The first thing I remember of Archie Mafeje is a story, then making the rounds of the student body and young tutorial assistants. Archie was the head of the Department of Sociology. He was the supervisor of one of the first PhD students in that department. The student went on to become the Head of Sociology in the 1970s and was an influential person in the corridors of power at the university. Archie failed him. The thesis, Archie said, without mincing words, was not passable. He stood by his decision in spite of the usual pressures. So long as Archie was in the department, the man did not get his doctorate. I came to learn later that the thesis was passed after Archie left the university. The students told and retold this story with great admiration. For us, then, Archie’s stand symbolised his great intellectual rigour and integrity. On ideas, he would not compromise.

Personally, I adore and respect Archie for his great and incisive intellectual insights, his uncompromising stand on matters of principle and his steadfastness on rigour and unwavering commitment to national liberation and social emancipation. He refused to be taken in by the fashions and fads among intellectuals—usually spawned by Western academia and mimicked by us in Africa. I marvelled at and enjoyed his think pieces in the CODESRIA Bulletin. I read and zealously circulated his sharp rejoinders to Achille Mbembe’s postmodernist writings on Africa. I quote and requote his excellent piece reviewing the debate on democracy between Thandika Mkandawire and Amin Yasir. I did not pull punches in his analysis of his colleagues whom he nevertheless respected and engaged with. Little did I realise before I read this piece that Archie had read my short piece on the debate. Even while agreeing with my basic thesis, Archie did not spare me for my loose formulations. He deployed his usual razor-sharpness. I will quote him extensively because it illustrates all I am saying about Archie’s style, rigour, theoretical sweep and utter forthrightness. Using Gramsci’s idea of the ‘philosophy of praxis’ as a peg on which to hang his arguments, Mafeje says:

From the point of view of ‘philosophy of praxis’, there is always an underlying tension between determinism and voluntarism. Intended or not, this manifested itself in the exchange between Shivji and M andaza (1990). Mandaza was inclined to accuse Shivji of determinism or ‘waiting for Godot’ in his academic and theoretical tower (unkind words, perhaps communicated as a sign of respect and appreciation), while not only reserving the latter for himself but advocating it for others on the basis of his experience in Zimbabwe, without acknowledging that it is a mixed one. He also chastised Shivji for ‘caricaturism’. Perhaps Shivji deserves what he got. He trivialised his own problematics by presenting it in a Charlie Chaplin fashion. (One wonders why but also one recalls that in his prison notes Gramsci affected certain verbal postures; so it could be with anybody.) But, as is known, Charlie Chaplin’s message was always very profound to the disquiet of the Americans who found it necessary to deport him back to his native England.

Irrespective of the reaction Shivji elicited from his colleagues (irritation from M andaza and disgust from Anyang’ Nyong’ of only with his ‘hackneyed terms’), his diagnosis is more correct than most and, theoretically, is better founded than that of his detractors. For instance, on liberalism and imperialism or ‘fashionable bandwagons’ of the West, his observations are valid and M andaza could not help granting this. His concept of ‘compradorial democracy’ might be etymologically vulgar and theoretically undeveloped but, as a shorthand for what is happening or likely to happen in Africa under the current pax Americana, it hits the nail on the head.1

This wonderful piece, tantalisingly subtitled ‘Breaking Bread with My Fellow-travellers’, was written sometime in 1992, during the transition in Africa from the one-party to multi-party. It stood out as a singularly enlightening piece and an incisive review of the debate on democracy among African intellectuals. In my view, it remains so to this day. Almost fifteen years into the so-called multi-party democracy, we are now in a better position to understand and appreciate Archie Mafeje’s great insights and analysis of the struggle for democracy. I would like to invite my fellow African intellectuals to revisit that debate and Archie’s great contribution.

Archie’s remarks cut sharply, but I never felt the pangs of hurt. Rather, my respect and admiration for him increased. Archie read his fellow African intellectuals, took them seriously, and engaged with them without being patronising. Unlike many of our colleagues, who embellish their references with writers from the global North, to prove their intellectualness, Archie’s references were African, rooted in Africa yet fully aware and critically appreciative of intellectual discourses elsewhere.2 He refused intellectual hegemonies, in particular those that proclaim universal truth and wisdom regardless of time or space. He detested racism but appreciated the ‘anti-racist racism’ (Senghor’s phrase) of African nationalism as an assertion of African humanity against centuries of oppression and humiliation. He was clear of the bourgeois nature of anti-colonial and post-independence African nationalism but appreciated and celebrated the historical role of national independence as ‘the greatest political achievement by Africans’. He called it an ‘unprecedented collective fulfilment’.3

As a person, Archie was modest but proud. In relation to those with whom he disagreed, he did not bicker behind their
Archibald Monwabisi Mafeje: A Vignette

Introduction

Mafeje will be remembered by those who knew him for a million and one things, and those of us who had the privilege of knowing him in different situations and climes for three to four decades and more will recognize in his character a vibrant and sublime cosmopolitanism that was rare. It was not a feature of his make-up that jumped into the face of the observer. Indeed, it could easily be missed or underestimated. But any close and careful appreciation of the personality would not have failed to perceive this almost effort- less worldliness. Most people knew him as Archie. Only few knew his second name M onwabisi (literally, one who makes others happy).

I would like to understand a cosmopolitan to be a citizen of the world in the core meaning of the idea as expressed by the classical Greek cynic, Diogenes, in the 4th century BC. ‘I am a citizen of the world’ were his words. He was making this pronouncement in a world in which Greeks saw themselves as the centre of all things. From the fifteenth century onwards with the European voyages of expansion and the early beginnings of globalization, the world became increasingly one unit, with the West as the centre.

Cosmopolitanism has for long been seen as largely a western sentiment. Too

back but told them to their face. I occasionally met him at Thandika’s place in Dakar. It was a great intellectual treat. From Thandika you got intellectual provocations, references to great progressive movies, tips on the use of a computer. From Archie you got controversies and heresies accompanied by choice wines. One could never predict Archie’s position on intellectual and political controversies. But one could always be sure that it would be from the class standpoint of the oppressed and exploited. Archie was not ashamed of his Marxist outlook. Even during the heyday of neo-liberalism when many former African Marxist scholars uncritically turned postmodernists or subalterns or culturalists, Archie indefatigably defended historical materialism and used it with great originality to understand the burning issues of the continent.

Archie’s oral and written interventions were short, simple, sharp, witty and pithy but never ‘sweet’ in the sense of being flattery. He rarely called a spade a spade or an instrument to cut with but used it to illustrate its sharpness. Reading him, you could never fail to recognise a spade when you saw one. I always wished I could emulate his style, at least the brevity and clarity, if not the sharpness, but never succeeded.

In memory of Archie Mafeje, the giant of an African intellectual, I keep this tribute short.

Notes


Kwesi Kwaa Prah
CASAS
Cape Town, South Africa
the heady 1960s when Amsterdam was regarded as the most libertarian city in Europe and when the old description of migrant Jews fleeing from the excesses of the Spanish inquisition in the closing decade of the fifteenth century found a new meaning in our times as Mokkum or 'Jerusalem of the North'.

It was a late summer afternoon, and I was sitting and waiting at the front of Reinders, looking in the direction of the tram-stop, which was within view and barely a few metres away. I did not have to wait too long. Amost at the appointed time a tallish, gaunt but ramrod African, carrying his head aloft, stepped out of one of the trams coming from the direction of the Central Station. He rolled forward with an easy and steady gait. I was looking in his direction, and he appeared to inquire from a newspaper seller the location of Reinders, because the two swung in our direction and the newspaper man pointed to Reinders. I immediately assumed that this was Mafeje, and I stood up to meet him. He had calmly penetrating and appraising eyes. He wore a vague straggling beard and had enough self-possession to carry a beautifully crafted handbag. The air about him was not macho but also not effeminate.

We exchanged greetings and initial pleasantries and took seats on the patio of the café. By his own account, Archie had settled well in The Hague but was not altogether happy about some of the attitudes he encountered at the institute. When the conversation drifted to the fact that we were literally a stone's throw from the Rijksmuseum he strongly expressed his wish to visit the museum in the not too distant future and went on to extol the excellence of the Dutch masters. We also discussed the Van Gogh Museum, and the eccentricities or rather madness of Van Gogh. It distinctly occurred to me that there were not many African academics who were at home in such subjects.

On another occasion, elsewhere, he displayed a sophisticated and totally uncommon knowledge of European wines. I am myself quite at home with such knowledge, but in the social science circles of Africa I have not come across anyone who could rival Archie in this respect. Archie's knowledge of the Western classical literature was equally not inconsiderable, although he hardly made a show of this.

In the Netherlands, I remember that I was invited to his rooms for dinner in The Hague with the K enyan Paul A. dhu Awiti. It was superb. I suspect that this culinary skill was one of Archie's accomplishments that not many people knew about. I have been informed that in his home in Cairo he was very often and easily in charge of the kitchen.

His robust intellect was particularly observable in debates where his often placid exterior belied a stridently combative spirit and expression. Sometimes this polemically acute approach came across as abrasive, but it was an abrasiveness that was measured and hardly licentious.

I was instrumental in getting Archie to Namibia during the very early years of Namibia's independence to work in developing an implementational strategy for the research wings of the new University of Namibia. I had, as a consultant for the new Vice Chancellor's office, produced the structural concepts and theoretical designations for the research wings of the university. However, I left shortly before he arrived. For some reason he could not hit it off with the interests on the ground and in the ensuing differences that emerged he was in some cases a casualty. Many of the interests on the ground in the then University of Namibia were not very welcoming to an African of Archie's calibre, and considerations they had, I suspect, for consultancies and other things probably made them fearful of a new and senior African presence in their midst. Archie returned to Cairo.

Later, after the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, he applied to be appointed to the new A.C. Jordan Chair at the University of Cape Town. Again, interests fearful of transformation and, I am recently informed, partly linked to elements from the Namibian scene, collided to bar his entrance into the university. I had written a reference, on his request, which was politely acknowledged but carried little effective weight in the corridors of power and influence in the university. This was the second time the establishment of the University of Cape Town had visited shabby treatment on him. The first time was during the 1960s, when they refused to offer him a lectureship.

Mafeje was a very kind and considerate person. He had a lively sense of humour, but his normal quietness often masked this quality. His kindness was equally matched by loyalty to his friends. He valued friendship and stood by his friends, but he did not suffer fools. Archie's cosmopolitanism was matched by a fervent Africanism, which was worn unbuckingly but staunchly. He was also outstandingly critical of political double-speak and other shortcomings of the African political elite. This did not endear him to many elements in the African National Congress of South Africa. His original political home had been in the Unity Movement in the Cape. It was from the philosophical inclinations of this grouping that his early appreciation of political Marxism and the intellectual rudiments of cosmopolitanism were possibly acquired.

All these multifaceted dimensions of his personality contributed to giving him a cosmopolitan make-up. He grew up in the Cape, in South Africa, and spent a good part of his life in Cairo. Our mutual friend, Helmi Sharawy, informed me that Archie held his own in the super-chaotic traffic of Cairo, in word and deed. I am not sure if Cecil Rhodes would have counted the successful migration of a 'native' from Cape Town to Cairo as part of his Cape to Cairo project, but Archie achieved much of Rhodes' project in more ways than one, and had a roaming family life in Cairo with his partner Shahida and daughter.

I was in Cairo when the news of his death arrived and had the opportunity to attend his funeral in the Omar Makram mosque in the heart of the city. It was extraordinarily moving to observe the wonderful crop of the Cairo intellectual class assembled to honour and pay homage to his life. They included Tayeb Saleh, the well-known Sudanese-Egyptian writer; Kamal Bahaa Elddeen, former Minister of Education; Prof. Husam Issa, Politbureau Member of the Nasserist Party; A.G. Shukr, Politbureau Member of the Progressive Party; Ragaa el Naqash, critic of Arabic literature; Prof. I. el Esawy and Prof. Helmi Sharawy. Archie managed successfully to pack all these different strands and impulses into his life and character.
The death of Archie Mafeje in March 2007 was a great shock to many African scholars and political activists. There is no doubt that Mafeje was one of the leading African social scientists who tried to deconstruct anthropology while trying to construct a new research methodology that was free from these colonially inspired disciplines within wider social science discourses to explain the African context. On the political side, there is also no doubt that Mafeje was a committed pan-Africanist who was dedicated to African emancipation and liberation, and a great teacher and crusader for African political, intellectual and cultural freedom. His achievements remain great landmarks upon which young African political, intellectual and cultural freedom and social responsibility.

I met Archie Mafeje in the heyday of the struggle for African liberation at the University of Dar es Salaam, where he was a professor of sociology, from 1969 and later in Harare. At each of these places, he was a vibrant progressive debater and a defender of the interests of the working people. He did not take an open political position in favour of any political party or liberation movement in South Africa, the country of his birth, although he was known to take a Trotskyite activist position that operated under the Unity Movement of South Africa, which had a number of student organisations. But in academia, he took a broad position, which enabled him to maintain contact with the general intellectual community.

Mafeje’s early contribution as a young anthropologist was a path-breaking article he wrote in 1970 for the Journal of Modern African Studies entitled ‘The Ideology of Tribalism’, which stimulated wide-ranging debate challenging the anthropological concept of ‘dual economy’ and the alleged static nature of African society that the concepts of ‘tribe’ and ‘tribalism’ implied. Throughout this early period, Mafeje argued that African society was composed of social classes just like any other society by introducing Marxist concepts of class and class formation. He became one of the African anthropologists who challenged the discipline of colonial anthropology, which was regarded as the ‘handmaiden of colonialism.’ At the eighth General Assembly of CODESRIA held in Dakar, Senegal, in 1995, he even dared to declare anthropology a ‘dead’ discipline in Africa. Indeed, he went ahead to write a monograph, which CODESRIA published as Monograph Series 4/96, to make good his claims and to give his African fellow-anthropologists an opportunity to ‘disabuse’ him.1

Mafeje went further to demonstrate that the ultimate concern for writing his essay was to interrogate anthropology as a discipline and challenge its credentials for claiming to study ‘the other’ as ‘a thing of the past’ as well as its claim to deal with the present ‘without making invidious distinction between the Third World subjects and those of the imperialist countries’ (Mafeje 1996:1). The problematic he set for himself in the essay was to explore the reconstruction of anthropology ‘with reference to the colonial world’ and as this emanated from the North and place the reconstruction debate within the African context. This enabled him to commit himself ‘irrevocably’ to adopting a different paradigm in the application of ethnography in Africa. He did so with the writing of his book: The Theory and Ethnography of African Social Formations: The Case of the Interlacustrine Kingdoms, which he wrote in 1986 but which was published in 1991. Indeed, this book can be taken as Mafeje’s magnum opus in that it laid out the research approach that he recommended for Africa, and therefore his contribution has to be judged from here.

Mafeje explains that he used the interlacustrine ‘social formation’ as both a synthesis of his previous theoretical and ideological explorations and as a testing ground for his deconstructionist ideas, first by moving away from the concept of ‘culture’ as an analytical category that was used in anthropology. The reason he did this was that the concept had no boundaries because it was widely diffused in space, especially in conditions of improved communication; and for this reason it could not be used as a designating category in social analysis. Secondly, he also declined to use the concept ‘society’ for the same reasons in developing the theory of analysing interlacustrine kingdoms of East Africa because there could be ‘societies’ within societies.

In many ways, therefore, it can be said that Prof. Mafeje made a real break with the anthropological past in writing this book for it enabled him to problematise both anthropological and Marxist concepts in trying to develop a new understanding of analysing dynamic changes in African ‘social formations’. His analysis of the ethnography of the interlacustrine kingdoms established a theory of ‘social formations’ of these kingdoms by relying on a discursive method that built on local histories with a strong interpretive force emanating from the local peoples’ epistemologies and ‘hidden knowledge’. Based on this theory, he argued that the pastoralists in the ten kingdoms of the interlacustrine region, which had both segmentary and centralising tendencies, challenged the notion that these kingdoms were ‘invaded’ by the empire-building Hamitic pastoralists from pre-dynastic Egypt. Instead he reconstructed a history of their ‘social formation’ that built on local processes of political action based on a detailed ethnography in which both the pastoralists and sedentary communities converged (Mafeje, 1991:20).

From this, Professor Mafeje was able to challenge the whole notion of a particular pastoral community that came down from the north with longhorn cattle associated with the Hima/Tutsi people as a racial group with any special political characteristics for introducing a new political system. His research proved that such cattle could be found in Sierra Leone, and along the River Niger and as far south as Namibia. He pointed out that the indigenous Bantu agriculturalists and the Nilotic Babilo peoples had a pastoral history and therefore the process of state formation in the Bunyoro Empire could...
only be understood in terms of dialectical social relations and interactions, which evolved between the two modes of production and existence. He pointed out:

The Bairu provided the agricultural base and services and the pastoralists, relieved of any onerous duties but in control of prestige goods, indulged themselves, turned the latter into a mechanism for political control and ritual mystification. This phenomenon, involving the same social categories, got repeated in five other kingdoms in the interlacustrine regions of Ankore, Burundi, Ruanda, Buhaya and Buzinza (Mafeje 1991:22).

The British anthropologist John Beattie had argued that when the Babilo dynasty took over from the Chwezi dynasty in the Bunyoro Kitara empire, these new rulers ‘appeared strange and uncouth to the inhabitants’ and had to be instructed in the manners appropriate to rulers of cattle-keeping and milk drinking. From the ethnographical evidence he collected from the people, Mafeje found that the Babilo were by tradition pastoralists and could not have been ‘ignorant of cattle-keeping’ although it was likely that they were ‘ignorant of the kingship institutions, which in Bunyoro centred on sacred herds and milk diet for the kings’.

Mafeje’s analysis and that of Peter Rigby, who investigated the Masai of Tanzania using a phenomenological Marxist approach, demonstrated that the organic relationship between people of different modes of existence and culture must inform any analysis of society as a dialectical process of social and economic relationships. The social formation that arises historically must be demonstrated to arise out of these organic social relations and political actions. This can only be arrived at by use of a detailed ethnographic investigation instead of hypothetical a priori constructions based on one’s ideological convictions.

In arriving at this method of conceptualisation, Mafeje tried to discard old anthropological concepts as well as polishing Marxist concepts by choosing ‘social formation’ as his unit of analysis and discarding the concepts’ culture and ‘society’. By interrogating the use of the concept ‘ethnography’ by the Comoroffs, he adopted ‘social formation’ and his own notion of ‘ethnography’ as ‘key concepts’ in writing his book. In doing this, he departed from Balibar and Samir Abas by virtue of their ascribed identities are assigned categorical statuses and roles (ibid.).

Having clarified his second ‘key concept’ of ‘ethnography’, Mafeje declared it to be ‘radically different from that of the Northern theorists or conventional anthropologists’. Referring to the results of his investigation of the interlacustrine kingdoms, he states:

It is these texts that I refer to as ethnography. They are socially and historically determined, i.e. they can be authored and altered by the same people over time or similar ones could be authored by people with a different cultural background under similar conditions. Therefore ‘context’ is most critical for their codification (Mafeje 1996:34).

If Professor Mafeje is therefore to be credited or discredited with the claim of having made a leap from the discipline of anthropology as a ‘handmaiden of colonialism’ to ‘ethnography’ as defined by him above, it is in the attempt he made in developing a thesis based on these ‘texts’ as an approach that was suitable for explaining African conditions. Mafeje sums up this attempt when he concludes:

The final methodological lesson that can be drawn from the study is that detailed ethnographic knowledge helps us to avoid mechanistic interpretations. Far from opening the way to relativism or particularism, it enables us to decode what might strike us at first sight as so many different things and, thus, puts us in a position where we can discover hidden unities. For instance, we discovered that ‘tribal’ names were used, not to identify tribes, but to designate status-categories in non-tribal formations, for example, ‘Bairu’, ‘Batutsi’. Furthermore, ethnographic detail showed that contrary to stereotypes that pastoralists were the founders of the kingdoms in the interlacustrine region, neither the pastoralists nor the agriculturalists can take credit for this. Likewise, ethnographic detail forbids us to treat pastoralism and cultivation as things apart. The kingdoms were a result of a dynamic synthesis of social elements that were drawn from both traditions and the prevailing modes of existence within them served as politically controlled alternatives. ... These discoveries enable us to generate more objective codes and to put into proper perspective the his-
Mafeje's claim here is epistemic, if indeed it is true, for it destroys the way colonial anthropology and imperial ethnology were used to classify human societies according to their basic characteristics. These approaches denied the colonized 'objects' knowledge of themselves since they were regarded as 'primitive' and 'backward'. On the other hand, 'ethnography' as used by Mafeje here was an end product of social texts that were authored by the people themselves as knowledge-makers. In this approach, all that a scholar does is to study the peoples' texts so that he/she can decode them and make them understandable to other scholars as systemised interpretations of existing but 'hidden knowledge'. According to Mafeje, his approach 'marked a definite break with the European epistemology of subject/object'.

So with Mafeje's approach, we have achieved a philosophic break with the dualistic 'dialectical opposites' inherent in colonial anthropology, so that instead of the 'subject/object' epistemology of the coloniser, us and them, we have a 'synthesis' or a 'convergence' of social elements that are drawn, in the case of the interlacustrine kingdoms, from both traditions of the pastoralists and agriculturalists, into an interrelated whole expressed in the existence of the kingdom. This means Mafeje had discovered a new epistemology behind the 'hidden knowledge', which he was able to retrieve through the 'ethnological' approach or what he calls 'ethnological knowledge' of the colonial 'object' who now becomes the subject.

But Mafeje operates as a neutral researcher or scholar standing outside the new epistemology because he informs us that in discarding the old concepts and approaches he also adopted a 'discursive method', which was not predicated on any epistemology but was 'reflective of a certain style of thinking'. It is with this 'style of thinking' that he is able to study the peoples' texts so that he can decode them and make them understandable to other scholars as systemised interpretations of existing but 'hidden knowledge'. But in such a case how different is he from the colonial scholar who claims to be 'neutral' and 'objective'? This is perhaps the legacy that young scholars must grapple with.

Notes
1. A. Mafeje (1996), Anthropology and Independent Africans: Suicide or End of an Era? CODESRIA Monograph Series 4/96, Dakar: CODESRIA.

Debating Archie Mafeje and Wole Soyinka: Can Africa Colonize Itself?

My most famous debates with fellow African intellectuals were, firstly, with Wole Soyinka, the Nobel Laureate in Literature and, secondly, with Archie Mafeje, the eminent South African anthropologist. The debates with both intellectual adversaries were brutal - almost no hods barred!

My personal relationship with Wole Soyinka was substantially mended when I invited him to a conference on my campus in Binghamton, New York, and he agreed to come unconditionally. I had also invited General Yakubu Gowon, former Head of State in Nigeria, who had once imprisoned Wole Soyinka during the Nigerian civil war. Both the General and the Nobel Laureate came to Binghamton, and we mended our fences.

With regard to my personal relationship with Archie Mafeje, we never really had a formal intellectual reconciliation. But I would like to believe that my tribute to him in my presentation at the CODESRIA conference on 'Pan Africanism and the Intellectuals', in December 2003, was at least an olive branch from me.

But what did my two major debates with Wole Soyinka have in common with my single debate with Archie Mafeje? My first debate with Soyinka was conducted in the columns of Transition magazine (originally founded in Kampala but more recently based at Harvard under the editorship of Henry Louis Gates Jr). My single public debate with Archie Mafeje was conducted in the pages of CODESRIA Bulletin, based in Dakar, Senegal.

My first debate with Soyinka arose out of his misinterpretation of my television series, The Africans: A Triple Heritage (BBC/PBS, 1986). Basically, Wole Soyinka interpreted my concept of 'Africa's triple heritage' as an attempt to facilitate or legitimise a kind of Muslim colonization of Africa.

On the other hand, Archie Mafeje interpreted my concept of 'Africa's self-colonization' as an attempt on my part to facilitate Europe's recolonization of Africa. Soyinka regarded my 'triple heritage' as a Trojan Horse for a Muslim colonization of Africa. Mafeje denounced my concept of Africa's recolonization of its own failed states as a Trojan Horse for the return of Pax Britannica and related European interventions.

In reality, my concept of Africa's triple heritage was about a convergence of three civilizations in contemporary African experiences - Africacity, the penetration of Islam and the impact of Western civilization. In spite of Soyinka himself, Nigeria already had more Muslims than any Arab country. The size of the Nigerian population that had more Muslims than any Arab country. My television series was trying to understand this triple heritage, rather than promoting it.

In fact, far from emphasizing the Islamic part of Nigeria when I issued invitations for my Binghamton conference on 'Glo-
Indeed include elements of Ethiopia’s military role in Somalia does terror. My own conclusion is that, while Ethiopia did it at the behest of the United
pect. Indeed, there was evidence that intervening in Somalia were inevitably sus-
riodic conflicts. Ethiopia’s motives for in-
vention in the interest of the Somali people. Unfortunately Ethiopia and Somalia had shared my sense of outrage. I suspect Archie M. Afeje would have had the same sense of outrage.

I do not think I came even close to convincing Archie M. Afeje that inter-African colonization could ever be either benevo-
benign (causing no harm on either side). M. Afeje regarded any kind of colonization as decidedly malignant (beneficial mainly to the interventionist power).

I, on the other hand, regarded Tanzania’s ouster of Idi Amin from Uganda in 1979 as benevolent inter-African occupation – while Tanganinka’s union with Zanzibar in 1964 as a case of inter-African annexation that was more benign than ma-
ignant. It was more benign because, on balance, the terms of the union were disproportionately to the advantage of Zanzibar. The union was indeed a forced marriage – but the bride wealth to Zanzibar was truly generous in the powers allocated.

Archie M. Afeje died before Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 2007 in the name of the so-called ‘war on terror’. Somalia was indeed a failed state and would have gained from inter-African benevolent intervention in the interest of the Somali people. Unfortunately Ethiopia and Somalia had a long history of mutual hostility with peri-

etic conflicts. Ethiopia’s motives for in-
tervening in Somalia were inevitably sus-
related to the reported participation of Ethiopia, Egypt and K enya in America’s scheme of extraordinary rendition. Egypt and Ethiopia are accused by human rights groups of accepting ‘terror suspects’ arrested or identified by the United States. Egypt and Ethiopia are Africa’s oldest states, with at least a thousand years of experience in forceful interrogation – oth-
erwise known today as torture. The United States seems to have exploited that millennium of African forceful interrogation. Mwai Kibaki’s government in Kenya has been accused of exporting its own Muslim citizens for torture in Adis Ababa. These accusations have been made not only in the Kenyan media, but also on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the Public Broadcasting System (PBS) in the United States. Since Archie M. Afeje had spent so many years in Egypt, he would not have been surprised by allegations of torture in Egypt either for local reasons or at the behest of the United States.

While my own debate with Wole Soyinka in Transition was partly about Arab and Muslim factors in Africa’s triple heritage, my second debate with Soyinka was on the Internet following the showing of another television series about Africa – Wonders of the African World by Henry Louis Gates Jr (Skip Gates) of Harvard University, who also happened to be the latest editor of Transition. I was a critic of Wonders of the African World, partly because this television series blamed the Atlantic slave trade on Africans themselves. Henry Louis Gates virtually declared the white slave as being off the hook, and got a series of Aficans interviewed in West Africa to confess that the Atlantic slave trade was supply-driven rather than demand-driven, and would not have occurred but for the collaboration of African kingdoms like A shanti.

Henry Louis Gates Jr is a very distinguished African American scholar and public intellectual. Why did Wole Soyinka defend him? Partly because Gates was Wole’s student at Cambridge University in England, and partly because Wole believed I was disqualified from criticizing a rival television series when I had produced an earlier TV series of my own. It was as if Wole Soyinka was arguing that anybody who had written a book on a particular topic was thereby disqualified from reviewing a book on the same subject by anybody else. Of course, I regarded such an argument as intellectually ridiculous, which made Wole Soyinka even angrier.

What did this second Soyinka–Mazrui debate have in common with the M. Afeje–Mazrui debate? My disagreement with M. Afeje was about whether Africans could colonize each other in the future if conditions were favourable and legitimate. My disagreement with Skip Gates and Wole Soyinka was about whether Africans had enslaved each other in the past when conditions were favourable and profitable. M. Afeje and I debated prospects of Afri-
can self-colonization in the future. Gates, Soyinka and I debated about whether there was a record of Africa’s self-enslave-
ment in the past.

I happen to believe that inter-African colon-
zation could be benign or even benevo-
ent if the circumstances are self-fulfill-
ing. But I do not believe inter-African enslavement during the Atlantic slave trade could ever have been either benign or benevolent. Whether Africans collaborated in enslaving each other, or were merely victims of European-instigated slave raids, the ultimate outcome was malignant and evil.

On the issue of Africa’s self-colonization I can try to understand why Archie M. Afeje was angry with me. But on the issue of whether Africa was guilty of self-
enslavement, I continue to be puzzled as to why Wole Soyinka was more angry with me than with his former student, Henry Louis Gates Jr.

However, I am relieved that Wole Soyinka and I are on our way towards intellectual reconciliation. I also hope Archie M. Afeje is at last at peace with me wherever he is. A man.
Homage to Archie Mafeje

In this paper intended to pay homage to our late friend and comrade Archie Mafeje, I would like to cite two of his most recent contributions:


I consider these two contributions to be quite exceptional in terms of the quality of information provided and the rigour of their analysis. They provide passionate reading, and I believe it is essential they be known by whoever is seriously interested in understanding the region surveyed (the Great Lakes), in particular and rural and sub-Saharan Africa in general.

I believe my judgment is not biased by my strong sympathy for the method and theories advocated by the author. I therefore want it known that I share the same line of thought in terms of how you join economy and politics; in other words, the reading of historical materialism, which some of us share in common (cf. Preface to Mafeje’s book), but not all who would claim to be Marxists. The method, notably the author’s criticism of the economy-world, which makes an abusive use of analogy instead of concept-deepening (cf. Introduction, and compare with my article ‘Capitalisme et système M onde’. *Sociologie et Sociétés*, M ontréal University, XXIV, 2, 1992). I, of course, particularly appreciated his discussion of the tributary mode of production theory that I proposed and the validity of its use to understand the region surveyed by the author. I personally learned a lot from it about this region.

On my side, I wish to cite:

(i) my book, commented on by Mafeje, *Classe et Nation*, Paris: M inuit, 1979, and *L’Eurocentrisme*, *Anthropos*, 1988, but also a book to be published by Paragon, titled *Modernité, Reli-

(ii) my article ‘Les réformes des régimes fonciers souhaitables en Afrique et en Asie’, which was presented at the Conference of African Farmers’ Organisation, Dakar Agricole, 2005, to be published in India under the English title *Desirable Land Tenure Reforms in Africa and Asia*.

Both of us have followed parallel paths and as a result, our dialogue, both oral and written, has always been fruitful. Our divergences if any have always incited me to deepen my reflection, and I believe the same applies to Mafeje.

We were to pursue this dialogue in the coming months on the issue of the future of African peasantry that both of us deemed fundamental. Our primary conclusions coincided; in other words, first we both acknowledged that the way to enter the global capitalist system, inevitably as a periphery of the centre, was a dead end; and secondly, that accordingly the only way to offer African peoples a better future was through a national and popular reconstruction within the long view of twenty-first century socialism.

Aulas, since the voice of our friend is never to be heard again, and the dialogue has become a monologue. I nonetheless want to pay deserved homage to Mafeje for his intellectual and political contribution.

1. However, I think it is important for me to indicate that I did not base the tributary mode production of theory on the African Great Lakes societies nor on sub-Saharan Africa in general but first on my reflection on the societies that I believe I know best, those of Egypt and the Arab and Islamic world. I then focused my attention on the history of the most advanced oriental societies (China, in particular) and the ethnography of Tropical Africa, through systematic readings. Like Mafeje, I believe in scientific rigour but neither in learnedness nor empiricism. Indeed, it appears to me that the history of the Arab and Islamic world is quite badly comprehended by the Arabs themselves, caught in the shackles of religious mythologies about nature and the role of Islam in their history or nationalistic mythologies. The lack of a genuine critical bourgeois thought in our region – whether it has remained embryonic or nipped in the bud, notably by nationalistic populism – is certainly responsible for the dire poverty of not only Arab and Muslim historiography but the common dogmatic nature of dominant Marxism as well. This is certainly the reason why a different reading, which departs from the prevailing dominant mythologies (and even reinforced by the decline of rational and critical thinking of the past few decades), is often unwelcome when understood.

The theory that I named the tributary mode of production was suggested to me by a few of the major conclusions that I drew from my reinterpretation of the history of Ancient Orient and the Arab and Islamic world. It was later further confirmed by my readings on China and a few other societies. I then felt comfortable enough to make a different reading of European history, freed from dominant Eurocentrism and capable of placing feudal specificity within the context of the general evolution of tributary forms.

The critical reading of the Africanist ethnography that I was leading in parallel helped me considerably in understanding the genesis of this tributary mode of production, the general form of pre-capitalist advanced class formations. I did say genesis because it is clear that the society of classes was preceded by a very long period when neither those classes nor the exploitation associated with them existed. I therefore described that period as a ‘community’ era without reducing it at any time to a single form but instead underscoring the diversity of these organisational modes while looking for their common denominator. I believe this should be found in the dominance of ‘the parenthood ideology’, the basis for diversity in the organisation of social power.
as distinct from the state). Going from there, it is easy to grasp the extremely slow pace of evolution of the passage to tributary formations. In the case of many societies of Tropical Africa, it seems I could detect some of the mechanisms of the long transition; and I sensed intuitively to detect some of the mechanisms of the societies of Tropical Africa, it seems I could pace of evolution of the passage to tributary formations of the system, which does not command by an economic law inherent in the system. And yet, this progress is a reality, even if precisely as I explained it, it has always been slow, making these systems to appear as ‘stagnating’. I then suggested several plausible explanatory hypotheses including class struggle or the greed of dominant classes on which examples abound. Mafeje has expressed reservations about these hypotheses (pages 95-96 and 113 of his book).

My proposal in which the capitalist mode is opposed to the tributary mode, the general form of all pre-capitalist advanced class societies, is clearly expressed, in my opinion, by the contrast between the predominance of the economy in the former (‘wealth is a source of power’) and of politics in the latter (‘power is a source of wealth’). This radical inversion reflects a qualitative transformation of the system, which does not allow an analysis of the infrastructure/superstructure relationship using the same method in both systems.

Incidentally, I believe this fundamental distinction later erased by common Marxists should not be the base of Marx’s analysis of capitalism specificity (merchandising). Identified by Karl Polanyi, who insisted on this qualitative difference opposing all pre-capitalistic formations to capitalism, this distinction has, however, often been overlooked in many analyses of Africa (and elsewhere) by historians or Marxist ethnologists.

Mafeje shares my view on this issue, which I believe to be a cardinal one, and expressed it in very clear terms. I person-

ally drew a few conclusions on the differences between the mechanisms commanding the development of productive forces in capitalism (viz. that this development is the result of an in-built and immanent economic law in the capitalist mode) as opposed to those explaining progress in anterior societies (which is not commanded by an economic law immanent in the system). And yet, this progress is a reality, even if precisely as I explained it, it has always been slow, making these systems to appear as ‘stagnating’. I then suggested several plausible explanatory hypotheses including class struggle or the greed of dominant classes on which examples abound. Mafeje has expressed reservations about these hypotheses (pages 95-96 and 113 of his book).

3. My description of feudalism as ‘peripheral’ follows the same logic. The predominance of the political realm in the tributary mode (which Mafeje admits) implies that the ‘central’ (elaborate) or ‘peripheral’ (non-elaborate) character of this social form should be measured by the strength of this realm. In this sense, the dispersion of power in European feudalism justifies my description of it by comparison to centralisation, which is found, for example, in China, Byzantium or the Muslim Caliphate, which then constituted elaborate tribal forms. On the other hand, the predominance of the economy implies, in capitalism, that the central-peripheral opposition should be founded precisely based on considerations pertaining to this realm (‘central capitalist economies’ and ‘peripheral capitalist economies’).

I explain this peripheral nature of feudalism by the fact that medieval Europe was formed by grafting barbaric community societies on to the Roman tributary empire. From this distinction between the elaborate tribal forms and its peripheral feudal form, I drew a few conclusions that I believe to be important.

The first one is that the centre/periphery contrast, which is marked in the political realm, is not necessarily so at the economic base level, which was not less developed in the European Middle Ages than it was, for example, in the Arab world.

The second conclusion is that precisely this peripheral nature of feudalism explains the ‘European miracle’, that is, the precocious birth of capitalism on the ground. Rejecting the Eurocentric explanations attributing this miracle to cultural specificities, acknowledging that the similar contradictions at work in all tributary systems (no matter whether they are central or peripheral) can only be solved through shifting to capitalism (thereby restoring the universal dimension of history), I can observe that the peripheral nature of feudalism gave it some degree of elasticity leading to a rapid passage to capitalism, while the power of the tributary political realm in the central forms represented an obstacle slowing down this evolution.

The third conclusion relates to the issue of the ideological forms accompanying the tributary mode. It was on this subject that I spoke of state religions, which replace here the parenthood ideology specific to anterior community modes, and clashes with the economist alienation ideology specific to subsequent capitalism. Whichever way you look at it, in my opinion this general theory appears to be the only one that can explain why Christianity in medieval Europe and Islam played the same role but through different means: in Europe, the Church substitutes for the birth of capitalism, during the mercantilist era, distanced itself from the Church and even sometimes opposed it; in the Islamic world, religion remains submitted to power. This distinction, which is factually unquestionable, is generally attributed in the Muslim world to the ‘in-built characters’ specific to each of the religions. The struggle in which I engage, to explain that the problem does not lie there but rather in the social use of religions, is still unwelcome to those who cannot rid themselves of the religious mythologies that I mentioned earlier on.

4. In his book, Mafeje studied the pre-and post-colonial history of the Great Lakes region. I must confess that I am perfectly and completely convinced by what he says on these subjects.

My opinion is that Mafeje’s theories on these issues are strengthened by the fact that the societies of the region surveyed were, prior to colonisation, still in transition to the tributary mode. These are embryonic forms of the tributary mode (be ware: the term ‘embryonic’ should not be confused with the term ‘peripheral’). Mafeje provided clear proofs in this mat-
ter and highlighted them very convincingly; he analysed using these terms the persistence of a kinship ideology to point out that it is dulled and does not confer on the societies in question a ‘tribal’ character as alleged by ethnography (the bad one); he noted in parallel that there was no religious phenomenon similar to the one I mentioned regarding tribal societies (cf. pages 97–101, 120–4 of his book). What does this mean if not that the societies in question were in transition from community forms to those of a tributary mode?

The nuances and perhaps divergences in views should be put back into context, that of the confusions created in some cases by the possible telescoping of pre- and post-colonial periods.

5. Mafeje also proposes in his book a different reading of the changes that colonisation inflicted upon the organisational forms of the region and an interpretation of the conflict between what he called the ‘small bourgeoisie’ of independent Africa (which I prefer to call compadre state-bourgeoisie) and the ‘aristocracy’ of the old regime. I am convinced altogether by these brilliant developments (cf. notably page 131 and subsequent pages of the book) and, like Mafeje, I never considered that a bourgeoisie revolution could have developed in the region (or anywhere else in the peripheral capitalist world). Like Mafeje, I have always believed that it was essential to make a distinction between the capitalist revolution and integration into the global capitalist system.

Neither Mafeje nor I have ever considered the ‘unavoidable necessity of going through the capitalist stage’, but have always advocated a socialist approach to development as the only way to pull African peoples out of destitution.

I claimed that all advanced tributary systems, before being colonised by capitalist Europe and submitted to the imperialist expansion logic, could find a solution to their contradiction only by moving towards an invention of capitalism and subsequently some forms of ownership that it requires to develop. Of course, this proposition is questionable and Mafeje may not have shared the same view. As always, he is no longer around to answer this question that I intended to ask him. But I have always written that the formation of the global capitalist system and the capitalist peripherisation of the formations submitted to its expansion had modified this problematic root and branch. Today in the countries concerned, the capitalist approach can no longer be but that of a peripheral capitalism. As a result, a new approach is necessary, and on this Mafeje and I totally agree.

6. I think Mafeje’s criticism of ‘the articulation of modes of production’ theory should be somewhat put into perspective.

I agree with Mafeje’s definition of social formations as a bloc covering the economic and political realms (p. 16). But it does not fully and necessarily substitute for the structuring of specific and differing modes of production. Mafeje and I are both critical of the abuses that have been committed in the use of this modes of production theory (p. 127). I personally limited its significance by making three clarifications:

(i) not ‘all modes’ and any modes can be structured in a complex formation. However, this does not exclude co-existence, for example in capitalism, of a small merchant production mode (which is frequent in agriculture and service economies) and the capitalist mode;

(ii) in this case (when distinct modes can actually be identified), their structure plays out through predominance over the other. In the previous example, the small merchant mode is submitted to the logic of accumulation (specific to the capitalist mode), which dominates the social formation in question as a whole. There are even submitted modes that have been actually ‘fabricated’ by the predominant mode. As an example, I cited slavery in America, at the service of mercantilist capitalism, which was neither original nor specific to the previous conquered systems but was established by the conquerors.

(iii) articulation-submission is not the only form characteristic of complex formations. The distortion of pre-capitalist forms (whether tributary or communal) through their submission is more frequent and marks all societies of peripheral capitalism. Mafeje, by the way, said nothing different on this point and brilliantly illustrated it in the case he was studying (p. 147).

7. The question about the future of African peasantries is at the core of the cited two papers by Mafeje and me. In my view, these two papers complement each other in a very happy way, and the conclusions that both of us draw from our analyses coincide.

In my view – which is also Mafeje’s – not only colonisation (and the post-colonial system so far) perfectly ‘adjusted’ to ‘the absence’ of private land ownership in most of sub-Saharan Africa but even reaped some additional benefit from it. We both share the view that integration into global capitalism does not necessarily require the adoption, in the dominated peripheries, of capitalist organisational forms of production.

But what does the situation look like today? My proposed theory is that in the prospect of the expansion of contemporary imperialistic capitalism the question about land privatisation has now to be raised. My paper is sufficiently explicit on this point so it is not necessary to explain it any further. Fractions – though a minority but politically powerful – of the African peasantry are now playing this game. The majority of the peasants are resisting. Mafeje, who put the focus on these forms of resistance, has made a useful contribution. On my side, I tried to analyse the different possible and necessary resistance strategies at work under many and various extreme conditions, from that perspective, from one region to another in the South, since in many of the Asian and Latin American regions land privatisation is already a fait accompli (which is not the case in sub-Saharan Africa or otherwise an exception), and in Asian countries where a socialist revolution occurred (China and Vietnam), access to land ownership is still managed by the state and the peasant communities without privatisation.

It is now more necessary than ever to pursue the discussion of alternative strategies for pulling out of the dead end reached by globalised capitalism. In the absence of late Archie Mafeje, let us live up to the challenge. This is the best way to pay him homage.
The End of Anthropology: The African Debate on the Universality of Social Research and its ‘Indigenization’

A Study Dedicated to Archie Mafeje

About a Special Relationship with Archie Mafeje

Cairo became acquainted with Archie Mafeje almost four decades ago, first as a young political militant in the leadership of the Unity Movement, one of the liberation movements in South Africa, then as a prominent Professor of Sociology in the American University in Cairo in the 1980s. I made my personal acquaintance as a political militant, when I was myself the coordinator of African liberation movements in the 1960s and 1970s. Then I became a friend and an associate in the Arab African Research Center (AARC) in 1995. All through his career, he was appreciated by Egyptian social circles as a critical intellectual and an astute observer of society. He always commanded a special social status as the husband of a prominent Egyptian researcher, Professor Shahida El-Baz, and the father of a promising young daughter, Dana Mafeje.

I had the pleasure of taking part in the session held in his honor in Dakar by the Council for the Development of Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA), as one of the prominent researchers in Africa, of the stature of J. Ki-Zerbo, A. Mazrui and I. Shivji. During that meeting much was said about his extensive career as a pioneer in laying the foundations of African Ethnography and Anthropology, since his master’s thesis in the University of Cape Town, back in 1962, about local African society. We also noted how UCT, under the influence of apartheid, refused to appoint him as a staff member, which triggered numerous demonstrations of protest on the part of students of many universities. Such persecution forced him into self-exile, to gain his PhD from Cambridge in 1966, followed by a long trek among the universities of Holland, Botswana, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Egypt and Namibia, to rest at last in the African Institute in Pretoria, in collaboration with the young scholars of the new South Africa, where he coaches the holders of scholarships in a program of higher education named after him, the ‘Archie Mafeje Programme’.

In this brief introduction, we cannot review the extensive scientific contributions of Mafeje to the body of African Studies. I can personally name at least ten books, apart from the scores of published studies and articles in Africa and abroad. However, Archie Mafeje must be read in the original to appreciate his debates over Colonial Anthropology, and the liberation of African Social Sciences. One should also read his analysis of modes of production in the African context, the economic, agricultural and social effects of colonialism in the African South, the ethnography of the agrarian question, the discourse of African intellectuals in the Continent and the Diaspora and the devastating effects of Structural Adjustment Programs. We can never ignore the great efforts of Mafeje in the UN Economic Commission for Africa, in CODESRIA, in FAO, and other bodies in search of an ‘Alternative Development for Africa’, and his close examination of social protest movements from Soweto to the Great Lakes, and elsewhere.

I personally took part in translating his book on African Social Formations, which was published in Arabic in 2006, a few months before he passed away. I wrote the introduction to that book in Arabic, and would like to present here that introduction, in English, for the benefit of his students and friends in Africa and elsewhere, as a token of my great esteem for this distinguished scholar.

The End of Anthropology: To the late Archie Mafeje

Introduction

The cry proclaiming the Death of Anthropology came several decades ago, from the European camp that saw the inception of this epistemological order under the name of ‘Colonial Anthropology’. P. Worsley (of Britain) was the first, presenting his paper entitled ‘The End of Anthropology’ to the anthropological congress in 1966. This concept was again discussed in an African congress in Dakar in 1991, where A. Mafeje announced the death of Anthropology in Africa. He reiterated this concept in an important study where he announced that Anthropology had committed suicide, and that a new beginning of this science was to be heralded.

Anthropology is one of the social sciences most attached to the world political and economic order, as it was closely linked to colonialism, and the expansion of industrial then financial capitalism beyond the European boundaries. Thus the anthropologist became a vulnerable colonialist, as James Hawker once said (1963), as Anthropology was created by the colonial administration as a means to ‘enhance’ its effectiveness. Some young American anthropologists even considered it an imperialist science as it was closely connected to the American wars of the 1960s. Such an assessment has meant different approaches to this science from the French school (of the Annales) on one hand, and the Marxist school or that of Historical Materialism on the other.

Such a varied outlook to this science may explain why its African protagonists declared its ‘death’ in their Dakar congress in 1991, or in Mafeje’s studies, in pursuit
of a new birth on new foundations for its methodological and theoretical basis, and aiming at new social objectives.

From such considerations we proceed to study the following aspects of Anthropology:

I. The main criticisms addressed to the objectives and methods of Anthropology;

II. The attempts to reconstruct Anthropology as a support for development in the post-independence state;

III. The efforts to transform the theoretical concepts and methodology after the declaration of the end of the old Anthropology, then trying to indigenize it in the context of African realities.

This means debating the doctrine of the universality of the social sciences when applied to African societies, meaning the need to fragment epistemological disciplines for the benefit of globalizing holistic scientific values. In such a pursuit, various African parties look out for new traits of African Anthropology, or Ethnography as constructed by Archie Mafeje.

The Critical Standpoint

Some critics of Anthropology lay stress on the functional role of the anthropologist rather than on the methodology of this science. This may explain the abundance of debate around the scientific personalities that contributed to anthropological research, such as Edward Evans-Pritchard, Charles Seligman, Nadel, Malinowski, and others. However, their connections with colonial and imperial administrations were always mentioned with regret, as a mar on their scientific trajectories. The Afrikaner and Afro-Americanists, likewise, to study 'African Culture' or indirectly, in the attempts for 'self-emancipation' from Anthropology by refusing to create studies of this discipline in the new universities in the post-independence states. This came about owing to the direct experience of some of them (Kenyatta, Nkrumah, etc.), or because of the conditions of building the modern state/nation, and the need for developmental sociology, and evading the fragmenting Anthropology of tribalism and racism. The Anglo-Saxon anthropologists tried to save their reputation when they adopted the theme of 'Social Change' in their congress in Kampala (1959), but to no avail. The counterattack came from African anthropologists in their congress in Yaoundé (1989), and in Dakar (1991). In these congresses the Africans raised the slogan 'Post-Anthropology', while some of them went to the extent of declaring the Death of Anthropology. Yet the historians of these attempts consider such moves for renaissance, or constructing development anthropology, to be still in the pragmatic stage, and as not constituting a negation of the old epistemological order, on the road to creating a new Afrikan Anthropology.

In this connection we would point out to the pragmatic stand of Kwesi Prah (in Dakar, 1991), who noted that British Anthropology insisted on functionalism as a non-historic order rooted in 'European Culture'. He concluded by urging Africanists, likewise, to study 'African Culture' within the framework of national construction, and delve deep into self-study, while constructing an Afrikan Anthropology as an interdisciplinary system that might...
make use of Marxist methodology in social analysis of the salient social phenomen (CODESRIA, 1991).

To stigmatize the pragmatic stand, Mafeje pointed out the position of A. Bujera (Kenya), who highlighted the role of Anthropology in development as being a recent trend in the USA, where investors planned to develop Africa with the help of the anthropologists. He contended that this field must not be left wide open to the Westerners by themselves while they lacked comprehension of African culture and ethnography.

Some opposed this developmental trend as bereft of a theoretical basis, and accused its protagonists of presenting a new imperialist form of the old anthropology (E. Leach), or at the best, trying to utilize Anthropology as a mechanism for projects that the local bureaucracy cannot manage. Ifi Amadiume proposed to the Dakar congress the liquidation of Anthropology, to be replaced by African Social History, or Sociological Historiography, which was a sure indication of her being influenced by Francophony and the French Annales school of social history, and the reliance on Oral History, Folklore and other popular arts as a source for the interpretation of society. The influence of the school of Cheikh Anta Diop on the anthropologists of francophone West Africa was evident by the inclusion of the ‘situation of women’ as a new topic for Anthropology.

Dr Abdal Ghafar Ahmed (Sudan) took part in the debate about Anthropology in his contribution to Talal Asad’s book (1973), followed by a number of sociological anthropological studies on Sudan from a critical viewpoint. Yet Mafeje considered him a vulnerable developmentalist ‘against his will’, despite his open criticism of Colonial Anthropology and traditional functionalism. Ahmed collected his contributions on the subject in Anthropology in the Sudan (2003), building on the premise that the old anthropologist was indeed colonialist against his will, because of the context and political environment in which he worked. The developmental approach, however, came in the context of the total society in the modern state, rather than the previous fragmented society. This change in approach was applied to his studies on unity and diversity in Sudanese society. Thus, Ahmed made his theoretical and field contributions on the theme of the disintegration of

the authority of the tribe, and assessing the authority of the elite on a political and class basis, and as the foundation for the hierarchy in society as a whole, and not the tribe as an isolated entity as in traditional Anthropology.

Therefore, Ahmed’s studies reflected his efforts to develop Anthropology rather than declare its demise or negation. Thus, the titles of his various contributions – Unity and Diversity, The Changing Systems in Rural Areas, and Anthropology and Development Planning in the Sudan – point to the possibility of transforming the role of Anthropology in the social context of the Sudan.

What End to Anthropology?

Talking about the ‘End’ of Anthropology does not mean its complete negation, but rather the negation of its functional non-historical legacy, and its methodology, which refused any historical approach to, let alone the social history of, the total social edifice. While the rejection was aimed at Colonial Anthropology as mentioned above, the attempts at its transformation came from the ‘North’ in the form of modernistic or postmodern methods that led to the reference to ‘ postanthropology’.

Such attempts led in turn, to the fear that ‘Imperialist Anthropology’ would come to replace the old ‘Colonial Anthropology’, as propounded by the French and M. Marxists. However, most African scholars consider all such attempts as ‘Northern’ efforts at reproduction of the old theme under new global conditions.

Here, stress was laid on the necessity to indigenize social sciences in the African anthropological congresses (Hountondji in 1993, and Mafeje in 1996). They refused to accept the holistic European advance while refusing such totality for African society, or that European postmodernism could lead to the old colonialist fragmented empirical outlook to be applied to Africa and the Third World alone while Western society would benefit alone from globalization (Mafeje 1996). Samir Amin also reiterates this theme when he writes: ‘The capitalist society of the Center, based on Rationality, is now exporting Irrationality only to our World in the South.’

Reconstructing the Old Concepts

Such refusal came firstly as a rejection of the old concepts of traditional Anthropology. This was the work of young African anthropologists who rejected the concepts of ‘Tribalism’ and ‘The Characteristics of Human Races’, and others, which they attributed to colonialism and its lackeys. We shall review in brief some such contributions.

P. Rigby denounces such attempts in his African Images under the title: ‘The Racist Ideology Creates the Legend of the Hamites’, where he denounces the extravagance in extolling their social ascendancy over their neighbors owing to their Caucasian ancestry, etc. He points out the discourse about the peoples of East and Central Africa, where some colonial anthropologists like Hinde proposed the utilizing of some such groups to dominate other groups for the benefit of the colonial power. The claim was that this group (the Masai) were superior as Hamites over their neighbors of the Nilotes as the anthropological studies asserted.

The same ‘theory’ of racial superiority of the Hamites was also extended to Rwanda and Burundi where the Tutsis were utilized to dominate the Hutus in accordance with the recommendation of another anthropologist. Such claims called for a special assessment of the physical, psychological and mental characteristics of the Tutsi to explain the continued discrimination to their benefit, and their domination of the Hutus, and even explain the post-independence struggles and colonialist interventions. Here we find Rigby tracing Hamite legend:

in the 19th century, as J.H. Speke applied it in 1865, for the first time, on the studies about East Africa. The anthropologists adopted this legend once more in the 20th century till 1950, in the form of ‘Hamite-Nilotes’. This last form was applied in 1953, in the ethnographic survey of Africa under the direction of Galvier and his wife. This survey tried to establish the ‘inferiority of the Negro Race’ by claiming that the history of East Africa cannot be explained except by an invasion by Caucasian Whites!

Mafeje and Southall and others – according to Rigby – refuted the Hamite legend, but it continued as popular mythology in the historiography of East Africa. Cheikh Anta Diop also refuted the mythology of the Hamites, by stating that the claim that the Dinka, the Shilluk, the Nuer or the Masai had a Caucasian origin was tantamount to claiming that the Greeks were not White! Such claims amount to saying
that any civilized group in Africa has a non-African origin, meaning that the Dinka or the Maasai were different from the ‘primitive’ masses around them. Indeed, such groups have a very long history in Africa.

This was also a denial of Seligman’s school that claims that the pastoral Hamites came in waves of migration from the Caucasus, passing through North Africa and the Nile valley. This school reached such conclusions after the study of the animistic tribes in Nilotic Sudan, and the claim that the intermingling between these superior immigrants and the local Negroes produced the Maasai and the Baganda, and later, the Bahima Nkule, and so on. Such claims – according to Rigby – were passed on by the followers and colleagues of Seligman, such as Malinowski and Evans-Pritchard.

The contribution of Mafeje in challenging the colonial anthropological concepts appeared first in his study on the ideology of tribalism (1972), followed by the study of the ethnography of the region of the Great Lakes (1991). He considered that it was not easy to separate social sciences from ideology, and that had the Africans written their history, the results would have been different. Thus we should look for the motivation behind such writings.

In this connection, Mafeje makes the following analysis, in which he notes that the Western system of concepts leads to the occurrence of the term ‘tribalism’ in any study, using the colonial European terminology about Africa. Even a century later, European ideology still stuck to the term tribalism to describe an African society. The British insisted on the use of the term and their students in East Africa and the South used it after them, despite the fact that the Southerners never used this term, but referred to the ‘nation’, the ‘people’ and the ‘clan’, or sometimes to the ‘land’ (of the person). A ngu-Saxon anthropology always looked for the pure tribalism that fitted the policy of indirect rule advocated by Lord Lugard, and Sir Donald Cameron. Some anthropologists thought such policies helped conserve social consistency and stability. Later when these anthropologists started studying urban societies, they attributed some folkloric phenomena penetrating urban society, such as dancing of rural origin, as an indication of persistence of tribalism in an urban context (e.g. Mitchell’s study on the dance of the Kalela in the Copper Belt), to evade any reference to social or class distinction in the towns.

When anthropologists started the study of social change, they again referred to tribal resistance to change, rather than its disintegration or loss of stability. Watson even refers to tribal stability in conditions of monetary economy. Here we find a divergence between politicians and anthropologists, the former attributing the failure of attempts at modernization to tribalism, while the latter think tribalism lies behind the success or failure of modernization, as the case may be.

It remains to answer the query whether tribalism may exist without tribes. If we accept the classic definition that ‘tribes are self-sustained groups with little or no external trade’, then anthropologists will have to explain whether all African political entities are tribes. What about the large kingdoms such as the Lwabola or the Zulu? Or shall we accept calling them super tribes as some anthropologists do?

Schapira tried to evade the discrepancy by calling the tribes ‘separate political groups’ that administer their affairs without foreign intervention … thus the tribe is considered as being above all known forms of human organization. Culture as a criterion of assessing the tribe was only introduced with the advent of modernism, and the contributions of political and social studies (J. C. Mitchell, M. G. Smith).

According to Mafeje, the anthropologists’ concept of the tribe, large or small, may be acceptable for pre-colonial societies, where the tribe lived in relative isolation as an entity defined in time and locality, and living a subsistence economy. Such a definition cannot, however, be applied after the intrusion of European colonialism, and their inclusion within the capitalist monetary system and the world market. The new division of labor, and the new modes of production and distribution, gave African societies a radically different basis. Thus it is no more a question of scope, but rather qualitative changes of the social and economic order. One cannot totally deny the role of the tribe in Africa, but we must differentiate between residing to one’s tribe as a token of integrity and self-esteem, and using it as a means to remain in power, in the capital of the modern state, or exploiting one’s tribesmen in the context of a modern society.

To simplify Mafeje: tribalism becomes an ideology with no objective existence as claimed. It becomes some sort of false consciousness of the so-called members of the tribe, and an aberration that the elite resorts to while exploiting their ‘tribesmen’. It is ideology in the Marxian sense, but also ideology for the Africans who share the Western ideology with their colleagues in the West.

With social change, people often belong to the region rather than the tribe, such as the Transkei in South Africa, or the immigrants in Cape Town. Thus the concept of region comes before that of the tribe, as has the criterion of culture that the British anthropologists ignored because they were isolated from structuralism. In South Africa, Xhosa speakers share a common culture over a very wide region, even though they belong to different political entities. Culture is utilized in South Africa to attain a higher social status, so can we also call this tribalism? Indeed, some still call it tribalism!

Why maintain the concept of tribalism so much in an urban context and a market economy? First, because it helps embroil the nature of the economy, and the power relations between the Africans, and between them and the capitalist world, as the concept of feudalism was used in Latin America to cover up imperialist capitalist relations.

Mafeje introduces the concept of ‘Regional Characteristics’ in order to facilitate situating the cultural elements in a wider society, as well as understanding the class transformations in that society. He maintains that anthropologists need to use a concept that may be generalized to cover human societies, and that tribalism cannot be such a concept.

In his book on the theory of ethnography (1991), Mafeje states that the first generation of European ethnographers in Africa contributed a considerable body of material that became the classics in the field. He also believes they adopted certain fixed concepts such as the tribe, the clan and the lineage etc. They also resorted to opposing categories for classification such as acrhephalous states in contrast with centralized ones, patriarchal societies in contrast with matriarchal ones, pastoral versus agricultural socie-
ties, etc. All such classifications were looked down upon with disdain by the British anthropologist Edmund Leach who named such methods ‘Butterfly Collecting’. A part from the clearly organic outlook of the functional structural anthropology, all such classifications are of an empirical and even static nature, trying to crowd various objects into a tight bag. They also create working modes of thinking that lead directly to an ahistoric stand. We note here that in biology, such methods of classification were abandoned for the more dynamic reactions of biochemistry that we meet in all forms of life. In human societies, some social phenomena may seem as various types, but in the last analysis they are found to be different manifestations, or permutations of the same phenomenon, such as types of existence or social classifications. All this makes us wary of falling into the snare of evolutionism or historicism.

Such studies may add to our acquired knowledge, but they have little effect on the classic ideological systems, as they use the same classified categories to reach almost the same results. M掏reover, ethnomethod or theorizing is far from their center of attention.

However, such criticism does not by necessity include all historians of African societies. As we find in _Modes of Production in Africa_, edited by D. Grumme and C.C. Stewart (1981), a great effort by the authors to theorize African history. They tried to apply the concepts of historical materialism to the pre-colonial African history, using accepted epistemological concepts and arrays of Marxist concepts such as ‘modes of production’, ‘classes’, ‘surplus value’ and ‘capitalist production relations’, to explain that history. They made a serious effort to allure English-speaking historians away from their empiricism, without showing a similar will to learn from African ethnography except to extract the greatest amount of historical facts and explain them by pre-accepted standards and classifications.

Mafje says (1991) that he intentionally tried to evade all such generalizations. He took an ethnography as a standard by which to assess all previous concepts that he did not take for granted. Using such a method, some epistemological hypotheses per se, including Marxism, became subject to doubt, and must be subjected to cultural discussion, as Y. Tandon remarks. Instead of being swamped by theoretical theses, Mafje took one fundamental thesis and subjected it to his method of doubt and examination. He applied this system to S. Amin’s thesis on the ‘Tributary Modes of Production’ whose history was different from that of the perspective of European history, and as such must be judged by its own terms.

I agree with Mafje that the main aim of Mafje’s study was to establish a conceptual formulation of some of the phenomena and social relations in Black Africa, which had been examined in a biased manner by non-Africans for a long time. The aim was to show that most of these concepts were misrepresented to prove the lack of correlation between the universal language of social sciences based on the European historical experience and the local language as understood by the Imperialists.

The problem, as we see it, is the authenticity of social sciences, as some of their texts have no historical context, and in order to grasp them fully we must comprehend their historic context. The point here is not that social formations are governed by the related ethnography, but that the latter explains social classification, and codes of social conduct, and the ideological reproduction. A given social stratum need not behave in a certain manner anywhere in the world. African capitalists may set aside the possibility of doubling the surplus value, for reasons of kinship. In Buganda the proprietor chiefs will gain more value from making political dependants than from squeezing their labour force. To evaluate these development aspirations, all such ideas are relevant and credible, and even objective. We must keep in mind that all local dialects, as well as all languages, can mislead, and what may guide the analyst is the context. When we read local tongues, we do not face an object that is clear per se, and this is exactly the error of both the empiricists and the globalists. The deciphering of the symbol usually means an expert translation of an ambiguous language to make it more lucid. Thus when we insist on comprehension of local dialects, we have no intention of discarding the current scientific social language; rather we insist on a clear understanding of local experience, hence better credibility and objectivity. From the point of view of social theories this implies a thorough process of examination, classification and rearrangement.

Speaking on the liberation of the discipline, Mafje recalled that among those who showed interest in developing a radical social theory in Africa and anywhere else, Samir Amin occupied a distinguished place. Although he cannot be considered among those who decline details, and go forward to present issues of forgone conclusions, yet he will always be consulted for his critical thinking and seeking out of new ideas. Although such ideas may not always be fundamental, they generally present logical conclusions.

Hence Archie Mafje does not uphold the idea of the End of Anthropology in order to liquidate an epistemological order, but rather to put in its place a more appropriate alternative to the concept, which, in his opinion, leads to anthropological theorizing of another kind.

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Archie Mafeje, the African Intellectual and the Anti-imperialism in Social Science

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It is impossible to summarise an intellectual work spanning four decades, but if there is a word constantly repeated in his writings and thought, just like in that of one of his friends, Issa Shivji, who retired recently and lost that retirement shortly after, it was probably the term ‘imperialism’. Mafeje considered ‘imperialism’ to be an evil, which must be combated at all costs in every domain including the social sciences. Claude Ake, another departed icon, noted that ‘imperialism’ did not spare the social sciences at all – as thought and transmitted to us from Europe – to the extent that it could also become or used as a vehicle of imperialism (Ake 1979).

My first meeting with Archie Mafeje was more ‘intellectual’ than physical. It dated back to the early 1990s and was largely facilitated by CODESRIA. In 1994 I was an Assistant in the Department of Public Law at the Law Faculty of the University of Kinshasa in what was then still called Republic of Zaïre. For the first time, I learnt of the existence of CODESRIA through a poster calling for applications for the Summer Institute on Democratic Governance. I decided to try my luck. The fact that my candidacy was retained among the fifteen who were selected was certainly one of the best surprises ever in my intellectual and scientific career. I thus found myself in Dakar from August to September 1994. Luc Sindjoun and Peter Kagwanja were among my fellow participants at the Institute. It was during my various reading visits to the CODESRIA Library that I came across the writings of Archie Mafeje.

Two years later, I experienced my first shock with the scholar. It was through the CODESRIA Bulletin published in 1995 and 1996. Ali M azrui, this other giant of African social science, had submitted his ideas on the Pax Africana. Faced with the risk of ‘disintegration’ threatening many African regions, Mazrui suggested that the Pax Africana was going through a ‘self-colonisation’ or rather through a ‘mild colonisation’ of the African states in decaying or ‘disintegrating’ states like Somalia, Sierra Leone and Zaïre (Mazrui 1995). Mazrui felt that ‘key states’ like South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt and Ethiopia could be charged with ‘re-colonising’ those in a disintegrating state. Colonisation by some African states would be a form of ‘self-colonisation’ not affected by the vices associated with ‘conventional’ colonisation.

Ali M azrui probably knew that his idea of colonisation whether mild or not, which is in-built in the imperialism ideology, was provocative and would not pass. The forceful reaction of Archie Mafeje was a bit-for-tat as he denounced ‘sly spirits at the service of imperialism’ (Mafeje 1995). The debate was thus ignited and involved all CODESRIA members. We wondered whether we should take the floor in the face of these two giants, who practically intimidated everyone, who keep silent for fear of being crushed on the battleground where the two wild cats of African social science were confronting each other cordially.

But I might have asked Shivji this question: between imperialism and anti-imperialism, do we really have the choice to remain silent? I then decided to sound my little voice even though it could not resonate in the middle of the heated exchanges and finesse shots between the two giants, all the more so as the debate was open to all (Mangu 1996). This was how I introduced myself to Archie Mafeje.

In 2001, I found myself teaching at the University of the North in South Africa, my home country. Five years had elapsed. Mafeje was invited to give a lecture at the university, and I was very happy to see him physically. He had a terrific memory: he was enough to remind him of the young and daring gentleman from former Zaïre who then was ‘bold’ enough to intervene during his heated exchange with Mazrui.

In 2003, I was a Professor at the College of Law, University of South Africa and Mafeje
was also there as a researcher emeritus. Since then, we met regularly and I continued benefiting from his relevant analyses.

My lasting memory is that he was a model senior scholar, somewhat radical and not always conciliatory about certain ideas, a rigorous and non-complacent scientist who opposed any compromise solution.

He so much loved this Africa extending from Cairo, where he lived as a ‘refugee’, to Cape Town, where his appointment as the first black lecturer in a whites-only university, in accordance with the very logic of apartheid, had provoked a general outcry on the part of the racist government of Pretoria to the extent of forcing him into exile forty years ago. He always dreamed of the greatness of the continent, which required mastering social science and challenging imperialism in all its forms insofar as it constituted a negation of the dream shared by several generations of CODESRIA members.

Against Alterity – The Pursuit of Endogeneity: Breaking Bread with Archie Mafeje

**Introduction**

The passing away of Professor Archibald Monwabisi Mafeje on 28 March 2007 was a great shock to so many within the African social science community and beyond. At a personal level, it was particularly shocking: Archie, as we fondly refer to him, was to be with us at Rhodes University (Grahamstown—Rhini) for Thandika Mkandawire’s D.Litt graduation ceremony, and we had worked frantically to finalise Archie’s travel arrangements just the Friday before he died. He was to return to Grahamstown in May for an audio-visual interview that I was to have with him, exploring his biography and scholarship; I had sent him the questions just the Friday before he died. He was to return to Grahamstown in May for an audio-visual interview that I was to have with him, exploring his biography and scholarship; I had sent him the questions and he was keen on the project. Scholarship is biographical, and it is even more so in Archie’s case. It was going to be a time to break bread with this most engaging of scholars; elegant in thoughts and taste. I had wanted to test out some of my hypotheses regarding the contours of his works and life with him; ‘sort out’ a few nagging issues in his works. Although he had been in poor health for a few years, when we sat down to what turned out to be our last dinner in Pretoria in February 2007, he was in the best shape in which I had seen him since 2002. He had spent 27 March as part of the arrangement to be our last dinner in Pretoria in February 2007, which might be forgiven in a fresh situation, as with anecdotes there will be as many as the number of individuals who encountered Archie. By themselves, they may be of limited intellectual significance. In this instance, it is in the personal that I seek the scholarly. The loss of someone like Archie pushes us to search for meaning that is both deeply personal and intellectual.

**Meanings and Encounters**

The meaning of Archie Mafeje for three generations of African scholars and social scientists is about encounters. For some it would have been personal, for others it was through his works, and for most in the community the encounter via scholarly works became personal and intimate. Archie reciprocated more than most. Babatunde Zack-Williams, in an intervention at a February 2006 conference in Pretoria, spoke glowingly regarding the impact that Archie’s ‘The Ideology of Tribalism’ (Mafeje 1971) had on him. Tunde wondered aloud why Archie was absent from a conference in a city of his residence on how to reinvigorate the study of Africa. The impact that Tunde referred to is shared by many, but I missed that by some five years. My encounter was through his ‘The Problem of Anthropology in Historical Perspective’ (Mafeje 1976). I was a first-year undergraduate student at Ibadan, and I had been rummaging through the journal section in the basement of the University of Ibadan Library. I came across a new issue of the Canadian Journal of African Studies, which I found delightful. In response, Raymond Firth (Firth 1972) rebuked Gough and others like her; quite the contrary, Firth insisted, Anthropology was a ‘child of Enlightenment’. Mafeje’s response in the 1976 article was: ‘What’s the point of dispute, folks? Imperialism is the child of Enlightenment, anyway.’ It was so elegantly written, with incredible detailed knowledge of the field and the debates from various parts of the world. His conceptual handle on the debate so rigorous and velvet, it was incredibly exhilarating. While taking no prisoners, he did not mind taking himself a prisoner too. Kathleen Gough had charged Anthropology with being ‘a child of Western Imperialism’ (Gough 1968), which I found delightful. In response, Raymond Firth (Firth 1972) rebuked Gough and others like her; quite the contrary, Firth insisted, Anthropology was a ‘child of Enlightenment’. Mafeje’s response in the 1976 article was: ‘What’s the point of dispute, folks? Imperialism is the child of Enlightenment, anyway. It was so detailed and elegantly argued I walked on air for days afterwards.

I was not to meet Archie Mafeje in person until 1992, at the CODESRIA General Assembly in Dakar. It was an incredibly engaging experience, and I got a copy of his Theory and Ethnography of African Social Formations (Mafeje 1991). He autographed my copy with the words: With pleasant memories after a most vigorous encounter with the irreverent but a wel-
come sense of rebellion – Dakar 15/2/92. The ‘irreverence’ was around the debate we kicked off at the assembly on ‘icons’. I had argued that a viable intellectual community develops around iconic individuals, events and/or ideas. I told Archie that we won’t act like the Orthodox Church; we won’t polish our icons and put them on a pedestal. When we disagree with them, ‘we will kick their butt’. He was quite tickled by it. Jibrin Ibrahim would later take a dip at being iconoclastic in an article, ‘History as Iconoclast: Left Stardom and the Debate on Democracy’ (Ibrahim 1993). The problem is when you denounce Issa Shivji for ‘manichean vituperations’, as Jibrin did, you should expect to have your feathers plucked; and plucked his feathers were. The ‘icons’ were not going to roll over and die or rock in their chairs watching the sun set (Amin 1993; Mafeje 1993). Even so, Archie and Samir were as gentle as one could expect of them in the circumstances. Issa stayed out of it. Archie’s focus was on conceptual rigour as a prelude to political action as well as empirical misrepresentations of what the iconic ‘Left stars’ did or did not do. He probably thought Jibrin was mistaken but not an ‘enemy’.

My take on the idea of ‘icon’ and iconic ideas was quite different from Jibrin’s. It was about constructing our intellectual community rooted in ideas firmly grounded in our conditions and drawing critical scholarly inspirations from those who went before; not in squeamish aduluation but critical engagement. But to return to Archie, the Theory and Ethnography of African Social Formations is another example of what Mahmood Mamdani called Archie’s ‘artisanal’ approach to intellectual work: painstaking and rigorously argued.

The 1992 encounter speaks to what many people confuse as intellectual arrogance and a gladiatorial stance in Archie Mafeje. He demanded of you a rigorous engagement with your field, extensive depth of knowledge, and knowing your onions inside out. But even the most brilliant mind is not infallible; Archie knew that. He lived on rigorous intellectual engagements and a willingness to engage with you if you thought he had not finely tuned his ideas. But ideas were not just esoteric things for their own sake. They are important because they mean so much one way or another to the lives of millions on our continent. That is why he comes across as fierce on ‘dangerous’ ideas – as in his contentsions against Ali Mazrui – or those who subsist on ‘the epistemology of alterity’ (Mafeje 1997b:5). It would equally explain why he chose not to have a public spat with Ruth First after her response (First 1978) to his article on the Soweto Uprising (Mafeje 1978b). Ruth First was a comrade even though they inhabited different points in the anti-Apartheid struggle.

Against Alterity

If there is a common thread tying all of Archie Mafeje’s professional writings, as distinct from his more political writings, it will be the relentless contestation of the epistemology of alterity and the pursuit of endogeneity. Endogeneity, in this specific case, refers to an intellectual standpoint derived from a rootedness in African conditions; a centring of African ontological discourses and experiences as the basis of one’s intellectual work. ‘To evolve lasting meanings’, Mafeje (2000:66) noted, ‘we must be “rooted” in something. Central to endogeneity is averting what Houquntji (1990) referred to as “extroversion”. In spite of the claims of being nomothetic in aspiration, social analysis is deeply idiographic. Those who exercise undue anxiety about being “cosmopolitan” or universalist fail to grasp this about much of what is considered nomothetic in the dominant strands of Western theories’. All knowledge is first local: ‘universal knowledge can only exist in contradiction’ (Mafeje 2000:67). It is precisely because Max Weber spoke distinctly to the European context of his time, as Michel Foucault did for his that guaranteed the efficacy of their discourses. ‘If what we say and do has relevance for our humanity, its international relevance is guaranteed’ (Mafeje 2000:67). In this paper, I will limit my focus to this aspect of Mafeje’s works.

While ‘The Ideology of “Tribalism”’, is often cited as the launching of Mafeje’s attack on alterity, the drive for the centrering of the African ‘self-knowing’ is evident in Langa: A Study of Social Groups in an African Township (Wilson and Mafeje 1963), co-published with Monica Wilson, his supervisor at the University of Cape Town. The preference for the research subjects’ own self-definition – e.g., ‘homeboys’ rather than ‘tribesmen’ – in the book presaged his 1971 paper. A similar mode of writing, which proceeds from the subject’s perspective, is evident in two of his other works published in the 1960s: ‘The Chief Visits Town’ (Mafeje 1963) and ‘The Role of the Bard in a Contemporary African Community’ (Mafeje 1967). However, in contrast to the muted negation of alterity in these earlier works, ‘The ideology of “Tribalism” ’ was a more self-conscious critique of the continued use of ‘tribe’ and ‘tribalism’.

While Mafeje’s paper was not new or alone in contesting the concept of ‘tribe’ and ‘tribalism’ – cf. Vilakazi (1965), Magubane’s 1968 paper (republished in 2000:26) and Onoge’s 1971 paper (published 1977) – that much Mafeje (1971:12; 1996:260–1) himself specifically mentioned. Nonetheless, Mafeje’s intervention was a focused ‘deconstruction’ (Mafeje 1996, 2001) of the categories on conceptual and empirical grounds. Empirically, Mafeje argued, the word ‘tribe’ did not exist in any of the indigenous South African languages – or, to the best of my knowledge, any that I know. Conceptually, those deploying the concept are unable to sustain it on the basis of their own definitions of tribe(s) (hence tribalism). It is a method of critique that defines Mafeje’s scholarship, anchored on conceptual rigour or its absence.

‘Classical anthropology’, Mafeje noted (quoting Fortes’ and Evans-Pritchard’s 1940 African Political Systems) defined tribes as ‘self-contained, autonomous communities practicing subsistence economy with no or limited external trade’ (Mafeje 1971:257). Others (citing Schapera’s 1956 Government and Politics in Tribal Societies) would define tribes as a group of people who claim ‘exclusive rights to a given territory’ and manage ‘its affairs independently of external control’ (Mafeje 1971:257). In this sense, tribes are defined by subsistence economy, territoriality and rule by chiefs and/or elders. Anthropologists and others who persisted in using ‘tribe’ and ‘tribalism’ as their framework for analysing Africa were violating their own rules. Territorial boundedness, political and economic isolation, and subsistence economy no longer apply under the conditions of colonialism. To argue, as Gulliver did (in the 1969 edited volume Tradition and Transition in East Africa) that they continue to use ‘tribe’ not out of ‘defiance’ but because Africans themselves use it when speaking in English (Mafeje 1971:253–4) would be woollily-
Much in the same way that M agubane’s vigorous critique of the M anchester School (M agubane 1971) was liberating for many African students studying Anthropology or Sociology in the United States at the time, Mafeje’s paper, of the same year, had similar edifying effects on the same cohort of African students studying in the UK or Anglophone Africa, as Zack-Williams has noted.6

Mafeje pursued his line of thought at the expense of conceding that the category might have been valid at an earlier time (Mafeje 1971:258). Not only does Anthropology deal with its objects of inquiry outside history, it is ill equipped to address the issues of history. The ‘isolation’ (political and economic) and territoriality that were supposed to define the African communities before the colonial encounter hardly stand up to scrutiny when approached from the perspectives of History and Archaeology. Neither about Africa, Asia or the Americas, is it possible to sustain the claims of territoriality and isolation. None of the groups in West Africa that are still routinely referred to as ‘tribes’ would fit the definition hundreds of years before the first intrepid anthropologist arrived on their doorsteps. Further, the very act of naming and labelling requires encounter. ‘Germanic tribes’, as a label, is only feasible in the encounter with the Greek or Roman ‘Superior Other’ who does the naming and the labelling. Isolation is thus unimaginable. Alterity rather than any conceptual validity is foundational to labelling one community of people a ‘tribe’, another a nation. The Germanic tribal Other is immediately the ‘Barbarian’: an inferior Other. The appropriation of such alterity by the labelled is one of the legacies of colonisation, such that it is still possible for Africanism themselves to speak of their local potencies as ‘tribal authority’! What is required at the level of scholarship and everyday discourse is the complete extirpation of the category of ‘tribe’ – evident in Mafeje’s works from 1963 to 2004, but insufficiently extirpated, conceptually, in 1971.

The same extirpation cannot be said for the category of ‘Bantu-speakers’ (Mafeje 1967, 1991), which he used as a shorthand for speakers of ‘Bantu languages’ (2000:67). Even if it is possible to categorise the 681 languages referred to by linguists as belonging to the ‘Bantoid’ subset of the 961 languages in the Benue-Congo group - itself a ‘sub-family of the Niger-Congo phylum’ - the ultimate in extravagance and alteration. While the languages may share linguistic characteristics and Bantu generally means ‘people’ (Abantu in IsiXhosa), none of the groups is self-referentially ‘Bantu’. The labelling is rooted in European alterity, which found its apogee in the apartheid racist group classification, with all Afriicans designated ‘Bantu’ – hence Bantu education, etc. A geographic classification, similar to ‘Niger-Congo’ rather than Bantu, might be less eviscerating. Even if one were to accept the singularity of classification involved - ‘961 languages’ as so linguistically close as to be given a name – it does not explain why Africans have to absorb the alterity. What is more, other linguists consider Malcolm Guthrie’s method, which is the source of the classification, as deeply flawed. The role of missionaries in the invention of the fragmentation of African languages and then scripting exclusive ethnic identities on the back of such fragmentation is widely known (Chimhundu 1992). Undoing this fragmentation has been the essence of Kwesti Pridi’s Centre for the Advanced Studies of African Society (CASAS) in Cape Town. The idea of ‘Bantu-speakers’ is an aspect of the inadequate ‘negation of negation’ (Mafeje 2000:66) that I had hoped to explore with him in the audio-visual interview planned for May 2007. It is a task that we must take upon ourselves as surviving African scholars.

**Negation of Negation: Mafeje on Anthropology**

Mafeje’s (2000) *Africanity: A Combative Ontology* is perhaps his most eloquent and elegant enunciation of the twinned agenda of the ‘determined negation of negation’ (ibid., p.66) and the pursuit of endogeneity. The former requires an uncompromising refutation of the epistemology of alterity that has shaped modes of gazing and writing about Africa and Afriicans. Such negation of alterity is the beginning of the journey to affirmation: a method of scholarship rooted in the collective Self and speaking to it without the anxiety regarding what the western Other has to say or think about us. In its specific sense, the two write-ups (2001, Mafeje 2000) were in reaction to the ‘cosmopolitan’ anxieties of the postmodern monologue that Achille Mbembe sought to foist on the CODESRIA community. The
year 2000 marked the reappropriation of the institution from the intellectual misuse to which it had been subjected. Maféje’s pieces were an ode to a recovered patrimony. However, Maféje’s ‘determined negation of negation’ goes back much further, and its object was the discipline of Anthropology as the epitome of alterity.

The Problem of Anthropology... (Maféje 1976) was an intervention in the debates between different factions of anthropologists: on the one hand, the new generation of anthropologists with a radical orientation, and on the other, an older generation of ‘mainstream’ anthropologists. Kathleen Gough represented the former and Raymond Firth, the latter. While Maféje mentioned M agubane (1968) as one of the new generation repudiating mainstream Anthropology, M agubane was never an anthropologist; he trained at the University of Natal as a sociologist.

As mentioned earlier, ‘The Problem of Anthropology...’ was elegantly written – in the best tradition of Maféje’s scholarship. Elegant erudition aside, Maféje’s contention was that Anthropology had passed its ‘sell-by’ date, and it was time to move on to something different. ‘Among the social sciences’, Maféje argued, ‘anthropology is the only discipline which is specifically associated with colonialism and dissociated with metropolitan societies’ (1976:317). The alterity associated with Anthropology is not accidental or temporal; it is immanent. If, as Raymond Firth (1972) claimed, Anthropology is ‘the legitimate child of Enlightenment’, the leading intellectuals of the Enlightenment, unlike latter-day anthropologists, were preoccupied with accounting for the moral, genetic and historical unity of mankind and had little regard for exotic customs (Maféje 1976:310). However, insofar as the scholarship of the Enlightenment sought to make its own anthropological viewpoint universal (ibid.) it inspired a ‘civilising mission’ in relation to non-European peoples – a pseudonym for pillage and imperialism. Anthropology, as a discipline, is rooted in this venture; it is in this sense that, contrary to Firth’s claim, Anthropology is a child of imperialism, and a foster-child (if not grandchild) of Enlightenment. English socialists like Beatrice Webb, for instance, did not think it strange to talk of East Asians as savages (Chang 2008); Christian missionaries took such labelling for granted: a pervasive conception of Africa and Africans that has received a renewed impetus. Anthropology is one discipline founded on such inferior othering of its ‘objects’ of study.

Unlike Gough and others who sought to reform Anthropology, Maféje’s contention is that epistemic ‘othering’ is so immanent to Anthropology as to be its raison d’être. The point is not to reform it but to extirpate it. Maféje uses ‘anthropology’ in at least two senses: anthropology as a conceptual concern with ontological discourses (Maféje 1997a:7), and Anthropology as an epistemology of alterity. While Maféje associates the latter with the discipline, it is equally as much a mode of thinking and writing that considers the ‘object’ as the inferior or the exotic Other. It is the latter that one would classify as the ‘anthropologised’ reasoning about Africa – a discursive mode that persists and with which I consider the curse of anthroplogy in the study of Africa. As a discipline, however, Maféje was careful to distinguish between the works of Colonial Anthropology (most emblematic of British Anthropology) and works of practitioners such as Maurice Godelier and Claude Mellauss. The former is more foundationaly associated with Anthropology as a study of ‘primitive’ societies (Maféje 1997a:6); the latter, Maféje insisted, must be taken seriously: ‘their deep idio graphic knowledge, far from diminishing their capacity to produce nomothetic propositions, has helped them to generate new concepts’ (Maféje 1991:10). They approached the African societies on their own terms – without alterity. Anthropologists may claim they are no longer concerned with ‘tribes’, but alterity remains their raison d’être. The study of the ‘exotic Other’ is only a dimension of alterity; often the ‘less-than-equal Other’. As an undergraduate, I had the good fortune of studying in a university that insisted from the early 1960s to eliminate Anthropology. Even so, my first-year teachers included social anthropologists who came with Anthropology’s mode of native gazing, which struck me then as native gazing, which struck me then as the ‘Sociology of the primitive Other’. It was probably the reason why Maféje’s ‘The Problem of Anthropology...’ resonated so much with me when I first read it. The claims by contemporary anthropologists that they are committed to the wellbeing of their research subjects or that field method defines their discipline are rather lame. Even the most racist colonial anthropologists made similar claims of adhesion to ‘their tribes’. We will address this further later in this paper.

Further, ethnography is no more unique to Anthropology than quantitative method is to Economics. The methodological opaqueness of the anthropologist’s ‘fieldmethod’ quite easily gives way to methodological licence. Since the function of anthropologists is to ‘explain’ exotic, foreign cultures, and strange customs to their compatriots, methodological licence and the erroneous coding of the ‘objects’ of Anthropology are taking on the same instrumentalism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century’s new age of Empire as applied Anthropology did under colonialism. Closely associated with the epistemology of alterity is erasure, which becomes distinctly imperial at inter-personal levels; and those attempting erasure tend to employ derision and intellectual bullying.

In response to Maféje’s (Maféje 1996, 1997b) critical review of Sally Moore’s book (M oore 1996:22), Moore sought to deride his claim that he ‘might have prevailed on Monica Wilson not to [use the tribal categories] in Langa’ (Maféje 1997b:12). M. Moore’s response was that while Maféje might have been responsible for the fieldwork, Wilson produced the manuscript, an assertion that hardly reflects well on her own understanding of the process of producing a manuscript. Authorship, if that is what this confers on Monica Wilson, does not mean exclusivity of even the most seminal ideas in a manuscript. Significantly, M. Moore confused ‘detribalisation’ used earlier by the Wilsons for a rejection of the category of ‘tribe’ or ‘tribalism’. Conversely, M. Moore failed to account for the recurrence of this rejection of alterity in other publications by Maféje (Maféje 1963, 1967) in the same period. She might simply never have bothered to read them.

In response to Maféje’s observation that she failed to account for the works of African scholars in her book with the lone exception of Melvin M udimbe, a distinct form of erasure, Sally Moore’s response was twofold. First, that she left out the works of African scholars like M agubane and Maféje because she concentrated on books and monographs not journal articles (Moore 1996:22). Second, that she cited many more other African scholars. On both accounts, she was less than candid. The sources she used are profuse with journal articles – German, French,
English, etc. (M oore 1994:135–60). Several of these are American anthropology journals, including Current Anthropology in which M afje’s piece appeared. It is difficult to imagine that M oore was unaware of M afje’s 1971 paper at the time it was published given the uproar it generated and her seniority – she was Chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Southern California at the time.

On the second charge, M oore’s response was that she did nothing of the sort and listed several African scholars she claimed she cited. Other than M udimbe, she engaged with none of the others. When she did, if one can call it engagement, they were part of general citation rather than an engagement with their ideas. The two references to O nwuka Dike (M oore 1994:11, 15) were from his obituary on M elville Herskovic. ‘You would hardly know that Dike founded the famous Ibadan School of History. The references to J omo K enyatta were either incidental to M oore’s discussion of M alinowski or an oblique reference to A fricans publishing ‘ethnographic monographs of their own peoples’ or ‘emigration’ (M oore 1994:32–3). In the latter, K enyatta was part of five A fricans grouped together, but the reader will have no idea what exactly they wrote. The reference to P auin H outondjji was second-hand, and part of A frican intellectuals who ‘rail against what they see as the misreading of outsiders’ (M oore 1994:84); hardly an evidence of intellectual courtesy.

The only A frican scholar she discussed with any degree of ‘seriousness’ was V alentin M udimbe, and even so, it was in a remarkably derivative and imperial manner. She referred to him as ‘a Zairean who lives in the United States’, like he did not belong. M udimbe’s The Invention of Africa was dismissed as ‘complex, indigestible, and highly opinionated’ (M oore 1994:84), without any apparent awareness that to label someone opinionated is to be opinionated. If one were to look for the enduring tendency to treat A fricans and their intellectuals as children one need go no further than read M oore. She would make similarly condescending remarks about M afje in a later article (M oore 1998), labelling his work as driven by ‘polemic strategy’, ‘noises’, ‘diatribe’, etc. As before, M oore failed to engage with a range of M afje’s works or even the ‘Anthropology and Independent A fricans’ (M afje 1998) to which she claimed she was responding. A gain, you might be forgiven for thinking she was talking to a two-year-old! How, for instance, is the crisis of funding that A frican universities face an answer to the alterity immanent to Anthropology? It was as if A fricans will have to choose between alterity and generous funding. Yet the high point of the rejection of alterity was when research funding was readily available within the universities themselves. The University of Ibadan (Nigeria) rejected the idea of a Department of Anthropology in the early 1960s when it did not have any problem of research funding and its staff had no need to seek external funding. The researches undertaken by K ayode A dosogan in organic chemistry were funded entirely from grants from the university (A dosogan 1987). It led to his contributing more than twenty new compounds to the lexicon of chemistry, precisely because his scholarship was rooted in endogeneity (A desina 2006:137). The same can be said of the diverse schools of History in Africa – from Dar-es-Salaam to Ibadan and Dakar. They flourished in the periods before the funding crisis. What they shared in common was an uncompromising rejection of the colonial racist historiography (A desina 2005, 2006). The difference in chemistry and history is that alterity is not immanent to them. History did not originate in the study of the ‘primitive’ Other nor was reserved for it. It was, therefore, amenable to epistemic challenge on its own terms. The same cannot be said for Anthropology!

M afje was fundamentally right in seeing through this in his review of M oore’s book. He ended the review by saying he did not mind the candour of those who write about A frica as:

Simply a continent of savages (read ‘tribes’) and venomous beasts... As a matter of fact, I like black mambas lethal as they are and wish A fricans could learn from them. Perhaps, in the circumstances their continent would cease to be a playground for knowers of absolute knowledge and they in turn would lose their absolute alterity. (1997b:14)

It was a ‘call to arms’ that many failed to heed. The debate in African Sociological Review 2(1), 1998, is interesting for the persistent claims by the professional anthropologists that M afje’s critique was ‘passed’ (Laville 1998). If Anthropology has transcended its alterity, why do so many anthropologists persist in exotising their ‘objects’ of inquiries? When the professional anthropologists transcend alterity, how will the result be different from Sociology? If, as Nkw i (N kw i 1998:62) argued, ‘the trend in A frican Anthropology is towards the interdisciplinary approach’ is the ‘discipline’ still a discipline? Nkw i is right in arguing that more A fricans were engaged in active objections to Anthropology than M afje acknowledged: M afje mentioned himself and M agabune. A case in point is Omafune O nogo at Ibadan. But M afje was referring to focused dissembling of Anthropology’s epistemology of alterity, not the ‘narcissism of minor differences’ within the camp (cf. N tarangwi, M ills and B abiker 2006) that the deliberations of the A frican anthropologists we was critiquing represented. Most A fricans simply walked away from the discipline rather than dissipate their energies in arguing with the ‘owners’ of the discipline. Central to this is the inherently racist nature of its discourse – alterity. I recognised the racist epistemology in my first term as an undergraduate; M afje (1976) only confirmed what I knew. More than thirty years later, we have A frican students expressing similar feelings within a few days of being in their first-year Anthropology class at Rhodes University. It is either the discipline has overcome its epistemology of alterity or it has not. Clearly it has not, precisely because whatever the negotiations around the ‘protective belt’ of the discipline’s core discourse, the core remains rooted in alterity.

The claim to field method (ethnography) as a defining aspect of Anthropology is equally intriguing. Ethnographic technique was used before the rise of Anthropology and is used in other disciplines beyond Anthropology. A s M afje (1996) noted, he did not have to be an anthropologist to write The Theory and Ethnography of African Social Formations. I made extensive use of ethnographic technique in my doctoral study of a N igerian refinary (A desina 1988); I did it as a sociologist. A discipline’s claim to being mono-methodological is hardly a positive reflection on its credibility. Research problems suggest the research techniques to adopt, not the discipline; most research issues would require multiple research techniques, not being wedded to a particular one.
Anthropology was born of a European intellectual division of labour. When they stayed home and studied their own people, they did Sociology; when they went abroad to study other people, ate strange food and learnt strange customs and languages, they did Anthropology (Adesina 2006). The idea of a ‘native anthropologist’, as Onoge noted, is a contradiction. In spite of protestations to the contrary, Anthropology is still more oriented towards the study of the ‘exotic Other’ than not. When they write about their own societies most still write as if they are outsiders. In 2007, it is still possible to come across a manuscript written by a Yoruba medical anthropologist with the title that reads in part: ‘… of the Yoruba of South-western Nigeria’. It is the kind of extroversion that Hountondji (1990, 1997) warned against. Clearly, if the audience was conceived as Yoruba such exoticisation would not be necessary.

Those who wish to study non-Western societies in the tradition of Godelier and Meillassoux should get beyond casting these societies as exotic objects that need coding for the ‘non-Native’ audience and broaden their methodological scope; in other words, move over to doing Sociology.

**Against Disciplinarity and Epistemology?**

However, two issues that I have argued with Mafeje about and would have discussed at the planned interview are his repudiation of ‘disciplines’ in the social sciences and ‘epistemology’. Given his ill-health in the four years before his death, I thought it would be taking undue advantage of his health condition to raise these issues on the pages of the CODESRIA Bulletin. In an intellectual appreciation such as this one these concerns are worth flagging. Mafeje’s rejection of disciplines, I suspect, derives from his recognition that to develop a robust analysis of any social phenomenon you need the analytical skill drawn from a diversity of disciplines. Nevertheless, to reject disciplinarity on such grounds is to confuse issues of pedagogy with those of research. While knowledge production is inherently inter-disciplinary, inter-disciplinarity works because each discipline brings its strength to the table of knowledge production. We address the broad scope of knowledge essential to rigorous analysis by offering ‘liberal arts education’, but in the context of disciplinarity anchor. From the point of pedagogy, transdisciplinarity is a recipe for epistemic disaster: you end up with people who are neither conceptually rigorous nor methodologically proficient. They are more likely to regurgitate than be profound. Mafeje’s own profundity comes from fusing his trainings in Biology, Sociology, Social Anthropology, Philosophy and Economics rather than their absence.

Mafeje’s rejection of ‘epistemology’ is rooted in his aversion for dogmatism, but that is hardly the same as epistemology, which as any dictionary will attest is ‘the branch of philosophy that studies the nature of knowledge, its presuppositions and foundations, and its extent and validity’. The study of specific epistemic standpoints – from positivism to Marxism and postmodernism – is the business of epistemology. The crisis of dogmatic adhesion to an epistemic standpoint can hardly be construed as a crisis of epistemology. Postmodernism’s pretension to being against grand narratives ended up erecting a grand narrative of its own. What it had to say that was brilliant was not new, and what was new was not brilliant. We deconstruct postmodernism’s deconstructionist claims precisely from the standpoint of epistemology – accounting for a paradigm’s presuppositions, foundations, claims to knowledge production, extent and validity, as the dictionary says.

**The Pursuit of Endogenity**

Right from the start of his intellectual career, Mafeje’s rejection of alterity was not simply a matter of rebellion; it was immediately about affirmation. It is instructive, for instance, that not one of those who purported to contend with him in the *ASR* ‘debate’ showed an awareness of anything Mafeje wrote before 1991. As mentioned earlier, the idea of endogenity is about scholarship ‘derived from within’, and that is not simply a matter of ethnography. Rather than works of anthropology, Mafeje’s sole-authored works in the 1960s (Mafeje 1963, 1967) are works of profound ‘endogeny’. They reflect a strong sociological mindset, combining fine field-craft with analytical rigour. For instance, Mafeje located the imbongi or bard in a comparative context. Mafeje (1967:195); he drew comparison with the Celtic bards; an immediate extirpation of alterity that would have marked the imbongi as a ‘praise singer’ of a primitive culture. He demonstrated their role as social critics who can be withering in their poetic social commentaries. Rather than ‘tribe’ or ‘tribal’ Mafeje used the categories of ‘South African bard’ and ‘South African traditional bards’.

The profundity of The Theory and Ethnography of an African Social Formation – apart from its artisanal nature and conceptual rigour – derives from Mafeje’s effort to understand the interlacustrine kingdoms on their own terms – from within and without the burden of fitting them into particular ‘universalist’ typologies. In the process all manner of intellectual totems were overturned. I suspect that this is what Mafeje meant by his rejection of ‘epistemology’: the freedom to allow the data to speak to the writer rather than imposing paradigms on them. What such scholarship calls for are authentic interlocutors able to decode local ‘vernaculars’: the encoded local ontology and modes of comprehension (Mafeje 1991-9; 2000:66, 68). Mafeje argued that this is what distinguished Olufemi Táwò’s account of the Yoruba from those of Henry Louis Gate and Kwesi Pratt’s interlocution of the Akan codes from Anthony K warne Appiah’s. This capacity, as others have demonstrated, does not come simply from being a ‘native’ (Amadiume 1987; Nzegwu 2005; Oyìwùmí 1997); it requires endogeneity; it requires being authentic interlocutors. The result in the case of the latter has been seminal contributions to African gender scholarship without the anxiety of wanting to be cosmopolitan. The same applies to the diverse African schools of History.

In earlier works, such as his review of Harold Wolfe’s On the Articulation of Modes of Production, Mafeje (1981) demonstrated such profundity as an interlocutor, decoding the local ‘vernacular’. Added to this was a more conceptually rigorous handle on what Etienne Balibar meant by ‘social formation’ and why Wolfe’s handle of articulation is a misreading of Balibar. Similar capacity is evident in his ‘Beyond Dual Theories of Economic Growth’ (Mafeje 1978a:47–73). The village (‘traditional’ economy) is intricately linked to the ‘modern’ economy of the cities. Some thirty years after Mafeje’s critique of the ‘dual economy’ thesis, the debate on ‘two economies’ is going on in South Africa without as much as an acknowledgment of his contribution on these areas. Similarly, the collection
essays in a special issue of *Africanus*, concerned with a critique of the ‘two economies’ discourse in South Africa and Wolpe’s articulation of modes of production’ as the basis of some of such critiques, did not contain a single reference to Mafeje’s works in these areas.

For Mafeje:

A frocentrism is nothing more than a legitimate demand that African scholars study their society from inside and cease to be purveyors of an alienated intellectual discourse... When Africans speak for themselves and about themselves, the world will hear the authentic voice, and will be forced to come to terms with it in the long-run... If we are adequately A frocentric the international implications will not be lost on the others. (2000:66–7)

The resulting product may ‘well lead to polycentrism rather than homogeneity/homogenisation... mutual awareness does not breed universalism’ (Mafeje 2000:67).

A Return to Intimacy

Archie, Bitter?

Let me end by returning to the personal. One of the things I have heard said about Archie – apart from the tendency to describe his style of writing as ‘gladiatorial’ – is that he was in the end a bitter man. The same ‘Mafeje scholar’ would claim that he never transcended his being defined. If there was any limits of ‘voluntarism’. If there was any argument, were ‘trapped’ in history – in the spirit towards the individuals who, in his response was his immense generosity of spirit and loyalty. I would arrive in his guest room, with clean towels and toilettries neatly laid out. After a long evening of socialising over an intimate dinner, at his preferred restaurant in Arcadia, Pretoria and we had engaged in the usual vigorous discussion of a range of issues. He won a few, but got his white wine wrong! Why would he suddenly go mute on me? The interview was not on record – there were no tapes; there was no reason why this most passionate of intellectuals should suddenly grow reticent. It was one of the ideas that I wanted to explore before we got to the formal, recorded, interviews.

Second, there is independent evidence of such absence of bitterness. A few years after the 1968 incident, Archie collaborated with others in a collection of essays in honour of Monica Wilson (Mafeje 1975). Michael Whisson was a co-editor of the volume. Finally, when in February 2007 he raised the issue of his intellectual isolation over an intimate dinner, at his favourite restaurant in Waterkloof, Pretoria, it was about the disparity in the relative intimacy he enjoyed within the CODESRIA community and his intellectual isolation in South Africa, it was about his returning home to exile, not UCT, and it was expressed more in sadness than bitterness.

What did Archie have to say for his rejection of the honorary degree? The university’s manner of making amends should not be simply about him. In the absence of an acknowledgment of the injustice done to all people of colour who went through the university, as staff or students during the period of Apartheid, accepting the honorary degree would be to individualise what is owed a wider collective. At the individual level, an acknowledgment of what is being atoned ought to precede the award, rather than an oblique assumption that it was, *ipso facto* an act of atonement. Rather than bitterness, Archie’s rejection was based on principle: it was a decision that took him long and was hard to reach. A formal apology was sent posthumously to the Mafeje family in South Africa – in a letter dated 5 April 2007 from Professor Njabulo S. Ndebele, the university’s vice chancellor.

Generous and Loyal

Archie was as gentle as he was vigorous in debate. Over dinner, with a glass of red wine and steak in tow, he was a ‘master craftsman’, but you need to listen carefully because of his constant reflexivity and the subtlety and nuanced nature of his discourse. Such reflexivity dots his works: a capacity to argue with and dismiss some of his earlier writings (see for instance, Mafeje 1971, 1978a, 2001, 2001). Many of us who have had the privilege of this encounter will attest to how much of his ideas have shaped our scholarship; but that was because he did not expect you to treat him as an oracle. Listen, but engage with equal vigour. The age difference between you and him counted for nothing; he considered you an intellectual colleague, and if you are a comrade, he took you even more seriously and demanded more of you. In his last few years he nibbled at his food rather than ate heartily; the discussions you had seemed to fill him more than the food.

Archie was a man of immense generosity of spirit and loyalty. I would arrive in his apartment outside Pretoria to find that he had neatly made the bed for me in the guest room, with clean towels and toilettries neatly laid out. After a long evening of dining out – and he dined like a Bedouin – he would engage you in discussions into the early hours of the morning; never about trivial matters. He would worry whether you were fine, if you needed coffee or tea. It would be a delight if you shared a glass of red wine, then you got down to serious discussion.

The tragedy for all of us, especially in South Africa, is that Archie did not die of...
natural causes – he died of intellectual neglect and isolation. In spite of the enorous love of his family and loyal, life-long friends, Archie’s oxygen was vigorous intellectual engagement. He lived on serious, rigorous and relevant scholarship. Starved of that, he simply withered. A fler four decades in exile, he returned home in 2002 to exile. Yet the gradual dissipation of our intangible intellectual heritage in South Africa by our failure to nurture the heritage we have in people like him is not limited to him. The twenty-fifth anniversary of Ruth First’s assassination in Maputo passed in August 2007 with few national acknowledgments. This I find confounding. If Archie’s passing away forces us to rethink how we engage with this heritage we might as yet salvage something for a new generation that des- perately needs intellectual role models, not just business tycoons.

Lessons of Mafeje’s Scholarship: Concluding Remarks

The lessons that a new generation of Afri- can scholars can take from Mafeje’s scholarship are many. I will mention four:

1. Deep familiarity with the literature and subject;
2. writing;
3. Immense theoretical rigour; and
4. Unapologetic and relentless commitment to Africa.

Over time, Mafeje moved from being proto-Trotskyite (in the tradition of South Africa’s Non-European Unity Movement) to being Afrocentric, but these were simply the scaffolding for deep social commitment. Noteworthy is that a rejection of domination must find its relevance in engaging problems; scholarship (however pro- found) must find its role in engagement. Mafeje’s works on agrarian and land issues, development studies, democracy and governance, liberation scholarship, African epistemic standpoints, etc., constantly challenged and prodded a new generation to think large and engage in issues around us. The policy implications are enormous. He was uncompromising in demanding that Africans must insist on their own space; be completely unabashed in rejecting every form of domi- nation. But averting alterity is not about being marooned on the tip of criticism; it must move from negation to affirmation.

References


Hountondji, P.J., 1997, Endogenous Knowledge: Research Trials, Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA.


Notes
1. Jimi O. Adejina is Professor of Sociology at Rhodes University, South Africa. He is engaged in a research project that explores the works of Archie Mafeje and Bernard Magubane, under the rubrics of Exile, Endogeneity and Modern Sociology in South Africa.

2. Quoting Mao Zedong via Kwesi K. Prah.

3. The shift from first-name term of endearment to formal academic reference is also because while the earlier part is personal, this and the following sections are more concerned with breaking academic bread with a progenitor.

4. Much of the claims of taking on Mafeje, especially Sally Moore’s, failed to acknowledge this; see further on this later in this paper.

5. J.C., Mitchell, The Kalela Dance (Rhodes-Livingstone Papers No. 27, Lusaka, 1956);


6. See the comments of the African reviewers to whom Magubane’s paper was sent by the editor of Current Anthropology: Onoge, who met Magubane in the US, described him as ‘the most exciting African sociologist’ of the time (Onoge 1977 [1971]).


8. Tiyambe Zeleza has documented his own experience of the silencing of alternative voices to M bembé’s monologue. The institutional dimensions drove CODESRIA to the precipice of extinction. For the relentless protection of our patrimony, generations of African social scientists will owe Mahmood Mamdani, the CODESRIA President at the time, a world of gratitude.

9. This distinction is, of course, relative. Kathleen Gough was born in 1925 while Raymond Firth in 1901. The distinction is more one of relative accretion to ‘classical anthropology’.


11. The similarity included the mode of self-appointment, being arbiter and conveyor of public opinion, etc. In this Mafeje registered a disagreement with the claim by the eminent linguist, A.C. Jordan, that the imbongi has no ‘parallel ... in Western poetry’... In the same breadth Mafeje pointed to the non-hereditary nature of the imbongi in contrast with the European bards.

12. See Toyin Falola’s (2000) collection of J.F. Ade Ajayi’s papers for insights into the methodological and epistemological issues that shaped the Ibadan School of History. Onwuka Dike was the founder and inspiration of the school.

13. Volume 37, Number 2, 2007. Africans is a journal of Development Studies published by the UNISA (University of South Africa) Press.

14. My appreciation to Thandika M kandawire, an enduring mwalimu, in this regard.
Mafeje and Langa: The Start of an Intellectual’s Journey

 Archie Mafeje’s contribution to Monica Wilson’s research project in the township of Langa in Cape Town was crucial. Wilson employed Mafeje as the project’s field researcher from late 1961 to mid-1962. He worked very hard in this capacity, explaining - in a letter to Wilson - that, particularly in the early part of his field research, he had hardly left Langa before midnight on any of his research days. 1

Mafeje’s long hours in the field provided Wilson with the detailed case studies of life in Langa that had been sorely lacking before he came along. He also provided acute insight into the ways the different categories of residents related to each other, and their views and opinions of each other. He introduced her to the terms - such as ‘ocosuse mè’, ‘oom ac’, and ‘ibari’ – the residents in these various categories used to refer to each other, providing sensitive explanations of their connotations, and when and where they were used or not used.

The Langa Project
The Langa project had been in considerable trouble before Mafeje was recruited as field researcher. It had actually commenced as early as 1954, shortly after Wilson’s own appointment as Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Cape Town (UCT). The project had been conceived as a study of African urbanisation in Cape Town, and it was an interdisciplinary endeavour involving Professor Jack Simons from the School of African Life and Languages and Dr Sheila van der Horst of the university’s Department of Economics. Wilson was to contribute an ethnographic study of contemporary urban life, Simons a history of the African population of Cape Town, and Stellenbosch its coloured inhabitants.

The Stellenbosch researchers included Professor R.W. Wilcocks, who was well known for his part in the Carnegie Commission of Inquiry into the so-called ‘Poor White Problem’ in the 1930s, the sociologists S.P. Cilliers and Erika Theron, and the anthropologist (or vollekundige) J.P. Bruwer. 4 There is nothing in the record (in the Wilson papers in the UCT Archive) to suggest that there were any tensions between the two sets of researchers on personal or explicitly political grounds (although the Afrikaner Nationalists had taken over the government in 1948 and were beginning, slowly, to elaborate the policy of apartheid). But there were signs of divergence over objectives and methods of research between the two parties. The UCT researchers saw their endeavours as being of the nature of pure research, and Wilson, in particular, laid great emphasis on the necessity for detailed, qualitative inquiry. The Stellenbosch researchers, on the other hand, seemed more inclined to think in terms of policy research, and to deploy the more rapid research techniques they deemed appropriate to this end. 5

Wider political circumstances impacted on the project when the National Council for Social Research refused, in 1955, to fund a period of research leave for Jack Simons on the grounds that the National Party government had declared him a ‘listed’ person (because of his communist sympathies). The UCT researchers were incensed at this obstructionism, but their Stellenbosch counterparts were not unsympathetic to the difficulties Simons faced, and the council was persuaded to change its decision in 1957 (although by then it was no longer possible for Simons to take the research leave for which he had applied earlier). 6

Wilson’s main difficulty in this period was the Social Research Council’s rigid insistence on the submission of regular progress reports as the key to renewed research funding. This insistence evidently drove her close to despair, and she considered throwing in the towel on her portion of the project on several occasions in the late 1950s. 7 The problem was the extraordinary difficulty of finding a suitable researcher to conduct detailed field research in Langa. Wilson may have compounded the difficulty by her apparent insistence that any researcher had to have a Cambridge – or, at a pinch, an Oxford – background in order to qualify as suitable. She managed to employ the Cambridge-trained A.R.W. Crosse-Uppcott, who had some experience of fieldwork in rural Tanganyika, for twenty-one months between mid-1955 and the end of 1957. 8 But after he left the project, to take up a permanent position in Tanganyika, Wilson went through a list of potential fieldworkers, only to be disappointed by her failure to engage their services. One of the people she tried, without success, to involve in the project was John Middleton, recently graduated from Oxford, who provided relief-teaching in Anthropology for a period when Wilson was on sabbatical leave.

Wilson was to send Mafeje to Cambridge in 1966, after he had completed a Masters degree in Social Anthropology at UCT under her supervision. In 1961 he was in his final year of a BA degree, with majors in Social Anthropology and Psychology (he already held a BSc degree from UCT). Mafeje passed his Anthropology successfully at the end of 1961, but failed the final examination in Psychology. He told Wilson he was furious at the lack of self-discipline he had shown in approaching this final examination, not least because he was obliged to take time off from the Langa research in order to prepare for the supplementary examination – which he negotiated successfully – early in 1962. 9
The quality of the information Mafeje acquired in the field is best understood by comparing his findings with those of Crosse-Upcott. In a rather defensive response to a request from UCT’s Principal in 1959 for a yet another progress report, Wilson explained that Crosse-Upcott disliked town work, and though he worked hard he did not prove as good an urban field worker as he had been in a remote district. He left her ‘560 pages of typed notes, reporting his observations and interviews’, but she complained that ‘the great difficulty in anthropological research is that it is almost impossible for one investigator to make much use of field material collected by someone else’.10

The small portion of Crosse-Upcott’s tome that I have examined – an eleven-page report on the first nine months of his field research – gives some indication of why Wilson should have come to these conclusions.11 He appears to have been very tentative in his approach to the residents of Langa, fearing that – aside from the ‘leading personalities’ with whom he conducted ‘private interviews’ – they were bound to regard him with animosity. His report referred to the need to avoid ‘arousing concerted opposition from potentially hostile quarters’, as well as ‘publicity that would enable extremists to sabotage the survey’. Why he believed that Langa was peopled by ‘extremists’ who were necessarily ‘hostile’ in the mid-1950s is hard to say. Wilson observed later that ‘at the time of the investigation what the inhabitants of Langa regarded as a case of corruption by a European (official) was being discussed everywhere’, but she gave this as the reason why some of the things people had said to Crosse-Upcott were ‘probably libellous’, not as a pointer to the fact that they would not speak to him at all.12

Crosse-Upcott began his study of social groups in the township by looking at the churches, on the grounds that they were ‘strong, friendly, and sophisticated’. His report divided the churches into ‘established’ and ‘independent’ categories, and then spent a good deal of time explaining that this ‘demarcation is blurred’, to such an extent that even the ‘ultra-conservative’ Anglicans shared much of the ‘nationalistic outlook typical of the independent’ Churches. This same outlook was also to be found among the leaders of the sporting, recreational, occupational and commercial groups whom he had interviewed (in much less detail than the church leaders), and he warned that since the leaders of the women’s groups he had encountered were ‘both articulate and aggressive, investigation of their affairs must proceed with caution’.13

Mafeje’s Field Research

Crosse-Upcott may have become less hesitant as he proceeded further with his field research, but Wilson still noted in 1959 that he had ‘failed to collect material on various topics (e.g. kinship and the groups of “homeboys”) on which I pressed for information’.14 Mafeje supplied material on these issues in abundance, as shown by the letters he exchanged with Wilson during his field research, and the relevant parts of the eventual book. In my opinion the best part of Langa is the one dealing with the ‘six homeboy’ groups (Wilson & Mafeje 1963:56–73), particularly insofar as it was able to compare the histories of these groups on the basis of when their respective members first arrived in Cape Town and the social class they achieved in the city. And I would go further to say that the chapters of the book in which Mafeje’s hand is most evident as field worker (such as those on ‘Kinsmen’, ‘Arbitration in Disputes’) are far more convincing than those that relied largely on Crosse-Upcott’s efforts (‘Churches’ and ‘Clubs’). Mafeje was clearly able to give Wilson much more ethnographic detail with which to work than his predecessor had managed.

Mafeje was, of course, an ‘insider’ in a way Crosse-Upcott could never have been. This was not only because he was a native Xhosa-speaking ‘middle-class’ people still reared in respectable family housing – where many, not-quite ‘middle-class’ people still retained strong links with the Eastern Cape countryside. In the wake of the Sharpeville shootings, the Langa uprising, and the march on Cape Town by 30,000 people in March 1960, the NEUM constituents decided to launch a new organisation to take advantage of what they regarded as the ‘pre-revolutionary’ conditions that had arisen in the country. Mafeje was one of the founder members of the African Peoples’ Democratic Union of Southern Africa (APDUSA), formed at a secret meeting in the Cape Peninsula in January 1961 (Kayser & Adhikari 2004:5). APDUSA was intended to realise the NEUM’s objective of a non-racial struggle to overthrow white supremacy and achieve national liberation as a prelude to a socialist revolution. It sought to forge an alliance between the urban proletariat and the rural ‘peasantry’ to this end, and therefore made the issue of land redistribution in the countryside central to its programme.

APDUSA’s programme was elaborated over time, of course, particularly at and after its first National Conference in 1962 (Kayser & Adhikari 2004:9). This means that, even if he had wanted to do so, Mafeje may not have been in a position to discuss its finer points with the migrant workers and members of the ‘homeboy’ groups in Langa during his field research in late 1961 and early 1962. Yet the general thrust of the programme, and particu-
larly its focus on migrant workers as the bridge between proletariat and peasantry, seem evident in the interest Mafeje took in the circumstances of the residents of the Langa barracks, and the detailed case histories of the ‘home-boy’ groupings he passed on to Wilson. His careful noting of which of these ‘home boys’ still had access to rural land, even if they had spent a great many years working in the city, may have had a significance for him far beyond what Wilson read into it.

But it is important to bear in mind that, his personal credibility in Langa notwithstanding, Mafeje was also a student who had only just completed his undergraduate studies in Anthropology, as well as a neophyte field researcher working under a professor whom he clearly regarded with considerable respect. At this stage, and for a good many years after this, Mafeje indicated to Wilson that social anthropology was his chosen field and, indeed, his ‘calling’. He also gave evidence of a deep regard, both professional and personal, for his mentor. He wrote, for instance, in response to Wilson’s comments on one of his field reports, that

It is very important for me to hear your comments because, as it happens, out of the many people through whose hands I have gone, you are one of the few I do not only approve of but also have complete faith and trust in. This explains, love for social anthropology aside, the tremendous pleasure I derive in working for you. You might not believe me when I tell you that, at the present moment, there is nothing I enjoy more than working on the Langa study.

Mafeje was 24 years old when he wrote this effusive passage at the start of the 1960s. As another of Wilson’s students (a decade later), I can empathise with the sentiments he expressed in it, sensing that he was responding to the intriguing combination of scholarly erudition, regal bearing and personal vulnerability that was manifested in the way she related to junior colleagues in whom she took an interest. My reference to ‘junior colleagues’ is intentional since, in my experience, Wilson made a point of treating the arguments and observations of students in whom she saw promise with great seriousness, giving them the impression that they had been admitted to an inner circle of fellow professionals (or at least professionals-in-the-making). It is clear, from the correspondence concerning Langa between them, that she regarded Mafeje in exactly this light, and one may speculate that he was the student on whom she honed her skill in this regard. Wilson certainly let him know how impressed she was with his field reports, but did so in subtle ways, often combining praise with an injunction to expand his interpretation of events or go back to the field to seek further detail. He expressed praise for his efforts, and open acknowledgement that they were vital to her attempt to rescue the Langa project from the doldrums in which it had landed in the late 1950s, she reserved for her communications with other people.

The part of privileged student was not always easy to play. Exactly how much intimacy was being granted by one’s distinguished mentor? This question seems, on occasion, to have exercised Mafeje.

I would be very pleased if you could tell me what you feel about this work and things in general. To be honest, I am anxious to hear from you. Silence from you affects me very unfavourably. The fact that you are my professor cannot be overlooked. I enjoy doing this work only if you are pleased or satisfied with it. I should imagine this would be the attitude of any student. Now, as it were, I am not certain whether one could really speak to one’s professor as I am doing at the moment. Anyhow, I hope you will understand my position.

These personal exchanges are, I think, essential background to an appreciation of Mafeje’s response to the manuscript of the Langa book, which Wilson gave him for comment prior to its publication. Wilson wrote the text on her own, drawing on the field reports by Crosse-Uccott and Mafeje, but she acknowledged the latter’s contribution by publishing the book as a joint endeavour. Mafeje was forthright in pointing to mistakes in areas — such as the correct spelling and use of Xhosa terms — where his knowledge was clearly superior to hers. He was similarly direct in dealing with her notoriously wayward spelling and syntax in English. The didactic tone he adopted in these instances is self-conscious, and no doubt afforded him more than a little satisfaction.

I found this chapter very weak in punctuation. A deverbal clauses of condition, time, and concession introduced by ‘if’; ‘when’ and ‘though’, respectively, are often not marked off by a comma from the principal clauses they precede. When a complex sentence is introduced by a relative clause instead of the principal clause, the two clauses are always separated by a comma. … I found the same thing in the use of ‘but’, introducing an adversative clause or to express mere contrast. ‘But’ introducing the above mentioned clauses is always preceded by a comma unless, by doing so, the writer gets the feeling of ‘over-stopping’.

Mafeje was also direct in his response to broad political issues that arose in Wilson’s text. Referring to a passage in the draft of the chapter on ‘Classes and Leaders’ (Chapter 7), Mafeje wrote sharply ‘You describe Noni Jabavu’s book “Drawn in Colour” as admirable. From what point of view is it so? One critic, an African writer and nationalist, remarked that the book is “thoroughly drenched with snobbery” … I also do not like the tone of the book. It is riddled with sentimentalism, and its descending attitude is simply nauseating.’ What Wilson made of this spirited sally one does not know, but it is noticeable that she made no reference to the ‘admirable’ character of Jabavu’s work in the final text, and mentioned her book only in a footnote.

On the other hand, at the end of his commentary, Mafeje gave Wilson’s text his unstinting approval.

Other than the few points I have raised, I am satisfied with the exposition of facts in this work. I am also in agreement with the fundamental ideas expressed — that is, at no time did I find myself forced to compromise my ideas. I am particularly pleased about this because I look at this study as purely scientific work which has nothing to do with what white or black nationalists feel or think. It grieves me to think that under present conditions the [re are] certain truths which, though demonstrable, cannot be stated.

Such wholehearted approbation gives pause for thought. In the light of his subsequent, and well-known, reservations about the whole ‘acculturation’ paradigm in anthropology (of which the book on Langa was clearly part), why should he have praised Wilson’s text in this fashion? Why should he have been able to express severe criticism of Jabavu’s con-
descending’ views about the thin veneer of ‘civilisation’ she encountered among the people of Uganda (Jabavu 1960), and yet have overlooked Wilson’s notorious conclusion that ‘the innumerable associations of the modern African townships (such as Langa) may, indeed, be seen as a school for civilisation’, where Africans ostensibly ‘gained experience in the organisation of groups which are no longer based on kinship and which are part of a money economy’ (Wilson & Mafeje 1963:179)?

The evidence on the relationship between Mafeje and Wilson persuades me that one cannot reasonably ascribe the former’s praise for the Langa draft to mere disimulation. I do not think one can say that Mafeje indicated his agreement with ‘the fundamental ideas expressed’ simply for strategic reasons – in order either to flatter Wilson or to avoid criticising her. Nor do I think it would be fair to either party to suggest that Mafeje sought refuge in the idea that the Langa manuscript was ‘purely scientific work’ that had ‘nothing to do with what black nationalists think’. This particular comment was in many ways a straightforward statement of his personal position, since he was never – either then or in his subsequent career – a narrow African nationalist. One of his admirable characteristics was that he remained true, throughout his life, to the principles of the NEUM and the African Peoples’ Democratic Union, particularly regarding the importance of non-racialism and the need for the liberation struggle to continue beyond the first phase of national revolution. Fifteen years beyond the end of apartheid in South Africa, his long-standing insistence on these principles looks ever more appealing.

But in the early 1960s, one may venture to suggest, Mafeje had not yet worked out how to bring the principles derived from his political activism to bear on his standing as a beginning anthropologist. His contribution to the Langa project through his field research was masterly, but it would take him another decade and more to arrive at a position from which he could use this field research to formulate a convincing counter to Wilson’s liberal interpretation of his and Crosse-Upcott’s findings. Wilson’s argument that the basis of social cohesion among Langa residents was undergoing a radical transition from ascription to achievement, and that social groups based on common interest were replacing those grounded in the generalised solidarity of kinship, was given added weight by the presence of so-called ‘middle-class’ (or ‘oscosume’) people in this township in far greater numbers than in other, similar areas with which she and Mafeje were familiar. Moreover, many of these people would doubtless have endorsed her liberal insistence that there was nothing, apart from the white government’s intransigence, that could have prevented this wholesale transition to ‘civilisation’ from succeeding.

Rethinking Langa

The flaw in this conviction was easy to identify when confronted with Jabavu’s views about faraway Uganda, but it was probably much more difficult for Mafeje, at this early stage, to make his own observations in Langa speak to the same objection. He returned explicitly to this issue only in 1975, in his contribution to Wilson’s Festschrift (Wisson & West 1975). By this time, of course, he had his own Cambridge PhD under his belt, had been through the chastening experience of the ‘Mafeje affair’ at the University of Cape Town, and had been joined in interrogating the shortcomings of liberal South African anthropology by compatriots-in-exile such as Bernard M agubane (1973). Moreover the field research Mafeje had undertaken in the Transkei in the mid-1960s gave him deeper insight into circumstances in Langa, and his contribution to Religion and Social Change turned on a comparison between these two field sites.

Viewed on its own, Langa seemed to be an exemplification of the ‘modernisation’ story Wilson had sought to tell. Many of the migrant workers, who were at the bottom of the social hierarchy (and at the spatial margins of the township), were reported still to be pagans. Most of the urban residents, on the other hand, were identified as Christians, but they fell into two categories in which there was a correlation between social class and the ‘types’ of church to which people belonged. The ‘respectable’, middle-class people belonged mainly to the established churches, while the less respectable, lower-class urban residents adhered to one or other of the independent churches in Langa. Wilson’s intention was, no doubt, to provide a more subtle account than this, but one could certainly read into the text of Langa a very straightforward story about the sequence of steps by which the urban encounter was ‘schooling’ black South Africans in Christianity in particular, and ‘civilisation’ in general.

The Transkei studies provided the vantage from which to give an alternative account of Langa. They allowed Mafeje to make two crucial points. One (which was well-known from Mayer’s work in East London, but was not clearly spelt out in Langa) was that the Christian-pagan (or School-Red) division was a longstanding rural phenomenon (Mayer 1963). The other was that, in the Transkei settlements he studied, adherents of the independent churches were looked down on by established-church Christians and pagans alike. Even the All Saints Mission Station, indeed, constituted a social environment in which Anglicans and pagans regarded each other with a strong measure of respect, in part because this distinction did not correspond, anywhere near as clearly as in Langa, with social class and standing. Moreover the ‘Red’ pagans at the mission station were conscious, and proud, of their paganism. Mafeje argued that they were ‘militant’ pagans, who deliberately refused to succumb to the self-alienation they saw among their Christian neighbours, and in this respect they stood in contrast to the ‘defensive’ pagans of the outlying settlement he studied, who – in the absence of in-their-faces antagonists – were merely waiting disconsolately for the tidal wave of ‘western’ civilisation to break over them (Mafeje 1975:177–84).

His Transkei observations allowed Mafeje to supplement the initial questions about the character of social groups and the types of churches in Langa (which he acknowledged had been ‘inane’) with an attempt to grasp what Christianity meant for people in the different social classes evident in Langa (Mafeje 1975:167). He emphasised that there were both pagans and Christians among the migrant workers in the barracks, pointing out that if the pagans appeared in any way apologetic about their beliefs this was because they, like their Christian counterparts, were at the bottom of the township’s socio-economic hierarchy. There was little space for militant paganism in Langa. On the other hand, however, there were many merely nominal Christians, particularly among the township’s youth, who were contemptuous of the Christian piety displayed by their elders, whether aligned with the established or the independent churches. In his reconsideration of the material, Mafeje clearly found these
young people the most interesting category of the general population, mainly because they – like the militant pagans in the countryside – had come closest to realising that Christian piety went hand-in-hand with the ‘respectable’ people’s willingness to mimic white, middle-class civilisation in all respects, and to ignore the obvious contradictions, as well as the costs in terms of ‘self-alienation’, involved in doing so.

Mafeje’s contribution to Wilson’s Festschrift was, in my opinion, the best piece in an otherwise pedestrian collection. This was, in large measure, because he succeeded in introducing many of the principles of his political activism into his reconsideration of the Langa field material. By 1975 he had clearly worked out how to formulate academic questions that were firmly grounded in his political convictions, and he did this by showing that some of the people in Langa, and indeed also (and perhaps particularly) in the Transkei, came close to sharing his understanding that a social order grounded in racial capitalism – not simply ‘white domination’ – constituted the major problem facing black South Africans.

Does ‘social change’ or ‘being civilised’ mean, unambiguously, being assimilated into the white middle-class cosmic view? What will it take for that view to transcend itself? (Mafeje 1975: 184)

Mafeje looked, in this context, to what he hoped was the growing influence of the militant urban youth, and the militant pagans in the countryside, for the answer to his questions. Whether the answer still lies in these particular categories of the population is, no doubt, a subject for contemporary debate. But the questions he posed remain as pertinent today as they were a quarter-century and more ago.

Mafeje’s reformulation of the Langa material marked a formal, and obvious, break with the teachings of his distinguished mentor. Yet this break was achieved without any hint of hostility or rancour. One might reasonably expect no such hint to be apparent in a contribution to a book intended to honour M onica Wilson and her scholarship. But it is also the case that there is no evidence of any parting of personal ways in the private correspondence between Wilson and Mafeje in the 1960s and 1970s. Their regard for each other survived the ordeal to which it was subjected during the abortive attempt to appoint him to a teaching position in the Anthropology Department at the University of Cape Town in 1968. At the height of this crisis, Wilson wrote to Mafeje in Cambridge to suggest that he might wish to consider turning the job down, because the South African government’s hostile reaction to his initial appointment indicated that any career he might have at the university would be neither easy nor of long duration. Mafeje’s reply was solicitous and firm. He regretted the difficult situation in which Wilson had been placed on his account, but he also declined the idea of withdrawing from the job. For many years after this he continued to address Wilson in his letters as ‘Aunt Monica’.

Speaking Truth to Power

In the light of his later writings, we have become accustomed to the idea of Archie Mafeje as a scholar who spoke truth, unflinchingly, to power. The value of the archival material relating to his early career is that it shows that he had to work hard to develop the skill to be able to do this. He did not criticise the Langa manuscript on substantive or theoretical grounds in the early 1960s. The fact that he did not do so was not an indication that he was unwilling to criticise his mentor, or that he had not yet arrived at the political principles that guided his later work. His endorsement of the manuscript suggests, rather, that he had not worked out how to marshal the findings of his field research in Langa in a way that would allow him to support his political convictions by means of his anthropology. His contribution to Religion and Social Change shows, on the other hand, that he had found a way to do this by the mid-1970s.

The start of Mafeje’s intellectual journey therefore tells us several important things. One is that it requires time, and careful reflection, to be able to speak truth to power effectively. A further important insight is that while speaking truth to power calls for hard and uncompromising intellectual argument, it does not require personal animosity towards, or the denial of respect for, those with whom one comes to argue.

A third lesson, on which I wish to dwell for a moment in concluding this article, is that the act of speaking such truth is most effective, in the case of an anthropologist, when it is grounded in a sophisticated understanding of one’s own ethnography. In this respect I am struck by the fact that Mafeje always insisted on the importance of his ethnographic inquiries, even when, in later years, he explicitly turned his back on the notion that he was an anthropologist (Mafeje 1998a, 1998b). What he objected to about anthropology was not its methods of research or the evidence that could be produced by careful participant observation. Even at his most critical he took care to endorse the value of this form of inquiry relative to others. In this respect, one may say, he remained faithful to Wilson’s injunction that any attempt to understand the circumstances of people in Africa required first-hand inquiry into what they made of these circumstances themselves.

What Mafeje objected to, by contrast, was an anthropology in which particular epistemological assumptions – which he invariably characterised as ‘Western’ – were allowed to overwhelm whatever it was that people on the ground had to say about the conditions in which they found themselves. In this article, I have shown how he developed his argument on this score in his early research in Langa. Liberal observers such as Wilson suggested that A fricans in towns had embarked on a process of social transformation that would remake them, ever more closely over time, in the image of ‘Western civilisation’. This was not in all senses incorrect, since these observers would have been able to point to people in places such as Langa who believed that they were undergoing this process of refashioning themselves. But the crucial point, at which Mafeje had arrived by the mid-1970s, was that this was by no means true of all the residents of Langa. This insight allowed him to distinguish between ‘assimilation’ as an analytical framework (which he, like M agubane, rejected outright), and ‘assimilation’ as an ideology to which some people in Langa undoubtedly subscribed. It also allowed him to argue that their adherence to this ideology was something that had to be explained by means of a more acceptable analytical approach, giving rise to his insistence that many of the ‘respectable’ residents of the township had become caught in the contradictions of a form of nationalism that encouraged them to mimic ‘Europeans’ in order to demonstrate that they were every bit as good, and as sophisticated, as the latter were purported to be.

Mafeje knew that the presence of such people had to be acknowledged. But he also knew that it was necessary to show, as Wilson and other liberal anthropologists had not, that there were others in
Langa who had not succumbed to these contradictions, and were on the road to overcoming them. Liberal anthropology could accommodate a narrative of African liberation based on assimilation, but it could not recognise the voices of the people who challenged the assumptions on which this narrative rested.

Mafeje objected to this kind of anthropology because anthropology was the discipline he knew best – the one he had said was his ‘calling’ at the outset of his professional career. Had he had cause to express himself with equal fervour in respect of other disciplines, he would no doubt have found the epistemological premises of their liberal versions as objectionable as those of liberal anthropology. What clearly distressed him in later years was the attempt by African scholars to resuscitate a form of anthropology that had evidently learnt nothing from his own confrontation with liberal thinking, and that sought – from a position of self-imposed disadvantage – to mimic ‘Western’ academic orthodoxy.

Notes
1. University of Cape Town, Manuscripts and Archives Division, Godfrey and Monica Wilson Papers, BC 880 (hereafter BC 880), Correspondence with Archie Mafeje re Research 1960–1, K1.2 (hereafter K1.2), Mafeje to Wilson, 22 July 1961.
3. BC 880, K1.1, NCSR to University of Cape Town (UCT), 25 April 1954.
4. BC 880, K1.1, Universiteit van Stellenbosch, Entwicklung van Wes-Kaaplandse Navoringsprojek.
6. BC 880, K1.1, Minutes of a Meeting of the Supervisory Committee, 3 June 1957; Wilson to UCT Principal, 6 October 1959.
7. BC 880, K1.1, Minutes of a Meeting of the Liaison Committee for Research on Non-Europeans in the Western Cape, 18 August 1956; Minutes of a Meeting of the Supervisory Committee, 3 June 1957; Wilson to UCT Principal, 6 October 1959.
8. BC 880, K1.1, Wilson to UCT Principal, 6 October 1959.
10. See note 8.
12. BC 880, K1.1, Wilson to UCT Principal, 6 October 1959.
13. See note 11.
15. BC 880, K1.2, Mafeje to Wilson, 13 February 1962.
17. BC 880, K1.2, Wilson to Mafeje (undated).
19. BC 880, K1.2, Mafeje to Wilson, 18 January 1962.
20. BC 880, K1.2, A. Mafeje, Comments on the Manuscript (undated).
25. BC 880, Correspondence, K1.

References
Background

Archie Mafeje began his distinguished academic career at the University of Cape Town (UCT). After completing his Master’s degree at UCT in 1964 and having co-authored a book with his supervisor and mentor, Monica Wilson, Mafeje went on to further his studies and registered for a PhD degree at Cambridge University in England. He was destined to return to UCT and pursue an academic career at this university upon completion of his studies. As it turned out, Mafeje never returned to UCT. This is despite attempts on his part to return to his alma mater. Later attempts by UCT to reconcile with Mafeje were not successful. This was in the form of the award of an honorary doctorate in 2003, as well as a formal apology in the same year in which the University Council offered its sincere regret and apologies. Mafeje treated these overtures with disdain, not even replying to the various communications. At the time of his death in March 2007, Mafeje was still angry and bitter with UCT.

The thorny and vexed relationship between Mafeje and UCT has become known as the ‘Mafeje affair’. To most, this relates to the events of 1968. As will be seen in the next section, Mafeje was appointed on merit in 1968 as Senior Lecturer in Social Anthropology at UCT, but the UCT Council rescinded the appointment allegedly owing to the apartheid government’s pressure. The Council decision was taken despite strong opposition from within the university, particularly from students who protested by occupying the university administration building for nine days. Little known, though, is what happened after 1968, especially after the demise of official apartheid beginning with the political negotiation process in 1990.

It is noteworthy that since the death of Mafeje, UCT has made strenuous efforts to reconcile with the Mafeje family. Following detailed research which I conducted on the relationship between Mafeje and UCT from 1968 to his death, the university brought together eleven members of the Mafeje family over three days in August 2008, during which period a symposium on Mafeje was held at UCT, where a second apology to the Mafeje family was publicly read and an Honorary Doctorate posthumously awarded to Archie Mafeje alongside the installation of the new Vice Chancellor at UCT, Dr Max Price. These events were meant to close this particular chapter in the history of UCT. As will be seen later, the second apology was much more comprehensive and accepting responsibility on the part of UCT than the 2003 apology.

My contribution attempts to give an account of the relationship between Mafeje and UCT, on the one hand, and to pose questions about the meaning of the recent (2008) agreement between UCT and the Mafeje family, on the other. Here are some key questions this contribution seeks to address: Why did Mafeje refuse to accept the two important gestures made in 2003? Was he angry or bitter about the withdrawal of his appointment in 1968? Or was it a case of too little, too late? What is the significance of the recent agreement with the family?

I argue that it is the manner in which UCT treated Mafeje in the 1990s, more than the 1968 episode that can help us understand Mafeje’s behaviour in 2003 and his anger and bitterness towards UCT at the time of his death. This must not be seen as downplaying the significance of the 1968 event. My contention is that a case can always be made that, in the context of 1968, a threat by the apartheid government could not be taken idly, given how vicious the system was. However, the context of the 1990s, the advent of democracy, was fundamentally different. There was no external pressure to hide behind. With regard to recent developments involving the second apology and the posthumous award of the honorary doctorate, my point is that while this undoubtedly marks a major step forward and opens up space to debate the Mafeje affair within the context of transforming universities in post-1994 South Africa, it is still an open question whether the chapter on the relationship between Mafeje and UCT can be declared closed. I will expand on this later.

The Mafeje Affair: The Events of 1968

Fred Hendricks (forthcoming) has arguably written the most comprehensive and provocative account of the 1968 events so far. For current purposes, I will focus on the selection process, the decision to rescind the appointment, the reaction to the decision to withdraw the appointment and how the Mafeje issue was finally resolved until it re-emerged in the 1990s.

As noted in the background section above, the UCT Council appointed, on merit, Archie Mafeje to the position of Senior Lecturer in Social Anthropology on 1 May 1968. It is clear from records that the process of appointing the senior lecturer in Social Anthropology was protracted, the first advert coming out in September 1966. Mafeje applied in 1967 in the second round. After an involved process, Mafeje was deemed to be the best candidate for the job. In recommending him, Professor Monica Wilson, head of department and Mafeje’s former supervisor and mentor, argued that Mafeje was ‘the ablest anthropologist of the three and much the best teacher’. She disclosed that she knew this ‘both from students in Cambridge and from Professor Fortes’, who pointed out ‘that there was competition’ on the part of students ‘to get into (Mafeje’s) tutorial group there’. According to Wilson, Mafeje ‘was equally popular when taking tutorials here (UCT)’. She concluded: ‘As a person Mr. Mafeje is very much liked both by fellow students and staff, wherever he works.’ Most of what Wilson had to say was echoed by the three referees of Mafeje.

It must be said, though, that there was one objection from a member of Senate, D.C. Robertson. His objection was based on the qualifications of the candidates, particularly the fact that the other two candidates had doctorates and had a far
better teaching record than Mafeje who was completing his PhD. However, Robertson’s objection was unsuccessful. The Committee of Selectors, ‘after full discussion’, resolved ‘that the unanimous recommendation of the Board of Electors that Mr A. Mafeje be appointed, be upheld’. This recommendation was accepted by Council on 1 May 1968. On the same day, the registrar wrote a letter to Mafeje in Cambridge.

This letter was never sent to Mafeje. The Principal, Sir Richard Luyt, reported that subsequent to Council’s decision at its meeting on 1 May 1968, he received a letter from the Minister of National Education urging that the appointment be reconsidered. According to Luyt, there was a clear warning that if the Council disregarded the request of the Minister, the Government ‘would not hesitate to take such steps as it may deem fit to ensure that the accepted traditional outlook of South Africa was observed’. Luyt read out the Minister’s letter and also outlined discussions which he had had with the Minister and with the Director of Higher Education.

In the end, the UCT Council resolved on 5 June 1968 to rescind its decision to appoint Mafeje. The motion was put to a vote, with a close outcome of 12 for and 8 against. An addendum to the motion to the effect that the Council ‘express disBay and regret that its decision in this matter of the appointment of Mr Mafeje should have been challenged by the Minister’ recorded a vote of 14 in favour and 7 against. Subsequently, Senate ‘noted’ the Council’s decision to rescind its appointment of Mafeje and associated themselves with the addendum of the Council cited above.

Following a report from the Academic Freedom Committee, Council adopted the following resolution by 11 for and 2 against:

In protesting against being deprived in this manner of the right to appoint the staff deemed most fit by normal University criteria, the University Council must make known publicly its future inability, as a consequence of the Government’s intervention, to appoint non-white persons to academic posts, unless allowed to do so in special circumstances.

On 1 August 1968, almost the same letter that was written to Mafeje was sent to Dr M.C. Whisson. There were only two alterations: the date of commencement, from 1 July to 1 September 1968 and the deletion of the paragraph referring to the need to obtain ‘the necessary permission to teach and reside in Cape Town’… On 13 August 1968, the Registrar notified Mafeje that ‘the vacancy (had) … been filled’.

The Council decision to rescind the appointment of Mafeje provoked debate even within Council. Some saw it as unduly succumbing to government pressure. After all, there was no law that stopped UCT from employing a black academic outside African languages. Others, on the other hand, feared that a refusal to heed the warning of the Minister of National Education could backfire in the event government were to introduce a law with a retroactive effect. Such a law would affect black academics who were already in the university system. Geoff Budden, a student at UCT in 1968, recalled in an interview with me that this was one of the arguments adduced by some members of Council justifying their decision to cave in to government pressure.

Another sector of the university that became involved in the Mafeje affair was the student population. In terms of world history, the Mafeje affair took place against the backdrop of protests that involved thousands of students in France, Germany and the USA. The decision by the UCT Council provided ammunition for students in South Africa to become part of these global developments. Students, not only from UCT but from other liberal campuses in South Africa, emphatically rejected Council’s decision to withdraw its appointment of Mafeje. The Mafeje affair got attention at the 1 June 1968 congress of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), held at the University of Witwatersrand. A resolution on the affair read as follows:

This student assembly regrets that the UCT council has, in capitulating to the Minister’s threats, been guilty of a betrayal of the university’s principles of academic freedom and university autonomy (Resolution 80, NUSAS Congress, 1968:25, as quoted in Hendricks’ unpublished paper).

Resolution 83 urged the UCT Students Representative Council ‘to do the utmost in its power to organise effective and significant protest against the treatment meted out to Mr Mafeje and furthermore urges all university and training college staff and students at other centres to give such protests their fullest support’.

This set the scene for students’ protests soon after their return from the mid-year vacation. A mass meeting was held in Jameson Hall on 7 August to discuss Council’s decision. Students attending the meeting supported Raphael Kapinsky’s call to Council not to do the Government’s dirty job. When this call did not elicit any positive response, the students organised another mass meeting on 13 August 1968. This, it must be noted, is the same day that the Registrar wrote a letter of regret to Mafeje. Following this meeting, about 600 students marched to the Bremner Administration Building, demanding an emergency meeting of Council. When their call was rejected, the students resolved to occupy the building, including the Senate room until such time that Council conceded to their demand for an emergency meeting to discuss the Mafeje affair. As Hendricks has noted, the sit-in ‘was the start of the first student occupation of a university building in South Africa in 1968’. There were solidarity protests at the Wits and Natal universities.

The sit-in came to an end after nine days. Those involved succumbed to all-round pressure: from the state, students from the then conservative pro-government Stellenbosch University, Council’s refusal to bow to students’ pressure, not to forget considerations of their future careers. To show its resolve, Council passed a final resolution on 26 August 1968 reaffirming that ‘an offer to Mr Mafje of appointment to the post of Senior Lecturer in Social Anthropology cannot in all circumstances be made’ (Minutes of the Special Meeting of Council, 26 August 1968).

In the end, the university embarked on what Hendricks correctly, in my opinion, refers to as ‘face-saving measures’ to ‘create an aura of respect for academic freedom and for institutional autonomy at the very moment when the University was responsible for the denial of these principles’. Students became part of this exercise. Their proposal for an Academic Freedom Research Award in honour of Archie Mafeje received the approval of all sectors of UCT. However, the Senate rejected a critical aspect of the students’ proposal that a levy be imposed so as to finance the award. The university never had a plan of financing the award other than that it
would be funded on a voluntary basis. Not surprising, nothing came of this exercise.

A somewhat successful venture was the erection of a plaque in remembrance of the Mafeje affair in the UCT Heritage Trail alongside the steps leading to the Chancellor Oppenheimer Library. The plaque is next to an earlier one commemorating academic freedom following the extension of Bantu Education to universities in 1959 as a result of the enactment of the Extension of Universities Act.

By the end of the 1960s, the Mafeje affair had escaped the memory of virtually all sectors of UCT, including students and staff who sat-in at Bremner building. It is interesting to note that almost all the students of 1968 that I interviewed in 2008 not only claimed that they never met Mafeje, they never made attempts to find out what happened to him – a clear suggestion that the Mafeje affair was, in the eyes of the students, not about Mafeje, the person, but about themselves and at best, the principle, in this case, academic freedom and the autonomy of universities.

The manner in which the UCT Council responded to government pressure is likely to be debated for a long time. There are no easy answers to the issue. With hindsight, it is easy to condemn the actions of Council. Yet it is important to remember the political context at the time and the viciousness of the apartheid state. The dilemma facing the UCT Council with Prime Minister Vorster and the viciousness of the apartheid state members the political context at the time is highly principled and proud scholar such as Mafeje. Mr Mafeje's record of subversive activities but he could assure us that it was serious. (Richard Luyt Papers, Aide Memoire, The Mafeje Affair, 23 April – 6 September 1968, as quoted in Hendricks' paper)

Luyt's account must be read in the context of a person who was trying to justify the position of Council. But there is a sense in which one can read the above accounts as some indication of the determination of the state to ensure that Mafeje was not employed. Whether being principled by defying these threats under the prevailing conditions was a viable option is debatable.

Hendrick's forthcoming publication deals with these issues and takes a hard and critical line, arguing that there was complicity between the UCT Council and the apartheid state in the Mafeje case. His stance will most likely provoke healthy debates about how to interpret the decision of the UCT Council in 1968. My position is that controversial as the 1968 UCT Council decision was, we must look beyond 1968 to understand why Mafeje never reconciled with UCT. Whenever Mafeje reflected about the events of 1968, he seems to have understood the pressure UCT was under. This does not mean that he condoned the position of Council. In fact, it is arguable whether Mafeje would have taken up the position. According to his sister, Mrs Swana, she advised him not to return to South Africa when the police started harassing her.

Mafeje and UCT in Democratic South Africa

Ordinary sense suggests that if UCT could not in the 1960s employ Mafeje because of government interference, the early 1990s created conditions for UCT to make amends and offer Mafeje the job that he was given on merit in 1968. There is little doubt that Mafeje would have welcomed the occasion. According to his friend, Kwesi Prah, Mafeje was always looking for opportunities to be close to South Africa in the late 1980s and to return to South Africa as soon as it became possible for exiles to do so. In the early years of the political negotiation process in South Africa, Mafeje was, in 1990 and 1991, doing research under the Visiting Fellowship Programme of the SAPES Trust in Zimbabwe. This research was published in 1992 as collection of essays under the telling title: In Search of an Alternative: A Collection of Essays on Revolutionary Theory and Politics. This seems to suggest that he was sharpening his intellectual tools for a return to South Africa. Most important, by 1990, Mafeje was a far cry in scholarly terms from the one who was appointed Senior Lecturer in 1968. He had by this time established himself as an internationally acclaimed scholar, as his CV showed.

It is well known by now that UCT did not make any approaches to Mafeje. This seems to bear testimony to the notion that for this institution Mafeje, the person, never mattered. In 1968 he was used merely as a ladder or a taxi to pursue certain principles and arguably also to feather the nests of some individuals. As indicated, hardly anyone was ever keen to enquire about the whereabouts of Mafeje, particularly as some at UCT claim that at the time the university was in search of black academics. Mafeje found himself in a situation where he had to take the initiative and explore opportunities of returning to UCT. It is difficult to imagine why a highly principled and proud scholar such as Mafeje would subject himself to reapplying for a job he was offered on merit. It can only mean that, for him, coming back to South Africa to pursue an academic career meant returning to UCT, his alma mater.

Archival records suggest that Mafeje made investigations through a friend about the possibility of returning to UCT in 1990, the same year that political organisations were unbanned and the political negotiation process was set to be under way. His friend took up the issue with the leadership at UCT. The response was that UCT could not 'make any commitment to Mafeje'. This again was an indication that, despite the treatment Mafeje received in 1968, the leadership of UCT did not want to take responsibility and create a job for Mafeje.

Following 'many discussions' Mafeje's 'champion' suggested that Archie Mafeje
be a visiting Senior Research Fellow on a one-year contract. The university leadership found this acceptable. However, when Mafeje’s friend conveyed this to him, he was not keen to accept such a compromise. Mafeje clearly deserved more than this. He reasoned with his friend that ‘as much as I appreciate the gesture … one year is too short for me to move my whole family and take my daughter out of the British International School here in Cairo’. He firmly pointed out that his family was ‘dead against the idea of moving on the strength of one year. They would rather wait until more posts for which I could apply come up’.11

Mafeje’s champion agreed with Mafeje that a year was ‘rather too short to uproot an entire family in order to come home’. He informed Mafeje that he had been trying to get a three-year contract at UCT, but this was not possible owing to ‘the current financial circumstances’. His hope was if Mafeje came, it would be possible ‘to raise funds or to find a job that could continue beyond the present one’. He told Mafeje that there were jobs that were coming up, including the Chair of Anthropology at UCT and the Director for Postgraduate Studies at UCT. Reluctantly, Mafeje accepted the one-year contract at the scale of a senior lecturer. With regard to the latter, the explanation was that this was owing to limited resources as the posts concerned ‘are funded with “soft money”’. The claim that UCT did not have financial resources to offer Mafeje a permanent job is of course laughable and must be rejected. Why UCT treated Mafeje in this manner is a matter that calls for careful research and may throw light on UCT’s attitude towards black scholars.

It is noteworthy that as the leadership of UCT was discussing their response to Mafeje’s letter, a senior member who drafted the offer to Mafeje wrote an internal memorandum in which he, among others, indicated that he was not convinced that Prof Mafeje is a suitable candidate for a senior permanent position at this university, given his poor publication and research record for the past 10 years. Thus, I would not be enthusiastic about extending the offer beyond one year, which will give him some time to hunt around for a suitable position in South Africa.

This quotation raises two issues. In the first place, it casts doubts about the UCT claim that the reason it offered Mafeje a one-year contract at the scale of a senior lecturer was as a result of financial constraints. The quotation strongly suggests that a senior permanent appointment was not beyond the capacity of UCT. Secondly, it is interesting to note that in his letter to Mafeje, this honourable person indicated that members of his department had ‘enthusiastically endorsed’ the invitation. However, in private, when Mafeje cannot defend himself, the enthusiasm evaporates and Mafeje is no longer good enough for a senior permanent position. When I interviewed this esteemed scholar at the beginning of this year (2008), he could not remember why he made this damning remark about Mafeje’s scholarship. He promised to get back to me. I’m still waiting.

In 1993, close friends of Mafeje urged him to apply for the A.C.J. Jordan Chair in African Studies at UCT. Reluctantly, Mafeje applied and was on the short-list as an ‘A’ candidate. In his letter, Mafeje had confidently declared:

I believe that I am eminently qualified for the post. Not only did I have the privilege of working with the late A.C.J. Jordan as a research student at the University of Cape Town and abroad but also I can claim that among African scholars specialised in African Studies I probably have the widest experience and recognition throughout the continent, including Arab-speaking Africa.16

After providing details of his achievements and extensive contacts with ‘pan-African and regional organisations’, he ended his letter on a somewhat personal note:

It would … be a great pleasure for me to bring all this intellectual capital to the University of Cape Town (my alma mater) and in general to African studies in South Africa. To impart some of this knowledge to South African graduate students who have been isolated from the rest of Africa for so many years would be the greatest contribution I could make after thirty years in exile.

A substantial amount of time was devoted to a discussion of Mafeje’s application. Critical to note is that the chairperson argued that Mafeje’s application be turned down. This was despite the fact that Mafeje was rated among the top candidates during the shortlisting stage. The reasons offered by the chairperson were largely based on Mafeje’s personality and had very little to do about his scholarship. After making reference to the 1968 UCT decision to rescind the appointment of Mafeje, the chairperson raised three critical issues that were severely damaging. First, the chairperson divulged that a colleague at the University of Namibia, where Mafeje was based, divulsed that Mafeje had negative things to say about UCT and ‘if offered the post will turn it down’. Secondly, the chairperson brought to the attention of the selection committee correspondence between the two regarding Mafeje’s refusal to submit copies of his publications as demonstration of Mafeje’s ‘character’ and to show how difficult it was to work with Mafeje. In response to the request, Mafeje had
opined that he did ‘not see how they would gain greater wisdom from reading randomly and subjectively selected texts by contending candidates’. The third issue was that Mafeje had ‘a drinking problem’. The authority in this regard was a UCT colleague who had spoken to (Mafeje) recently. Lastly, it was alleged that Mafeje was ‘very opposed to the women’s centre being set up at UCT’.

No decision was taken at this meeting largely because those attending did not make up a quorum. The matter was to be formalised in the next meeting.

It is not clear what happened in the period leading to the next meeting to make the chairperson appear to have softened his stance on Mafeje. Having argued in the previous meeting for the rejection of the Mafeje candidature, the chairperson changed his mind and persuaded the committee to grant Mafeje an interview. It is clear from records that the main reason why the chairperson changed his mind was to put Mafeje on the spot and make him not only to state his case, but also to give the committee a chance to assess his personality. Ultimately, a decision was taken to interview Mafeje.

At its next meeting, the chairperson reported that since the last meeting ‘he had subsequently learnt that Mafeje had left the University of Namibia and had gone to the American University in Cairo’. He noted that Mafeje had not advised the Appointments Office of his change of address. This seems to have given the chairperson an excuse to exclude Mafeje. According to the aide-memoires, the chairperson indicated that ‘as he had reservations about Mafeje, and as it was a marginal decision to invite him for interview at the last meeting, he felt at this stage, Mafeje not be invited for interview’. If the committee felt differently, this could be discussed after the interview of the other candidate for the job.

As it turned out, this strategy had the effect of successfully excluding Mafeje from contention. When the other candidate was interviewed, all the members of the committee had to decide whether the candidate was appointable or not. A t the end of the interview, there was a unanimous decision that the candidate was appointable. As soon as the candidate accepted the UCT offer, the chairperson wrote a letter of regret to Mafeje, thus ending the latter’s dream of returning to UCT.

I have not the least doubt, on available evidence, that the selection process for the A.C. Jordan Chair was fundamentally flawed. In the first place, the chairperson had already demonstrated that he was highly prejudiced against Mafeje. This goes back to Mafeje’s attempt to return to UCT in 1990. At the time, the chairperson wrote to the leadership at UCT pointing out that a department that he was associated with would not house Mafeje if he accepted the one-year contract discussed above. Later, when one colleague at UCT recommended Mafeje when the post for the A.C. Jordan Chair became available, the chairperson indicated that Mafeje was not what they were looking for. Records show that the chairperson was influential in tarnishing the image of Mafeje.

Secondly, the information or evidence that was used against Mafeje about his activities in Namibia was hearsay, based, as indicated, on what the chairperson heard from a colleague in Namibia. The information was never tested. Why a selection committee made up of senior members of the university accepted this is puzzling, except to say that the seniority of the chairperson is a factor that must be taken into account when considering whether members of the committee allowed themselves to be influenced by an individual. Additionally, I could not come across evidence to show that reference was ever made to or intentions that some people saw as impolite. It is only in 2002 that the Mafeje affair was reopened for discussion at UCT.

**UCT’s Attempts to Make Amends**

As pointed out at the beginning of this contribution, in 2003, UCT tried to make amends with Mafeje. This came in two forms. First, following a motivation in 2002, Vice Chancellor Ndebele wrote a letter to Mafeje, inviting the latter to accept an honorary doctorate at the UCT June graduation ceremony. A subsequent letter from the chairperson was approaching and Mafeje had not replied to the letter, a second letter inviting him to the December graduation was issued. On the same day, the University Council offered its sincere regret and apologies for the university’s role in the events of 1968. As indicated, Mafeje did not even reply to the various letters, something that some people saw as impolite. But we have to ask ourselves why Mafeje behaved in this manner. Was he angry or bitter about the withdrawal of his appointment in 1968? Or was there more to it than the events of 1968? As will be seen below, Mafeje felt the honorary doctorate was too little, too late and that it did not address broader political issues. Of more interest for our purposes is the apology, which is discussed in some detail below.

In his letter dated 17 June 2003, Vice Chancellor Ndebele informed Mafeje about a unanimous decision of the University Council … to apologise to you formally for withdrawing an offer of appointment to you in 1968, following severe pressure from the government of the day. Ndebele concluded with these words:

> This apology is part of our process of reviewing and redressing aspects of our past. It is a matter of personal satisfaction to me that Council has taken this decision.

We hope that you will be able to accept this apology in the spirit in which it is offered.

With regard to UCT’s Council resolution, this is how it reads:

> The Council of the University of Cape Town recognises that there remain many who are critical of the 1968 decision of the Council to rescind its decision to offer an appointment of senior lecturer in social anthropology to M.A. Mafeje. The Council has reviewed this, expresses its sincere regret for this, and apologises to Dr Mafeje.
The resolution that was adopted by Council shows a slight amendment of an earlier draft whose last sentence read: "The Council has reviewed this, accepts that this was wrong and apologises to Dr Mafeje for having done so." (my emphasis).

As can be seen, the apology is about the 1968 decision to rescind the appointment of Mafeje. There is not even a slight reference to the treatment meted out to Mafeje in the 1990s as discussed above. While the events of 1968 are important and cannot be swept under the carpet or justified in terms of a repressive apartheid regime, I argue that it is developments in the 1990s that lie at the heart of Mafeje’s resentment, anger and bitterness towards UCT. That the 2003 apology did not refer to the 1990s casts doubts about the seriousness of UCT in extending the apology.

In conversations with former Vice Chancellor Ndebele, he pointed out that he only heard about the developments of the 1990s when I reported to him in 2008. He joined UCT in 2000. What is important to note though is that some of the people who were associated with the Council decision were not only aware of the events of 1990s, but were directly involved. They cannot claim ignorance.

When Mafeje understandably did not reply to the letters sent to him, Council sent an emissary. This is her account:

Archie (Mafeje) was very bitter and resentful about UCT’s late recognition of what had happened; that under the black leadership … no approaches had been made and by the time I approached him he had made up his mind that UCT was compromised about his situation … When I asked him why he would not accept the nomination and the apology, it was clear that he had closed his heart towards UCT in a big way. He liked talking to me and enjoyed telling me about his pain and resentment, and for him UCT failed and took far too long to acknowledge what they had done. He also had a sense that they thought he was a third rate scholar and not good enough for them. I think he would have liked being offered an Extraordinary or Emeritus position, the use of an office and UCT’s resources, etc. For him an apology, coming from UCT at the time that it was done, seemed to him more like the politically correct thing to do rather than one of real contrition.

There is little doubt that the letters to Mafeje must have forced him to close the UCT chapter in dramatic fashion. In March 2004, he wrote in his will that all his books be donated to the Walter Sisulu University in the Eastern Cape. The message seems loud and clear that Mafeje wanted to distance himself from UCT.

It appears as if the issue of reconciliation was not pursued with any sense of vigour and hardly anything was being done by the time Mafeje passed away.

Since the death of Mafeje, UCT has made giant strides to bring closure to the Mafeje saga. This process began under the leadership of the previous Vice Chancellor, Njabulo Ndebele. It was, it must be said, under his leadership that the Mafeje affair was reopened for discussion in 2002. In the letter to the Mafeje family referred to earlier, Ndebele had this to say to the family:

The UCT Council Executive Committee in this week stood in silence in honour of Prof Mafeje. It recognized again the deep injustice done. It acknowledged his extraordinary contributions. The Committee has instructed that his impact as an extraordinarily gifted scholar be captured forever. UCT will find a practical way to do this.

In September 2007, just on six months after the death of Mafeje, Ndebele restated his commitment to resolving the Mafeje affair before his retirement in June 2008. He told me in a conversation that he would not like his successor to inherit this problem, as was the case with him. He wanted to establish whether I was willing to be part of the solution. I told him, as I did when I agreed to be UCT emissary at the funeral, that it would be an honour for me to part of solving this complex but extremely important issue.

Towards the end of 2007, Ndebele formalised the process by appointing Deputy Vice Chancellor Thandabantu Nhlapo and me to apply our minds as to the most appropriate way of resolving the Mafeje affair, as well as how best to honour him. We agreed with Deputy Vice Chancellor Nhlapo at the end of 2007 that I should conduct the research on the relationship between Mafeje and UCT in order to base whatever steps would be followed on sound knowledge and understanding of what precisely happened in this relationship.

A working paper based on research on the Mafeje affair, which contained some recommendations, was made available to the then outgoing Vice Chancellor Ndebele. Given the limited time at his disposal, the new Vice Chancellor, Dr Max Price, picked up the threads. It is under his leadership that the Mafeje family was brought to UCT, a second apology offered and an honorary doctorate posthumously awarded to Archie Mafeje.

Regarding the apology, UCT acknowledged that it has become clear that the University did not do nearly enough in the 1990s to make it possible for Professor Mafeje to return to UCT, and that this remained an obstacle to his reconciliation with his alma mater.

It goes on:

We record therefore that significant opportunities were lost during the period of South Africa’s transition to democracy to bring a very significant African scholar home to UCT. In this the University showed a serious lack of sensitivity, and it is a matter of profound regret that Professor Mafeje’s life ended with these matters unresolved. The University now wishes to apologise to Professor Mafeje’s family that it did not make a committed effort to secure a place for Professor Mafeje at UCT, and that it may even have acted in a way that prejudiced Professor Mafeje a second time in the 1990s. UCT also reiterates its regret regarding the Council’s decision under government pressure to withdraw the appointment as senior lecturer in 1968.

With regard to how UCT would honour Mafeje and ensure that justice is done, the university committed itself to finding tangible ways in which the memory of a fine scholar of Africa might be acceptably and indelibly enshrined both at the University of Cape Town, and in the wider scholarly community.

These tangible ways entail the following:

- The University undertakes firstly, to permit access to scholars wishing to research the events surrounding Archie Mafeje at UCT to all relevant archival material without waiting the normal proscribed period, and to allow publication of any research resulting from this. However, no individuals still living may be named or identified without their permission.
• UCT will fund and promote a Festschrift to honour Professor Mafeje’s life-long body of scholarly work.

• UCT will create a postgraduate scholarship in the name of Archie Mafeje for a black South African scholar in the field of African Studies.

• UCT will rename the Senate Room in which the 1968 sit-in took place as the Archie Mafeje Room and erect an appropriate plaque recalling the history of the Mafeje affair.

• UCT will confer on Archie Mafeje posthumously the degree Doctor of Literature, Honoris Causa.

On 17 August 2008, the first of the above undertakings was fulfilled when it was formally announced at the symposium that the Senate Room would be renamed the Archie Mafeje Room and the plaque to this effect unveiled by Mafeje’s son, Xolani. On the following day, along with the installation of the new Vice Chancellor, an honorary doctorate was posthumously conferred on Archie Mafeje. The certificate was received by Mafeje’s daughter, Dana.

At the time of writing this contribution, at the end of August 2008, nothing concrete has been done regarding the remaining three undertakings.

Unfinished Business? Concluding Remarks

UCT is attempting to bring closure to the Mafeje saga in circumstances where earlier attempts to reconcile with Mafeje failed rather dismally. This immediately raises questions about how UCT’s current attempts to make amends with the Mafeje family will be viewed. There is a real danger that efforts on the part of UCT to resolve the Mafeje affair, however genuine, may be seen as opportunistic. Vice Chancellor Ndebele made it clear to us that the university was not open enough to consider not only Mafeje’s immediate family, but his wider family of scholars and activists. They are as concerned about the Mafeje affair as his immediate family. Inviting scholars to do research is one way of extending the apology to Mafeje bigger family.

The 2008 apology makes another important breakthrough by permitting opening access to archival material to scholars wishing to research the events surrounding the Archie Mafeje affair at UCT … without waiting the normal proscribed period and to allow publication of any research resulting from this. W hat is this section of the clause in the apology also points to is the recognition that Mafeje was a scholar, and that in making an apology, it is critical to consider not only Mafeje’s immediate, biological family, but his wider family of scholars and activists. They are as concerned about the Mafeje affair as his immediate family. Inviting scholars to do research is one way of extending the apology to Mafeje bigger family.

Worrying, though, is the qualification in the above clause. In terms of this qualification, ‘no individuals still living may be named or identified without their permission’. If this was all the qualification was about there would be no problems. After all, this is standard practice in research. It is, however, the footnote that raises concern. A ccording to this footnote, ‘scholars wishing to access material still within the 30-year archival protection period must first obtain the permission of the Vice-Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor will have to approve how any information obtained may be published or shared with third parties’. This requirement, in terms of the footnote, is meant to ‘ensure public confidence in the confidentiality and integrity of selection committee processes past and future’.

How are we to interpret this qualification? What does it mean to say that the Vice Chancellor ‘will have to approve’ how information obtain may be published or shared with third parties? W hat does this mean in practice? Are scholars expected to submit whatever they write to the Vice Chancellor for approval before they submit for publication? Is this going to be a form of censorship? With regard to the rationale given about ensuring public confidence and integrity of selection committee processes, it can be argued that the very process of keeping records closed for 30 years makes these committee members accountable to the broader university constituency and beyond. This protection may be a recipe for abuse and irresponsible behaviour. Indeed, the 30-year embargo on records is something that must be put on the agenda of transforming higher education institutions. This is arguably one important lesson we can draw from the Mafeje affair.

In a nutshell, it is important for the credibility of the 2008 apology and for an everlasting solution of the Mafeje affair that the truth about the relationship between Mafeje and UCT be known. Whatever is done for Mafeje will be meaningless if UCT will be seen to be suppressing the truth. On a personal note, this would amount to a betrayal of Mafeje. Until such time that the qualification is clarified in terms of how it will affect telling the truth about what happened in the 1990s, the Mafeje affair may well be an unfinished business.

Notes
1. See File 12.2.5, ‘Senior Lecturer/Lecturer in Social Anthropology’, Administrative Archives, UCT. I could not establish from the records whether Mafeje applied.
2. Ibid.
3. ‘Personal file’, Location 4.3.3, Box No. 366. Administrative Archives, UCT.
4. Minutes of a meeting of the University Council held at 3 pm on Wednesday, 5 June, 1968. ‘Personal file’, Location 4.3.3, Box No. 366. Administrative Archives, UCT.
Epistemicide and Its Legacy in Education

It is important to unashamedly declare from the outset that I am in sympathy with, and therefore an advocate of the core concerns of the proponents of Africanisation of universities in South Africa. In this regard, the recurrent theme of my academic and popular articles has been the issue of Africanisation of universities in light of colonial epistemicide and valuecide fostered by Eurocentric paradigmson one hand, and the imperative for indigenous knowledge to inform and underpin social policy and development trajectories in South Africa on the other. Given the longevity and quantity characterizing white colonial-settlerism in South Africa, epistemicide was comprehensive and extended to all spheres of life, including religion, politics, law, economics and education.

Historically, European colonisation was justified on the basis of vacuous claims that when Europeans first came to the southern African part of continent, they found a territory that was empty, unknown and un-owned. By virtue of its status as such, such a territory invited the attention of those who wanted to know and own it. Ownership, here, entailed both claiming possession of and imposing one’s knowledge systems on such a territory. This defining mantra of colonial historiography had serious implications for South Africa, as it had for the entire African continent. For instance, it necessitated claiming and, thereby filling of the country with European moral philosophy, social values, cultural traditions and economic fundamentals. But this also meant that in their self-serving wars of conquest, which did not meet the requirements of both the right to wage war and the ethico-legal imperatives in the conduct of war, the invading colonialists destroyed indigenous African social institutions and customs.

With regard to the South African academy, epistemicide inaugurated intellectual parochialism and resulted in intellectual ex-troversion in which raw data was exported, theories were uncritically imported and categories on local conditions were superimposed. A cademia became an imposition and extension of the epistemological paradigm of the colonial conqueror. The thrust of Western education was to deny the colonised indigenous people of South Africa useful and relevant social knowledge about themselves and their world and, in turn, transmit a culture that embodied, and was designed to consolidate dependency and generally undermine their creative capacities.

In many ways, colonial epistemicide has been an indispensable trigger for re-affirmation by indigenous African people. Although historically preceding the period, in South Africa the call for indigenous knowledge heightened with the advent of post-apartheid education and the need for an educational philosophy that would reflect a renewal and redirection towards the rest of Africa, African cultures, identities and values. Since then the debates on indigenization of knowledge in South Africa have been so emotive and polemical. Not only its content and purpose but also its very possibility have been, and continue to be, the subject of understandably passionate exchanges.

The idea of indigenization and the issues raised in the raging national debate, such as endogeneity, context-sensitivity and relevance, directly speaks to the right to be an African university. However, there are many who are still intrigued by the idea of the ‘right to be an African university’. The argument is made that this right

...
to be an African university’ presupposes that someone is denying this ‘right’ and therefore this argument only made sense in the context of colonial-apartheid, but not in a post-colonial environment. It would be naïve to assume that the South African academy, which has so stubbornly resisted transformation, has reversed epistemicide. In fact, the South African academy as seen in its institutional rigidity and cultural conservatism, remain insulated and has not benefited significantly from intellectual expositions and philosophical projections coming out of the continent. This is despite the few ‘few’ African scholars recruited to teach at a number of universities in the country.

Importance of Historical Memory

The importance of appropriate historical memory and historical imagination and practice (as an antidote to the colonial historical project) has been the preoccupation of a number of post-independence African historians, especially the Dar es Salaam School of History, the Ibadan School of History and the Diopian Africanity. Despite variations in their intellectual enterprises, the central characteristic of these historians has been their refusal to be carried away by and to endorse the dominant knowledge systems of the colonial conquerors. Rather, they engaged in vigilant, combative and uncompromising deconstruction of historical distortions which were conscripted into the service of the colonial project. But this engagement has to be understood dialectically since in deconstructing the Eurocentric colonial project, they also reconstructed Africanity. They challenged and debunked well-encrusted negative notions and systematically eroded a number of misconceptions and philosophical crotchets about the African continent; its “lack of civilisation, history and moral values”.

Therefore, the younger generation of African scholars can only condemn such intellectual icons at their own peril for spending too much of their intellectual careers’ demythologizing European colonial historiography on Africa and demonstrating the existence of indigenous African knowledge systems and history prior to colonisation. Clearly, it is not only combative but a liberatory act to expose the tendentious nature of European colonial historiography.

My direct contention is that without appropriate historical memory and historical imagination, the academia in South Africa will continue to depose rather than pose vexing questions relating to higher education and its relevance in the new political and socio-economic dispensation. For instance, in the immediate post-1994 South Africa, the result of overlooking the historical perspective in the educational sphere has been the false and misleading but commonly held stratification of higher education, especially its university subset, as either merely black/disadvantaged or white/advantaged.

Such descriptors emanated from an incorrect historical understanding regarding the development, nature and role of universities in colonial-apartheid South Africa. As far as descriptors like metaphors, are conjured up to give an organizing pattern to matters. In theory, they are supposed to help explain what is going on, but in practice are often meant to shape responses to policy. Essentially, descriptors carry an acknowledged political freight and perform a political purpose.

Given that South African historiography is still fundamentally colonial, a wrong diagnosis and a wrong prognosis were inevitable. An appropriate historical analysis indicates that the real problem of universities in South Africa has been that of the right to be an African university. This right was denied through a process of degrading and marginalizing indigenous African knowledge systems. In the post-apartheid era, such a process takes place through resistance to transform universities to meet the critical requirements of the transforming society.

The Myth of Standards and the Search for Alternatives

In the light of the above, we propose a reversal of epistemicide through an inscription of indigenous African epistemologies in education. The resistance of underpinning universities with African philosophy, on grounds that this threatens standards, is to perpetuate cognitive and epistemological injustice. Our observation is that the intellectual thinking behind the standards argument is the fear that most white intellectuals and academics will experience erosion of their power base. The actual motive for wanting to protect the current standards is essentially to spawn a ‘law of inertia of privilege’ that guarantees that there is no reversal of epistemicide and reclamation of African epistemologies. The reversal of epistemicide will inevitably undermine existing dominant interests and challenge the citadel of European paradigms and scientific epistemologies of knowledge. For instance, an African wit reminded us recently that ‘Apartheid created a self-satisfied culture among white South Africans. Because they could put down blacks through force of law, white South Africa did not imagine that they would not make the grades internationally. And so they continued talking about standards but essentially from a very low base’. Little wonder that there are various attempts at circumscribing and pre-empting the entry into the dominant discourse of indigenous African epistemologies.

From the perspective of the sociology of indigenous knowledge, the assumptions which constructed European thought, literature and traditions are not universal but are derived from specific and discreet European experiences prescribed by the level of economic and industrial development. Implicit in this perspective is that standards are not universal but contextual. A cademic standards are tentative, constructed, historical and contextual and, therefore, certainly not universal, permanent, objective, neutral or invariant. Clearly, the notion of standards must be subjected to a careful, specific and historically sensitive analysis. Some scholars have advised that rather than maintaining and applying given academic and educational standards, we need to continually create and redefine them.

The right to be an African university, which implies Africanisation, is essentially part of continually creating and redefining educational standards within appropriate context of relevance. In other words, the focus on relevance and usefulness is not antithetical to high standards. Rather, the imperative for inscribing indigenous African epistemologies into the curriculum and underpinning education with African philosophy is, in the first instance, a question of rights, and thus a matter of natural and historical justice. These are key issues the South African academy should not only acknowledge but, more importantly, begin to address.

It is in appreciation of the need for such natural and historical justice that Professor Mafeje was always measured in his writings and was never comfortable with ideas lacking in substance. Until he passed away, he remained particularly respectful of his sizeable and highly conscious African scholarly and intellectual
Crossing Swords and Drawing Blood: Archie Mafeje – A Warrior in a Double Battle

Introduction

Archie Mafeje thrived on debate. He clarified his own positions as he marshalled his arguments in his many frontal attacks. He revelled in a genuine difference of opinion, informed by evidence and commitment, because these permitted him to pursue his purpose with a rare single-mindedness. ‘You are either stupid or intellectually dishonest’, he barked at a young Rhodes University lecturer at a dinner party at my house in Grahamstown a few years ago. The other guests were somewhat astounded by his brazenness, but it cannot be said of Mafeje that his bark was worse than his bite. He could also bite with considerable force and his eloquence together with his erudite manner never failed him in his many intellectual battles. Ali Mazrui felt the full ferocity of his bite in the pages of the CODESRIA Bulletin (1995:16) when Mafeje made the following remark, which has stuck in my mind as a powerful metaphor of argument as war:

I am prepared to cross swords with Ali Mazrui. If in the process real blood is drawn, it might be an overdue sacrifice to the African gods or an invitation to young African warriors.

I don’t regard myself as young but I am taking up the invitation extended by Mafeje. It is a double-edged and hazardous invitation. Knowing just how much he detested the banal, I have to be extremely careful not to be platitudinous, because that would be an affront to his abiding spirit. Irrespective of the fact that Mafeje has now departed from our world I can’t help the sense of awe that I have in the presence of his intellect. He is still very much with us in his work, in his words and in our many memories of him. So, on the one hand, I am driven to pay tribute to his inestimable contribution, but at the same time if only in respect to Mafeje, I try to do this in ways that demonstrate a critical engagement with a small part of his corpus. Having known Archie Mafeje as a person imposes a particular constraint on any engagement with his work. He did not suffer fools. He was an enormously complex and multi-faceted individual who has helped us in constructing a unique approach to understanding our continent. Here, I refer to only two of the very many sides of the man. Firstly, I use his style of debate to symbolise how, in his many years of scholarship, he has tried to engage epistemological, theoretical and empirical issues in the process of generating knowledge about, on and of Africa. Secondly, I illustrate how he changed the way in which we think about Anthropology in Africa.

Argument as War: Mafeje’s Double Battle

In his later years Mafeje started to violate some of the basic principles of epistemology. He did this consciously, realising the importance of the subject of inquiry as a research problem rather than as a pre-determined area of specialisation or discipline. But his interests did not end with being a mere maker of knowledge. His other side radiates a deep political commitment to the pan-Africanist ideal of proper political, economic and cultural emancipation for Africans. It is precisely this mixture of a normative concern for what is good for Africa with his sharp analytical mind that made Archie Mafeje such a formidable intellect on the continent.

I wish to use the conceptual metaphor ‘argument is war’ as analysed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980:4) in their book, Metaphors We Live By, to provide some backdrop to Mafeje’s style of debate and to ensure that the battle of ideas as conceived and practised by Mafeje is placed in a reasonable framework. Lakoff and Johnson (1980:4) state their case very clearly:

It is important to see that we don’t just talk about arguments in terms of war. We actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can abandon it and take a new line of attack. M any of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. Though there is no physical battle, there is verbal battle and the structure of an argument – attack, defence, counterattack, etc. reflects this.

Their definition of a metaphor is captivatingly simple, “… understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another’ (1980:5). I’m using the metaphor of argument as war in order to demon-
state one aspect of Mafeje in debate. It is obvious that verbal discourse and the conduct of war are two entirely different things, but the one is understood in precisely the same terms as the other. Mafeje’s discourse fits this metaphorical concept perfectly. His polemics are suffused with the metaphors of war: to take one choice example, ‘(F)or an Anthropologist,’ says Mafeje, ‘it is well to remember that one thing “primitives” do not know is how to fight in the dark.’ I use this example to show the linkages between the combative style in Mafeje’s writing, the various representations of actual ethnographic experiences and his struggle to understand how he understands his own encounters with history.

Mafeje committed himself to combating the distorted images produced and reproduced about Africa from the outside, by reference to the notion of authenticity in his ethnographic practices. His polemic is thus not only metaphorically warlike, it is an extension of a battle over how Africa may be conceived and how African claims over those conceptions may be framed.

Mafeje is a warrior in a double battle. He is totally immersed in the struggle for ideas about Africa to be produced by Africans for themselves and he connects this endeavour to a profound commitment to the political and economic liberation of Africans. His armour as well as his arguments have to be scrutinised very closely for an assessment of their strengths and weaknesses so that we can collectively engage with ways in which this double struggle can be advanced. Mafeje’s clearest asset is his incisive mind and his ability to translate the complexity of his thought into compelling and elegant prose. He is almost intrinsically combative. And it is through these intellectual debates that he has revealed his encyclopaedic knowledge of Africa.

The major chink in his armour was the fact that he fought alone. He never co-authored any significant work and he only collaborated with others in rather esoteric areas where the outcome did not really matter. As a warrior of the social sciences in Africa, Mafeje chose his battleground very carefully. One of the major gaps in his considerable repertoire of writings on Africa is North Africa. Being married to an Egyptian with a daughter from the marriage, Mafeje spent a considerable period of time in Cairo. Yet, almost as part of the syndrome of his exile, he chose not to accept Egypt as his home, and he certainly did not regard it as part of his social laboratory. This remains an abiding problem in his pan-Africanism. Since he paid no scholarly attention to the cultural and political milieu of North Africa he inadvertently reproduced ideas about a disaggregated and dismembered Africa. While he lived in North Africa for those years, his intellectual gaze remained fixed and confined to Sub-Saharan Africa.

As much as I respected his intellect, admired his brilliant turn of phrase and cherished his company, I also appreciated that Archie Mafeje was a deeply embittered man. ‘What’s wrong with being bitter?’ he would frequently ask in conversation. As a retort, I would point to the lack of bitterness in Nelson Mandela, after spending almost three decades in apartheid jails. But Mafeje was, as with almost everything else, assured in his bitterness, or at least he managed to give the impression of being so self-assured. The consequences of his bitterness were beneficial because when it crept into his analysis it sharpened the terms of the debate and it permitted him to utilise his penchant for pushing the arguments to and even beyond their logical conclusions. Balance is clearly a casualty of this form of polemic, but it served the very important purpose of extending the boundaries of our understanding. Mafeje was obviously aware of the consequences of his style of debate. In his polemics, he gave at least as good as and often much more than he got. He was prepared to expose himself to personal abuse and attack, and he was often bruised in the process, sometimes very severely, but this did not make him waver from his pan-Africanist ideals and objectives of building a viable community of social science scholars on the continent.

Mafeje’s voice is unambiguously African. He brings his Western learning to bear on a profound understanding of the limits of decolonisation. In many ways, his work precedes and pre-empt the kind of analyses that have emerged from the “subaltern” school of history in India on the relation between the struggle for national independence and colonialism. There is simple realisation permeating this school concerning the way in which nationalism did not end up being the antithesis of colonialism but instead its most grotesque imitation. Mafeje tries to avoid this kind of stricture in his writing by ensuring that his project was genuinely emancipatory and not compromised by association with colonialism and oppression.

**Anthropology in Africa: Who are its makers and its subjects?**

As a protagonist in the debate about Anthropology in Africa, Mafeje reveals the full range of his analytical thinking, his incisive mind and his unwavering commitment to the continent. He made us think about Africa in different ways. There is little doubt that his acerbic engagement stems from a steadfast dedication to a pan-Africanist ideal as the negation of a Eurocentric discourse. The point of Africanity, Mafeje would argue, is a very simple one indeed. Africans should speak for themselves, they should nurture ideas about themselves, they should understand themselves through their own intellectual efforts, they should make their own representations about themselves, and they have to ensure that they have a monopoly over the images that are made of and about them. Mafeje has played a central role in the legitimate African claims to write about and understand themselves, and the Anthropology debate can be firmly anchored within this overarching Africanism impulse.

The debate represents a turbulent mixture of Mafeje’s passion for and encyclopaedic knowledge of the continent and his grasp of the intricate details of the political passing parade in Africa.

All students of African Anthropology cannot avoid encountering Mafeje’s debate with a range of scholars and anthropologists. The debate was appropriately published in the very first issue of the *African Sociological Review* in 1997, which in itself represents an effort to establish a community of self-referring African social scientists. Mafeje’s wide-ranging review of Sally Falk Moore’s book, *Anthropology and Africa* is a frontal attack on the manner in which the discipline is constructed and structured around metropolitan interests. He deconstructs the essential concepts of Anthropology and reveals what lies hidden – its basis in alterity. But he does more than that. Since he is concerned about African claims to study, understand and interpret their own reality, he exposes the manner in which the supposed makers of anthropological knowledge position themselves vis-à-vis the assumed objects. Invariably, given its history as well as its political and ideological importance in Africa, especially around the concept of ‘tribe’ the makers
were suffused, according to Mafeje, with deep-seated white racism. Mafeje challenges the conventional division of the social sciences and links the historiography of Anthropology directly to the colonial experience. He issues an abiding challenge to all African anthropologists to become makers rather than mere objects of knowledge. He also insists that they should be centrally involved in a project to produce images, understandings and analyses of and for themselves rather than merely consuming what is produced for them by others outside the continent. For Mafeje, Anthropology is necessarily a discipline founded on alterity, on the colonial settlers studying the native other. For this reason it is intrinsically limited and therefore was driven underground by the decolonisation process in Africa. While the anthropologists did not suddenly disappear, they had to be content with operating under the rubric of joint academic departments, invariably with Sociology. It was really only in Southern Africa that the discipline of Anthropology survived as a separate entity, and that in itself reveals very much about both the discipline and the colonial history of the region.

A question that lies at the heart of Mafeje’s efforts is the epistemological basis of the discipline of Anthropology in postcolonial Africa. Since tribe was such a central organising concept in colonial Anthropology, it is important to emphasise how Mafeje was deconstructing this notion.

‘It is interesting to note’, wrote Mafeje in his highly influential article, ‘The Ideology of Tribalism’, ‘that the word for tribe does not exist in indigenous languages of South Africa’. As he became more familiar with anti-colonial struggles across the continent, and more fully conversant with social and political realities in other African countries, he extended this formulation to the rest of the continent.

How often must it be pointed out that in African languages there is no equivalent for the term ‘tribe’ and that the concept ‘tribe’ is a colonial imposition in Africa? What is ethnographically known is that Africans, like everybody else, are conscious of the linguistic and ethnic group to which they belong.

A bout his own ethnic affiliation, Mafeje said the following.

I don’t care about being Xhosa, I am a South African black. It does not matter to me if I’m Xhosa or Zulu or Tsowa or anything else. I am just comfortable. If I had a choice, I would probably go along more with the Sothos than with the Xhosas. Just in terms of temperament and the way they do things. I am certainly not committed to something called Xhosa.

Mafeje’s views are consistent with his explanation for ethnic politics and conflict. He scolds Nnoli and others for not providing an analysis of ethnicity and for treating ethnic groups as things in themselves, following the empiricism rife in American Political Science. Instead he dispels the idea that there are discrete naturally occurring entities of belonging that may be called ethnic groups in Africa. He draws a distinction between social groups and social categories, where the former are characterised by inevitable patterns of social interaction, for example, lineages or associations, and the latter does not imply such regular interaction at all but is rather defined by common identity, such as membership of the same religion. Mafeje’s argument is that ethnicity is related to the national competition for scarce resources in response to the centralisation of power rather than to local particularistic conflicts. In this sense, ethnicity has a recent derivation since it refers to an ideological ploy used by political elites to yield the benefits of power and wealth. On this view, ethnicity does not represent some pre-existing African cultural essence but a convenient means of political mobilisation for elites.

The Embattled Warrior

In 2003 Archie Mafeje delivered the third annual Z.K. Mathews memorial lecture at the University of Fort Hare, in the little village of Alice in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa. It was an auspicious occasion indeed. The first of these lectures was delivered in 2001 by the president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, and the second lecture was given by Quett Masire, the former president of Botswana. A Richie Mafeje followed a formidable line of speakers. The warrior took on the role of performance, Mafeje stood alone among the ruins of the disciplines that he had annihilated.

I thought that there was a profound contradiction in all of this. While he was singularly scathing about anything that had emerged from Africa in the field of social science, Mafeje continued to argue for an Afrocentric approach to our subject of investigation. He was also against anything that smacked of Euro-centrism. It appeared to me that Mafeje the warrior was fighting a very lonely battle indeed, since he was the only one worthy of its lofty heights.

In Praise of Mafeje

We all realise that developing an African social science discourse through the promotion of an African social science community of scholars is an extremely difficult exercise against the background of the parlous state of African universities. Mafeje reminded us just how structural adjustment and a range of other factors have conspired to wreck these universities. Under these circumstances and within this context it is to be expected that African social scientists would be quite happy to apply metropolitan ideas and concepts without subjecting them to critical scrutiny, and certainly not developing concepts appropriate to the study of African societies. Attempts to indigenise social science in Africa have been inchoate, unsystematic and anecdotal. In this respect, there can be little doubt that the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and the Organization for Social Science Research in East and Southern Africa (OSSREA) stand out as important beacons of hope for the future of the social sciences in Africa. Yet, their reach cannot stretch far enough to the nooks and crannies of intellectual poverty on the continent.

Mafeje has more than most enriched our intellectual landscape by grappling with the issues of historical explanation, of how to relate science and ideology to development, how to understand the constraints that confront the neocolonial state in Africa, how to combine social history with ethnographic experience and generally how to marry scholarly pursuits with political commitment. He represents...
the collective conscience of African social science, and because of his widespread legitimacy and credibility across the continent it is not surprising that he is not liked by those outside who wish to write about Africa in ways that distort and harm the interests of people here. It is well that we honour Mafeje as an intellectual warrior so that younger generations can appreciate the depth and breadth of his contribution and so that they can also be inspired by his irreverence and his irrepresible spirit.

Honouring a Giant

A Note on the Archie Mafeje Special Panel of the CODESRIA 30th Anniversary Grande Finale Conference, held in Dakar in December 2003

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Mafeje’s sarcasm and misgivings about him being honoured during his own lifetime was therefore more of a kind of reminder to us in the African academy that perhaps the best way of honouring people like him is not to make them look like extraordinary people, but to both preserve the conditions that enable the academy to give birth to more great scholars, and to highlight the principles, ethics, values and practices that younger generations of scholars should be encouraged to cherish, and portray people like him as living examples of what, with hard work, they (the younger generation) could seek to achieve. Entrusting young scholars was in fact one of Mafeje’s main preoccupations. I return to this issue later.

The panel discussion and the many testimonies that followed were each a mix of personal recollections of encounters, intellectual and otherwise, with Mafeje, and a discussion of his contributions to scholarship on a broad range of issues such as democracy, academic freedom, land and agrarian issues, and the nature of scholarship itself. The presentations began with a portrait of Archie Mafeje, the man and the scholar (Ebrima Sall), followed by a presentation on Archie’s style of scholarship: ‘drawing swords in the social sciences’ (Fred Hendricks). Sam Moyo, the third speaker, focused on Mafeje’s work on land and agrarian issues. Eddy M aloka spoke about Archie’s place in the South African community of scholars today, where he has remained a relatively unknown figure, particularly to the younger generation, a point that Jiniadesina also made in his contribution to the general debate. Maloka also discussed the slow pace of change in the tertiary education sector in post-apartheid South Africa, particularly in matters of curriculum reform, and Tandeka Nkiwane discussed Mafeje’s contribution to the debate on democracy. Speakers from the floor included Helmi Sharawy, Samir Amin, Thandika Mkandawire, Jiniadesina, Said A dejumobi, K unle A muwo, and Shahida El - B az, the spouse, friend and colleague who shared 35 years of Mafeje’s life.

Mafeje: The Man, and the Scholar

Participants were reminded that Mafeje was fond of saying that he was South African by birth, Dutch by nationality and Egyptian by adoption, for he lived in Cairo for 24 years. His childhood and adolescence were spent in apartheid South Africa. After a first degree in zoology and botanical sciences, Mafeje obtained a masters degree in social anthropology at the University of Cape Town (UCT), where he was going to be the first black African scholar. Archie’s life took a dramatic turn thereafter, for he then went into exile and returned to his native South Africa only recently. He has held senior positions in many universities in Africa, and Europe, including the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, the American University in Cairo, the University of South Africa in Pretoria and the Institute of Social Studies in The Netherlands. It was in The Netherlands that, in 1973, he became a Queen Juliana Professor of Anthropology and Sociology of Development by an act of Parliament, with the approval of all the 29 universities of The.
Behind the cynical façade, my father was one of the kindest, warmest and most giving men I ever met. I vividly remember him getting me dressed for school every day (militarily), asking me what I wanted to eat for lunch religiously (until I was 26!), never telling me to study because to him exams were for idiots, having serious chats with me without ever looking me in the eye (those of you who know him personally will relate), speaking to me logically in the most illogical situations, pushing me to excel just to be worthy of being his daughter and mostly for being my ultimate reference.

Shahida El-Baz, his spouse, gave a very moving account of how they met, and shared a whole life of struggle in mutual respect. She was a student at the Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in The Hague, very active in the campaign against the UCT refusal to allow Archie to take up a teaching position to which he had been duly appointed. During his stint at the ISS, Mafeje became the guru of a small group of radical students, as he was later to be a key member of the Marxist and pan-African circles of Egypt. When they decided to get married, Dr El-Baz said he told her: ‘I know you will make a lousy wife, but I don’t like wives anyway’.

According to her, some of the episodes that left a lasting effect on Mafeje included his sojourn in Namibia, a sojourn that he actually shortened as a result of both his utter disappointment with the slow pace of transformation going on after the country’s independence, and the endless fights he has had to fight against unrepentant racists desperately hanging on to a colonial mentality. Since for him going to work in Namibia was a first step on his journey back to South Africa, the unpleasant experience meant that his return to South Africa was going to be deferred by almost a whole decade.

Mafeje has mentored many African scholars, and many of those he mentored, including some of the panelists, found him to be hard with those he was mentoring, because his reference was the rigorous training he had himself been through, and the very high standards that he had set for himself as a scholar. As the Senegalese sociologist, Momar Coumba Diop once put it, Archie was what he would call a ‘knowledge aristocrat’ (un aristocrate du savoir), and a creative artist of sorts. Yet he was a very committed scholar as well, one whose mission was nothing short of the liberation of Africans, and the building of a viable and self-sustaining scholarly community in Africa. His intellectual curiosity knew no bounds. I remember him explaining how he had spent six months underwater, observing the flora and fauna of the Atlantic Ocean in a Soviet submarine.

Crossing Swords in the Social Sciences

Fred Hendricks called Mafeje an ‘academic warrior’. Mafeje saw argument as war, and explicitly talked about ‘crossing swords’ with Ali Mazrui, in the famous Mafeje-Mazrui debate that went on for two years in the columns of CODESRIA Bulletin. The powerful metaphor of argument as war could also be applied to the exchanges Mafeje had with Sally Falk M ore, following the review that he wrote of M ore’s book on Anthropology and Africa. The review was published in the maiden issue of the African Sociological Review in 1997. ‘His polemics are fused with the metaphor of war’ (Hendricks): ‘One thing primitives can’t do is to fight in the dark’ (Mafeje).

In the view of most of the panelists and contributors to the general debate, Mafeje’s scholarship was an extension of his battles for Africa, for he was ‘totally immersed in the battle for Africa’. A good illustration of this is his seminal piece (published in 1971 in the Journal of Modern African Studies) on the ideology of tribalism, an ideology that, he argued, brought with it certain ways of reconstructing the African reality. It regarded African societies as particularly tribal. This approach produced certain blinkers or ideological pre-dispositions which made it difficult for those associated with the system to view these societies in any other light. Hence certain modes of thought among European scholars in Africa and their African counterparts have persisted, despite the many important economic and political changes that have occurred in the continent over the last 75–100 years.

The ideology of alterity, which is so central to colonial anthropology, is suffused with deep-seated racism that Mafeje exposed with brio. Hence the questions that he asks in his monograph titled Anthropology and Independent Africans: Suicide, Or the End of an Era?: what is the epistemological basis of the discipline
Dessalegn Rahmato’s Green Book that Peasant Organisations in Africa Amin over the tributary mode of production, both of which enlisted critical responses of Sally Falk Moore’s book, and by distinguished African scholars. In addition to the Mazrui–Mafeje therefore crossed swords with a land question in Africa.

Given that it was founded on alterity, how can it survive when colonialism has been overcome? This monograph formed the core around which a symposium was organised in the maiden issue of the African Sociological Review in 1997. Deconstructing concepts inherited from colonial social science has actually been part of the search for autonomy that Archie Mafeje and Joseph Ki-Zerbo, both of whom were honoured during the CODESRIA 30th anniversary conference, and both of whom have moved on, were engaged in, along with many other distinguished African scholars.

Another good example is Mafeje’s critique of the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment (AAFSA), published in CODESRIA Bulletin in 1990, in which he openly calls for an African recovery in thought. Other concepts that Mafeje subjected to a thorough critique include those of ethnicity (discussed by Hendricks), Africanaity, and the peasantry. Sam Moyo’s presentation was centred on Mafeje’s work on the land and agrarian questions in Africa. In his critique of Dessalegn Rahmato’s Green Book on Peasant Organisations in Africa, Mafeje challenged the assumption that peasants exist in Africa, and called for a much closer study of property relations in rural Africa, rather than transposing concepts borrowed from European sociology and anthropology. This was partly in response to Samir Amin’s work on the tributary mode of production, and his characterisation of certain social relations as semi-feudal.

On the land question, according to Moyo, Mafeje has been arguing that apart from the settler colonies of Southern Africa, where there was massive expropriation of land and racial hegemony, there is no real land question in Africa. Mafeje therefore crossed swords with a large number of African and non-African scholars. In addition to the Mzurui–Mafeje debate, examples cited by the various panelists include: the critical reviews of Sally Falk Moore’s book, and Dessalegn Rahmato’s Green Book that Sam Moyo discussed in his presentation, both of which enlisted critical responses from the authors, his debates with Samir Amin over the tributary mode of production, but also with the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the World Bank. Mafeje was a member of the expert group that, in the late 1990s, was put together by the CROP, an organisation based in Bergen, Norway, to review the World Bank’s work on poverty.

Mafeje’s work, Hendricks argued, in some respects preceded what later came from the subaltern school. He saw colonialism as a debasement of Africans. Unfortunately, according to Mafeje, nationalism did not always end up as a negation of colonialism, but its imitation.

The legitimacy that Mafeje enjoyed in Africa and other parts of the world has been a source of discomfort for all those who, particularly outside Africa, wish to continue to write about our continent in ways that distort the reality. Mafeje represented the collective conscience of the African social science community, and his knowledge was encyclopaedic.

Criticisms

Mafeje was awarded a Lifelong Membership of CODESRIA, for a lifetime contribution to scholarship. In his acceptance speech, he said he was not worried that he would be subjected to severe criticism by the panelists, ‘because I knew you will not denounce me as you are honouring me’. However, the panel was not about an uncritical celebration of Mafeje, but also critically engaging with his work. As Hendricks put it, in his contribution to the panel, he was answering Archie’s invitation to the younger generation to draw invitations to the younger generation to draw swords, including with him. He therefore pointed out a couple of areas in which he felt Mafeje’s positions were problematic.

One such area is North Africa, which is almost totally absent from Mafeje’s work. Hendricks felt that this was a major omission, despite the fact that Mafeje had lived in Egypt for 24 years. This was rather difficult to comprehend. Was it a reflection of what his spouse Shahida called a ‘refugee mentality’, that is, some reluctance on his part to get himself deeply immersed in the social and intellectual life of Egypt?

‘Mafeje was fighting a lonely battle’ (Hendricks). To illustrate, Hendricks cited Mafeje’s critique of the social sciences, one by one, in a Memorial Lecture he gave at Fort Hare in 2001, advocating, instead, for an ‘afro-centric’ approach.

Hendricks also argued that towards the end of his life, Mafeje had become an embittered man’ (Hendricks), and that the bitterness occasionally crept into Mafeje’s writings, although he offered no examples of how bitterness sometimes had clouded Mafeje’s scholarship. There were certainly many things that Mafeje couldn’t help being unhappy about. Besides the unpleasant Namibia experience, when he went back to South Africa itself, he was relatively unknown by the younger generation and isolated by those whose politics made them uncomfortable with someone like him. That great scholars like Archie Mafeje, Bernard Mugabe and Cheikh Anta Diop are relatively unknown to the younger generation of South African scholars was a point made by several speakers, including Jiji Adamsina, K. Nkomo, Eddy Maka and Tendeka Nkwiwa. Eddy Maka explained how the Afrika Institute of South Africa was, under his leadership, trying to deal with that problem by establishing an Archie Mafeje visiting fellowship, with support from the South African National Research Foundation. Although the problem of making great African scholars known to younger generations of scholars is particularly acute in South Africa, it is an Africa-wide problem, which is why CODESRIA has launched a Distinguished Lecture Series aimed at enabling people like Mafeje (who was a nominee of that programme) to travel and give lectures in different parts of the continent.

As for Mafeje’s relative isolation in South Africa, in the conversations I was privileged to have with him during the last few years of his life, on many occasions he said some scholars began keeping away from him from the moment that he frankly expressed his views on some of their published work – which he found rather sloppy. It was also rather unfortunate that in post-apartheid South Africa, a scholar of the calibre of Archie Mafeje could be left without a proper pension scheme. Maka also made the very important observation that no serious attempt is being made to encourage African scholars to study the history of the liberation movements, particularly those of Southern Africa – not even the history of the ANC is being seriously studied. His explanation was that South African scholarship has been constructed, and is construncting itself, as a sub-field of scholarship in Europe and the USA. Other major
gaps in South African scholarship highlighted by Maloka are those of the study of legal Marxism, and the study of Africa more generally.

Nkwiwane, one of the panellists, and a few of the contributors from the floor (Samir Amin in particular) argued that the genius of Archie was not so much in the fact that he broke new ground, but because he revisited old questions, such as the question of democracy (Nkwane), and the agrarian question (Amin). Yet his critique of the ideology of tribalism has been celebrated as a seminal contribution.

On the land question, according to Sam Moyo, Mafeje has been arguing that apart from the settler colonies of Southern Africa, where there was massive expropriation of land and racial hegemony, there is no real land question in Africa. To defend such a thesis, Moyo argued, was to fail to acknowledge the complexity of the land question in Africa today, particularly with urbanisation and migration, on the one hand, and on the other, the new ways in which land is being concentrated in few hands for use as tourist resorts. There are broader territorial issues involved, and much of the Southern African land mass (about 40 per cent), Moyo further argued, is now more or less reserved for operations related to tourism, which is a massive expropriation carried out with the backing of state and global capital.

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Archie Mafeje took African scholars very seriously, and read and engaged with as many of the scholarly writings of Africans as he could (Mkandawire). He was a fugitive scholar, who found a base in regional organisations like CODESRIA, OSSREA and SAPES, and he was certainly one of those who contributed most to the building of these organisations. Mafeje was a committed Pan-Africanist, and a world-class scholar.

In a way, he seemed to have sensed that the end wasn’t far away. As early as the year 2000, several of us heard him say, in his usual joking manner, that he had a ‘rendezvous with death in three years…’. It was as if he could foretell when his life was going to end.

He was a man with multiple identities and he had many dimensions to him. Upon his passing, many of these dimensions were brought out. Part of Archie’s journey ended in his village close to the city of Umtata, in South Africa, where he was given a decent burial. But prayers were said for him in mosques and churches in Egypt, in the United Kingdom and in South Africa.

The special session organised to honour Mafeje ended on a very high note, with Archie, in his near-legendary humility, reminding everybody that he wasn’t a lone star/scholar: there are other people, scholars he’s been talking to over the years. Among those present at the sessions, he cited: Thandika Mkandawire, Samir Amin, Helmi Sharawy and Sam Moyo. And then there are all those he’s been crossing swords with. The list is long. ‘You don’t make knowledge alone…’ said Mafeje.

This was also an occasion for Mafeje to reiterate what he had always been saying: that CODESRIA should continue to encourage multi-disciplinarity. That was why when, as new members of the Scientific Committee of CODESRIA, ‘we were asked to write state-of-the-discipline notes on our respective disciplines, we refused to do so’.

That was Professor Archibald Mafeje, or ‘Mr Mafeje’, as he preferred to be called.

À Dieu, Prof.!
In his address to the National Research Foundation in South Africa in May 2001 on ‘The Impact of Social Sciences on Development and Democracy: A Positivist Illusion’, Archie Mafeje made this point:

Some social philosophers believe that the universal is contained in the local. This is only true, if the local is universally recognised. The so-called Africana renaissance is not universally recognised. Its intellectual representations are wanting and its political determinations are in question. This raises two questions: i) the indigenisation of knowledge in Africa; and ii) the political significance of Africanness or the so-called Africana renaissance. Both of these questions are not popular in white South Africa and the West in general. In their immediate connotations these signify nothing more than an assertion of a new self-identity. It is inevitably that any identity emerges as an opposed category to another/others. Likewise, it is inevitably that the assertion of any identity provokes equally subjective/ideological revulsions from whatever is perceived as alterity.¹

Mafeje here was taking issue with the ‘illusion’ of positivism in social sciences in favour of ‘normative social science’, that is, a social science that does not only acknowledge the fact that it is not ‘value-free’ but is willing to confront and objectify social and moral issues such as poverty, racism, and globalisation.² However, the dialectic of and the tension between the local and universal, or the self and the other that he describes in the citation above somehow explain how he was received in his country, South Africa, on his return from exile.

Jimi A. Adesina, in one of the tributes to Mafeje, recounts how ‘in our last conversation he [Mafeje] spoke of his isolation and loneliness in South Africa (at home, in a place of his birth, in a land that gave us one of the finest minds in the global community of the social sciences)’.³ And this, indeed, is one of the themes that emerged from speeches by friends and relatives at a memorial service held in his honour at the University of South Africa (UNISA), which took place in the Transkei a few days leading to his funeral.

In his widely disseminated tribute to Mafeje, Pallo J. Jordan, South Africa’s Minister of Arts and Culture, recalls that Mafeje described himself as South African by birth, Dutch by citizenship, and Egyptian by domicile. His return to the Mthathaland was intended to not only fuse these into one but spend the last years of his life as a living example of African cosmopolitanism.⁴ A nother observer described Mafeje as a ‘straight-shooting Afromeric critic of colonial anthropology and distortions of Africa in western academies…[his] work is not well known among younger scholars and is not as widely circulated in western venues as it deserves’.⁵ Mahmood Mamdani concurs: ‘The important point is to memorialize the meaning of his life and work in a way that makes it accessible to the younger generation, those who did not have the opportunity to know him personally as we did’.⁶

When I persuaded Mafeje to return ‘home’ some few years ago, the intention was, among others, to bring his intellectual influence and the respect he commanded on the continent and internationally, closer to his home front. We had hoped he would dedicate whatever strength was still left in his body and mind to collate his work for publication and dissemination. This is a daunting task that is yet to be accomplished.

I was also hoping that Mafeje’s return ‘home’ would inject more energy and, perhaps, even direction, in the ongoing debate about the role and contribution of black intellectuals in the post-apartheid transition. This debate is in three related areas. Firstly, is the concern over the fact that public discourse in post-apartheid South Africa is largely dominated, shaped and led by those who were historically privileged in the past because of the colour of their skin. Indeed, at its 52nd national conference of December 2007, the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), deliberated on this challenge under the topic: ‘Communications and the Battle of Ideas’. One of the resolutions adopted at the conference in this regard committed the party to ‘vigorously communicate the ANC’s outlook and values (developmental state, collective rights, values of caring and community solidarity, ubuntu, non-sexism, etc.) versus the current mainstream media’s ideological outlook (neo-liberalism, a weak and passive state, and overemphasis on individual rights, market fundamentalism, etc.’.⁷ and ‘that the battle of ideas must be conducted in deeds not only in theory and these deeds must find practical expression through the ANC structures’.⁸ Accordingly, the party’s mouthpiece, ANC Today, subsequently carried a lead article with the title: ‘The Voice of the ANC Must Be Heard’!⁹

The second area of the debate is about the virtual absence of black intelligentsia in the country. Pitika Ntuli painted a disturbing picture:

In South Africa, with the advent of the new dispensation, intellectuals were induced from academia into government to function as bureaucrats. Those who felt constrained there were in turn induced into the corporate world. In both these new homes they find their voices circumscribed by the logic of survival. There were those who went the NGO route, but even there they found that if they spoke out they would not receive state funding. Some sought other means of contributing to the broader society: they sought funding from international agencies, but this brought new problems; they were accused of collaborating with enemies of the state or were used by these agencies to subvert our new democracy.¹⁰

Similarly, for Ebrahim Harvey, alongside the decline of civil society we have seen the decline in black intellectual production. There is a resulting dearth of independent and committed black intellectuals. So discourse in every field continues overwhelmingly to be dominated by white academics and intellectuals.¹¹
And finally, there is a tendency in the white intellectual and opinion-making establishment to deny the currency and significance of ‘race’ in South Africa today because, they argue, apartheid is dead! What matters now is, for the white Marxist Left, ‘class’ or, for most, the fear of being overwhelmed by an all-powerful ANC. When some black intellectuals organised themselves into a Native Club in 2006, this was dismissed in the media and other public fora; others even comparing the club to the ‘Broederbond’ of the Afrikaner nationalists during apartheid. Recently, some black journalists convened a Forum for Black Journalists, and this also led to outrage in the white opinion-making establishment, with some white journalists even gate-crashing into a meeting of the forum to play heroes and martyrs for ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom of speech and association’. The argument was, as in the case of the Native Club, that it is racist for blacks to organise themselves into exclusive or, as they put it, ‘apartheid-type’ organisations. Yet many public spaces in the country, including organisations, remain exclusively white because of structural constraints and impediments to access and entry for blacks, thanks to the impact of centuries of colonial rule.

Unfortunately, Mafeje could not fit in and find his way into this debate. His towering intellectual stature and his ‘straight-shooting’ approach could have helped make the case for a very vibrant, strong and independent black intelligentsia as a force to reckon with in confronting the Afrikaner nationalists during apartheid. Recently, some black journalists convened a Forum for Black Journalists, and this also led to outrage in the white opinion-making establishment, with some white journalists even gate-crashing into a meeting of the forum to play heroes and martyrs for ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom of speech and association’. The argument was, as in the case of the Native Club, that it is racist for blacks to organise themselves into exclusive or, as they put it, ‘apartheid-type’ organisations. Yet many public spaces in the country, including organisations, remain exclusively white because of structural constraints and impediments to access and entry for blacks, thanks to the impact of centuries of colonial rule.

Of course, when the South African Left debated the future of socialism in the early 1990s in the wake of Joe Slovo’s ‘Has Socialism Failed?’, Mafeje joined in the fray with his ‘The Bathos of Tendentious Historiography’. Mafeje, informed, as it were, by the belief that Slovo was a confirmed Stalinist until the writing of the essay under review’, argued that the South African Communist Party (SACP) was formed by ‘white émigré communists [who] depended to a very large extent on the Soviet Union and had virtually no constituency inside the country’. For him, the Party ‘succeeded in splitting the black national movement right in the middle for its own purposes. Having lost any support of white workers...it sought a constituency within the black national movement without giving up its privileged position, as a “vanguard party”’ [emphasis in the original]. Thus, concluded Mafeje, ‘...had it not been for its [SACP’s] self-interested interference, a number of differences, say, between the Unity Movement and the ANC, and between the ANC and the PAC could have been resolved’.

In his survey of the ‘Has Socialism Failed?’ debate, Pallo Jordan observed at the time that Mafeje unfortunately did not engage with Slovo, choosing instead to scold the SACP and its ally, the ANC, about the policies they are pursuing to bring down apartheid. Although Mafeje could have made a number of valid points, these got lost because of the Afrikanist stance he adopted. This was unfortunate because South African Marxism has an extremely underdeveloped theoretical tradition to which Mafeje might have made a more substantial contribution if he had contained his bad temper. In this instance his eagerness to settle accounts with ideological opponents got the better of him.

Mafeje may have not had the impact all had hoped for on his return ‘home’ from exile, but perhaps it was because he was a living expression of the dialect of the local and the universal; an African living without borders, be they geographic or intellectual. He may have not been one of the commissars in the trenches of the liberation movement for fear of being constrained by ‘borders’ negotiating the dialectic of the local and the universal, but he was without doubt one of the pioneers of the knowledge that we are armed with today in our struggle for the total liberation of our continent.

But Mafeje could change lives also, and even transport them from the local to the beyond of the universal, like that of Ken Hughes, now with the Department of Mathematics and Applied Mathematics at UCT, who was among the 200 odd students who staged a sit-in at that university in 1968 to protest the ‘Mafeje incident’. For Hughes:

The UCT sit-in of 1968 was a landmark event, both for the university and for those who took part in it. Several people for whom it was a formative experience are still around... In my case it was the start of a peculiar career as an international student agitator – for I went from UCT to the University of Warwick in England, where general grievances resulted in occupying the Registry, and then on to MIT in the US, where we sat in protest against the Vietnam War.

Notes
In 1957, fresh out of university, I left England for South Africa, looking to join the struggle there. I thought the revolution was imminent. Shortly disabused of this notion, I remained to be instructed from scratch in what that revolution entailed. Eventually, in the organization distinguished from all others in the liberatory movement for its uncompromising probity, non-collaborationist policy, non-negotiable programme of democratic demands, I found my instructors. This happened in Cape Town when I providentially picked up a job at the university, thereby acquiring at one and the same time a livelihood and an introduction to Unity Movement politics from an assortment of its junior members studying there. That was how I became acquainted with Archie.

Already a seasoned Unity cadre, lately arrived from the Eastern Cape to study (after a trial run in the biological sciences) for a degree in Social Anthropology, he was then in his early twenties, a tall, spare, loose-jointed young man, tastefully attired, however meagre his wardrobe. His face too, highly charged and singularly resolute, had its merits, but beauty wasn’t one of them. Years later, in his Dar-es-Salaam period, that face took the brunt of a head-on automobile collision that landed him in one hospital after another for months on end. Immediately upon hearing the grim news, I wrote him post-haste to say for his consolation what a mercy it was only his face, since he never had any looks to lose. But it wasn’t his looks he was worried about. From the hospital, in Copenhagen this time, where he was about to undergo highly specialized surgery on his jaw, he replied piteously, ‘For two weeks my mouth will be sealed. Can you imagine?’ It was indeed barely imaginable. I never knew anyone so terse in his speech who had so much to say, ‘to discuss’, as he called it.

He was always at it, discussing, analyzing, synthesizing, everywhere on the campus, with the single exception of Blackie’s Corner - so-named as the undisputed preserve of the non-whites. Archie denounced it as voluntary segregation. He wouldn’t be found dead at Blackie’s Corner. Likewise at lectures, while the non-white students customarily occupied the back row, Archie sat right up in the front row, an admiring white girl on either side. Ever himself, how strenuously he safeguarded his autonomy was equally plain to all of us who knew him in the Unity Movement in those years. No respecter of persons, he kept a measured distance from the leadership, the better (as he gave out) to get his Movement work done.

In his first year at UCT he would sometimes drop in at my office, ‘to discuss’ between lectures. But thereafter, as our acquaintance progressed, he preferred to call at my lodgings (always transient in those days, since I had to decamp as often as either my landlady objected to black visitors, or scandalized neighbours called the police). He would stop by regularly on his way from the towns where he did his fieldwork, bringing me his insider’s knowledge and meticulous observation of the township people, the multi-farifious African working class, whose as yet unconsolidated struggle, he, of all the comrades who contributed to my political education, best interpreted for me, because he was closest to the people whom it most closely concerned. He was my political touchstone in those years, and so he remained all the years of our life-long friendship.

Archie was one of those intellectuals who (as he described them), petit-bourgeois by definition, yet actively seeking to transform their society, have thrown in their lot with the worker/peasant constituency in their struggle towards socialism. Mindful of the inherent contradiction in this position, he proposes in one of his essays that ‘the intellectual, like the samurai, should go armed with two swords – one for killing his enemies, the other for killing himself when he betrays his cause’. But the one sword was all Archie ever needed. The cause he served was the social, political and economic transformation of Africa, nothing less. In this comprehensive vision of a socialist Africa, his inexhaustible intellectual passion found its commensurate form and scope. Hence, (to quote one of the early CODESRIA tributes), ‘he could not be shaken from his stand’.

Archie’s opposites in South Africa, the majority intellectuals of the petit-bourgeois constituency who share the spoils of the ANC’s negotiated settlement, not surprisingly foresaw his presence in their midst as a direct threat. That is why when – free to return to South Africa in the 1990s, an eminent scholar of international renown – he sought appropriate employment at his alma mater, the UCT administration, far from making due amends for their predecessors’ craven withdrawal of his appointment in 1968, contrived by all manner of foul means to keep him out. Nor, when he returned to South Africa permanently in 2002 did they extend themselves further than to send him the following year an apology exclusively for his resignation in 1990, an offer of an honorary doctorate – both of which Archie, never a man to be messed with, studiously ignored. And there the matter rested till his death last year, whereupon the students came out in such clamorous and widely broadcast protest on his behalf that the administration, taking fright, forthwith reversed their position. With declared intent to ‘bring closure to the Mafeje issue’, they dispatched their
emissary to Archie’s funeral with assurances that the UCT Council Executive Committee, recognizing ‘the deep injustice done’, resolved that ‘his impact as an extraordinarily gifted scholar be captured forever’, and promised ‘to find a practical way’ to that end.

As it now appears, the post-apartheid custodians of UCT who so assiduously kept Archie’s impact out of the curriculum, who closed their own ranks against him and, with the ready collusion of their sister universities, effectively ostracized him till the end of his life, have lately attempted to make amends. The new Vice-Chancellor, in his public apology for the University’s failure ‘to bring a very significant African scholar home to UCT’, has gone so far as to say that the University ‘did not make a committed effort... and that it may even have acted in a way that prejudiced Professor Mafeje a second time in the 1990s’. A regards further replications, the first and most notable on the list is the University’s undertaking to open their archives to ‘scholars wishing to research the events surrounding Archie Mafeje at UCT’. Archival research on the University Council’s withdrawal of Archie’s appointment in 1968 has already revealed that the Minister of Education, in his discussions with the Principal of UCT at that time, informed him of ‘Mafeje’s record of subversive activity’. But it’s a safe bet that research into the motive for the post-apartheid Council’s equally unbecoming conduct in the 1990s won’t turn up any such telling material. Indeed, the University’s deafening silence on Archie’s politics casts serious doubt on its fitness to celebrate the memory of the man whose unshakable commitment to the interests of the disregarded majority of South Africa’s people so strongly recommended him to the university constituency of South Africa’s comprador government.

It remains for those of his family, colleagues, students, comrades and friends to whom he was dearest, and who best know the crucial importance to Africa’s future of his transformative, unerringly honest and fearless life’s work, to keep his banner flying.

Archie, Dear Archie

Archie was a Renaissance man. Others have written about his outstanding intellectual abilities, which are so well known in academic and political circles that they need no repetition here. He also loved and was highly knowledgeable about classical music (I can see him now, lounging on the sofa, totally absorbed in listening to a recording). He had a formidable grasp of the English language, frequently using words that had mother-tongue English graduates reaching for their dictionaries - and always finding that he had used them correctly. He knew about wines, he knew about food, he knew about many other things too numerous to mention here. He was a demon table-tennis player. When he displayed any of his huge range of interests he was not showing off, simply stretching his knowledge and practising it.

I first met Archie at Cambridge in the Anthropology Department library, in the autumn of 1964. We had both arrived at the same time, he to do his PhD against all the odds after the torment and experience of growing up in apartheid South Africa, I as a first-year undergraduate after working briefly in a multiracial school in Swaziland between English boarding school and university. I remember our first encounter vividly. Someone told me that the man sitting hunched at a table absorbed in reading was South African. I bounced up to him, introduced myself, told him I had just come back from Swaziland and had been volunteering in...
Professor Archie Mafeje was born in the region of Eastern Cape on 30 March 1936. A few days before his 71st birthday on 28 March 2007, he passed away. The sad news of his death brought to the whole African intellectual community, to his family and friends, a deep shock and a profound sense of pain. For a moment, it seemed, time stood still, poised at the edge of the unknown.

One of the finest minds among African scholars, Archie was a fighter for African freedom, a comrade, a mentor, and a very special friend, to so many of us. Archie was above all the projects of CODESRIA, husband of our dear sister and friend, Shahida. His departure leaves an insoluble sense of loss. This untimely departure leaves us with many projects and dreams unrealized, as CODESRIA had great plans of immortalizing his formidable achievements and ensuring continuity for the mentorship he was never tired of giving us, and the younger generation of social scientists.

In his intellectual and commendable controversial style, Archie was a profound thinker, always concerned with the different social, political and economic challenges Africa has faced and still faces. It would be shortsighted of us to limit our appreciation of Archie’s contributions to knowledge only to his published works. To celebrate the fullness of his contribution, we need to recognize that the areas covered by his analysis came out also through his speeches, conference papers, public lectures and many other interventions. Whether published or unpublished, his highly original and profound quality of thought has always been a great inspiration for different generations of African scholars and for Africans of all walks of life.

Archie has been and will always remain a founding father and guide of CODESRIA. His contributions are of such magnitude that the history of CODESRIA cannot be complete without him. In recognition of his immense work, he was honored by the African social research community with a life membership of CODESRIA at the 30th Anniversary Conference in Dakar in 2003.

As current president of CODESRIA I shall sorely miss his wisdom, guidance and good humor at Scientific Committee meetings. With other founder members, he shared different debates on the future of Africa. His honest positions, political and intellectual integrity, immense generosity and authority of voice earned him profound respect from the academic community.

In this moment of profound pain, and on behalf of CODESRIA’s members, the Scientific Committee where he served, the Executive Committee, and on my personal behalf, I would like to express our heartfelt condolence and solidarity with Archie’s family, intellectual colleagues, friends, and all those who have had occasion to drink from his well of wisdom.

And last but not the least, I have a word for our dear sister. Dear Shaida, I’m aware that in a moment of pain such as this, and especially the loss of someone we love so dearly, the words of our friends are not enough to fill the great emptiness we feel. However, I would like to assure you that CODESRIA’s family will walk with you, with Dana, with Xolane, and with the other members of Archie’s family, hand in hand, in this difficult phase of your lives, offering as much as we can, a shoulder for you to lean on. Accept therefore, our deep expression of love and solidarity. On behalf of CODESRIA I can also assure you and the African community of our commitment to make any efforts necessary to immortalize Archie’s lifelong work and to realize the dream we built together, to spread his knowledge to the younger generation in the continent and beyond.

Archie has died, Archie lives. Archie will live forever in our hearts. Archie’s memories and thoughts will continue to grow and flower like the seed of a giant tree.

Teresa Cruz e Silva
University Eduardo Mondale, Maputo, Mozambique
Dear all,

I have read and appreciated all that was written about my father so far. At first, I refused to, simply because I wanted to shut out the idea of having lost such a man. Most of you wrote about his academic prowess, genius mind, incomparable wit and endless struggle for his nation and greater Africa. Having acknowledged all these attributes at a very early age, I later realised that Papa was a ‘giant’ not only in the intellectual sense but as a human being.

My father was critical but humane, fierce but compassionate, sarcastic but gentle, silly but brilliant, stubborn but loyal, but most of all he was passionate.

Behind the cynical façade, my father was one of the kindest, warmest and most giving men I ever met. I vividly remember him getting me dressed for school every day (militarily), asking me what I wanted to eat for lunch religiously (until I was 26!), never telling me to study because to him exams were for idiots, having serious chats with me without ever looking me in the eye (those of you who know him personally will relate), speaking to me logically in the most illogical situations, pushing me to excel just to be worthy of being his daughter and mostly for being my ultimate reference.

Last time I saw Papa was late 2005. We spent a week together in Pretoria. Somehow I felt he didn’t want to lose a minute, he introduced me to my South African family and friends, gave me advice on relationships, life and tennis, he even taught me his famous curry recipe. On my way back, I called my mother from the airport, crying and I told her I knew it would be the last time I ever saw my father. Unfortunately I was right.

I was always told by him that ‘life isn’t fair’, I never really understood what that meant until he left me. I wish I had seen him one last time, I wish I had told him what a hero he was in my eyes. I wish he had known how loved and admired he was. To me he will always remain Papa, Archie Mafeje, the man who got on the pedestal and never fell down.

His daughter, Dana
April 2007

There are three gifts that he has left his students and readers:

1- The importance of cognitive value as distinct from empirical stock;
2- Clarity and rigour in writing as an alternative to writing postmodernist circles in an opaque but likeable language;
3- Courage to find a peer group and recognize when established criteria of worth are fickle and faddish.

Thank you, Archie, on behalf of the ‘not so brilliant’ who you helped challenge and shape. Thank you for your brilliance, cheek, audacity and very loving self.

Tribute to Archie Mafeje

Hania Sholkamy
Cairo, Egypt

My Father

Dear all,

I have read and appreciated all that was written about my father so far. At first, I refused to, simply because I wanted to shut out the idea of having lost such a man. Most of you wrote about his academic prowess, genius mind, incomparable wit and endless struggle for his nation and greater Africa. Having acknowledged all these attributes at a very early age, I later realised that Papa was a ‘giant’ not only in the intellectual sense but as a human being.

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After 71 years of life, this is what Archie Mafeje would have told you:

My Way

And now, the end is near;
And so I face the final curtain.
My friend, I’ll say it clear,
I’ll state my case, of which I’m certain.

I’ve lived a life that’s full.
I’ve traveled each and every highway;
And more, much more than this,
I did it my way.

Regrets, I’ve had a few;
But then again, too few to mention.
I did what I had to do
And saw it through without exemption.

I planned each charted course;
Each careful step along the high-way,
But more, much more than this,
I did it my way.

Yes, there were times, I’m sure you knew
When I bit off more than I could chew.
But through it all, when there was doubt,
I ate it up and spat it out.
I faced it all and I stood tall;
And did it my way.

I’ve loved, I’ve laughed and cried.
I’ve had my fill; my share of losing.
And now, as tears subside,
I find it all so amusing.

To think I did all that;
And may I say - not in a shy way,
No, oh no not me,
I did it my way.

For what is a man, what has he got?
If not himself, then he has naught.
To say the things he truly feels;
And not the words of one who kneels.
The record shows I took the blows -
And did it my way!

Written by Paul Anka

God rest his soul.
P.S. I love you Papa, Dana
Archie Mafeje Debates in the CODESRIA Bulletin

Culture and Development in Africa: The Missing Link*

The Problematique in its Historical Setting

The problem of culture and development is at least as old as the social sciences, which are largely the product of the West. Within the West two principal traditions which date back to the nineteenth century can be identified. These are idealism and materialism, which in contemporary society feature as liberalism and Marxism, respectively. Of the two, the former is hegemonic and fully elaborated in the social sciences. In contrast, Marxism has not been part of academic social science until the onset of the current world economic crisis, which saw the resurgence of political economy and the ascendancy of neo-Maoist studies, especially in development theory. This has meant a renewed confrontation between these two major European traditions. In the Third World this has coincided with the questioning of Eurocentric social science which, in turn, is a reflection of the intensification of anti-imperialist struggles which are its antecedents.

Here, we do not propose to go into a detailed history of these different traditions. However, in order to set the stage for a possible African debate and research on the question of culture and development, it might be expedient to identify the relevant western schools of thought:

(a) The best known school "modernization theorists". Amongst them would be included writers such as W. E. Moore, N. J. Smelser, B. F. Hoselitz, E. E. Hagen, S. N. Eisenstadt, E. M. Rogers, D. McClelland, etc. Although these writers are a mixture of sociologists and what could be called "institutional economists", basically their work derives from Talcott Parsons' theory of "pattern variables", as expounded in The Social System (1948). In his book Talcott Parsons set up a paradigm which consisted of two polar ends or binary opposites, *modernity* and *traditionalism*. These could be identified by means of certain indicators, which he called "pattern variables". Simply put, these were: traditionalism is to modernity as parochialism is to universalism, ascription to achievement, affective to effective, and diffuseness to specificity. These attributes depended on the type of social values each society has. Significant shifts from the traditional end of the spectrum towards the other marked *social change*. Parsonsians have always argued that theirs is not a dichotomous schema, counter-posing the traditional against the modern, but rather a continuum capable of several combinations of variables. If granted, this implies a significant departure from Weber's sociology, of which Talcott Parsons is supposed to be the American heir-apparent. Max Weber is renowned among sociologists for his ideal-type analysis and cultural relativity. In the hands of Parsons the former became real-types, capable of measurement along a progressive scale of modernity. Secondly, modern capitalist society such as that of the United States became a terminus of all development. This dispensed with cultural relativity and replaced it with an absolute ethnocentric standard, the western bourgeoisie society. It also implied a unilineal model of development.

(b) Over-time the Parsonian paradigm infected cultural anthropologists as well in America, especially what came to be known as the Chicago School. Prominent among these were Robert Redfield (*The Primitive World and Its Transformation*, 1953) and Oscar Lewis (*The Children of Sanchez*, 1961). In their case traditional/primitive society was explicitly associated with "low culture"/"Little tradition", as against the "high culture"/"great tradition" of modern industrial society. Regrettably as it was from the point of view of liberal romanticism, the primitive or traditional societies were destined to be swept away by modern civilization. This was supposed to be reflected in the way traditional villages were being penetrated by metropolitan mores even in the most remote parts of countries such as Mexico. This found expression in the so-called "rural-urban" continuum which is associated with the Chicago School. The basic thesis was that with the spread of European industrial culture, rustic or traditional values were being gradually displaced by modern, "universal" values. Unlike the "modernization" theorists, cultural anthropologists did not think of this as either desirable or necessary but inevitable. From this point of view their position was more akin to that of Weber than to Talcott Parsons.

(c) The third and less well-known school which dealt with the problem of development and social values is that of the technological evolutionists. They are often referred to as the Columbia School of technological evolutionists. Marvin Harris and George Foster are the best known representatives among anthropologists. But there are others, mainly economists, who derived their ideas from C. E. Ayres instrumentalist philosophy. Among these, K. Baldwin, R. Manners, E. Service and Louis Junker are the best advocates. Their basic thesis is that social values can be divided into two main categories, ceremonial and instrumental. Traditional societies are characterized by the predominance of "ceremonial" values which militate against experimentation, whereas modern societies are characterized by instrumental values which encourage experimentation and reward technological innovation. This is reminiscent of Talcott Parsons' "effective" versus "affective", and "achievement" versus...
"prescriptive" values. Both ascribe social progress to individual initiative and achievement. The only difference is that in Parsonian sociology technological progress is endemic in modern societies and this is how "the social system" regulates itself in such a way that it maintains its equilibrium indefinitely. In contrast, the technological evolutionists saw technology not only as a prime mover but also as liberating force from retrograde "ceremonial" values.

(d) The fourth and opposed school within the western tradition is M axism, as has already been remarked. If it were not for its epistemology, the M axist paradigm comes closest to that of the technological evolutionists. Whilst in M axist theory a distinction is made between the superstructure, which represents philosophical and legal rationalizations, social ideologies and cultural forms and beliefs, and the infrastructure, which represents material and productive forces, it is the latter two (accumulated and live labour) which are accorded a determinant role. The superstructure is treated as a derivative category i.e. it is a reflection of what goes on in the infrastructure. For this reasons, in M axist theory the concept of "culture" is hardly elaborated (see W orleys, 1981), except in the general sense of "civilization" or the development of the arts.

The only occasion in which "culture" received a positive treatment in M axist theory is in relation to the question of the right of nations to self-determination or definition of nation, as such. Even then, it remains a subjective category. This is notwithstanding the fact that M axists have had some difficulties with language and family, both of which straddle the supra- and infrastructure. K inship relations can denote both culture and production relations. Language can be symbolic/expressive as well instrumental at the level of cognition and conceptualization as in the development of science. What all this points to is the fact that M axism is a child of European rationalism and is ill-equipped to deal with what is perceived as subjective aspects of social existence. However, it must be recognized that its emphasis on material factors at the expense of non-material factors was a reaction against Hegelian idealism. The question, then, is whether M ax’s followers the world over should forever be haunted by Hegel’s ghost.

### The Problematique in its Contemporary Setting

As is well-known, "modernization theories" have suffered a sharp decline since the mid-sixties. This was part of a general disillusionment with functionalism (see Gouldner 1971). But more specifically, it was a nationalistic revulsion from Third World social scientists against the western or northern presumption that in order to develop, their countries should be carbon copies of the west/north. The strongest attack on " modernization theories" came from Latin-A merica, spearheaded in particular by the "dependencia" theorists. They all denied that underdevelopment in Latin-A merica was due to traditional values or culture (see Sunkel, 1980). Instead, they maintained that it was attributable to structural factors that gave rise to the dependence of the south on the north, which had a constraining effect on the autonomous development of the south. As is acknowledged, Gunder Frank is probably the one who put in the last nail on the coffin of " modernization theories" when he published his article, "Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology" in 1966. The final verdict was that, on the basis of the Latin-A merican experience, " modernization theories" were empirically invalid and theoretically wanting "by their own standards".

A straight reading of this would lead to the conclusion that culture qua culture was irrelevant to the problem of development. Structural relationships between developed and underdeveloped countries was the underlying problem. In other words, while not ascribing an active role to culture in the process of development, the Latin-A mericans were satisfied that whatever cultures existed in their region were not a barrier to development. It is conceivable that Latin-A mericans whose modern culture is a derivative of European culture (including language) could afford this minimalistic position. Therefore, if culture could be treated as a common variable between them and M editerranean Europe, then their underdevelopment could not be explained by recourse to the same variable. The logical conclusion which could be drawn from this is that the nationalism of the "dependencia" theorists was structural rather than cultural. This deduction might not appeal to some chauvinistic Latin-A mericans. But from the point of view of the sociology of knowledge, it is not without significance that the most effective critique of theories which attributed lack of development to cultural differences came from Latin-A merica. In order to test the critical role of any variable, it is always convenient to be able to hold certain variables constant. For the reasons already given, Latin-A merica is the only region in the Third World which could do that *, culturally.

The 1970s saw "modernization" theorists on the retreat (see Gouldner, 1971 and Bottomore et al., 1982), yielding ground to the dependistas. The "dependencia" theorists anticipated anti-imperialist or nationalist struggles. What they did not anticipate was cultural revivalism in the Third World, which received its most dramatic expression in the Iranian revolution and Islamic fundamentalism in general. Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the political results thus far, it is clear that revolts against western domination have issued an increasing and general emphasis on local culture and traditions. This is the fountain from which nationalist movements draw their sustenance. However, such a quest for authenticity and an independent identity has not necessarily been linked directly to what in the current jargon is called "development". Third World nationalists often appeal to local culture, without saying clearly what kind of new society they wish to build, as is exemplified by Iran or Afghanistan. In Africa the nationalists have shown a great inclination towards western capitalism. Then, the interesting question is: if a genuine case were to be made, where would the African intellectuals begin?

It is obvious that evolutionist theories would oblige them to accept industrial capitalism and bourgeois culture as the apogee of development so far. The anthropological view of writers such as K rober or Redfield and Weber’s cultural relativism would seem attractive, but this would be succumbing to liberal idealism which has very little to do with the nasty praxis of development. It is true that We ber in his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1921) did tackle head on the question of values and development. Nevertheless, Weber, along with classical anthropologists, has been criticized for ignoring structural and material forces in his theory of development and change. Most of this criticism came, though not exclusively, form M axists, starting with Lukacs’ tour de force, History and Class Consciousness: Studies
in Marxist Dialectics (1926). But as has been warned, Marxists have never used “culture” as a critical concept in their theorization of society. Therefore, a radical call for the re-instatement of culture in development studies, justified as it is in the context of anti-imperialist. On the other hand, it is a deviation from classical Marxist theory, which is anti-imperialist in so far as it is anti-capitalist. Consequently, any explorations in this field represent a *terra nova* which should be approached with some reverence.

The Necessity of Culture

As is well-known, culture distinguishes man from brutes. It characterizes the human species and simultaneously divides it over time and space. The history of human civilizations testifies to this. Modern western civilization is the first civilization to try and homogenize culture. This is not only impoverishing, culturally-speaking, but is also inimical to development in so far as it denies so many other unexpected possibilities. Nonetheless, the invitation to the study of these possibilities should not be seen as affirmation, without negations. All cultures are subject to mutations and transformations. Since Tylor’s celebrated definition in 1871, it is generally known what culture encompasses in its complexity. What is not known in advance is what elements are possessed with a potential for farther development. This is a sensitive and intricate problem which cannot be deciphered through received theory or contrived universalism. It requires intimate knowledge of the dynamics of African culture in a contemporary setting. This has to be so because there is no way in which modern Africans can re-live their pre-colonial past. This does not detract from any calls for authenticity. Indeed, there have been calls from Third World intellectuals for the indigenization of the social sciences. This presupposes a rejection of received theory and an awareness and knowledge of indigenous modes of thought and doing. Africa is the worst victim of intellectual and cultural imperialism and, consequently, is in the grips of the worst development crisis ever. And yet, no clear views have emerged from African intellectuals as to how the situation could be remedied. This could be a measure of the social alienation of most African intellectuals. For instance, when views are solicited on the problem of rural and agricultural development, “experts” form the former imperial countries have more to say than the indigenous scholars. The reason is that the latter suffer from illusions of grandeur. They imagine that they could reach the summit, without having established a solid foundation. The foundation in Africa culturally- and practically-speaking, in the agrarian sector. If anything unique is to be discovered on the continent, it is most likely embedded there. The immediate challenge is to produce intellectual tools for unraveling it. This cannot be a solitary but a collective enterprise, involving a series of workshops and seminars in which well-considered papers, grounded on regional or local reality, are presented.

FESPAC in December, 1988 in Dakar could offer a useful and convenient platform for introducing the topic, raising the relevant questions and for setting up the machinery for further discussions and research.

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Archie Mafeje
African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes: An African Recovery in Thought*

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Preamble
Since the beginning of the present economic crisis in Africa, the continent has been inundated with “approved” programmes of economic recovery. These mainly came from credited international agencies, whose job it is to contrive such programmes for underdeveloped regions, especially. In Africa the most predominant since 1980 has been the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), sponsored by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These have been implemented in more than thirty African countries to date. In addition, there has been the FAO programmes, *African Agriculture: the Next 25 Years* (1986), and the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990 (UN-PAAERD).

During the same period (1985) the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic recovery 1986-1990 (APPER). From the point of view of re-direction of the African economies and the analytical grounds for it, there was nothing distinctive about APPER. Consequently, it had virtually no impact on its African audience. This is to be expected because the majority of African countries had already adopted the SAPs and had accepted the loans offered for the purpose - the so-called Structural Adjustment loans (SALs). Under the circumstances APPER was politically hollow, intellectually platitudinous, and financially uncompetitive.

In contrast, the programme sponsored by international agencies had everything going for them. Invariably they had the blessings of the developed countries, always bolstered up by great intellectual/technical pretensions and seductive financial benefits. Therefore, to varying degrees their sponsors tend to take for granted their intellectual and ideological presuppositions in dealing with Africa, especially. This is not to suggest that their postures are identical or static but that the intellectual reasons for any shift of positions have been for a very long time internal to them as far as Africa is concerned. Thus, the scope for scientific licence, political paternalism, and ideological mystification was unlimited.

In practice this has led to a situation where in changes in policy are highly arbitrary and dependent governments such as the African ones are tossed form pillar to post, without any clear scientific explanation. For instance, while in the 1960s and 1970s FAO was advocating individual land tenure and capitalist agriculture as a matter of policy and a “scientific” basis for development, since the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (WCA RRD) in 1979 it has emphasized the role of the poor in agricultural development and the need to alleviate rural poverty. In that context in 1981 it published a policy document entitled, *The Peasants’ Charter*. These were significant policy changes and FAO perceived them as such. Confronted with them in the 1980s the present author could not help remembering being rebuked, as a young consultant in 1974, for advocating the same thing and being described as “too ideological” by one of the FAO chiefs.

In 1986 when I read *African Agriculture: the next 25 years*, I knew FAO had come full circle. In a written response (Mafeje, 1987), I wanted to know the scientific/theoretical reasons for it. I knew that there were none for, if there were, they would have appeared in the document itself. Africans would have had the pleasure of learning a new scientific theory about agrarian transformation, new methods for allocation of production factors, especially distribution of land or improved land tenure regimes for future development. The only deduction that could be made from this lack of intellectual consistency is that while FAO might be sensitive enough not to push too hard its earlier neoclassical orthodoxy, in the case of Africa this has left it with neither a coherent theory of agrarian transformation nor clear recommendations on land policy. Instead, it is guided by normative values which are noble in themselves but do not advance our scientific understanding of the development problems of the continent. Existing theories must be upheld or discarded according to their explanatory power, and not be merely suspended for anybody’s convenience.

This demand is perfectly consistent with the canons of scientific positivism. Indeed, what on the surface gave the World Bank its intellectual dominance among the international development agencies over the last ten years is that it prides itself on applying these proven principles, without compromise. Despite Robert McNamara’s flirtation with the idea of “small producers” in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the World Bank technocrats were theoretically less concerned about this and were itching to get back to undiluted neoclassical economic theory. With the change of guard in that vaunted power-house later in the 1970s, they got their chance. McNamara’s policies in Africa had failed and the African economies were in shambles because of certain economic irrationalities and a certain international soft-mindedness or sentimentality. The new marching orders were foreshadowed in the now famous or infamous (depending on how one looks at it) Berg report, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*, World Bank, Washington D.C., 1981. As is well-known, the report had a great impact but largely negative. African governments, which had just the year before adopted their own blue-print, the Lagos Plan of Action (1980), were jolted. Publicly, they refused to endorse the Berg Report on the grounds that it contradicted their own policy priorities, as set out in the Lagos Plan of A ction.

In spite of the unfulfilment of the Lagos Plan of Action, the issues were clear. The World Bank was insisting on the reinstatement of neoclassical orthodoxy. Among other things, this entailed concentration on capitalist farmers and export agriculture, elimination of price controls, removal
of agricultural and food subsidies, liquidation of parastatals in favour of the private sector, and curtailment of public spending. On the other hand, the African governments, while not equipped with any particular orthodoxy, knew from political experience that there was a range of things they could not afford. Foremost among these was the question of food subsidies for populations which generally suffered from sub-minimal levels of income and the plight of small producers whose economic situation was getting so desperate that, without government financial support, the alternative was chronic food shortages among the rural and urban poor with predictable consequences.

In the posture adopted by most African governments on this issue there might have been a huge dose of cynicism. But this does not matter so much. What matters most is their sense of reality or of the objective situation. If at first they were afraid that they may endanger their survival by endorsing publicly the Berg Report, since their individual capitulation to the SA Ps subsequently provoked nothing dramatic, most might have got encouraged to forget about the Lagos Plan of Action. This is particularly so that they were promised continued blood transfusion in the form of SALs and that, if they played the game according to the rules, recovery was inevitable. Whether or not recovery has come to the SALs adopters, as time ticks away there is bound to be increasing anxiety, if not apprehension, among both the adopters and the authors of the programmes. This is especially so that all along there had been a certain amount of muted scepticism among some African intellectuals and policy-analysts.

**AAF-SAP: Its Intellectual and Theoretical Significance**

In reviewing AAF-SAP the intention is not only to pay tribute to its architects, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) under the leadership of its Executive Secretary, Professor Adebayo Adedeji, but also to bring it to the attention of African intellectuals and scholars. Through OAU representatives and African Ministers of Economic Planning and Development, and of Finance, African politicians and policy-makers are fully aware of the document. As the document represents basically a framework, it will certainly require further elaboration and research. In the given division of labour, this falls largely on the shoulders of African scholars. Here, one is reminded of the role of the Latin-American scholars in the 1960s and early 1970s under the stimulus of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). As is well-known, this gave rise to a pervasive paradigm which was distinctly Latin-American and yet inspired scholars everywhere in the Third World by proving the fallibility of northern conventional wisdom. For a paradigm to achieve such a transformational effect, it does not have to be “right” on every specification within its field of discourse. So it was with the Dependencia paradigm. It is sufficient to show through systematic analysis and methodological rigour that there could be an alternative, if the various omissions of existing theories were taken into account. In other words, the selection of indices for measurement is as important as the measurement itself. In our view, this is precisely what gave birth to the AAF-SAP.

**Indictment Against the Bank**

In its review of the World Bank’s report *Africa’s Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s* (1989), the ECA accused the Bank of the following:

a) manipulation of statistical data to confirm pre-conceived ideas;

b) a simplified approach which failed to take into account external factors, the social costs of adjustment, and long-term negative effects of the recommended adjustment policies;

c) ignoring the role of aid flows which favoured adjusting countries and thus penalized non-adjusting countries;

d) arbitrary classification of sub-Saharan African countries into “strong” adjusting, “weak” adjusting, and non-adjusting;
e) indiscriminate price decontrol; and
f) anti-social curtailment of public spending.

On (a) the evidence presented in a document entitled *Statistics and Policies* (1989) was devastating. Using weighted averages and 1980 as the baseline, instead of the unweighted averages used by the Bank and 1985 (an exceptionally good year) as its baseline, ECA was able to show that: “…during 1980–1987 the performance of Sub-Saharan African countries with strong SA Ps was the worst of any group; a negative annual average growth rate of -0.53 percent contrasted with a positive 2.00 percent for countries with weak structural adjustment programmes and a relatively strong positive rate of 3.5 percent for non-adjusting countries in Sub-Saharan Africa”. Although the World Bank tried to find formal excuses for its omissions, substantively, it was not able to prove in this reply that its findings were not spurious. The rest of the points by ECA concerned approach to development itself. While at first the Bank was inclined to argue that its programmes are basically a stop-gap and do not aim at long-term development, later it produced a report, *Poverty Adjustment, and Growth in Africa* (1989), which purported to deal with all the social issues and problems of equity raised by agencies such as ECA and UNICEF. Therefore, the challenge form the ECA’s African Alternative Framework should help to clarify the matter.

**The Challenge**

Although the ECA at times made it appear that its critical comments on the orthodoxy of the structural adjustment programmes were nothing more than a call for a modification of policy instruments and measures, in fact they were tantamount to an explicit rejection of the approach of the World Bank and the IMF. Likewise, the attempt by the World Bank to give the impression that it could embrace a “human-centred” development strategy, without abandoning its basic philosophy of development, was misleading. If, as the ECA did, the following were declared unacceptable:

- Drastic budgetary reductions, especially with respect to expenditures and
subsidies on social services and essential goods;

- Indiscriminate promotion of traditional exports through price incentives offered only to "tradeables";
- A cross-the-board credit squeeze;
- Generalized devaluation through open foreign exchange markets, currency auctions and large and frequent currently depreciations;
- Unsustainable high real interest rates;
- Total import liberalization;
- Over-dependence on market forces for getting the "prices right" in structurally distorted and imperfect market situation and
- Doctrinaire privatization.

What would the World Bank be left with as building blocks for its programme? For all intents and purposes, the World Bank is committed to laissez-faire policies and by implication to old-fashioned "trickle-down" suppositions. In contrast, the ECA upholds the principle of government intervention in the allocation of resources and income distribution. These represent two different approaches to the problem of development and transformation in Africa.

In the light of this, one of the questions that has been raised is whether the rejection of the World Bank orthodoxy amounted to a serious questioning of neoclassical assumptions and a new contribution to African development theory. This might not be part of the ECA's brief but that of the African academic community in general. However, the supposition could be made that there is a relationship between ECA's intellectual/scientific endeavours and those of the African academic institutions. If this turns out not to be the case, as one suspects, then the implications are very serious indeed. Therefore, it might be worthwhile to check to what extent are the ECA's prescriptions under AAF-SAP informed by the discourse that has taken place beforehand in African academic institutions.

Broadly speaking, the AAF-SAP advocates a mixed economy approach. This idea had been on the agenda since the Indian second five-year plan in the fifties and had been adopted in Africa since independence as a matter of necessity for the same reasons as advanced by the ECA. Secondly, the problem of growth with equity had been debated fiercely in academic circles since the Arusha Declaration by the Tanzanian government. According to the debate spreads from the University of Dar-es-Salaam to other university campuses in Zambia, Nigeria, and Kenya by the end of the 1970s. For that matter, it might not be an accident that the SALs have had an extremely mixed reception in countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, and Nigeria. Thirdly, the concept of "self-reliant" development, nationally and regionally, had also received a great deal of attention from African scholars between 1968 and 1975 under the influence of the Latin-American dependency theory. Fourthly, though to a limited extent, the question of the relationship between external and domestic demand had already been raised in the context of export crops versus food crops. Fifthly, although not an area of concentration by any means, since the end of the 1970s the limitations of import-substitution industrialization strategy with regards to production of essential goods for mass consumption had been made apparent.

It is, therefore, surprising to discover that after a brilliant critique of the World Bank SAPs the ECA technical staff have not been able to take advantage of prior insights by African scholars and go beyond what is given. For instance, in the AAF-SAP under Strengthening and Diversifying Production Capacity in table 5.2 reference is made to "land reforms" and "increased inter-linkages between agriculture and industry". "Land reform" is a term which frequently features in policy recommendations in Latin-America and Asia. In Africa nobody knows precisely what it refers to, outside the settler economies of Southern Africa. In Sub-Saharan Africa it used to be associated with the introduction of individual land tenure and modern technology. But both these indices have been under serious review up to as late as the Third Government Consultation on Follow-up to WCA RRD in Africa in Addis Ababa, October, 1989. As a result of sustained research on land tenure systems in Sub-Saharan Africa by no more than five African scholars, FAO can no longer vaguely refer to something called "land reform" in Africa. How much more with ECA?

Secondly, while there can be no question about the desirability of food self-sufficiency in Africa, it is not quite clear what would be the role of agriculture in the changed circumstances. This is bearing in mind that conventionally and historically agriculture had been looked upon as an earner of foreign exchange and a source of primitive accumulation. Under the twin concepts of "sustainable growth" and "preservation of the environment", would African agriculture be able to meet all these requirements? This is particularly pertinent because contrary to the assumptions of the AAF-SAP, African agriculture has not suffered necessarily because of technological level but its performance continues to approximate to the low technological level. In the mean time, there are reports everywhere in Africa about the degradation of the soil. In the circumstances intensification of technological factors a self-evident policy instrument, as the ECA is inclined to suggest.

This brings us to the third issue, "increased inter-linkages" between agriculture and industry. It might well be that what is at stake here is not the magnitude of inter-linkages between the two but the type of inter-linkages. It has been complained that import-substitution industrialization led to a discrepancy between resource use and domestic demand and that agriculture was used, without any transformational benefits. Likewise, one of the charges against the SAPs is that they are anti-industrialization in their effects. The question then is: at the stage of primitive accumulation what is going to be the relationship between agriculture and industry and what is going to be the dynamic link between the two, especially under the rigours of "self-reliance" and scarcity of foreign exchanges? The ECA's interesting idea of diversifying export crops by diversifying their products can be subsumed under "agro-industries", which need not be outward-oriented. These are some of the questions on which policy makers need guidance which goes beyond the usual economic clichés.

Consistent with its idea of "human-centred" development, the AAF-SAP is very strong on Pattern of Expenditure for the Satisfaction of Needs. By placing a priority on the satisfaction of critical social needs, investment in human capital and raising the living standards of the majority of the population, the AAF-SAP succeeded in putting upside-down the paradigm of the World Bank. But it would seem
that the emphasis on increased consumption is not matched by equally stout policy instruments and measures for increased production. In recommendations under Improving the Level of Income and the Pattern of its Distribution the main concern is how to augment government revenues. Although frequent reference is made to “productive investment” of revenues so gained, this remains unspecified and no clear long-term pattern of investment emerges under the section. It is true that under the previous section, Strengthening and Diversifying Production Capacity, agriculture is given priority mainly from the point of view of food self-sufficiency and employment opportunities. This still leaves us with a largely consumption-oriented development strategy. The same comments could be made in regard to the separation of social services from production and treating them as a purely bureaucratic responsibility.

It would seem that whatever happens in Africa in the next few years, “diversifying production capacity” must go beyond the usual preoccupation with crop diversification within agriculture and confront the problem of diversification of production within the economy as a whole. For instance, is agriculture going to be maintained in the intermediate future as the leading sector, despite the low added value in its products and high market inelasticities? This question could be answered in relation to the role of mineral wealth in the future development of the continent. Very little attention has been paid to this factor and no reference is made to it in the AAF-SAP. Yet, the strategic value of minerals in rapidly industrializing world and their potential for regional industrialization cannot be minimized. It must be remembered that it is this kind of wealth which made countries such as South Africa. A mong African countries Botswana is making effective use of it and it is hoped that Namibia will follow suit. But what about the rest of mineral-rich African countries? One cannot help feeling that the AAF-SAP could have been more forthcoming on prospects and strategies for industrialization in Africa i.e. an alternative to mere import-substitution.

Finally, we come to the section on Institutional Support for Adjustment with Transformation. Here, the concern is agrarian development and transformation. The frame of reference used is fairly conventional – credit facilities, extension services, mobilization of small producers (especially women), popular participation, NGOs, self help, and promotion of cottage industries. All these activities are subsumed under the concept of “integrated rural development”, which has gained currency in recent years. But the question is: what is “transformational” about it? Be it noted that historically, this referred to a transformation from one set of institutions to another or from one level of technological development to another. In Sub-Saharan Africa the rural institutions are kinship- or communally-based. Modernization advocates, including the World Bank, conceived of transformations as a movement away from such institutions to more individualized and privatized forms of ownership and production. Technologically, they equated this with the adoption of western machinery and production techniques. Both assumptions have become a source of controversy in contemporary Africa.

Therefore, it would have been useful if the AAF-SAP had spelled out the kind of transformation its authors had in mind. Allusions to accelerated “process of achieving a green revolution in Africa” will not allay the worst fears among some African analysts, given the Asian experience and that of African countries such as Nigeria. If what is envisaged is industrialization of agriculture, then this cannot be realized, without basic industrialization of the African economies themselves. Therefore, what is needed most is advice on the intermediate steps. There are enough ideas and research findings to make this feasible. In fact, some of the evidence would have come from ECA itself. When they discovered that it was the “weak adjusting” and non-adjusting African countries that did best during the crisis of the 1980s, they should have been able to derive clues from that experience for formulating practicable policies for the future. What adjustments did these countries make on their own to survive the crisis?

Conclusion

From the point of view of the psychology of knowledge-making, it is of historic importance that the ECA was able to issue the challenge it did. Even more significant, psychologically, is the fact that what its technical staff wrote is something which they had already known or was known but for one thing: the implicit belief in the infallibility of external agencies such as the World Bank. The simple discovery that the statistical claims of the World Bank were spurious gave them the confidence to give vent to suppressed, authentic, intellectual knowledge. Prior to this, the same external intellectual dominance might have led to the devaluation of internal intellectual capital. Otherwise, how else do we explain the fact that the recommendations of the AAF-SAP start from a lower scientific base than would be justified by the state of the arts within Africa?

Nonetheless, it is worth reiterating that the AAF-SAP is an effective critique of the SAPs and thus has created a new policy environment in Africa. It falls short of providing a recognizable alternative, as against a modification of the World Bank’s flawed framework, this should be welcomed as an invitation to African researchers scholars to make good any deficiencies therein. It is very rare for a holistic framework to be evenly developed in a single shot. A bove all the temptation towards reformism is ever so present, especially when social indices are included as an integral part of development models, which are by convention “economic”. This political economy approach favoured in the AAF-SAP has been in disuse for sometime or associated with “leftists”. Now that there are no leftists to worry about any more, it might be the time has come to experiment with new models, without appealing to the usual prejudices of the west.

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On ‘Icons’ and African Perspectives on Democracy: A Commentary on Jibrin Ibrahim’s Views

In the context of Jibrin Ibrahim’s polemic against ‘Icons’, it could easily be retorted that the opposite of ‘Icon’ is ‘neophyte’ (from the Greek word, neophytes, meaning ‘newly planted’). Whether we think of it as ‘newly initiated’ or ‘novice’ the emotive connotations would not be soothing to anybody’s ego. Therefore, why appeal to those terrible things, human passions - green, yellow, and red? Why not keep to essence - black and white - so that we can tell with clarity whether it is a funeral or a wedding; a requiem for the ‘icons’ or an overture for ‘neophytes’.

Jibrin Ibrahim’s strictures against what he calls ‘icons’ can neither be clarified nor validated because they violate all the rules of intellectual discourse. First, nowhere in his diatribe does he define his terms. Second, he uses abstracted single sentences as substitute for studied texts. Third, he shows great disregard for historical and empirical facts. Fourth and most disconcertingly, he has no argument but merely a series of subjective complaints. Fifth and sadly, he seems to be oblivious of the dangers of ‘finger-pointing’ or of ad hominem accusations. Failure to become ‘unabashed celebrants of liberalism’ does not in all honesty render any of Ibrahim’s chosen ‘icons’ liable to accusations of having spent ‘too little time learning or practising’ (in this case fighting for) democracy.

To a great extent, liberalism as an ideology is organised to guarantee the social reproduction of the state. The state is organised to guarantee the social reproduction of the state and this part of the social character of the state accounts for the origins and the social character of the state. In the case of feudal Europe it was a question of liberating whole classes from either bondage or political subordination. It is obvious that to liberate people from generalised servitude or oppression, recognition of the individual has great intrinsic as well as strategic value. However, this does not detract from the fact that social liberation of any kind is a collective responsibility.

This is an issue which plagued European bourgeois social thought and philosophy until the first quarter of this century. This irony of history did not escape the attention of such well-known ‘laissez-faire’ individualists as Auguste Comte (1789-1857) and H. Spencer (1820-1903). Their problem was how to reconcile individual freedom with the necessity for social organisation. Accepting the latter as a necessary evil, they resolved the issue by drawing a sharp distinction between the ‘state’ and ‘civil society’. In this context the state was seen as generally inclined to impose its will on individuals and it was thought that individuals could save themselves from the imposition by insisting on independent existence outside the state. Thus ‘civil society’ came to symbolise a community of private citizens who by virtue of their collective existence and political vigilance guaranteed individual freedom. Part of this was, of course, illusory for two major reasons.

First, as is known, civil society derived its strength from organisation. Secondly, insofar as civil society is organised into different social groups with different interests, it is open to social competition for power. Thus, the necessity for social organisation and the self-imposing imperative to protect common interests in practice make nonsense of the abstracted ‘individual’ of the ‘laissez-faire’ theorists. Without collective commitment, individuals cannot be defended. The significance of this assertion becomes apparent only if we are able to decide in our own minds whether individuals are subjects or objects of freedom. Bourgeois thinkers became self-contradictory on this matter because while they insisted on individualism and treated the state with great suspicion, they at the time maintained that not only was it the right of the state to guarantee civil liberties but also its duty to protect them. But the state could not guarantee all this, without reserving the right to overrule individuals or even groups if justified according to the same constitution which theoretically binds it to its citizens.

On Liberalism and Liberal Democracy

Jibrin Ibrahim simply fails to define either of these two terms. The nearest he comes to define ‘liberal democracy’ is to make a vague reference to people’s attachment to their civil and political rights as individuals’, and ‘bourgeois social thought and philosophy until the first quarter of this century. This irony of history did not escape the attention of such well-known “laissez-faire” individualists as Auguste Comte (1789-1857) and H. Spencer (1820-1903). Their problem was how to reconcile individual freedom with the necessity for social organisation. Accepting the latter as a necessary evil, they resolved the issue by drawing a sharp distinction between the “state” and “civil society”. In this context the state was seen as generally inclined to impose its will on individuals and it was thought that individuals could save themselves from the imposition by insisting on independent existence outside the state. Thus “civil society” came to symbolise a community of private citizens who by virtue of their collective existence and political vigilance guaranteed individual freedom. Part of this was, of course, illusory for two major reasons.

First, as is known, civil society derived its strength from organisation. Secondly, insofar as civil society is organised into different social groups with different interests, it is open to social competition for power. Thus, the necessity for social organisation and the self-imposing imperative to protect common interests in practice make nonsense of the abstracted “individual” of the “laissez-faire” theorists. Without collective commitment, individuals cannot be defended. The significance of this assertion becomes apparent only if we are able to decide in our own minds whether individuals are subjects or objects of freedom. Bourgeois thinkers became self-contradictory on this matter because while they insisted on individualism and treated the state with great suspicion, they at the time maintained that not only was it the right of the state to guarantee civil liberties but also its duty to protect them. But the state could not guarantee all this, without reserving the right to overrule individuals or even groups if justified according to the same constitution which theoretically binds it to its citizens.

The second major point is that the counterposition between “state” and “civil society” is part of bourgeois mystification because it fails to identify the state according to its origins and social character. There is no such a thing as an undifferentiated civil society. Part of civil society accounts for the origins and the social character of the state and this part is organised to guarantee the social reproduction of the state and benefits by it. For instance, what is popularly called “petit bourgeois” / neo-colonial” governments in Africa is not autogenous apparatus but rather a reflection of the social interests of the emergent African elites. Sociologically, these are identifiable as the educated elite, politicians, senior bureaucrats, estate/commercial farmers, and businessmen – mainly parasitic merchants.
Despite the denial of civil liberties and frequent violation of human rights in Africa, these elements sway by bourgeois democracy and in most cases it is written into their national constitutions. They are sufficiently indoctrinated in bourgeois ideology and in their own inferiority that they are consumed by a great desire for bourgeois respectability. When this cannot suffice, they opportunistically appeal to ‘traditional’ African values such as the justification for the one-party state and life presidencies in Africa. They know that, objectively, they cannot afford bourgeois democracy and the most they can do is to pretend. The result is that there are neither guiding principles nor authenticity in the running of national affairs. In the circumstances, the road is open to arbitrary and personalized use of power by the rulers and what would have been the objective functions of the state, even a reactionary one, become secondary. Contrary to Ibrahim’s fervent belief, the cure of this socio-political aberration is not reversion to liberal democracy anywhere in the world. This is, indeed, a foreclosure which befits an ‘icon’. However, in mitigation it can be stated that it is not born of dogmatism but of a more than casual reading of the development of bourgeois democracy.

Philosophically speaking, World War I marked the end of ‘liberal democracy’ as a leading bourgeois ideology. Different issues had emerged. First was the question of whether ‘bourgeois democracy’ was realisable at all in ex-colonial countries dominated by imperialism. This was raised by socialist idealists in the wake of the Russian revolution. Their concern was not repudiation of civil liberties as had been attained under liberal democracy but rather socialist democracy which was seen as a negation of class rule and exploitation. Although this got associated with the ‘proletariat’ revolution and international ‘socialism’ among Marxists or members of the Third International, the critique of liberal democracy itself was not limited to them. It had become general in capitalist countries in a way which is hardly acknowledged by their historians. The risk of labour parties or social democratic parties in different parts of Western Europe and the failure of the liberal parties to win popular support in the inter-war period and after the Second World War were strong pointers to the inadequacies of liberal democracy. These did not centre on civil liberties but on actual distribution of power and wealth. This remains the issue whether raised inside or outside capitalist societies.

In this connection, it is well to remember that social indictment is not about the good that is given but about the good that is seen but denied. Therefore, it is rather inane to suppose that a critique of liberal democracy is essentially a denial of the value of the rights which liberal democracy ushered in its heyday. Consequently, the cutting edge of any contemporary demands for democracy should be the perceived good which is denied by existing social systems. If, for instance, liberal democracy is offered as a sop to the ‘African masses’, is it not the duty of African intellectuals to show in what ways this is historically fraudulent? It might come as a surprise to Ibrahim to discover that his African ‘icons’ did not have to ‘demolish’ liberal democracy because that had already been done by the societies which invented it.

First, it was European voters who passed a negative verdict against liberal parties in the aftermath of World War I. It was not an ideological reversion but a well-founded perception of the good that was not being delivered. This did not become crystal clear until the onset of the ‘Deep Depression’ of 1929-1933. Liberal individualism could not give any solace to multitudes of unemployed and starving individuals nor could ‘laissez-faire’ theories of the 19th century suffice. The liberal model with its trickle-down suppositions had collapsed. This cleared the way for the Keynesian revolution in economics. Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ was jettisoned in favour of the visible hand of the state in the management of national economies. For political expediency, the state interference in the allocation of labour and resources, and in the redistribution of value in the form of free social services was beguilingly referred to as ‘indicative planning’. In fact, this signalled the rise of the welfare state which had different ideological underpinnings from those of liberal individualism or ‘laissez-faire’. The governments of the day were called upon to intervene to stimulate economic growth, to create employment, and to guarantee the livelihood of the unemployed/unemployable. This is precisely what the social democrats had been agitating for since the end of the 19th century.

In the circumstances, the only crime the African ‘icons’ might have committed is to take all this for granted and for good historical reasons to ask for more. It is the ‘more’ which is, theoretically and politically, interesting because it is not self-evident. It leads to divergent views which are worth considering in their own right, especially with regard to the question of whether or not African and other Third World countries can hope to reproduce the socio-historical experience of the West. Failure to confront this fundamental question can only lead to such drippings-wet arguments as ‘half a loaf is better than no bread’. These are no arguments but jaded apologists which sounded the death knell of liberalism – the inclination to be charitable where else fails. Although Ibrahim confuses ‘liberalism’ with ‘liberal democracy’, the two terms have come to denote two entirely different things. ‘Liberalism’ has become an expression of contempt in intellectual and political debates precisely because it does not offer any solutions but apologetics. Witness the contempt in which democratic Americans hold liberals since the doomed attempt by President Truman to set the clock back after World War II. Yet, the Americans nationally are willing to destroy half of humanity in defence of ‘liberal democracy’. Social democracy having been publicly renounced on their continent, the Europeans are also willing to beat the drums of war but are not brash enough to do it themselves. In the circumstances, why would any self-respecting African ‘icon’ be expected to condone such cynicism and to engage in a feckless parody of ‘liberal democracy’?

On ‘Liberal’ and ‘Socialist Democracy’

On this particular issue, Jibrin Ibrahim can be accused of muddled thinking and a woeful lack of sense of historiography. Metaphorically, albeit inelegantly, it could be said that: “liberal democracies evolved social democracy”. But, historically and analytically, this obscures the fact that it was those who objected to the omissions of liberal democracy, namely, the workers and their socialist/Marxist allies, who were instrumental in the evolution of social democracy within bourgeois society. Secondly, if ‘liberal democracies’ is used as a metaphor for bourgeois society, then it must be granted that, historically, bourgeois society produced a number of other things such as fascism, dictatorships, socialists, Marxists, colonialists, racists, and imperialists. To avoid depicting
Ibrahim as a starry-eyed neophyte, it could be granted that he knows about all these things but that his ideological interest is to affirm the virtues of liberal democracy and to decry the iniquities of “socialism” or Marxist doctrines. The moment for this type of exercise could not be any more felicitous. However, history does not begin or end with the rise and fall of the so-called socialist societies in Eastern Europe.

It is very demeaning to suggest that an African icon should celebrate liberal democracy simply because “socialist” regimes did nothing else but degenerate into dictatorships. In the event what would be an African about them? Or is there an alleged “universalist Marxism” there? Naturally the collapse of Eastern European societies has theoretical implications for socialists/Marxists but it does not dispose of social problems that inheres in capitalist society. The issue concerning “liberal democracy” versus “social democracy” was about distribution of the social product and political power between classes in capitalist societies. Whether this issue is referred to as “socialism” or “social democracy” is immaterial. What is of critical importance is that liberal democracy does not address it and consequently it got superseded by programmes which do.

Everywhere the battle lines are drawn very clearly between the Right, which firmly believes in concentration of wealth and power, and to that extent is prepared to dismantle the welfare state and to dispense with distributive justice, and the Left, which fervently believes in the redistribution of wealth and power in favour of underprivileged classes. The left having suffered defeat and loss of credibility since the reversals in Eastern Europe, is finding it difficult to formulate a new programme and to devise strategies for its implementation. At the same time, it is obvious that retreat into liberalism under conditions in which it has been over-taken by historical events is of no avail, despite Ibrahim’s illusions. New and critical thinking is what is required.

Pronouncements by African scholars, like any other, can fruitfully be reviewed against the background of changing historical perspectives. For instance, in rejecting liberalism and the limitations of liberal democracy as were experienced in Europe, the African ‘icons’ are sailing in well-chartered waters. In advocating socio-democracy as well as democratic pluralism, they are on firm ground since this has in fact become a universal issue precisely because of the collapse of the so-called socialist societies in Eastern Europe. They helped to re-introduce the question of social democracy in ‘united’ Europe which, predictably, issued in the rise of fascism in Western Europe, the centre of wealth and privilege. Mahmoud Mamdani’s point about the rights of citizens and non-citizens would apply here but would not necessarily be attributable to “liberal democracy” but rather to the anachronistic conception of the “nation-state” at the moment of its historical suppression. In the Third World the collapse had the effect of intensifying popular rebellion against external control and comprador regimes in the wake of an aggressive drive by the Western powers to consolidate their global stranglehold in the name of a “new world order”, as is boisterously declared by “ugly American”. It is this popular energy which the African and their allies are trying to channel into “liberal” solutions which they themselves have long forsaken. They patronise Third World countries by setting lower standards for them than for themselves and by telling them that “half a loaf is better than no bread”. Where is the full loaf? Is it the privilege of the Western bourgeoisie?

Universal struggles, despite the supposed collapse of “socialism”, would indicate that nowhere is this accepted unquestioningly. In Europe the struggle for social democracy is such that the triumphant right-wing is not able to consolidate the power of the bourgeoisie, without making social democratic concessions, as is shown by the vicissitudes of the Maastricht Treaty or the frustrated GATT talks for more than six years. The pressures are felt most acutely at the national level. The gullible Eastern European reformist regimes have discovered, in the shortest possible time, the folly of offering liberal democracy at this historical juncture, without social democracy. Some have even imagined that they could escape their plight by selling their countries piece-meal to the West for a morsel of bread. Empty promises and the shutting of the floodgates has been the response from the West partly because of the fear of internal repercussions but basically because it still harbours imperialist motives towards Eastern Europe. Therefore; the struggle for social democracy in Europe will continue unabated. What needs to be reviewed is the relationship between such struggles and what was perhaps erroneously called ‘socialism’ in Eastern Europe.

In this regard, Samir Amin is correct in maintaining that the collapse in Eastern Europe does not foreclose any discussion on socialism. However, it would seem that the burden for elucidating the logical implications of social democratic struggles by extra-population as happened in the past, falls squarely on the shoulders of the left.

There are pragmatic grounds for posing the question this way. In Third World countries the struggle for social democracy entails a number of other freedoms which might have already been attained in the North e.g. civil rights and national self-determination. Anti-imperialist struggles are still reality in their case and, nationally, denial of civil liberties by regimes which lack legitimacy but enjoy enough external support to hold onto power indefinitely is common-place. These jointly put the national question firmly on the agenda. Therefore Amin, Shivji and myself are hardly mistaken in emphasizing the right to self-determination and the right of the people to chose for themselves. It is also known that the people do not only want to be free to organise themselves and to express their views but also to have adequate access to means of livelihood or a fair share of the national product. This could mean any of a number of things. Therefore, in dismissing liberal democracy as inadequate it is incumbent upon the African ‘icons’ to say what their conception of the new dispensations would look like almost in the same way that progressive Northerners would be required to say what is the possible articulation between social democratic struggles in advanced capitalist countries and the transition to full social equity, whatever it is called.

In approaching the national question, say, in Africa it is an acceptable orthodoxy among African ‘icons’ to think in terms of a “democratic national alliance”, certain classes having been left out after independence. It is also a Marxist or socialist orthodoxy to think in terms of “classes”. But are members of a class always organised as such everywhere? For instance, what happened in Ethiopia, Chad, Somalia or Liberia? Was it a purely class phenomenon? It would seem that in evolving a social-construct for our social democratic revolution it would be necessary to take into consideration forms of social organisation other than “classes”. Claude Ake,
Alarm Bells Ringing

Some time in October last year I received some frenzied telephone calls from some Egyptian intellectuals and scholars, enquiring indignantly: 'What kind of African scholar is this Ali Mazrui? How can he say that Africa needs recolonisation?' 'Where and when?' I asked in my bewilderment. It turned out that some had seen it as a commentary in Arabic newspapers and others had heard it in the newsreel. However, none could identify the source of the news. This seemed to be of lesser importance than the message itself. It was that dramatic and probably this is what Ali Mazrui had intended. Of course, being an African myself, I had to see it to believe it. This proved very difficult and frustrating. It was not until I went to Europe in January 1995 that I could get hold of a copy of the original text from African colleagues. Significantly enough, they had been discussing the article among themselves while their European 'hosts' looked on smilingly.

The conjuncture is most unfortunate as it coincides with the period when European racism has reached new heights under the leadership of the Christian Democrats or Conservatives. This might not have entered Mazrui's mind whose extreme egocentrism is well-known among African scholars within the continent and in the diaspora. Suffice it to say, the article had appeared in the International Herald Tribune of August 4, 1994 but distributed by the Los Angeles Times Syndicate. Ironically enough, the particular copy I received was printed in Pretoria, where Africans have just ascended to power. The juxtaposition must have infuriated them, as it did the OAU and some ECA representatives in Addis Ababa. But, as will be seen later, Ali Mazrui spares the South Africans for entirely different reasons.

Some African scholars I talked to over the phone were also shocked but not surprised, including those who are personally close to Ali Mazrui. Among other things, this makes it possible to discuss Ali Mazrui's utterances, without personal rancour.

Ali Mazrui's Record

Ali Mazrui is by some reckoning the most prominent African professor. According to report, he is at present one of the three 'mega-professors' in the social sciences in the USA. He is also one of the only two African scholars who have ever been asked to give the Reith Lectures in England. Likewise, he has had the rare privilege of being put in charge of a multi-million dollar programme for the BBC called The Africans. Furthermore, he has had the honour of being invited to join the Advisory Board of the World Bank. There are many lesser honours which Ali Mazrui would reel out without any prompting for there is one thing he did not learn from the British, namely, that self-praise is no recommendation. His pride lay elsewhere. As he declared in an Afro-Arab conference in Sharja in 1977, this was part of what he described as 'counter-penetration' of the colonizers by the colonized. Nobody was convinced. In fact, one of the African scholars from the USA walked out of the conference room, protesting that 'This fellow is obscene.' It was not to Ali Mazrui's Freudian metaphor that he was objecting so much but rather to his grotesque intellectual rationalisations. But even so, what Ali Mazrui had going for him was enough to excite the envy of many a professor in Africa and, indeed, elsewhere.

For these accomplishments Ali Mazrui is often described in the Western media as a 'leading African scholar'. Even in the article under review, the editors did not forget to project him as a 'Kenyan author'. Why not AImbongi La Kerina or the Professor of African Studies in New York? The fact of the matter is that Ali Mazrui is serviceable to the Americans, the British and the African. The latter is more relevant than anything else for there are other outstanding African scholars but who might not be so serviceable. Samir Amin is first and foremost among them. Not only has he made a lasting contribution to the devel-
opment of social science in Africa but also his scientific integrity and scholarship is of a different order altogether compared to Ali Mazrui’s. Owing to the fact that his is not serviceable to imperialism, instead of honouring him, they dishonoured him in the UN system, despite the fact that IDEP was flourishing under his intellectual leadership. (Ali M. Mazrui might not even remember this, given his preference for airy-fairy-effusions.) Needless to say, all this was done with the complicity of the same putrid African governments whose countries Ali M. Mazrui is recommending for ‘recolonisation’.

Another interesting and illustrative example right next door to Ali M. Mazrui is Edward Said, the illustrious Palestinian Professor of Literary and Cultural Criticism at Columbia University. His scholarship and erudition would put Ali M. Mazrui to abysmal shame. Yet, in the same way as in Samir Amin’s case, his unserviceability to imperialism (see his book, Culture and Imperialism, 1993) has brought him nothing else but Levitical abominations. This makes one wonder whether what we are talking about is scholarship or something else.

There is no doubt that Ali M. Mazrui has a brilliant mind that by all counts he is a prolific writer. He has written more than 20 books and numerous articles. He is a gifted writer, a master at coining catchy phrases and at conjuring up images of the grotesque and the ridiculous. For the same reason his oratory is unsurpassed and attracts big audiences. Yet, with all this in his favour Ali M. Mazrui has hardly any followers among African scholars. He has produced no body of knowledge which they could use for building sustainable systems of thought about African societies. Like newspaper articles or commentaries, his books are read albeit with pleasure and forgotten. Even worse, in immediate encounters he tends to draw a negative intellectual and ideological response from African scholars – young and old. This is something one has observed since our days at Makerere College in the mid-1960s. He has been called names in his face by angry or outraged African scholars. The same thing happened 25 years later at a CODESRIA symposium in Kampala in 1991. Some of the people involved were fairly senior e.g. President Museveni, Tarsis Kabwegyere and, of course, Mahmood Mamdani. I also tried to have a quieter dialogue with Ali M. Mazrui. Ali M. Mazrui seemed to be of no avail. This was most embarrassing because during that symposium there was a deliberate effort to rehabilitate Ali M. Mazrui at a time when the Zionist lobby in the USA was doing everything possible to undermine him, including some unworthy personal attacks in Newsweek. This aside, once in a review of some of Mazrui’s work Christopher Fyfe, who has long been associated with African Studies, asked rhetorically, ‘Need our author be such a gadfly?’ This raises questions about the role in which he is cast by this western admirers. If Ali M. Mazrui is a leading African scholar, whom is he leading and where to?

Apart from ideological divergences, Ali Mazrui’s African Scholarship is in doubt. Since he escaped in 1971 from the clutches of Idi Amin whom at first he had given support against Milton Obote’s violent constitutionalism and “The Move to the Left”, Ali M. Mazrui has been visiting Africa like an intellectual tourist. Not that this matters much as he has never been a believer in solid scientific work. In 1966 when we were gathered in Makerere to discuss field work and its importance, Ali M. Mazrui’s only question was whether in our considerations we had left room for library work. Everybody laughed knowingly. A is revealed by the references in his books, his data is culled largely from newspaper cuttings, radio newscasts, and conversations with leading politicians when the opportunity offers itself. Using his known mental agility and great sense of imagination, from these he produces bright but ephemeral ideas like white phosphorus in a bowl of water.

In 1966 in Makerere he dramatically asserted that, if it had not been for the English language, there would have been no African nationalism. This assertion disrupted African nationalists but delighted British ex-colonial officers who had turned academics after independence. In 1970 in Dar-es-Salaam University he castigated the leftists for their intolerance and declared that everybody was entitled to his ideas, including racist Verwoerd in South Africa (he could have included Adolf Hitler in Nazi Germany). The implicit contradiction here is that while ideas are perceived as primary, their practical implications are eschewed unless they come from the left.

In 1991 in Kampala Ali M. Mazrui had come full circle. A long with others, he declared that a nation which does not produce knowledge in its own language cannot develop. But according to his 1966 testimony, English had developed African nationalism. And why not an African nation? Fully aware of the fact that the total eclipse of Eastern European communism was a foregone conclusion, he for the first time put socialism on a part with capitalism. He ostentatiously observed that socialism is best at redistribution and poor at production while capitalism is best at production and poor at redistribution. With great aplomb, he suggested that in the event what would be ideal is to combine the socialist redistributive system with capitalist production – a perfect recipe for African countries which took into account neither the practical implications of the actual existing crisis of accumulation in these countries nor the history of social democrats in Scandinavia and other countries such as Holland and the problems they are facing now under the drive for greater concentration of capital in Europe. Barely three years later, in 1994 Ali M. Mazrui has yet another ideal solution for Africa: ‘recolonisation’.

‘Benign Colonization’: Intellectual Bankruptcy or Self-prostitution?

Ali M. Mazrui’s discourse on ‘benign colonization’ is intellectually bankrupt, analytically superficial, sensational, and downright dishonest. First, as is typical of him, he uses what would be social science concepts as mere words or slogans e.g. social ‘decay’, ‘decomposition’, ‘dependent modernisation’, ‘national freedom’ etc. Historically, the concept of ‘social decay’ or ‘social decomposition’ is used with reference to old societies that were once cohesive and viable but were getting outmoded under changed socio-economic conditions. Post-independence states in Africa are only one generation old nor could it be proved that during this short period they had become cohesive and self-sustaining. In fact, the opposite is generally true of most of them. Power struggles ensued within them almost immediately after independence. These took the form of competition between political elites with different regional or ethnic backgrounds and later between different fractions of the bureaucracy e.g. the civilian vs. the military establishment. This was a reflection of the artificial nature of the colonial state. African leaders were fully aware of it, as is shown by their perpetual concern about ‘nation-building’. This presupposed the attainment of a unitary nation state. But the conception
itself was ill-founded and inevitably degenerated into one-party state dictatorships. This in turn exacerbated centrifugal tendencies within the African ex-colonial state and destroyed the necessary conditions for economic production and social reproduction. In this sense Africa is definitely undergoing a process of political and economic disintegration.

However, it cannot be assumed that this necessarily means social decay. The successive collapse of African states in the 1990s that Ali Mazrui finds so alarming has been accompanied by new democratic social movements which have brought to power new regimes or at least held at bay the old dictatorships. True enough, there is hunger and civil strife in Africa. But there is also social vibrancy and militancy we have not seen since the independence movement. Popular civil wars like in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Togo, Somalia, Western Sahara and so on might be the social price that has to be paid in order to deconstruct dominating and coercive structures. The collapse of totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe was celebrated in the West, as would be expected. What is of interest to us is that the same processes of political and economic disintegration that are found in Africa are taking place in the various Eastern European countries. In several of them is increased poverty among the mass of the people and there are civil wars which are epitomised by the war in Bosnia, which the UN and NATO have not been able to stop, despite Ali M Mazrui’s illusions about an ‘African Peace-keeping Force’. By failing to recognise these obvious historical parallels Ali M azru could be accused of being an unconscious agent of Western racism.

Concerning civil wars in Africa more could be said. Ali M azru, like a breast-beating liberal, flauts to the world the bitter message that has emerged from the horridly events in Rwanda. A frican know better than that. We do not know yet with certainty what happened in Rwanda and for that reason CODESRIA is planning a special workshop on the Great Lakes social formations. What happened in Rwanda is not new in Africa and contrary to M azru’s facile assumption, it might have nothing to do with ethnic imbalance between B a-Tutsi and Ba-Hutu. The civil wars in Angola and Mozambique cost millions of lives. The same imperialist countries that are now crying, ‘wolf’, contributed to the tragedy in no mean way. The US Strategy of ‘low-intensity warfare’ adopted since the Angola and Mozambican civil wars means that when it is necessary warring A fricans will be helped to engage in mutual extermination or genocide. For southern A frica this has been fully documented by Horace Campbell, among others. Therefore, conflicts in A frica need not to be associated with ethnicity. Since independence Lesotho, a single-ethnic country, has had a series of coups and counter coups. Lately, another single-ethnic country, Somalia has been plunged into the worst kind of civil war in A frica.

The proposition that A frica be recon- trolled is not only preposterous but is also mischievous in that it is not meant for A frican consumption. It is again Ali M azrui playing up to his Western gallery. He is acutely aware of the racist and imperialist connotation of the term and for this reason he tries to dispense with the ‘whiteman’s burden’ (a crude cliché). He does this by inviting A sians and A fricans to be custodians of the envisaged ‘benign colonisation’ – a contradiction in terms, as ‘colonisation’ implies political imposition by whosoever does it. In trying to deal with this hare-brained scheme Ali M azrui makes suggestions which verge on lunacy. For instance, he proposes a ‘Trusteeship’ system – like that of the United Nations over the Congo in 1960’. He seems to be oblivious of the fact that it was under the same imperialist trusteeship that Patrice Lumumba was eliminated. Likewise, as an East A frican, he should have known that the relationship between A sians and A fricans still suffers from an unresolved imperialist legacy. Ali M azrui definitely goes overboard and loses all sense of reality when he imagines that Egypt could be called upon to ‘re-establish its “big brother” relationship with Sudan’, or that Ethiopia, despite the challenge from former oppressed nationalities, could resume not only its imperial role but also run Somalia on behalf of his supposed ‘United Nations’, or that South A frica and Nigeria could be invited to play the role of benign sub-imperialist powers in their regions. How absurd!

This is most amazing because every political scientist in A frica knows that these are huge incompatibilities and that Ali Mazrui’s prescription is in fact contrary to popular sentiments on the continent. ‘The rejection of the monolithic one-party state, the demand for “democratic pluralism” and regional autonomy or “decentralisation” are a sufficient indication of current trends on the continent. Hegemonic powers are resented or at best treated with suspicion. This is true of South A frica in the SADC region and of Nigeria in ECOWAS. It is also true of Egypt vis-à-vis the Sudan. The Ethiopian empire has already been dismantled and will not be resurrected. All these facts cast serious doubt on Mazrui’s sense of reality and renders his claim that there is ‘colonisation impulse that is resurfacing’ in Africa spurious. Above all, he is basically confused because he cannot advocate ‘recolonisation’ of A frica and at the same time proclaim that regional integration is the order of the day and that:

If A frica does not follow this path, the lack of stability and economic growth will push the entire continent further into the desperate margins of global society.

Johan Galtung, a brilliant but hard-headed European professor, addressing the European Parliament, warned that in the coming division of the globe into regional blocs, A frica will be cut adrift. In the same vein he advised that A fricans should see this as a blessing in disguise because for the first time they will be left alone and in the event they will be forced to find their own solutions to their problems. There is a certain wisdom in this which is lost to our A frican professor.

Instead of fantasizing about ‘recolonisation’ and the reproduction of the UN system (which is itself under review) in A frica, Ali M azru could have contemplated the question of why our own UN, the OAU, has not been able to fulfil all the functions it ascribes to its ‘benign colonisation’; second, why the ECOWAS Peace-keeping Force in Liberia has not been able to fulfil its mission; third, why the real UN failed in its intervention in Somalia; and fourth, why it proved impossible for the OAU to intervene in the Rwanda crisis, even though it had been invited to do so by the UN Secretary-General – something which France did unilaterally? It would seem that, far from needing recolonisation, we need decolonisation in A frica not only of the body politic but also of the mind.

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Self-Colonization and the Search for Pax African: A Rejoinder

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My following statement, (Mazrui 1967: 204-216), still holds up:

As between the old idea of imperial pacification and the new ambition of Pax Africana the United Nations temporarily provided a third alternative. And yet it was soon clear that the United Nations as an alternative could never be as self-sufficient as imperial pacification had been and as Africana self-policing aspired to be... Towards the end of 1964 the United Nations therefore withdrew from the Congo. And yet pacification of the Congo by Africans themselves from internal continental resources was as yet not a practical proposition... In the meantime conflict between (African) leaders themselves, or between them and the military, or between one soldier and another, remains an aspect of the African political scene. So does the risk of foreign intrusion. The quest therefore continues for an African tranquillity capable of being protected and maintained by Africa herself.

I am advocating self-colonization by Africa. I am against the return of European colonialism and the equivalent of Pax Britannica. But I fear that if Africans do not take control of their destiny themselves, including the use of benevolent force for self-pacification, they will once again be victims of malevolent colonial force used by others. I was discussing the dream of Pax Africana decade before we experienced failed post-colonial states and before Africa paid the post-colonial price of four million lives. Does Mafeje feel that we have to lose a few more million lives before we help each other? The United Nations help is needed but it has to be subject to the consent of African peoples. The UN has been a help to Mozambique, and may continue to be needed by Angola. The UN mishandled Somalia, and was grossly, almost criminally, negligent over Rwanda. But Africa will continue to need the United Nations for the foreseeable future. I am not sure if Archie Mafeje would like to join Republican extremists in the United States who would want to end the peacekeeping role of the UN, and perhaps even destroy the world body.

It is not the big countries which, in the final analysis, need the United Nations and its specialized agencies. It is the small countries, and the vulnerable people. That includes most of Africa. A r chic Mafeje thinks I am being used by Westerners. Is Mafeje being used by Newt Gingrich?

Mafeje accuses me of being an 'intellectual tourist' in Africa. He assumes that I had a choice about being based either inside or outside Africa. When was the last time Mafeje offered me a permanent job in Africa and heard me turn it down? And has he forgotten his own long years as an 'intellectual tourist'? Has his own exile ended? Such chaotic thinking is enough to make one recommend inter-African intellectual colonization and re-education.

Professor Mafeje seems to regard inter-African colonization as a kind of fairy tale. In reality that is what happened in 1964 when Tanganyika annexed Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania. Nobody consulted the people of Zanzibar in a referendum or by a prior general election whether or not they wanted to give up their sovereignty and independence. Julius K. Nyerere of Tanganyika signed an agreement with Zanzibar dictator A beid Karume – the same way British empire-builders used to get African chiefs to affirm the equivalent of the 1900 Uganda Agreement for so-called British protection.

Zanzibar was in disarray following the revolution of January 1964. The union with Tanganyika provided Zanzibar with a form of pacification. Although the terms of the union were very generous to Zanzibar, it was nevertheless a case of inter-African colonization.

Dr. Mafeje also cites a case where inter-African intervention has so far resulted in a stalemate – i.e., the case of ECOMOG.
in Liberia in the 1990s. Mafeje conveniently forgets the case of the intervention of the Tanzanian army in Idi Amin’s Uganda in 1979. The Tanzanian soldiers marched all the way to K am pala and successfully ousted the brutal dictator: ‘Mission impossible’ turned out to be ‘mission accomplished’ after all. The ill-trained army of a poor African neighbour was still strong enough to end Amin’s tyranny.

Dr. Mafeje has convoluting speculations as to why my article on ‘Recolonization’ was datelined Pretoria. It never occurred to Archie Mafeje that the most obvious explanation was the correct one – that I was myself in Pretoria, South Africa, on August 4, 1994, when the article was published in the International Herald Tribune (and simultaneously in such African newspapers as The Daily Nation of Kenya). If I had been in Kampala, Dakar, Nairobi or A buja, the dateline of the article would have been changed accordingly. Instead, I was invited to South Africa to listen to Archbishop Desmond Tutu, to extend my personal felicitations to President Nelson Mandela, and to attend a conference on ‘Islam and Civil Society’ to listen to Archbishop Desmond Tutu, to extend my personal felicitations.

It was only then that the Western media sat up and took notice. The Washington Post quoted me from what I had said in the Sunday Nation in Nairobi. And the Los Angeles Times Syndicate called me to ask me to elaborate on my views. The article which Dr. Mafeje read in the International Herald Tribune was written long after many African audiences had heard me discuss those issues of ‘recolonization’ – in Kampala, Cairo, Addis A baba, Nairobi and later A buja. Dr. Mafeje cannot go around accusing others of shoddy scholarship when he does not even try to find out where else I had discussed the issue of ‘recolonization’ and for what kind of audiences.

Mafeje refers to a remark I made in Kampala in 1991 that socialism was best at redistribution and poor at production while capitalism was best at production and poor at redistribution. (Mazrui’s epigram is ‘The genius capitalism production’ – the genius of socialism is redistribution’). Which part of the epigram does Mafeje want to contradict? He mentions some ‘crisis of accumulation’ in Scandi navia and the Netherlands. Mafeje carefully side-steps the examples of China and Vietnam which have been moving towards market Mաշկ. Fidel Castro has declared similar intentions for Cuba. Had my epigram anticipated the momentous economic changes in China and, increasingly, in Vietnam? The Chinese have certainly demonstrated the truth of the proposition that ‘the genius of capitalism is production’. So have their neighbours in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, M alaysia and elsewhere. But the Chinese also want to rescue the second part of the epigram – ‘The genius of socialism is distribution’. Mafeje may prefer weary and all-inclusive phrases like ‘crisis of accumulation’ to explain global changes. That is Mafeje’s privilege.

Mafeje’s references are in the public domain. Should I have treated Professor Archie Mafeje with greater politeness than he has shown towards me? In fact, I have treated him with less venom and less abuse, I have not used words like ‘bankrupt’, ‘egoistical’, ‘self-prostitution’, ‘downright dishonest’, ‘malignant mind’, ‘servant of imperialism’, or ‘obscene’ – which are freely scattered in his attack on me. There are depths of unprofessionalism to which I refuse to descend even under provocation.

**References**

‘Recolonisation’ or ‘Self-colonisation’ in Pursuit of ‘Pax Africana’: Another Response to a Reactionary Thesis*

I wish to thank Ali A. Mazrui, Director of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies and Albert Schweitzer Professor in the Humanities, State University of New York at Binghamton, Albert Luthuli Professor-at-large, University of Jós, Nigeria, and Senior Scholar and Andrew D. White Professor-at-large Emeritus, Cornell University, Ithaca, for having refused to descend to certain depths of unprofessionalism even under provocation. If that had been my crime in the initial response, I wish to assure him that his magnanimity and professional propriety will not go unappreciated. Secondly, I would like him to note that, if I had treated him graciously before, it was not because I ever shared his views. It was because we are who we are and this will not cease. However, if we live in a divided house, it is in the best interests of the community that this be known. It is in this context that I am prepared to cross swords with Ali Mazrui. If in the process real blood is drawn, it might be overdue sacrifice to the African gods or an invitation to young African warriors.

Indeed, this is a very good time for clarifying intellectual and political standpoints among African scholars for it is not only a period of deconstruction of old models and structures but also of increasing popular pressures of reconstruction and independent styles of thinking. Therefore, ‘leading’ African scholars can ill-afford to fudge issues that arise from their own intellectual praxis. I think scholars can ill-afford to fudge issues that arise from their own intellectual praxis. I think these scholars can ill-afford to fudge issues that arise from their own intellectual praxis. I think these scholars can ill-afford to fudge issues that arise from their own intellectual praxis. I think these scholars can ill-afford to fudge issues that arise from their own intellectual praxis.

The second question which followed immediately after the first was whether a UN-like trusteeship system for Africa would be able to do what the OAU and regional organisations such as ECOWAS and SADC (contrary to Mazrui’s false charge, I was not concerned with the UN proper) could not do. If the latter were the case, then it had to be explained before any presuppositions could be made about the necessity or efficacy of ‘recolonisation’ of Africa. At issue was the political and ideological implications of such a suggestion at this juncture in African history. Personally, I could not credit such a reactionary stance form any African scholar whether ‘at-large’ or in-house. Closely related to this was the question of whether colonisation of any sort could be benign, given the element of imposition at a time when African peoples are rebelling precisely against this. One is mindful of the fact that in the text Ali Mazrui used ‘recolonisation’ and ‘self-colonisation’ interchangeably. In this, I found a certain sloppiness and flippancy which I do not associate with serious scholarship. ‘Self-colonisation’ is a contradiction in terms and is contrary to ‘self-liberation’ which is what the current struggles for democracy on the continent would signify.

The third question was whether there was a political raison d’être for sub-imperialist powers in Africa to presume that they could take charge of the affairs of their weaker or ‘chaotic’ neighbours. In our view this would be a condonation of that which we seek to terminate, namely, domination and coercion by bigger powers. It would also militate against democratic regional integration. Leadership is not imposed but attained. Hence, the question posed to Ali Mazrui was how does he reconcile the notion of colonisation with the principle of regional integration? If it were not the question of ‘might is right’, what would be the moral, ideological and political grounds for casting in a leadership role countries such as Nigeria, Zaire, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt (Mazrui’s ‘pivotal states’)? What is it that they offer as a solution in the current crisis in Africa, seeing that they themselves have not resolved the national question under their own sovereignty? Is it not the case that Ali Mazrui is in fact reproducing the ideology of the Great Powers? If this is the product of...
Ali Mazrui’s life-long work, call it ‘recolonisation’ or ‘self-colonisation’, then there might be no value in reading all his books. Secondly, if it is a measure of his African scholarship, then it remains my conviction that we could do better than this and that probably we have already done so, especially under the sponsorship of CODESRIA.

d) The final point raised had to do with the idea of African nationalism in the 1960s and 1990s, as is seen by a scholar like Ali Mazrui. According to him, much of Africa is in a state of ‘decay and decomposition’. This is so much so that ‘even the degree of dependent modernisation achieved under colonial rule is being reversed’. (If Mazrui did not know, this is precisely what the term, ‘crisis of accumulation’, refers to in the circumstances it cannot help being ‘weary’). He observes that ‘the successive collapse of the state in one African country after another during the 1990s suggests a once unthinkable solution: recolonisation’. The movement of the 1950s and 1960s in Africa was described as: ‘anti-colonial’ or ‘African nationalism’...If all this seems to have evaporated in the 1990s, what are we left with? What was the significance of the 7th Pan-Africanist Congress in Kampala in 1994, which Ali Mazrui apparently attended. A corollary to the conference papers sent to me the spirit and the mood in Kampala was decidedly at variance with Ali Mazrui’s projections. Disillusionment with the post-independence states in Africa has not led to a feeling of helplessness but rather has generated a new spirit of Pan-Africanism and cultural nationalism reminiscent of the 1950s and 1960s. The issue, therefore, is whether these political impulses are compatible with the notion of ‘recolonisation’.

The Role of African Intellectuals

I have never been comfortable with this expression because it assumes too much. The reason is that it is not so much the role which is expected of African intellectuals than the role which African intellectuals choose for themselves that makes the difference. Here, the interaction between ideology and scientific endeavour; and between intellectual praxis and personal vicissitudes makes it very difficult to prescribe any single ethical system for intellectual behaviour. This has been hotly debated in the CODESRIA and AAPS symposia, without any clear resolution. Nevertheless, the effect it has had is to set minimal ideological psychological, and political standards for African intellectuals. This has created a climate in which intellectual representations by African scholars can be judged as authentic or unauthentic. This is the issue between me and Ali Mazrui and it was the same in Kampala in 1991.

In my response to Ali Mazrui’s article in the Herald Tribune I charged that his intellectual representations, as an African, were neither leading nor authentic. They were, I contended, addressed to the ‘other’. In his rejoinder Mazrui denied this absolutely. His rebuttal took various forms, which I will take in their order of importance. First, he argued that if I had read all his books (which I did not for good reasons), I would have known that for him ‘recolonisation’ is synonymous with ‘self-colonisation’ which is the essence of his life-long trajectory on Pax Africana. This is an inadmissible conflation and is certainly not a mark of great scholarship and scientific rigour. Historically understood, the independence movement in Africa was an explicit rejection of colonialism. In the wake of disillusionment with post-independence governments in Africa, popular representations made no reference to colonialisation but rather to deconstruction of hegemonic structures and realisation of ‘democratic pluralism’.

In an attempt to refute my assertion that his intellectual representations are unauthentic, Mazrui refers me to many African fora in which he had the occasion to present his ‘self-colonisation’ alternative. According to him, the ‘geographical sequence of [his] representations’ took him from Kampala in April, 1994 to Cairo in May 1994, and to Addis Ababa (no date mentioned). What is interesting is that most of this is at the invitation of the same leaders who, according to his confession, are responsible for the African collapse. In South Africa, where he got the dateline for the article at issue, he had been invited to listen to Bishop Tutu, to extend his personal felicitations to President Mandela and ultimately to attend a conference on ‘Islam and Civil Society in South Africa’. It is not clear who invited him but the accent is unmistakably on powers that be. This is in contrast to what happened at the Seventh Pan-Africanist Congress in Kampala where he refers merely to the fact that his paper was distributed. Did they or did they not put him on a pedestal in Kampala? Did the Western media, as represented by The Washington Post, Los Angeles Times Syndicate, and the International Herald Tribune, take as much interest in the Pan-African intellectuals in Kampala as they did in his ‘geographical representations’?

If not, why not?

The platforms on which one speaks are not unimportant. In Ali Mazrui’s case this is best illustrated by the Western reaction to his Reith Lectures and the BBC series on The Africans. My comment regarding these was more on the platform rather than their content. It is not that Mazrui missed the point that he was too anxious to prove that his representations are not in the service of imperialism. In the event he confirmed what he sought to disprove. Not unnaturally, his sponsors expected him to make affirmations on behalf of imperial history and interests. When he failed to come up to their expectations, they denounced his representations both in England and in the United States. Given that kind of invitation or platform, why should the imperial reaction be so surprising, Like Dr. Faustus, Mazrui had sold his soul to the devil for immediate glory. For that matter, it is mischievous and misleading for Ali Mazrui to compare his intellectual praxis to that of Edward Said. Edward Said’s intellectual representations are consistently anti-colonial and anti-imperialism. This has over the years determined the platforms to which he is invited in the west and in Palestine. Secondly, while he is prepared to talk to Mazrui, he has made it known that he profoundly disagrees with his epistemology of colonialism.

There is a name for the attempt by anybody to have the best of both worlds. Ali Mazrui’s theory of ‘counter-penetration’ gives him an excuse for betting on the strong al times whether it be in the West or in Africa. It is hard to imagine how anyone could hobnob with the oppressors for the benefit of the oppressed. It is the same regimes or neo-colonial organisations that are objects of popular resistance in Africa which invite Ali Mazrui to indulge in his usual mystification to their great delight. He is happy to refer to the dictator Idi Amin but will not answer the specific question as to whether or not he lent support to Idi Amin before he decided to flee the country. It is also curi-
ous that he proffers the role played by Tanzanian forces in Uganda as a vindication of his advocacy of ‘self-colonisation’. Little does he know that the Executive Committee of TANU had consistently opposed such a policy. It was only after Amin’s forces had crossed the Tanzanian border and attacked some villages that an attack on U ganda could be justified. It is true that President Nyerere saw A min as a dangerous usurper and wanted his ally, Milton Obote, reinstated. Whether this was a felicitous thing or not, it became a source of great controversy among East Africans. Nonetheless, from Mazar’i’s perspective Tanzania gets a plus.

Yet, when we gave intellectual and political support to Tanzania after the Arusha Declaration, Ali Mazarui saw us as suffering from a terrible disease he called ‘Tanzaphilia’. Or is this again a contrast from a terrible disease he called ‘Mazrui’s epigram’ notwithstanding, is that the supposition that the capitalist mode of accumulation could be combined with a socialist mode of social redistribution might be difficult to sustain. Not only is it a contradiction in terms but also, as is shown by the experience of modern welfare states such as the Scandinavian countries and Holland, this presupposes that there would be a continued surplus to guarantee social distribution. Yet, under conditions of an actual or threatened crisis of accumulation capital seeks to guarantee the conditions for its own reproduction by putting a stop on ‘waste of money’ on social services and even on foreign aid. This is what underlies the policies of the Christian Democrats in Europe, the Conservatives in Britain, and the Republicans in the U.S. Therefore, Ali Mazar’i’s epigram is of no avail. But the debate centring on it goes back to the days of the Second International and the emergence of socialist reformism in the hands of Bernstein and Kautsky within SPD in Germany.

However, this has nothing to do with what is happening in countries such as China, Vietnam, and Cuba. A part from the intensified pressure on remaining socialist economies since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is not true that commodity relations did not exist within these economies and between them and capitalist economies. In the case of Cuba she did not choose not to engage in trade with her neighbours. Rather she was and still is a victim of trade embargo on her by the U nited States. The dichotomy between ‘planned economies’ and ‘market economies’ , which Ali Mazarui seems to take at face value, was not a creation of the socialist countries. As far as they were concerned, the issue was how to reconcile between ‘blind’ market forces and the need to rationally plan the economy so as to guarantee social equity.

This problem is not peculiar to socialist economies. The various interventions in the economy by African states, which the World Bank so strongly opposes, were meant to contend with the same basic problem. Whether or not the result was positive in all cases is not the issue. What is at issue is how to maximise economic efficiency and equity at the same time. The same issue is implicit in K ynesian economics in the aftermath of the Great Depression in the West. These are major issues which cannot be comprehended by resorting to nonconcepts such as ‘market M arxism’ (whatever that may be) instead of ‘crisis of accumulation’ and the ‘problem of equity’ under the present international economic order. If indeed Ali Mazarui admires Samir Amin, then familiarity with his work on this particular subject might prove a useful antidote to his supra-structural illusions.

Finally, the reference to intellectual tourism might have nothing to do with exile but with the extent to which one’s intellectual representations are rooted in A fric an reality and not on impressions gained from ethereal visits. A somebody who is preoccupied with the question of the indigenisation of the social sciences in Africa, I can afford to make this remark. Also, I should like Ali Mazarui to know that my intellectual exile ceased since I went to Tanzania in 1969 and that within Africa there is no exile for me. This has been the case since 1976. At times it has been hard and painful. Yet, it has been the source of my intellectual emancipation. I judge the authenticity of my representations not by what any organisation or commentator abroad might think or say but by communion with similarly placed African scholars. I feel accountable and, therefore, I cannot with impunity speak on behalf of the ‘other’. I might be consumed by envy but certainly I am not in competition with Ali Mazarui simply because we are not looking for the same thing. But then he should not make excuses for himself by referring to such things as job opportunities. He did not have to be Albert Luthuli Professor at large at J os University. He could have become Professor in-residence, if he so wished. Anybody can guess why that did not happen. The interest, I think, is how to reconcile between ‘blind’ market forces and the need to rationally plan the economy so as to guarantee social equity.
Pax Africana: Between the State and the Intellectuals*

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The moral issues were hanging in the balance. But since the bride never gave her consent, the unions could not be made permanent without ascertaining the wishes of the bride sooner or later. Zanzibar needs to give its consent to the union. Only then will this form of inter-African colonization be saved from becoming malignant and become ethical under Pax Africana.

In the final analysis inter-African colonization should never be permanent. It should happen only in times of desperation. It should then either end or be legitimated by a vote of the colonized people. The vote can either be a referendum or full participation in a truly democratic order.

In did not think that I would have to teach Mafeje the laws of logic. European colonialism meant colonization by category A countries (European). Self-colonization in my sense meant being colonized by category B countries (fellow African). Zanzibar was previously colonized by category A (the British). Zanzibar was subsequently colonized by category B (i.e. Tanganyika).

Therefore Zanzibar was recolonized. Obviously there is no contradiction between ‘self-colonization’ and ‘recolonization’. Just as self-conquest is a meaningful concept, ‘self-colonization’ is equally operational. But self-colonization can only be saved from being malignant if it is not permanent or if it is legitimized by a vote of the colonized people.

But between the self and the other is there something called the United Nations? Is that an intermediate political and moral actor? I thought it was self-evident in both my original Herald Tribune article and in my first response to Mafeje that I believed that Africa needed the United Nations and its specialized agencies. How much guidance does Mafeje need in interpreting my sentences? There are two forms of recolonization which I regard as potentially defensible under certain circumstances – by fellow Africans and by a multi-racial United Nations. I do happen to believe in both Africa and the United Nations, but both are for the time being dominated by the West. Just as I am unwilling to reject Africa simply be-

Self-Colonisation: Benevolent, Benign and Malignant

Dr. Mafeje seems a little confused about how I use the two terms – ‘recolonization’ and ‘self-colonization’. Actually, it is quite simple. Recolonization can be by non-African countries, or by the United Nations, or by other African states. I reserve the term ‘self-colonization’ for inter-African colonization only especially when its purposes are substantially benevolent. In such a context inter-African colonization could become part of Pax Africana.

Africa’s capacity to control its destiny requires a capacity to stabilize and pacify itself. A francophone country which are larger and potentially more influential have a special responsibility in a world organized on the basis of nation-states. There may be occasions when a larger country has to be its brother’s keeper, or even its brother’s guardian. Inter-African pacific-

cation can become a form of benevolent self-colonization – a Pax Africana.

Inter-African colonization can be benevolent, benign, or malignant. It is benevolent when the intervening power stands more to lose than to gain from the intervention; and when the short-run advantages of the country which is occupied are considerably greater. Tanzania’s intervention into U: A: m: a: n’s Uganda seemed to be, in the final analysis, benevolent – for it ended eight of the most brutal years in Ugandan twentieth century history. Mafeje Mafeje rightly points out that the Tanzanian government’s intentions were not necessarily benevolent. Their motives were defensive against Idi Amin’s territorial claims. But the consequences of Tanzania’s intervention included the ending of eight years of Idi Amin’s tyranny. Tanzania’s temporary military occupation of Uganda was benevolent. Nyerere erred in trying too hard to restore Milton Obote to power – whose second administration turned out to be almost as disastrous as Idi Amin’s. Pax Africana received a setback.

At the other extreme is malignant intervention or colonization which is very damaging to the weaker country, and usually perpetrated entirely in the interest of the powerful country.

Benign intervention is a situation where the moral case for and against intervention is about equally compelling. In such a situation the moral issues hang in the balance.

Was Tanganyika’s annexation of Zanzibar in 1964 benevolent, benign, or malignant? It would have been benign but for the attempt to make the annexation permanent. The wedding between Zanzibar and Tanganyika was a forced marriage, but the bride wealth from Tanganyika to Zanzibar was exceptionally generous. Zanzibar was over-represented on union institutions.

The vote can either be a referendum or full participation in a truly democratic order.

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cause it is Western-dominated, I am unwilling to reject the United Nations either. If Mafeje read more of my work (instead of just the Herald Tribune) he would know my real position.

Mafeje thinks I am an Afro-pessimist because I have identified areas of decay and vulnerability. On the contrary, I am an Afro-optimist because I come up with ideas about how Africa can transcend those problems. Mafeje’s paradigm focuses more on ECOWAS and SADC as failures. My more optimistic paradigm views these as organizations which simply need more experience, better leadership, and a will to act more creatively. We also need more effective continent-wide organizations. Endless verbiage about some ‘crisis of accumulation’ will get us nowhere.

Nor must we be limited to what will work in the next few years. It is time we planned the future of our continent with longer term horizons in mind. That means we need to institutionalize Pax-Africana.

On exile and Domesticity

Dr. Mafeje taunts me for being in exile. As a neo-Marxist Mafeje should know that exile is for some people a more creative condition than being at home. Does Mafeje remember for how long Karl Marx was in exile from his native Germany? Over thirty years! All those years he spent at the British Museum were much more fruitful for the intellectual history of the world than if Marx had remained at home in Germany to be silenced or imprisoned. V.I. Lenin also had a spell in exile before the 1917 Russian revolution.

What about Marx’s friend and benefactor, Friedrich Engels? What was he doing making money from capitalist ventures in Manchester, England, while the German people suffered from tyranny? Engels also found exile much more productive than political domesticity.

History is littered with radicals, liberals and intellectuals who were forced into exile by the intolerance of power at home.

Just as exile is not necessarily barren, residence at home is not necessarily fruitful either. Indeed, as a South African, Mafeje should know that being located in Africa is no guarantee that one is rooted in African reality. The whites of South Africa were located in Africa for generations, but to all intents and purposes they were racial exiles. The question which arises is whether the Archie Mafeje of Africa are ideological exiles in spite of being physically located in Africa. I suspect that if he and I were to address the same audience in South Africa, and I discussed ethnicity and race, and he addressed the ‘crisis of accumulation’, I would be closer to the real nerve of South African reality than he would, given his ‘exile vocabulary’.

Would he like to test this out in practice before a live audience in a debate with me in South Africa or Kenya?

What about my own physical exile? How voluntary is my own exile in the United States? What about Mafeje’s location – is he in Africa by default?

Mafeje says I did not have to be a professor-at-large at the University of J’nos when I could have become a professor-in-residence. It is obvious that Archie Mafeje does not have a clue that I had been a professor-in-residence at the University of J’nos for years. Since he knows so little about my life, why does he presume to judge it?

He does not know that I have offered myself more than once to my old university, Makerere, in Kampala, Uganda, and not been taken up. He does not know that I have not been invited to give a public lecture on any of the campuses in Kenya since Kenyatta died in 1978.

How much freedom to say what I want would I have in Kenya? One test was the fate of my television series. Mafeje does not seem to know that my television series, The Africans: A Triple Heritage, which has been shown in dozens of countries, in several languages, has not been shown in my own country. Mafeje thinks I am hob-nobbing with the powerful in Africa. He does not have a clue about my life and its relationship with the powerful in Kenya.

Since he knows so little about me personally why is he giving me personal advice? I do not know much about his life either. But I hear rumours that Mafeje recently applied for a job in the United States. He was even short-listed. If he did not succeed in this application, it is not hard to understand why he is making a Pan-African virtue out of his failure to get the job.

Is he in Africa by default?

On Power and the Intellectuals

Mafeje is right to raise the issue of power in relation to the role of intellectuals. But Mafeje has a few contradictions to sort out. I have been to South Africa every year since Nelson Mandela was released.

My credentials have been intellectual and academic. Dr. Mafeje would like to know who has been playing host. Actually it has varied. The range of hosts has included universities, religious groups, a Black Chamber of Commerce, a major national newspaper, students’ groups, and a non-profit organization for international peace. Admittedly, I have never been invited by the poorest South African, partly because they have never heard of me. But I suspect they have never heard of Archie Mafeje either.

Mafeje assumes that I interact only with the powerful in Africa, and he regards this as evidence that I am against the people! And yet suddenly Mafeje is on the side of dictator A Gebi Karume’s decision to end the independence of Zanzibar without consulting the people in a referendum. Suddenly Mafeje is on the side of the power-structure controlled by Karume and Julius Nyerere. What happened to Mafeje’s support for the people?

Nor does Mafeje seem to realize that part of the reason for Nyerere’s decision to embark on a union with the Zanzibar was the pressure from the President of the United States Lyndon Johnson, and the pressure from the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Sir Alec Douglas-Home. These two Western powers wanted Nyerere to prevent the emergence of an East African Marnaxist Cuba. President Nyerere colonized Zanzibar partly to appease President Lyndon Johnson of the United States. I thought Mafeje was on the side of the people. Has Mafeje’s democratic instinct run out of steam over the issue of Zanzibar?

It is possible to argue that the power structure in Africa consists of politicians, soldiers and intellectuals, each category broadly defined. Politicians rely on skills of verbal manipulation and electoral horse-trading. Soldiers rely on the use or threat of military force to achieve desired goals. Intellectuals invoke the skills of wider expertise and the analytical power of the mind. Sometimes intellectuals like Julius Nyerere and Leopold Senghor become politicians. Sometimes the three categories enter into alliances with each other. How will the three units respond to the imperative of inter-African colonization?

Did I serve as an intellectual advisor to President Idi Amin? I did not! I had never heard of President Idi Amin! That is not like Mafeje who had never heard of me. But Idi Amin had never heard of me either!

Mafeje, of course, is right to raise the issue of power in relation to the role of intellectuals. But Mafeje has a few contradictions to sort out. I have been to South Africa every year since Nelson Mandela was released.
Mafeje would liked me to tell him more about my attitude to Idi Amin, either when he took over power or afterwards. I have written a whole book about such matters entitled *Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: The Making of a Military Ethnocracy*. If Mafeje is too lethargic to read my books, he can continue his blind speculations about my relationship with Idi Amin. I invented the term *lumpenmilitia* after Idi Amin captured power, and when I still lived in Uganda. The term was later adopted by a West-Indian colleague at the University of Dar es Salaam. I may write another book about the Amin phenomenon one day.

Behind Tanzania’s invasion of Idi Amin’s Uganda were there politicians, intellectuals and soldiers in alliance? Mafeje points out certain fundamental disagreements in Tanzania about the wisdom of invading Uganda. But the differences of opinion did not coincide with the divides between politicians, soldiers and intellectuals.

Dr. Mafeje keeps on trying to hold me to some intellectual standard ostensibly set by the Seventh Pan-African Congress in Kampala in April 1994 at which I was a participant. But the organizers of that Congress deliberately decided to marginalize intellectuals and scholars – including Makerere academics. I was amazed at how few Makerere colleagues were in the programme, or even in attendance at all. I and other scholars (academic intellectuals) were relegated to relatively obscure workshops. High visibility roles were given to either those politicians already in power (a head of state or a foreign minister) or those military leaders struggling to share power (like John Garang of Sudan and Mohammed Farrah Aideed of Somalia). Is Mafeje’s support for the people as against the power-structure. Mafeje changes like a chameleon according to which power-structure he approves of.

I turned up at the Kampala Congress with 30 copies of my own paper concerning the spectre of recolonization. Copies of my paper disappeared without a trace – but with no impact at all on the final communiqué, since nobody in the drafting committee had read it! I gave copies of my paper to the UGanda Press, who were also slow. Strangely enough, UGanda did not pay attention until the same material was published in the K enya Press.

Mafeje as a long-established intellectual should know by now that where an article is published can make all the difference in its impact. My views on recolonization were known in Africa before they were published in *The International Herald Tribune* – but once they were published in *The Herald Tribune* and in a syndicated column of the *Los Angeles Times*, even Mafeje sat up and noticed. A frican intellectuals themselves react differently to articles published in major Western media than to articles published in A frican newspapers and magazines. That is one of the facts of life of international power-relations and intellectual know-how.

Mafeje is right to compare A frican intellectuals with other intellectuals abroad. But how much does Archie Mafeje really know about Edward W. Said and his ideas? Mafeje keeps trying to cast me against Edward Said, the Palestinian scholar and man-of-letters. I assume Mafeje trusts Edward Said’s judgment in his book *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) Edward Said described me as a distinguished scholar... whose competence and credibility as a first-rank academic authority were questioned” (page 38). Professor Said went on to defend me against the furious attacks against me by the *New York Times* television critic, John Corry. This is how Edward Said (1993:38-39) put it:

> Here at last was an A frican on prime-time television, in the West, daring to accuse the West of what it had done, thus reopening a file considered closed. That M azrui spoke well of Islam, that he showed a command of *Western* historical method and political rhetoric, that, in fine, he appeared a convincing model of a human being – all these ran contrary to the reconstituted imperial ideology for which Corry was perhaps inadvertently speaking.

Elsewhere in the book Edward Said includes me among a handful of intellectuals whose “scholarship [has been] a catalyst for other scholars” (p.261). Earlier Said had made the following observation in another context (1993:239):

> ...it is no longer possible to ignore the work of Cheikh A. Diop, Paulin Houkonjdi, V.Y. Mudimbe, Ali M azrui in even the most cursory survey of A frican history, politics and philosophy.

Why is Archie Mafeje trying to deceive readers of the *CODESRIA Bulletin* that Edward Said and I are ideologically and epistemologically at war with each other? I have myself always admired Said’s work. And I have quoted Edward Said’s own words of his scholarly solidarity with me. Does Mafeje have any evidence from Said’s writings to the contrary? Or is Mafeje as ignorant of Said’s writings as he is of mine?

While it is a good idea to discuss A frican intellectuals in relation to intellectuals from other cultures and societies, we need to begin from a higher level of discourse than Professor Mafeje has afforded us so far.

**Conclusion**

In spite of all, I am grateful to Professor Archie Mafeje for creating a situation in which I had to explain my concepts of self-colonization and Pax-Africana to readers of *CODESRIA Bulletin*. I promise to believe that Mafeje genuinely misunderstood my original article in the *International Herald Tribune*. Perhaps so did William Pfaff when he quotes me in his own article ‘A New Colonialism’ , published in the influential American journal *Foreign Affairs* (1995:26).

On the other hand, Leenco Lat, an A frican normally living in Canada, fully understood my idea of inter-African colonization, but rejected it as both immoral and impractical *Sunday Nation* (Nairobi).

In the same newspaper in Kenya, Stephen Harrison’s rejection of inter-African colonization was based on a more unique argument. He argued that since post-colonial A frican governments had been so incompetent in governing their own countries, why should they be any more efficient in governing their neighbours? To Stephen Harrison (1995), the European colonizers were much more efficient.

The solution, I think, would be to invite them back to run the continent until the local population has been given proper time and training to take over again. This should be a commercial arrangement, in the same way that companies in trouble have to bring in temporary management expertise, or when receivers are appointed to run the affairs of near-bankrupt companies.

This is different from William Pfaff’s call in *Foreign Affairs*. Pfaff called upon European powers to return to Africa and complete their unfinished moral responsibility of trusteeship as colonizer. Harrison, on the other hand, was proposing a new business contractual relationship between the colonizers and the colonized.

I prefer my original position of inter-African colonization for benevolent reasons, preferably under a system which includes
a Pan-African Security Council, a Pan-
African Emergency Force and a Pan-Afric-
can High Commission for Refugees. As-
uming they survive in their present form
my five pivotal states for the African Secu-
rity Council will be South Africa, Egypt,
Nigeria, Zaire and Ethiopia. Some of
theses are currently more in need of treat-
ment themselves than of providing it. But
I must emphasize that my proposed de-
sign for Pax-Africa has longer time ho-
rizons well into the twenty first century.

We in Africa can occasionally live with
benign (as distinct from benevolent) in-
ter-African colonization when the moral
arguments for and against evil out – as
was the case in 1964 when Tanganyika
annexed Zanzibar. But we should be on
guard against malignant recolonization –
as when the Emperor Haile Selassie I uni-
laterally ended the autonomous status of
Eritrea, or when Morocco attempted to
deny Western Sahara self-determination.
Outside Africa, India’s annexation of Goa
from Portugal in 1962 was clearly either
benevolent or benign, whereas India’s
annexation of Kashmir in the teeth of mili-
tant opposition of Kashmiris themselves
continues to be tragically a malignant an-
nexation. Also malignant was Indonesia’s
unilateral annexation of East Timor in 1975.

I can understand why my old colleague,
Professor Archie Mafeje is sometimes
confused. The ethics of inter-African (or
inter-Asian) colonization are often com-
plicated. But in the quest for comprehension
what we need is more light and less heat,
more argument and less abuse. Perhaps
one day Professor Mafeje and I will suc-
cede in conquering our feelings in order
to liberate our intellects? If such self-con-
quest is achieved, can self-colonization
be averted?

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Conflict Settlement in Post-Colonial Africa: Recolonization or
Decolonization? A Reflection on the Mafeje/Mazrui Debate*

The Debate

Ever since the beginning of the decade,
at the same time that the democratization
process was launched, Africa has been
plagued by serious problems which recall
those it experienced on the eve and imme-
diately after the era of independence. Not
only is Africa confronted with unprec-
cedented economic doldrums never expe-
rienced during the colonial regime, from
the East to the West, North to the South,
it is also rife with conflicts of all kinds,
and exceptionally violent, which consti-
tutes a matter of great concern to the in-
tellectual elite.

As observed by Fares (1993:19), Africa is in
‘troubled waters’ and has become the
subject of major concern. Already in 1991,
Kâ Mana wondered whether Africa was
going to die while M mbem expressed the
view that it was going to implode.

In an article published in the International
Herald Tribune, Mazrui (1995:24-26)
noted that the continent ‘was losing its
elite’ and ‘disintegrating’. He proposed
‘a benign colonization of disintegrating
areas in Africa, a form of self-coloniza-
tion in search of Pax Africana’. At the
institutional level, he suggested, as an
instrument of this, a ‘self-pacification’,
the establishment of an African Security
Council composed of five key regional
States or potential States (South Africa,
Egypt, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Zaire, in
spite of the reservations he expressed about
the last two States, due to the problems
with which they are presently con-
fronted). The said council would super-
vice the continent and be entrusted with the ‘burden’ of recolonization.

He also proposed the setting up of a
‘Pan-African Emergency Force’, an army
that will be charged with any indispensa-
table intervention and peacekeeping oper-
ations as well as an African High Com-
mission for Refugees, in collaboration
with the United Nations Agency for Refu-
gees. His major concern is that Africa
should undertake its own colonization
through the use of a ‘well-intentioned
force’ for its own pacification, to avoid
falling victim to the misuse of authority
and colonization by foreign powers. Ac-
cording to him, ‘our self-managed colo-
nization would be better than the type
administered by foreigners’.

As could be expected in Africa where
such debates are well-sustained since the
establishment of CODESRIA, Mazrui’s
proposals were met with angry protests
from Mafeje who saw in this ‘benign
recolonization’ attempts by the ‘malignant
minds’ serving the cause of imperialism.

He in turn proposed a ‘decolonization of
the body politic and esprit de corps’
(Mafeje 1995:20-24) instead of a ‘recolonization’. Most naturally, Mazrui
riposte (Mazrui 1995:24-26).

In its Bulletin (2, 1995), CODESRIA pub-
lished items from both parties and sought
the points of view of its members. We
have just received this entry after it had
probably been circulated in the capital
cities and libraries around the world.
However, it would be a wrong step on the
part of CODESRIA to hurriedly end
the debate which is of great interest to
the African Social Science Community.
If it has already done so, this reflection on
the topic will constitute, for that matter,
a request to reopen debates on the issue.

Parties to the Debate

Mafeje and Mazrui should be commended
for initiating the debate on how to settle
conflicts in Africa, and fortunately, with-
out making an in-depth analysis of the

* CODESRIA Bulletin, Nos 3 & 4, 2008 Page 80
subject, thereby making it possible for the 
African social science community to fur-
ther examine the issue while leaving the
door open for other analyses.

I have not yet had the privilege of meet-
ing directly with any of them although it 
have been my ardent desire for nearly a de-
cade. It was when I attended CODESRIA’s 
Summer Institute on ‘Constitutions, In-
stitutions and Democratic Governance in 
Africa’ in 1994 that I took interest in ac-
quainting myself with some of the arti-
cles written by Mafeje and Mazrui.

The little I knew of Mafeje was that he 
was one of the leading intellectuals of the 
continent. The several telephone calls he 
had received from Egyptian intellectuals 
and those from other African countries, 
reaction to M Mazrui’s article, testify to 
his position in the African social science 
community. I knew Mazrui as one of the 
celebrated social scientists of the contin-
ent. He is one of the best social science 
professors in USA and in Africa where 
the sense of solidarity makes it obligatory 
on us to express satisfaction at the 
beautiful hut built by one’s neighbour. I 
hold him in high esteem! Consequently, 
Mafeje and Mazrui are leading personali-
ties in the social science field. Conse-
quently, a young researcher should bow 
before such monuments with the greatest 
respect and admiration, even if he 
does not fully share the ideas expressed 
by any of his elders.

I did not know that Mafeje and Mazrui 
were both lecturers in American universi-
ties, one in Cairo and the other in New York.

I was however convinced that, as leading 
social scientists from East Africa, they 
must surely have known each other very 
well. Mafeje found it necessary to sum 
up the ‘itinerary of Ali Mazrui’ in a few 
words and even if the latter did not deem 
it necessary to do the same for the former, 
there is no doubt that they both know 
each other very well. For more than a quar-
ter of a century, they have established sus-
picious friendly relations characterized by 
cordial and fraternal contempt. On this 
point, I have not been disappointed. The 
critical stand taken by Mafeje against his 
colleague Mazrui and the strong rejoinder 
of the latter constitute a sufficient proof.

**Mafeje’s Critical Outlook**

Personally, I did not understand why, in 
response to the proposals made by Mazrui 
on the settlement of conflicts in Africa,
Mafeje made such a strong attack on the 
former, referring to his professional life 
and his works. The impression created is 
that Mafeje went ‘too far’.

In his criticism of Mazrui, Mafeje de-
scribed the famous professor as a ‘malig-
nant mind serving the cause of imperial-
ism’. Fortunately, the term does not imply 
‘evil spirit’ in Islam as it is in Christianity. 
Otherwise, Mazrui and his abundant dia-
bolic works would be subjected to the 
sentence passed on Salman Rushdie and 
his Satanic Verses. In fact, that is exactly 
what Mafeje is praying for.

Before criticizing his ideas, Mafeje at-
tacked the colleague’s personality in the 
following terms: ‘M Mazrui’s self-center-
dness is well known to African intellectu-
als residing in the continent and abroad’.

He then made ironical statements about 
him: ‘It is said that Mazrui is the leading 
African professor. He is reportedly one of the three “mega professors” presently in 
the social science field in the United 
States of America’.

A according to Mafeje, the celebrated 
Mazrui owed his fame to the certificates 
lavished on him, the publicity made 
around him by ‘his western show case’ 
for which he operates and whose inter-
ests he serves. For Mafeje, Mazrui is sim-
ply useless as a social scientist:

M Mazrui […] has become a master in the 
art of forging attractive expressions 
which recall ludicrous and ridicu-
lous images. He has never be-
lieved in carrying out a real empirical 
work […] the only issue he once raised 
was whether work done in a library 
was worth anything. Indeed, judging 
by the bibliography of his works, he 
obviously culled most of his data from 
newspaper clippings, news items from 
radio broadcasts and his conversa-
tions […] He conceives brilliant but 
short-lived ideas comparable to phos-
phorus in a bowl of water. Is it lack of 
sufficient intellectual ability or self-
prostitution?”

Mafeje’s answer to this question on 
Mazrui is certainly affirmative:

the discourse of Mazrui leaves much 
to be desired intellectually… it is su-
perficial, sensational and dishonest… 
M Mazrui makes suggestions bordering 
on mental alienation. He is easily ex-
cited by an idea and loses any sense of 
reality […] A bove all, he has a con-
fused mind.

Instead of talking about himself, Mafeje 
showed his preference for Edward Said 
‘the illustrious Palestinian professor’ at 
Columbia University whose works and 
scholarship ‘would totally astound 
M Mazrui’ and Galtung ‘a brilliant and prac-
tical European professor’ who made to 
Africans a recommendation ‘with some 
wisdom which our African professor did 
not have’. Complex (which?) or refusal to 
recognize the merits of a renowned col-
deleague? Such were the sentiments shared 
by African intellectuals. In any case, more 
than twenty books and about a hundred 
articles published as well as chairs in lead-
ing universities prove that our brother 
M Mazrui is an eminent intellectual.

Cheikh Anta Diop, our scholar and our 
celebrated Samir Amin are not prominent 
because they are not in the good books 
of the western world. However, they are 
eminent by virtue of their intrinsic quali-
ties. The western world did not offer them 
red carpets. Never mind if it offers Profes-
or Mazrui red carpets. Would one refuse 
to recognize him if a Nobel Prize were 
awarded to him, simply because one does 
not share his ideas or that the prize would 
have been awarded to him by the western 
world? As confessed by Mafeje, ‘in spite 
of all that, Mazrui had a lot of qualities to 
make professors in Africa and elsewhere 
evious of him’. He still has them.

Mafeje asserts that ‘praising oneself does 
not constitute, in any way, a recommen-
dation’. However, it is difficult to believe 
that the lack of courtesy towards a col-
deleague or an unrestrained insult of an 
opponent whose ideas are not shared can 
constitute lessons learnt from the British!

The nihilism shown by Mafeje in his di-
rect quotation of theses defended by 
M Mazrui amply reflects the scope of the 
gap created between the two men over 
the years and which they now seem deter-
mphased to bridge through heated debates.

**Settling Scientific and/or Ideological Scores?**

Mafeje and Mazrui have had stormy ex-
changes for nearly thirty years. Mafeje 
often felt frustrated. On several occasions, 
he was offended by the haughty, proud 
and contemptuous attitude of M Mazrui, 
this very self-conceited liberal, towards 
his African papers:

His direct meetings with his African 
colleagues, the young and old alike, 
generally led to negative intellectual and 
ideological reactions of the latter […]

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This remark dates back to our university days at Makerere College, in the mid-1960s [...] 

The situation remained the same 25 years later, as revealed at a colloquium organized by CODESRIA in 1991 in Kampala [...] I also tried, on my part, to engage M. azrui in a more peaceful debate but all my efforts were in vain. During an Afro-Arab conference held at Sharja in 1977 [...] one of the intellectuals from the United States left the Conference hall in protest against this man’s obscenity. 

Ali A. Mazrui

Binghamton University, USA

M. azrui therefore had several scores to settle with M. azrui personally and on behalf of other African intellectuals who, at one time or other, felt scandalized by the remarks of the latter. 

Furthermore, when the article written by M. azrui was published in October 1994, M. azrui received telephone calls from African intellectuals and scientists who were outraged and in January 1995 in Europe, a copy of the original text was sent to him by African colleagues. These reactions confirmed my fears: M. azrui is a great man; nonetheless, why the ‘alert’ and calls solely to M. azrui? Why did the Egyptian correspondents ask him such questions with indignation: ‘What kind of African intellectual is this M. azrui’? Why were the African colleagues so preoccupied with sending him the original article written by M. azrui? The response to these questions seems clear. His correspondents knew fully well that M. azrui was one of the rare African academics who was quite familiar with the itinerary of M. azrui, his personality and his ideas. He was one of the few personalities who could confront him. They were also aware that no one else had ever been so outraged by M. azrui as M. azrui and that the Cairo American University Professor was the only African intellectual better armed to lead the battle with all the force required to break the myth built around the famous East African Professor of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton, University of New York. An ‘alert’ by way of telephone calls was enough. M. azrui did not have cause to solicit such entreaties. One could count on his immense talent at this crucial moment. One could take him into full confidence as to his ability to institute, as expected, a brainstorming debate on M. azrui, and he really deserved it. He was not disappointing, for he discharged his duty with enthusiasm. 

Since M. azrui is presented by his opponent as a ‘malicious spirit in the service of imperialism’, a self-conceited liberal acting for his western audience, an unrealistic intellectual hostile to ‘leftist’ ideas, a conscientious agent of capitalism who is unconscious of racism, as well as the peripheral adviser of centralism and the neo-colonial order guaranteed by the United Nations, the brainstorming debate launched against him by M. azrui should also be directed against ‘imperialism’, ‘liberalism’, the western world, ‘rightist parties’, capitalism, racism, centralism, colonialism, neo-colonialism or ‘recolonization’ and, to a certain extent, against the United Nations system. 

In any case, was it a prophecy or provocation? - M. azrui had warned that his comments were ‘frightening ideas for a proud people who had spilled so much blood and deployed all the necessary political will to liberate themselves from the hegemony of European powers’. He should therefore have expected to be confronted by M. azrui, one of the most dignified adversaries of ‘imperialism’ in Africa and one of the most ardent defenders of African nationalism, resolutely committed to the ‘left’ out of conviction and necessity. 

M. azrui denounced the demons of ‘imperialism’ (the term is used abominably three times along with ‘imperialist’, four times), of capitalism (two times as a noun and two times as a qualifying adjective) and racism (three times) who accompany the ‘devil’ of colonialism or ‘recolonization’ of which the professor acts as a prophet. 

As a self-styled radical nationalist, M. azrui has not forgotten that, in 1966 at Makerere, M. azrui had made a disturbing statement affirming that, without the English language, there would never have been any such thing as ‘African Nationalism’. However, in 1993, M. azrui returned to his point of departure: like other intellectuals, he declared that ‘a nation which does not produce knowledge in its own language cannot develop’. M. azrui never reacted. Nevertheless, since it is never too late to return to one’s good opinion or idea, should we reproach him for this? Unless we wish to preach some fixed ideas in social sciences or demonstrate scientific fetishism, both of which do not fit M. azrui at all. The important thing now is to, among other things, find out whether since 1991, those excellent ideas have begun to materialize or whether these African intellectuals who take pleasure in abstract phraseology, have finally moved on from slogans to concrete actions so that African nations produce knowledge in their own languages. Unfortunately, several of them, alienated to the marrow, continue to act as sycophants of Anglophone or the puppets of Franco-phonie. 

The conclusions we drew from the colloquium on Educational Innovation in Post-Colonial Africa, held in Cape Town in December 1994, remain a dead letter for lack of support from governments which are on the payroll of western ‘cultural imperialism’. Swahili, for example, which can serve as a tool for the production of scientific works in East Africa, continues to be regarded as ‘degrading’ and I have observed with much admiration that M. azrui and M. azrui continue to produce knowledge in a style of Shakespearean English which they communicate to their students in African universities with great skill, with one demonstrating his talent in Africa and the other in America itself. The sad reality is that we do not only continue to produce works in foreign languages; we also seem to impart knowledge not to our people primarily but to people in the western world. 

In M. azrui, one observes the expression of a ‘leftist’ who has not forgotten and who is not likely to forgive or make concessions to the too liberal M. azrui who has built a solid reputation for himself by waging war against the African ‘leftists’. 

‘In 1970, he denounced the leftists of Dar-es-Salaam University for their intolerance and declared that everyone had the right to express his opinion’. 

Is intolerance the ‘strong point’ of the ‘left’? M. azrui also had a grudge against this generally ‘unrealistic’ man who perceived the fundamental ideas but refused to draw practical lessons from them unless they emanated from the ‘left’. 

Finally, it is the colonial monster itself that M. azrui is fighting, there is no such thing as ‘reconcentration’ or ‘benign colonization’. From this point, the professor suddenly shifts from scientific thinking to concrete action, threatening and warning: ‘Africans will not allow themselves to be deceived’. 

M. azrui
Decolonization and Conflict Settlement in Africa

Mafeje begins by affirming that contrary to the ‘disintegration’ issue raised by Mazrui, Africa was rather ‘decaying’. However, beyond the divergences about concepts and discourse on the sex of angles which African intellectuals are so fond of, there are basically no concrete differences and this is reflected in the fact that, notwithstanding the beautiful expressions used and the scholarly theories propounded, Africa’s situation is worsening each day as if the continent is infected by the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) as a result of colonization.

Mafeje sees conflict settlement in post-colonial Africa as being contingent upon ‘the decolonization of the body politic and esprit de corps’.

Mafeje has most probably presented his idea of ‘decolonization’ in one of his numerous publications which, unfortunately, he does not mention.

The fundamental issue which events brought to bear on Mazrui consisted in knowing how to settle conflicts in Africa and put an end to the ‘disintegration’ of the continent. Mazrui tried to respond to it and could not escape criticisms. For his part, Mafeje seems to be in the clouds. In the end, who is more realistic than the part, Mafeje seems to be in the clouds. In the continent. Mazrui tried to respond to and put an end to the ‘disintegration’ of Africa’s situation is worsening each day as if the continent is infected by the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) as a result of colonization.

Harsh Rejoinder from Mazrui

In a short rejoinder to Mafeje, Mazrui reaffirmed his proposals as already published in the International Herald Tribune. He first defended himself against the accusation that he was serving the cause of imperialism and bent on destroying Africans. Thus, he produced supporting documents to prove that the issue of ‘self-pacification’ and the search for ‘Pax Africana’ had preoccupied him for several years. The international scholar reaffirmed his support for the United States and immediately after, like an answer from the shepherd to the shepherdess, like a seriously wounded animal it seems that is called to self-defence in the trial of a scientific case the lawyer returned blow for blow, insult for insult and discourtesy for discourtesy. He loaded his anger in one of those magic words known to him alone and hurled his bomb spitefully at Mafeje whom he accused of expressing ‘confused reasoning’ and for whom he recommended ‘colonization and inter-African intellectual re-education’. Even though Mafeje confessed that he had been ‘less spiteful and less insulting’, he is not justified for that matter. He is in a better position to know that to reply spitefulness with spite and trade insults, even if moderately applied, is not an excellent source in the social sciences.

I hope Mafeje and Mazrui, are still practising Muslims I have the greatest respect for Islam, even if I disapprove of certain Islamic principles and practices. Perhaps it might be necessary to recall this verse of the Spittle of J ude (1,9) which teaches Christians that even when involved in an argument with the Devil – the true one – about the corpse of Moses, Michael the Archangel dared not utter insults against the Devil. A las, the brainstorming debate between the two men appeared to be violent. It was marked by the regrettable lack of courtesy and was rife with insults, whereas the two professors were expected to put up a better behaviour. Mafeje distinguished himself by his lightning attack, characterized from beginning to end by the type of annoyance said to be rare among Anglophones, even when they disagree. Provoked, Mazrui unfortunately also ended up not observing professional ethics and the rules of propriety. As a result, the two fighting eagles were swept off by the devil’s tide toward murky waters of the debate.

Peace as Conceived by Mazrui:

Mazrui’s Peace Proposal

Mazrui is absolutely a man of peace! He very well merits an African Peace Prize and even a Nobel Peace Prize. He is obsessed by peace and really believes in it. If he spontaneously accepted the invitation to go to South Africa to listen to a Archbishop Desmond Tutu, personally congratulated President Mandela, both winners of the Nobel Peace Prize, it was partly because he was convinced that he was following their foot steps. Was it not because they had also seen in him a potential Nobel Prize Winner that they invited him? It will therefore not be surprising if Africa is again honoured with another Nobel Peace Prize through Mazrui, after being totally ignored in the past whereas it had offered shelter to the Son of God when his life was threatened in Israel.

However, Mazrui’s conception of peace is not the same as that of Tutu or Mandela. The latter conceive peace without servitude, peace without colonization or apartheid which negates it. Mazrui, on the other hand, conceives peace under slavery, under colonization, under apartheid or its new form, ‘recolonization’. Since the ‘peace professor by the professor’ is practically opposed to that of the South African leaders and that the latter very well knew the professor they had invited, one may wonder whether a Archbishop Tutu and President Mandela had not invited Mazrui to South Africa to subject him to what Mazrui himself called ‘interafrican intellectual re-education’! Was it not to have him change his ideas on peace that they considered it worthwhile to look at see him directly listen not to the Te Deum but rather the requiem in aeterna of colonization and apartheid which he always claimed to be a better guarantee for peace? The invitation was too enticing to be refused and the aim too far-fetched to be understood. Did this smack of foolhardiness or misunderstanding? The professor seized the opportunity to publish right in the heart of South Africa, which was just throwing off its cloak of racism, his famous article on ‘recolonization’, while making sure he had reserved a place for South Africa on his ‘African Security Council’. This attempt to seduce had no impact in the South African political circles and on the intellectual elite, for they did not react. However, in Soweto and the townships, the people who had paid the highest price to see the end of apartheid...
were outraged. Mafeje became their spokesman and legal adviser; unfortunately, he did not present any special authorization to the court of CODESRIA.

As M azrui is concerned, peace should be attained at all costs, irrespective of the means used and the conditions. M azrui’s peace is that of the cemetery and nothing else. It does not matter whether the peace comes from A Ilah or Satan. The question which quickly comes to mind is: if Idi Amin’s peace were good, why did M azrui resign from M akere U niversity when the peace-loving A min came to power in 1971? He can still find another pretext to say that in any case, it was an excellent evil given that his flight finally opened for him the gates of the world as well as the road to fame with the result that he is now presenting himself on the Nobel platform.

M azrui’s peace unfortunately remains associated with the defence of the dictatorial, colonial or neo-colonial order.

Mazrui’s Colonial Order: ‘Recolonization’ and Peace

‘Now that the colonial order has come to an end, who will undertake peacekeeping in Africa?’ (M azrui: 1967).

Mafeje was wrong in situating the decline of several A frican States in the 1990s as the basis of M azrui’s frustration. In fact, M azrui’s frustration dates back to the 1960s and is linked to the collapse of the colonial order which, according to him, maintained perfect peace.

One would say that M azrui adored the colonial order to the extent that he became demoralized by its collapse. As a man with foresight, he considered that the independence movement was not a good thing and for that matter, that independence would lead to several conflicts (he was right as regards the form). This explains his preference for colonization and the colonial order.

For M azrui, if the colonizer has not existed, it would have been necessary to create him; if he has left and cannot be recalled from overseas, it is necessary to find a local one, an ‘authentic’ model, as the President of Zaire might say. It can thus be understood why M azrui outrage and provokes several A fricans who are hidings behind Mafeje. In law, it is always the good intention which is presumed. I am tempted to believe that M azrui simply tried to lead a debate on a social science subject and I think he succeeded in that respect and therefore merits our gratitude. For one thing, science makes progress through the exchange of ideas and debates. Did M azrui really want to conduct debates in the A frican media? It is difficult to say so because he confesses through his rejoinder that his opinion on the subject has not changed over thirty good years.

M azrui seems to have the nostalgia of the colonial order. Terms such as: ‘colonial’ , ‘recolonization’, ‘self-colonization’ etc., have been accorded special attention in his works. In 1977, ten years after his brilliant defence of the colonial order which was on the verge of ‘disintegration’ , he placed the A fro-A rab Conference in Sharja within the framework of ‘the counter-penetration of the colonizers by the colonized’. In A ugust 1994, he came up preaching ‘recolonization or self-colonization’. In 1995, in spite of the ‘criticism’ levelled against him by Mafeje in the second edition of CODESRIA Bulletin, he persisted in his arrogance, a style which threw his enemies into panic. The Western world might have found in M azrui its best A frican adviser during the colonization era and since this ‘humanitarian mission’ is still not over, M azrui is one of the celebrated heads who should be exempted from presented a job application or curriculum vitae.

The peace conceived by M azrui is peace in hell, sustained by inequalities, oppression, exploitation and servitude. As far as we are concerned and, as observed by P atrice L umumba, ‘there is neither honour nor peace in servitude’. It is not this chimeric and empty peace that the A frican people want. Besides, if the ‘colonial peace’ administered through flogging and exploitation had really been the right peace, nobody would have felt the need to fight or sacrifice himself for independence, unless the prominent professor ascertains that independence was an error!

Besides, when he refers to ‘recolonization’ it is because at a given time, colonization has ceased and the colonial order considered better than the previous one needed to be restored. However, he who spends most of his time meeting with the colonial masters in their home countries, does he, Professor M azrui, think that the colonization of A frica ended, and hence his proposal of ‘recolonization’? The independence attained has remained nominal and the Western world is still pursuing its colonization activities in new forms through its peripheral agents and international institutions. This fact cannot be denied, unless one should continue to consider A fricans as eternally under-aged or the fake independence as a genuine achievement. I cannot believe that M azrui, who knows so well the secrets of the colonial deities, can make the mistake of taking the superficial for the essence, lightning for light, starlit night for day and the wrong side as the right one.

In his first statement, M azrui envisaged a ‘recolonization from outside, inspired by humanitarianism [...]’ and administered by powers from A frica, Asia or member countries of the United N ations Organization.

Is ‘recolonization’ by A fricans conceivable for countries of Eastern or Western Europe, A merica or Asia which are facing problems similar or comparable to those of the A frican countries where the term ‘colonization’ has already been thrown into the dumping ground of history and ‘recolonization’ is viewed as a dangerous ghost to be fired at sight by nationalists? For instance, when will Bosnia, Ireland, some former Republics of USSR, certain provinces of Spain or Corsica be ‘recolonized’ by A fricans? Perhaps the Professor proposes a one-way ‘recolonization’ of A frica by foreign powers with preference to the ‘former’ colonizers, this would constitute a kind of repetition of the history of colonization, this time, upon request?

It is obvious that the West does not need to make any request before carrying on with an enterprise it had never really stopped. It has become the self-proclaimed guardian of the democratization process and distribution of patents for ‘good governance’, the moral authority to decide on the fairness of elections – manipulated by it at any rate – and to announce the corresponding results. It has already intervened in Zaire under cover of the Troika (the coalition comprising USA, Belgium and France) which actually constitutes the country’s supervisory authority. However, democracy under supervision is a mere facce.

In recommending a ‘recolonization based on humanitarianism’, is M azrui forgetting so soon that humanitarianism has always served as a Trojan horse for colonial invasion? Has he forgotten that at the Berlin Conference of 1885 the objective put forward for the colonization of A frica was equally humanitarian in character - to being ‘civilization’ to barbaric peoples and put an end to the slave trade [...] - or that without sharing the views of the Bagh-


That ‘Pax Africana’ has already been interpreted, in my opinion, as cases of ‘Africanization’ which crystallizes into a permanent system of exploitation. The lightning in Namibia under South Africa, Western Sahara under Morocco and part of Chad under Libya, were not underscored by humanitarian or charitable provisions. At any rate, it is that aspect that justified or still justifies all the means employed by the people of Western Sahara to put an end to the colonization of their brothers as well as those initiatives taken by the latter to settle on their fatherland.

Whether it came from Africa or from foreigners outside Africa, colonization remains a bad experience for the colonized peoples. The black devil is not preferable to the white one. Moreover, a good devil or a good colonist cannot be found anywhere. It is therefore of no use to bring the colonial monster back to life in Africa, if this monster is already dead or about to die. Who can control it?

Colonization establishes the colonial system which crystallizes into a permanent system of exploitation. The lightning intervention of the Tanzanian army in Uganda in 1979 to rescue the people of that country from the bloody claws of monstrous Idi Amin from whom M. azrui escaped and for which Africa is grateful to God – and the intervention of ECOMOG troops in Liberia cannot be interpreted, in my opinion, as cases of ‘African colonization’ or ‘recolonization’.

In advocating self-colonization or ‘recolonization’ M. azrui seems to forget that ‘Pax Africana’ has already been imposed or is still being imposed in certain States by authoritarian regimes. In such cases, the central authoritarian state had certain regions or provinces of the country ‘recolonized’ by the national dictator. Soon after the passage of the festivities marking the nominal independence, new African leaders took over the seats and armory of the white colonizers and thus put on their helmets and held their whips. The neo-colonial state colonizes some of its provinces and a segment of its population. However, like the peace preferred by any authoritarian system, colonial peace is an antithesis of genuine peace. ‘Recolonization’ would only generate new liberation struggles. M. azrui could also have advocated the procedure for settling conflicts created by the ‘recolonization’ process.

M. azrui commends the United Nations Organization for its peacekeeping efforts in the world. He admits and deprecates the failure of some UN missions, but he does not go farther. He was also expected to have pointed to the lacunas inherent in a system in which certain entities have a complete say in the affairs of the Security Council while others do not have much or anything to say and only applaud or laugh during General Assembly sessions which offer several African Heads of State and their Ministers an opportunity to tour New York and its suburbs. I also expected M. azrui to express, in passing, the fact that he supports Africa’s membership of the Security Council. However, this issue does not seem to interest him, as attested in his proposals. Maybe he has discussed it in one of his twenty works which, unfortunately, are more available in the Western world than in the African continent.

Africa will always need the United Nations services but that does not mean it will swel the ranks of those extremists who bear a grudge against Africa for their own reasons. It seems to me that the UN system suffers from serving as a tool for ‘recolonization’ managed, moreover, in an undemocratic manner.

Does M. azrui give the United Nations Organization more than its due account of its peacekeeping vocation or because it is an instrument of ‘recolonization’ manipulated by the countries forming the UN Security Council, particularly the five permanent members?

The two aspects go hand in hand, according to M. azrui’s philosophy. First, it is by virtue of its status as an instrument of ‘recolonization’ vital to world peace that the United Nations Organization has won the favours of the celebrated professor. Indeed, the UN system makes it possible for the give ‘great powers’ to ‘recolonize’ the world, using all procedures including even those that are contrary to the provisions of international law which is itself in an indisputable state of imperfection. The UN peace is first the peace proclaimed by America, Britain, France, Russia or even China as well. This type of peace imposed as a new form of colonial peace is too fragile not to carry M. azrui away.

It is difficult to support M. azrui’s point of view that ‘the great countries’ are not those that need the services of UN and its specialized agencies but rather the ‘small countries’ of which the majority are in Africa. Thus, taking into account the fact that UN is a charitable enterprise for the ‘small countries’, which should be grateful to the ‘great’ countries, only one step is quickly taken. Even though he does not contradict M. azrui – who considers that the westerners have been using him but only asks to know whether it’s Newt Gingrich who has been using him – it would be surprising to argue that M. azrui does not serve western interests.

The truth is that USA, France or Great Britain, cite only three countries, actually need the UN and its specialized agencies. It is not because of the beautiful eyes of the citizens of the ‘small’ countries that USA for instance refuses to quit the United Nations in spite of the strong criticisms from a segment of its public opinion. It is not for humanitarian reasons either that the five ‘great’ powers refuse to extend the membership of the Security Council to include Africa, Asia or South America. Their charity in this regard actually goes to Germany!

The Western states, i.e. the ‘great countries’ actually need the UNO to ‘recolonize’ the rest of the world, to exploit it and maintain their leadership in the world. Such an interest is of great significance; it is also essential and strategic in character. General de Gaulle even qualified UNO as a ‘machin’ (‘thing’) but neither the General nor his successors withdrew from that ‘thing’. It was the same General de Gaulle who said that ‘States have no friends, they have only interests’. Ever since the proclamation of this notion, France has made that philosophy part and parcel of her spiritual heritage. French interests in the United Nations and its specialized agencies are such that the ‘Liberator of France’ dared not change course and his successors did not do so either to discredit the grandeur of France.

However, the greatness of France, like that of the other counterparts, lies in their ‘imperialism’. France remains within the United Nations to strengthen its position.
as a ‘super power’ to reconquer or enlarge its colonial empire.

Eventually, and as an instrument of ‘recolonization’, the United Nations Organization serves the ‘great countries’ more than it serves the ‘small’ ones, unless one considers that the apartheid system benefited the blacks more than the whites in South Africa, that the slave trade was more advantageous to the slaves than to those who sold them, that colonization was a ‘bad enterprise’ for the colonizers and very lucrative for the colonized people or that the exploitation of Africa is more profitable to Africa than to the Western world. I cannot imagine Mzauri supporting such an argument that would then call for Majeje’s death threats.

Even ‘recolonization’ by Africa herself within the framework of an African Security Council will still benefit the Western world. Mzauri’s five key States that will set up the said council are within the framework and under the control of the Western world. Consequently, they would only constitute Western proconsulates in Africa entrusted with the administration of African territories under the authority of the West which would supply them with arms, money and experts in addition to teaching them the expedient techniques that enabled it to exploit the rest of the world for several centuries.

In his Security Council for ‘recolonization’, Mzauri seems to have forgotten two other key states which however have sound experience in the field: Morocco and Libya, which respectively inherited from Spain and France the colonies of Western Sahara and Northern Chad.

The Pan-African Emergency Force advocated by the distinguished professor also poses problems. How can Africa set up such a force, ensure its efficiency and sustain it if the continent already lacks the means of maintaining ECOMOG troops in Liberia? To intervene in Chad for example, Zaire had to wait for several months until France financed the operation and supplied the Zairian troops with aircraft, vehicles, provisions and arms. At any rate, this particular initiative of France was amply justified because the Zairian army intervened as a platoon of black French parachutists established in the continent, i.e. on the orders and in the interest of France.

Africa lacks the requisite moral and material resources for its ‘recolonization’. Several millions of her sons have sacrificed their lives to put an end to colonialism and apartheid. Accepting ‘recolonization’ would therefore be tantamount to desecrating the tombs of the martyrs.

Coming back to Mzauri’s five key states, one notices that almost all of them are plagued with problems of ‘disintegration’, Egypt is shaken by internal tensions. Ethiopia, Nigeria and Zaire are breaking up and the newly born South Africa is very fragile. That being the case, from where will these prominent states mobilize the strength they need to ‘recolonize’ the others? From where will they derive the resources required to enable them to fight simultaneously on both fronts—on the one hand, by arresting their internal ‘disintegration’ and, on the other hand, by arresting the disintegration of the other countries and foster Pax Africana?

The ‘disintegration’ of a key state is yet another relatively imminent problem. Who will ‘recolonize’ such a state, supervise it and act as its ‘big brother’? Indeed, several lessons can be drawn from the aforementioned supervision of Zaire by the ‘Troika’. The guardian will definitely come from the West.

What therefore prompted our great Mr. Mzauri to declare support for colonization or ‘recolonization’ and thus abandon ‘self-pacification’, the term he was using in the 1960s? Is it he who teaches us that, at any rate, ‘self-colonization’ and ‘recolonization’ mean the same thing to him. However, is it not possible to ‘pacify oneself without being ‘recolonized’? The answer is yes and it therefore seems to me that Majeje and Mzauri starved away from that course which is identified with democratization.

It is strange to notice that, in the 1990s, Mzauri prefers ‘self-colonization’ or ‘recolonization’ as opposed to his preference in the 1960s when he advocated ‘self-pacification’! Is this because he has now found a better opportunity than he did find in 1960 to make people accept a proposal he would never have attempted to formulate for Africans who had just buried the martyrs of their independence? Fortunately or unfortunately, he can still find along his course nationalists such as Majeje who, in spite of his scientific approach to the argument, does not hesitate to draw on the wrath and violence that marked the liberation movements, thereby complying with courtesy and ethics.

Democratization and the Settlement of Conflicts in Africa

More pragmatic than Majeje, Mzauri takes the merit especially since he expressed his anguish, raised the problem of conflict settlement in Africa, proposed ‘recolonization’ as a means of fostering peace in Africa and suggested at the same time the framework for such an enterprise.

Mzauri makes observations and formulates a proposal and therefore does not limit himself to merely making observations and passively accepting the status quo with resignation. He could not be expected to do anything less than that in his capacity as a scientist. Solicited on many occasions and also pestered with severe criticisms, he had the duty to reflect on this issue and he did fulfill that obligation.

In social science, certain solutions are often inappropriate because the corresponding problems are not properly defined, because efforts are not made to master the terms of the equations generally comprising several unknown quantities or that the time dimension is not adequately taken into consideration.

The fundamental question one should ask oneself before proposing solutions—‘Decolonization’ or ‘Recolonization’—appears to be as follows: what is or are the cause(s) of the conflicts underlying the ‘disintegration’ of Africa? This question seems to have eluded Majeje and Mzauri.

CODESRIA organized a seminar on ‘ethnic conflicts in Africa’ from 16th to 18th November 1992 in Nairobi. Several papers were read on that occasion and these made it possible to establish the fact that almost all the countries are affected and that most of the conflicts plaguing the entire continent are closely linked to the phenomenon of ethnicity or tribalism.

Conflicts arise whenever certain groups of people are exploited by others, whenever certain provinces or regions are marginalized by the central government or consider their situation as the outcome of the authoritarian attitude of government toward the citizens. Others are either orchestrated or entertained by forces outside Africa. Some of the conflicts appear as true liberation struggles.

The effects of external and internal imperialism cannot be permanently and effectively overcome by imposing a new form of imperialism or those forms identified
with colonialism through ‘recolonization’, however slight it may be.

The root causes of the conflicts have to be overcome in order to ensure lasting peace. The said root causes are many and appear in the form of ethnocentrism, tribalism, regionalism, marginalization, oppression, inequitable development, etc.

A peaceful society still constitutes the ultimate goal of Pax Africana and, since, M. Azru admits that the United Nations Organization has an important role to play in this regard, it seems to me that the question he attempted to answer – which interests both Mafeje and myself – can be summed up as follows: ‘What is the best procedure for restoring peace in Africa?’

Perhaps, in this regard, and as Africans, a ‘peace-loving’ people, we should rather humbly solicit the opinion of another African in the person of Boutros-Boutros Ghali of Egypt, also a professor, who is currently reputed to know better the United Nations and peace-related problems in the world, and who, by coincidence, is the incumbent Secretary General of the United Nations Organization at a time when we are fighting scientifically and shaking fists at opponents in an effort to find solutions to the conflicts plaguing Africa.

More than one year before the publication of M. Azru’s article and two years before the debate between Mafeje and M. Azru, Boutros-Boutros Ghali had already arrived at the conclusion that could have been taken into account to spare us heated and less courteous debates. According to him, ‘Democracy is a guarantee for peace and that sound development is impossible in the absence of democracy’ (Ghali 1993:15). Ghali also warned those who might be tempted to consider positive economic performance as a solution to conflicts: ‘If the States do not initiate democratic reforms after obtaining the first economic results, they will eventually end up with declining growth which is the source of the increasing levels of inequalities and the attendant social disorders.’ Ghali ended his argument on an authoritative note: ‘I repeat, it is democracy alone that gives development a meaningful dimension’ (Ghali 1993:16).

The synchronous relationships between democracy, development, and peace were also highlighted by Tafsir Malick Ndiaye (1992:26).

After all, the general concern of everybody – Mafeje and M. Azru, members of the CODESRIA Community and all Africans – consists in settling conflicts in Africa and beyond, ensuring the survival of a continent in ‘decay’ or being ‘disintegrated’. One of our colleagues, Ake, had earlier on observed that, for Africans in the present situation, just as for the citizens of all the States of the world, ‘Democracy is the basic prerequisite for survival’ (Ake 1991:4). One can hardly live or survive without peace. Be it at the institutional or economic level, the absence of democracy, in the broadest sense of the concept, mainly accounts for the wave of conflicts raging throughout the continent and plunging it into a state of hypertension.

Africans and all peace-loving people in the world should first of all and right now support the on-going democratization process if they wish to see lasting peace restored in each African country.

The Pax Africana worth its appellation will depend on national peace in each African State guaranteed by democracy. There is no doubt that, as long as the human race lives, there will always be conflicts. Democracy is the ideal framework for settling conflicts. It does not suppress them but it helps to limit them and the most serious conflicts are peacefully settled through the implementation of rules established by law and through dialogue.

Peace and servitude cannot be matched, and neither can democracy and (re)colonization nor paradise and hell, for that matter. Without a real independence or full sovereignty democracy and peace are inconceivable.

Once we succeed in achieving ‘self-pacification’ for each African country, through democratization, we will then be able to tackle with greater force and success the political, economic, social and cultural integration of the continent. To this end, it will be necessary to redefine the mandate of the OAU. The positive economic results obtained through a transparent and democratic management by people who set themselves back to work after winning the democratization struggle will make it possible to finance and sustain continental institutions such as the ‘Pan-African Peacekeeping Force’ to restore peace and not ‘recolonization’. Consolidated democracy, peace and development will considerably reduce the number of political and economic refugees or even ensure that there are no more refugees at all, since the factors that make people become refugees would have disappeared completely.

However, we should not jump the stages and we should not sleep on our oars. The major challenge Africa has to meet at the end of this 20th century and at the dawn of the third millennium consists in ensuring the success of the democratization process and its consolidation.

The struggle for democracy and total decolonization in Africa is already bitter and will be worse. However, it is an existentialist requirement binding on all citizens and peoples of Africa. Africans should therefore be prepared to confront ‘imperialism’ and all of its demons.

The Western world continues to successfully implement the ‘divide-and-rule’ principle in order to maintain African countries under its control. It plays the role of prompter or even director in several plays involving conflicts in Africa. It pulls the strings! Indeed, but for its intervention, many conflicts would not have erupted or would have easily and quickly been settled.

The action taken by the Western countries and particularly France during this ‘Transnational’ period shows that the Western world is not ready to leave Africa to assume its independence or to see it implement democracy in its own way with the men and the regimes it wishes to have but rather to follow plans with experts and men chosen and prepared by the West. Togo, Gabon, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Zaire and many other more examples can be mentioned. The recent coup d’état orchestrated in the Comoro Islands by the famous French mercenary Bob Denard, against a democratically elected African president, is heavily loaded with implications. For one thing, Bob is very popular in eastern Zaire and that was not the first coup d’état he had ever engineered: he had always wished to reign in Africa over Africans and France, his country, had always been more lenient with him than with ‘terrorists’. There is therefore cause to wonder if he did not operate under cover of the authorities of his country!

Furthermore, a democratic and independent Africa will be detrimental to his interests of the Western world and all those who live by exploiting Africa. After supporting the most bloodthirsty dictators in the service of its interests, the Western world continues to support the totalitarian regimes.
To prove its goodwill and to support the pacification of Africa, the Western world should cease intervening in the internal affairs of the States; they should stop imposing regimes and people of their choice on the States and rather rid the continent of the numerous mercenaries, wild dogs who are the cause of terror and many conflicts in Africa.

It is first and foremost the duty of Africans themselves to accelerate the decolonization and democratization of the continent as well as fight to cut the umbilical cord binding Africa to the Western continent just as it links a baby to its mother. In this struggle against the ‘disintegration’ or ‘decay’ of the continent and for the settlement of conflicts, scientific reflection should play a predominant role and debates constitute an important framework. ‘Yes’ to actions in favour of democratization and decolonization. ‘No’ to ‘recolonization’, which one would however have considered understandable, in view of the status quo in Africa. Neither Mafeje nor Mazrui should be excommunicated. We should hold discussions without fighting one another. The temptation to give into a fro-pessimism is quite great but we should also consider the time-frame. Fortunately, the CODESRIA court has this characteristic quality as it receives direct summons, presides over hearing sessions and produces evidence. Moreover, it can deliberate over issues while making provision for an appeal without necessarily passing sentences or pronouncing judgements.

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**A Commentary on Anthropology and Africa**

**Preamble**

First, it is important to note that this paper is not a book review but rather a review article which aims at discussing the major ideas and perspectives which emerge from Sally M oore’s book. Although no special effort will be made to follow the exact format of the book, every attempt will be made to follow through the ideas presented in a systematic way. Second, such an undertaking might serve as an advertisement of Sally M oore’s ideas about Africa and anthropology which, I daresay, are not familiar to most African scholars. In fact, it came as a surprise, at least to me, that all the anthropologists who have worked in Africa she was the one who elected to make the final pronouncement on anthropology and Africa. Perhaps, this should be taken as a sign of her courage and deep commitment to her craft.

Nevertheless, this is not to say that in certain situations a fine distinction between courage and foolhardiness could not be made. This is meant in both the professional and the political sense.

The history of anthropology in Africa is one thing; its ideological import and practice in modern Africa is another. Besides, the question of which anthropology and which Africa is still far from being resolved. Probably, the younger generation of anthropologists and what Sally M oore contemptuously refers to as the ‘colonial mentality’ advocates are less sanguine about the future of their craft than her. The African anthropologists who do not feature at all in her book are still in a political and intellectual quandary. In South Africa and its environs volkekunde anthropology is part of the bitter past and at present is being rejected by Africans as colonialist and racist. It transpires, therefore, that ‘anthropology’ and ‘Africa’ are abstractions which could refer to any number of things at the concrete level. In this context it is interesting to note that Euro-American can easily talk and write about ‘African studies’ but not ‘African anthropology’. The difference in connotation is not in the phraseology itself, which is perfectly symmetrical, but in the noun agency. In African studies, Africa is unambiguously the object whereas ‘African Anthropology’ could, among other things, refer to a specific claim by Africans. If the notion is recognised by the proprietors of anthropology, this impulse exists and is probably strongest in southern Africa. According to this reckoning, the alternative is the abolition of anthropology which, as is well-known, is exactly what African nationalists did elsewhere in Africa.

It is apparent, therefore, that in the present epoch scholars, whoever they are, have to contend with the antimony between intellectual imperialism and the desire by Africans for self-liberation. This is not merely a matter of ‘framework of thought’, as Sally M oore might suppose, but actual politics of knowledge-making under conditions of global imposition and its antitheses. In this respect a certain sense of sociology of knowledge even among anthropological stalwarts might be of value. Who are the makers of anthropology in the 1990s and for whom? Who are the objects of anthropology and why? Why ‘Anthropology and Africa’ and not ‘Aethnology and Europe or America’? A number of answers to these questions are implicit in Sally M oore’s text? It is the
anthropologists that:

If an established lady from Harvard such as Sally Moore wishes to tell her fellow-

 Avoiding being too obvious.

This is obviously the opposite of tendentious which is being accused by colonial whites of being traitors and now independent Africans are accusing them of being colonialists. Richards and Fortes eventually disowned me whereas Monica Wilson, the Zulu warrior, feeling betrayed shook his fist at me warning me that my strictures against them would not do because only yesterday they were

Under the circumstances the rich and the dominant cannot help using Afrika as a playground and anthropologists have no reason to be self-effacing but instead should march forward and only be wary of capricious African governments (p.117), would not this throw everything into relief and make existing contradictions more apparent? Instead of beating about the bush, is it not better that the 'candid self is revealed so that we all know what we are about? For an anthropologist, it is well to remember that onetongue' primitives' do not know how to fight in the dark.

The Colonial Legacy

Anthropology and the colonial era constitutes half of Sally M oore’s short survey and rightly so. Before anything else it should be granted that there is no drama, without characters. There is no question about it, the colonial anthropologists were great characters and personable persons. I got to know personally the succeeding generations of British Anthropologists since Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, and Evans-Pritchard. I do not remember disliking any of them, except Henry Forsbrooke, the last colonial Director of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute and a former District Commissioner in Tanganyika – a half-baked colonial anthropologist by all counts. The anthropologists I knew in Britain and in Afrika such as A udrey Richards, Fortes, Leach, Goody, Firth, Schapera, Gluckman, Mitchell, Beattie, Victor Turner, Mary Douglas, Lucy Mair, Phyllis K aberny, Monica Wilson, Philip Mayer, Southall, Gulliver, M aquet, Jappie van Velsen, Gutkind, A nthorpe, Blacking and a few other less well-known figures were, indeed, liberals. But once in a light conversation Mary Douglas reminded me that, that was a swear word and that it was ‘kosher’ to belief.

Whether this was a friendly dig at me or not, the fact of the matter is that I used to have bitter arguments with some of them on the colonial question and white racism. In one occasion the exchange became so intense that one of my mentors, A udrey Richards, had to remind me that during the Second World War they sweat blood in the colonies, presumably for the colonialised. Yet in another meeting in L usaka M ax Gluckman, the Zulu warrior, feeling betrayed shook his fist at me warning me that my strictures against them would not do because only yesterday they were

Although the fact that the anthropologists came from the dominant society, they were preoccupied with the dominated population, its affairs, and its well-being. Anthropologists mixed freely with the Africans among whom they worked, often living among them, acknowledging no colour bar and respecting none of the many social boundaries between rulers and ruled that were conventional among white administrators and settlers.

Sally M oore’s claim is as unanthropological as it is false. Everywhere they went, the anthropologists were Bwana M kubwa or Mama by virtue of their skin colour in a colonial setting. They commanded the attention and the services of the natives at will. The fact that some of them were more gentle than others and did not use N adel’s ‘bullying method’ whereby he ordered his informants to his tent and hotly interrogated them is irrelevant. What remains is relations of superordination and subordination or social and political exploitation. At the formal level there is yet another distinction that should be made. By virtue of their class background, the first generation of British anthropologists in Afrika enjoyed as much power as the colonial administrators with whom they collaborated in developing what became known as applied anthropology. There are well-known examples such as the Seligmans, N adel, and E vans-Pritchard in the Sudan, J.G. Jones in Nigeria. A udrey Richards in Uganda, M itchell in Rhodesia, L estrade, van W arme l o, O denda l a, and H ammond-
Tooke in South Africa. Likewise, Daryll Forde did his best from the Royal Anthropological Institute in London. Sally M oore (pp.19-20) is our witness:

In London, the profession tried intermittently to persuade the government that anthropology could indeed help in the affairs of colonial rule. By the mid-1920s the nature of the interface between scholarly and administrative interests in Africa had become clearer (pp.19-20), (note the choice of words).

This did not apply to the next generation of British anthropologists who went to Africa in the period leading up to independence e.g. Victor Turner, Mary Douglas, John Beattie and a number of their contemporaries from the Manchester School. Not only were they not empire-builders but not also they took no particular interest in the colonial government. All the same they still enjoyed some prestige and respectability. Things were to change rapidly with the advent of independence. The first generation of British anthropologists who came out to Africa shortly after independence e.g. Caroline Hutton, Ann Sharman, Suzette Heald, Joan Vicent, Rachel Yeld, Sandy Robertson and a few others enjoyed neither prestige nor respectability. They were on their own. The political and ideological environment was hostile. They were under pressure to account for themselves. They responded by being generally anti-colonial, anti-colonial anthropology, and denounced structural-functionalism. They avoided tribal studies like plague and opted for thematic topics which focussed on processes of transformation.

Most of them were good researchers but it was never clear whether or not what they did was reproduction of anthropology under changed conditions. One thing certain is that they never enjoyed the same eminence as their predecessors. In fact, by the time I left Cambridge in 1968 none of my students wanted to go to Africa for fieldwork. One of them chose to go to Mongolia, another to the Amazon, and yet another to the T asta Mountains. So, when Sally M oore refers to a flourishing anthropological enterprise in Africa I truly do not know what she is referring to. In her book she has great problems proving her case. But for the time being, my contention is that the trends I have sketched above marked not only the decline of colonial anthropology in Africa but also the ensuing atrophy of anthropology itself in Africa.

It is obvious that in the context of the foregoing discussion, personalities and individual attributes were not the issue. Colonialism was the issue. Anthropology got identified with colonialism because of its object and epistemology of alterity. It was introduced by people whose professional interests were the same as those of the colonial administrators. The fact that the two shared the same structural position and often collaborated to perfect the desired system of political control made it possible for the Africans to distinguish between them, politically and ideologically. The argument that the anthropologists cared for their objects of study and defended them when necessary misses the point and is too subjective to be useful. A part from the implicit paternalism, protecting individual groups did not amount to anti-colonialism on a broad front, which is what African nationalism signalled.

Many liberal anthropologist hated black ‘agitations’ and trouble-makers and did not want them to come anywhere near ‘their people’ almost in the same way that Sally M oore hates the ‘colonial mentality’ critics within anthropology. The only two anthropologists I know of who joined the nationalist movement in the countries where they were doing research caused a stir not only among colonial administrators but also among their fellow-anthropologists who felt that it was ‘not necessary’. Likewise, when an anthropologist from the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute fell in love with a young woman from the ‘tribe’ he was studying and wanted to marry her, he was forced to resign and was advised to disappear from Northern Rhodesia. A similar situation occurred in M kerere when a British woman shortly after independence had a child by a Masai elder but this time could insist on keeping it and remain in independent U ganda. Colonialism went hand in hand with racism even among anthropologists. This is to be expected because they were part of the colonial community. If any changes were taking place, they were not due to change of ‘framework of thought’ among the anthropologists, as Sally M oore is so well aware, but to the dynamics of decolonisation.

**Deconstruction or Reconstruction of Anthropology?**

Undoubtedly, Sally M oore does not believe in the deconstruction of anthropology as an historical-determined process and is obviously contemptuous of those who so believe. In her book she remarks (p. 22):

These connections between, anthropology and the colonial enterprise became the subject of considerable invective in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus the ‘colonial connection’ became a political issue among ‘radical’ internal critics of anthropology just at the point at which such connection no longer had any practical relevance, i.e. in a post-colonial reaction. Other attacks came from African academicians who wanted to repossess control of scholarship concerned with their own societies. This invective went on for decades.

In a book which purports to be a historical guide to anthropology one would have expected that even these bastard children of anthropology would be mentioned as authors in their own right. But none of them features in the text, except James Clifford and Paul Rabinow. Their omission is definitely tendentious. Whatever one thinks of the deconstructionist literature of the late 1960s and the 1970s in anthropology, it is historically and sociologically important. Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter (Asad 1973), Reinventing Anthropology (Hymes 1974) and ‘The Responsibility of the Social Scientist Symposium’ in Current Anthropology, 9, 1968 probably marked a turning-point in anthropology. Any arguments by people such as Sally M oore that the authors of these texts were merely reiterating what anthropologist had already been doing are misguided and superficial. The intensity of that debate which lasted for decades indicates that there was more than meets the eye.

First, they signalled a growing paradigmatic crisis within anthropology which was brought about by social and economic transformations of anthropological units of analysis. Second, they were a response to the anti-colonial revolution in regions such as Africa. The former colonial subjects were refusing to be treated as objects of curiosity and hence the political intervention by newly independent African governments. Third, there was a political and intellectual ferment in Europe and America in the form of the student movements of the 1960s which questioned traditional forms of knowledge and their organisation, something which threatened an epistemological break, especially in the social sciences. There was also the rise of Black Power which pro-
duced the Montreal hurricane in 1969, and the anti-Vietnam War protest in America. Here, we witness a conjunction of historical forces which made the so-called invective protracted. One is not sure if the battle is yet over, despite Sally Moore’s complacency. For the time being and contrary to what she claims, one notes that there is no observable theoretical framework at the moment which characterises anthropology as a discipline nor are there emerging paradigms at least in Africa which distinguish what passes as anthropology from other social science disciplines. What seems to be the case is that if one declares oneself an anthropologist in advance, then, as if by fiat, one’s work becomes ‘anthropological’. Addressing this most interesting from the point of view of Sally Moore’s testimony and epistemology of subjects and objects, the anthropological enterprise in Africa is flourishing, without Africans. As if to rub in the point, she does not refer to any African authors, except Mudimbe for negative reasons which will be commented upon later. Suffice it to say, from what one knows about the current situation in African studies the veracity of her claim is in doubt.\(^2\)

In rejecting the deconstructionist critique as spurious, Sally Moore (pp. 22-23) has this to say:

>Apart from the vituperation of the 1960s and later as Sally Moore’s ‘radical’ upstarts from within. Among these may be mentioned Adam Kuper, Maurice Bloch, Ralph Grillo, Jim Fair, Jack Stauder (whom they sacked from Harvard for his colonial mentality obsession), and Marilyn Strathern, to mention only those I knew in Cambridge. There were others at University College in London. The Protest of this younger generation had an impact not on the senior generation of anthropologists but on the intermediate generation notably Jack Goody and Mary Douglas. In Oxford to achieve the same effect, it seems that one had to undergo a certain kind of spiritual transformation as in the case of Rodney Needham. But certainly, in seminars and informal discussions people like Jack Goody and Mary Douglas used to listen with interest to these ‘noises’ and then address them indirectly lest they were accused of encouraging rebellion by the old guard. Insofar as this is true, unlike Sally Moore’s sages who knew it all from the beginning, they were liberated by the younger generation. In Jack Goody’s case one could draw a graph which portrays these changes accurately and which would amuse Enid Schildkrout and Keith Hart who became members of his extended family.

As far as the ‘ahistoricity’ of structural-functionalism is concerned, it is obvious that one had to stand outside this particular paradigm to be able to accuse its adherents of ahistoricism. The founders of British structural-functionalism were ahistorical by choice and conviction: anthropology was meant to be a science which established causal connections from direct observation, whereas history belonged to the humanities and established causal connections indirectly and through extrapolation. So, history was not and could not be an integral part of anthropology. This has nothing to do with awareness of the ‘time dimension’ in Sally Moore’s simple sense. Of course, every anthropologist was aware of time and change but for structural-functionalism the problem was how to incorporate it into its theoretical-construct, without becoming ‘historical’, probably, in the sense of social history. This had deconstructionist implications which could not be faced, without radically transforming the discipline itself. To wit every good British anthropologist concluded his/her monograph with an appendix on current changes in the community under study. Some even went further and revisited their ‘tribes’ after some years so as to get two static pictures separated by time in order to compare them in what was called the diachronic method.

There were also monographs devoted to social change, of which the best known is Analysis of Social Change by G. and M. Wilson (1945). As Sally Moore correctly points out, the book was a comparison of two static models or stereotypes of ‘primitive’ vs ‘modern’ society. Implicit in this were a number of colonial and Eurocentric presuppositions which were critically reviewed by Ben M. Agbunag in his article, A Critical Look at Indices Used in the Study of Social Change in Africa (1971). His critique included some of the works by the members of the Manchester School, to which Sally Moore is unmistakably partial. The amazing thing, perhaps not so amazing, is, that she does not even mention M. Agbunag’s work, despite the impact it had on the younger generation of anthropologists both in Britain and in America.

Sally Moore believes that ‘situational analysis’ and ‘extended-case method’ introduced by the members of the Manchester School helped anthropology to move away from the ‘closed system’ version of functionalism. However, she does not say whether or not they remained functionalist or became historical. No doubt, situational analysis was dynamic and exciting like all drama. But where did it lead to? It led to confirmation of functional equilibrium through ordered or ritualised conflict. As Sally Moore acknowledges, most of this was inspired by Gluckman’s work and ideas as are found, for instance, in Rituals of Rebellion in South-East Africa (1952). Custom and Conflict in Africa (1955), and Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa (1963). Victor Turner’s Schism and Continuity in an African Society (1957) was in the same mould. Even in his later work which was on symbolic systems, e.g., The Forest of Symbols (1967), and The Drums of Affliction (1968) he never abandoned the idea of structural reconciliation or respite by affirming community solidarity through ritual. In this sense he was more Durkheimian than Levi-Straussian. A mother
interesting example from the Manchester School is \textit{Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy} by William Watson (1958). He sought to show that Mambwe in then Northern Rhodesia participated in a money economy without losing their tribal cohesion i.e. they managed to maintain dynamic equilibrium under changing economic conditions. As would be noticed, the referent in all these studies is the 'tribe'. This means that, far from transcending the tribal framework, situational analysis succeeded only in recognising rhapsodic explosions with the same melodic lines as in medieval motets.

Sally M. Moore credits Gluckman for having planted the seed, referring in particular to the analysis of a situation on the bridge in Zululand and his assertion that an African miner is a miner, meaning that once they sell their labour in the urban areas Africans cease to be tribemen but become urban proletarians as everyone else. But in the context of discussions about 'detribalisation' in Africa, Gluckman was not able to sustain his position in the historical symposium on social change in modern Africa in Kampala in 1959 because he granted that once an African worker returns to his village he is 'retribalised' (Southall, 1961). It was Watson who gave a clearer answer to this apparent paradox by arguing that the African migrant worker did not have to choose between these two worlds; he belonged to both Gluckman could not have liked this much because his subjective position (stated to me in several occasions) was that either the Africans were left alone to enjoy their traditional splendour or, if that could not be sustained, that there was a complete revolution. To this extent he sympathized with the South African Communist Party. Even so, he remained a colonial rebel, something he could never understand or accept. Neither would Sally M. Moore because of an inability or unwillingness to see history as so many interpretations of reality and also because of a deep-seated belief in the absolute objectivity of their own perceptions.

\textbf{Social Change as Unrecognized History}

In her book Sally M. Moore sees some significance in the fact that Gluckman was brought up in South Africa, where the confrontation between black and white is more direct and self-imposing? Whether for this reason or another, under the topic 'detribalisation', she introduces the tained comparison between the Wilsons and the Mayers. The works in question are \textit{Analysis of Social Change} (1945) by the former and \textit{Townsmen or Tribemen: Conservatism and the Process of Urbanisation in a South African City} (1961) by the latter. The issue is whether 'culture loss' or 'detribalisation' on the part of the African signifies that great transformation from 'primitive' to 'civilized'; or conversely whether retention of 'tribal' traditions is a mark of conservatism or unwillingness to be 'civilized'. These are basic and topical issues in Africa. But I would say, the choice of texts by Sally M. Moore is less than perfect. It is hard to imagine how she could compare a 1945 text with a 1961 text. The counterpart of the Mayers' book is \textit{Langa: A Study of Social Groups in an African Township} (1963) by M. Wilson and A. Mafeje or 'The Growth of Peasant Communities' by Monica Wilson in M. Wilson and L. Thompson (eds), \textit{The Oxford History of South Africa} Vol. II (1971).

In \textit{Townsmen and Tribemen} the Mayers identified a category of people they call the 'red people' i.e. those who paint themselves with red ochre or dip their traditional shawls and skirts in red ochre (\textit{amagaba} in Xhosa). A corollary to the M. mayers, these people are conservative because they refuse to give up their traditional values and habits and to assimilate to the urban environment. The Mayers admired them for their insistence to be themselves but at the same time admit that in the urban environment they are disadvantaged because preference is given to 'school people'. The latter are Christian converts, otherwise called 'amagqoboka' in Xhosa. At the beginning they were forced to learn the three Rs in missionary schools and hence they were referred to as 'school people' (\textit{abantu basesikolweni} in Xhosa). These represented modernity according to the Eurocentric model and were favoured. However, as time went on and segregation or apartheid took over not all Christian converts had access to education and not all pagans rejected modern education. Consequently, the distinction between the two was getting blurred, especially in the urban areas where everybody wears European clothes. Therefore, the Mayers could only have arrived at their classification by asking subjective questions to which they would get answers according to the convenience of the respondents. So, we actually do not know whether the people they interviewed were in fact 'red people' . All we know is that they were conservative rural migrants.

In undertaking the Langa study we avoided what we thought was a procedural error on the part of the Mayers. Instead of thinking in terms of 'school' and 'red people', we thought of urban-oriented people. In Langa this was not difficult to determine because the migrant workers were quartered in the barracks whereas the permanently urbanised African population was housed in individual municipality bungalows. The first category was referred to by the people themselves as 'amagoduka' (those who return home) and the second category as 'abantu baselokishini' (location people or townpeople). Secondly, mindful of the fact that labour migration to cities like Cape Town favours those who have some education, we tried to see whether urban-orientedness among the migrants was at all correlated with more than average rates of education among what was called 'amagoduka'. It turned out that the least educated or the uneducated migrants tended to be more conservative and rural-oriented than those who had received better education and found it easy to interact with the location people whose codes they had acquired through modern education. This had nothing to do with 'detribalisation'. It had something to do with social differentiation or class-formation among urban Africans in Cape Town. For that matter, even the conservative migrants could not be thought of as 'red' or 'school' people or 'tribesmen'. They were merely peasant migrants who recognised common regions or districts or origin. For this reason, instead of referring to them as 'tribesmen', we adopted the commonly used urban terminology, 'homeboys'.

Clyde Mitchell contended with some of these problems in what was then the Rhodesians. Sally M. Moore refers to his \textit{Kalela Dance} (1956) but not so much to his \textit{Tribalism and the Plural Society} (1960). There were often questions as to whether Mitchell's work was anthropological or sociological. In his urban studies Mitchell frequently used 'tribalism' as a term of reference but maintained that substantively it referred to more than one thing. For instance, he believed that in the Kalela the dance the Bisa were not asserting their tribal identity but rather their ethnic identity in a multi-ethnic environment in the Copperbelt. He contended
that ethnic identity in everyday interaction in the Copperbelt was more important than anything else. Even this claim he qualified by pointing out that his observation applied only to inter-African relations and not to black and white relations. In the latter case ethnic differences were of no consequence. He elaborated on this theme in his *Tribalism and the Plural Society*. This was effectively about the interaction between race, ethnicity, and class in a colonial society. In the context of this late analysis M. Itchell had the opportunity to decide whether his term of reference was going to be ‘tribalism’ or ‘ethnicity’ and ‘class’, but he did not. His Kalela dancers in the Copperbelt could have been looked upon as rural-oriented peasant migrants as against the urban-oriented, educated, and non-ethnic trade union leaders who were destined to be among future nationalist leaders who led the anti-colonial movement. In Southern Rhodesia and South Africa once again it is the urban-oriented, educated class which spearheaded the struggle against racial domination and oppression under white minority regimes. So, the Wilsons could not have been altogether wrong in supposing that the modernizing African elites were anti-colonial to pre-colonial social formations. Their major crime was Euro-centrism. They supposed that these elements would be European-like and not just be modern African with their own social peculiarities. In a surprising outburst in a seminar in Leiden some years ago A. Kuper accused the Christian anthropologists in Africa of proselytizing in that they used conversion to Christianity as an index of modernity or civilization. Although he did not say as much, this indirectly explained why Jewish anthropologists, at least in South Africa, identified more with the conservatives than ‘school people’. To an African, this was not immediately comprehensive because most African do not know who is Jew or a Christian. They simply know of whites in Africa. Whether this indicated subtle competition among anthropologists for the souls of Africans, it is unknowable and probably is inconsequential.

The review above shows that the so-called urban studies in Africa were a mixed bag. Some of them were anthropological only in name and not in subject matter. In all of them the major referent was ‘tribe’, ‘tribal’, or ‘tribalism’ (I might have prevailed on Monica Wilson not to do the same in *Langa*). Why is this the case? Sally Moore (p. 92) in a rather annoying and self-satisfied manner proclaims:

> The idea of the ‘tribe’ was firmly fixed in the consciousness of African and outsiders, but was far from a natural unit of analysis. It was patently not ‘natural’ and for many issues did not represent the most meaningful unit of study.

This is in contrast to an honest declaration by Gulliver (p. 92) whom she quotes. In his words: “The natural ‘unit’ of study for the anthropologist in Africa has been the tribe – not the ‘tribe’ under colonial rule but the ‘tribe’ tout simple.” Despite Sally Moore’s Euro-centric pretensions, they did not deconstruct the concept of ‘tribe’ in anthropological discourse. The Africans did in my person in 1971 when I published my article on ‘The Ideology of Tribalism’. It is interesting that my starting point was not Gulliver’s (1965) article quoted above but the 1969 treatises entitled *Tradition and Transition in East Africa: Studies of the Tribal Element in the Modern Era*, of which he was the editor. In his introduction Gulliver explained that:

> We do not continue to use it (the term ‘tribe’) in any spirit of defiance, let alone of derogation and disparagement. We use it simply because it continues to be widely used in East Africa when English is spoken... among the citizens there (p.2).

In 1994 Sally Moore offers the same justification. How often must it be pointed out that in African languages there is no equivalent of the term ‘tribe’ and that the concept of ‘tribe’ is a European imposition in Africa? What is ethnographically known is that a tribe like everybody else are conscious of a linguistic and ethnic group to which they belong. The theoretical question then is how do we know that this predicated ‘tribal consciousness’ or that the collectivity to which they claim affinity is necessarily a ‘tribe’? The fact that English-speaking Africans and foreigners use the term does not prove anything anthropologically and in fact conceptually it might be a confirmation of my contention. The second theoretical question which follows is; in the absence of concrete ‘tribes’ or real tribes what semantic categories are there for the anthropologist to use to designate her/his unit of analysis?

Sally Moore has no answer to the above question. Instead, she takes refuge into thematic issues such as gender, food systems, land reform, legal history, some social history, guerrilla warfare, and development studies. But then she admits that the discipline has broken up into subspecialisations which have proliferated to the point where they often have more in common with parallel topics in other disciplines than with other sectors within anthropology (p.122). This contradicts her claim that anthropology as such is flourishing more than ever before in Africa. Out of approximately 500 references cited in her book, there are only about 40 studies on Africa by anthropologists since 1968. This paucity had already been foreshadowed in her discussion of anthropology after ‘African Independence’ in which she warns her readers that: ‘...there will be a certain amount of tacking back and forth form earlier to later monographs...’ (p.87). In the event she invoked the names of the anthropological ancestors in vain for there was not much to go ‘forth’ on. When the chips were down and she had to demonstrate the current presence of anthropology, she cited only five works to illustrate the eburnance of the anthropological enterprise in Africa. Realizing that even these did not cohere in the disciplinary sense, she indulged in special pleading:

> Their authors have three things in common – a knowledge of the earlier anthropological literature in Africa, a familiarity with the general theoretical problems addressed in the discipline and a commitment to the fieldwork method (p.122).

In the context of deconstruction of colonial anthropology and anthropology at all, this is methodologically and epistemologically naïve because background to anthropological literature and the fieldwork method is now given to Africanist social scientists of all kinds and the theoretical issues which are supposed to be addressed by anthropologists are now common property, as her own testimony shows. Therefore, there is no place to hide!

Finally, on the question of ‘Africanity’, Sally Moore is in all probability right in describing M udumbe’s text in *The Invention of Africa* (1985) and in general as ‘complex, indigestible, and highly opinionated’. But M udumbe’s hostility to colonial anthropology is shared by many African scholars. To harbour such feelings an African scholar does not have to be an anthropologist. Familiarity with classical anthropology texts is sufficient. What is important is the images of Africa they conjure up and their association with
the colonial past. Sally M oore mistakenly thinks that this does not matter any longer in the post-colonial era and pours scorn on the ‘colonial period mentality’ critique. These issues are still very much alive among African intellectuals, to whom she seems to pay no attention as is reflected in her references in which African are conspicuous only by their absence. This might confirm existing beliefs among Africans about whiteracism and Eurocentrism. The insistence by writers such as her that anthropology is, not in so many words, a grasp of anthropology or otherwise but his command of the etymology of the Africans alterity as perceived by Europeans over ages. The classical texts (which I have no problem in decoding having wasted my youth learning classics in a missionary boarding school) have one advantage, namely, that their authors had no inhibition about expressing their prejudices concerning Africa. It was simply a continent of savages (read ‘tribes’) and venomous beasts. I do not mind such candour; I got used to it in Southern Africa. As a matter of fact, I like black mambas lethal as they are and wish Africans could learn from them. Perhaps, in the circumstances their continent would cease to be a playground for knowers of absolute knowledge and they in turn would lose their absolute alterity.

Notes
1. Sally Falk Moore, 1994, University Press at Virginia, Charlotte-Ville

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**A Contribution to the Debate on the Recolonization of Africa**

If it is not indecent for an ‘outlander’ whose only justification for speaking out is the dubious honour of being an ‘Old Man’, a title given to me by African friends, I would like to enter into the inter-African debate launched by an article by Professor Mazrui (International Herald Tribune, August 4, 1994) and continued in the columns of the CODESRIA Bulletin (issues 2 and 4 of 1995). Firstly, it is imperative I comment on a matter of form. It saddened me to note that among the comments made on Ali Mazrui’s article, there were several *ad hominem* attacks directed against a colleague and compatriot who, in his own way, has helped spread a current of African thought. The urgent need for this has already been pointed out by M. Kamto. Characterizations such as ‘completely dishonest discourse’ and ‘retrograde ideas’ are not acceptable. No one expects that kind of treatment in the academic milieu. Differences of opinion are no excuse for reflections which are at the very least discourteous and which do nothing to further intellectual debate.

The right and, indeed, the duty to criticize are part of the intellectual’s mission. However, as Konrad Lorenz and Karl Popper pointed out, ‘it is important for politeness’ sake and it is extremely important for democracy’ sake... that criticism be as objective as possible instead of succumbing to the urge to cut down he who dared think the unthinkable and cast out the demon, the unpure’. Now my readers must also pardon me for pointing out that most African states are undergoing a profound crisis, whatever the cause (the causes of the crisis have been analyzed among others, by Samir Amin (1995)). Professor Mazrui is legitimately worried about the failure of policies implemented since the 1960s and one cannot blame him for being naïve enough to suggest a solution which could only be reproved by any African wanting to preserve an independence which was won at great cost. How could one imagine a single instant that a state such as South Africa, which has been on ‘a long walk to freedom’ (title of Mandela’s autobiography, 1995) since the beginning of this century, might agree, as suggested by Mazrui, to collude in placing its sister States under a protectorate? Moreover, at the end of his original article in the Herald Tribune, Mazrui clearly indicated that his idea would provoke opposition from ‘proud peoples who have shed so much blood and used all the political will necessary to liberate themselves from the yoke of European powers’. It would only be fair to give Ali Mazrui the benefit of this statement. It would also be fair to admit that the author sees his idea as a ‘last resort’. After all, he suggested in this conclusion that ‘it would be even better if Africans conquered themselves’.

Therein lies the real problem. Professor Mazrui can be reproached with resuscitating an old idea whose origins are themselves suspect. In 1990, an American journalist, N. Pfaff, broached the subject in a Herald Tribune article (April 24), when he spoke of the need for an ‘international recolonization of Africa’. A year later, B. Lugon, in a paper on ‘The Results of Decolonization’, concluded with the question: Should A. Africa be recolonized? Quite rightly, he felt that recolonization would be of no help for Africans and suggested they instead practice the old saying: ‘The Lord helps those who help themselves’. An African would probably equate that with the saying from Burkina Faso: if you go to the pond and someone scrubs your back, the least you can do is scrub your own belly!

In this contribution, Bangura (1994) addresses the real problem: remaking the state. One may dream about a United States of Africa and integration on a regional and sub-regional scale. That is probably the future of Africa. But one must admit that the road to integration has been long and hard. I have already pointed out the obstacles in the path of
politically - and/or economically integrated assemblies (Gonidec, 1987).

For the moment, reality lies in the irredescribable state, which is sovereign although it is not a nation-state.

How can the state be remade? Bangura (1994) proposes ‘a radical reform of the nation state is urgent for political stability and economic development’, two objectives which, according to M azrui, have not been reached due to Af rican’s inability to ‘band together’. A radical reform of the nation state, or rather, a plan for a nation-state, since there is as yet no nation, would be the solution to the crisis. I think the real solution is even more daring. It is essential to break away from the imposed ideology of the nation state.

Like all states, Af rican states are the product of a long history, dating back to pre-colonial and colonial times, as well as a more recent post-colonial history. Realistically, if Af rica is to progress, the state must be made, or remade, using the materials at hand. At the present stage, not all the materials necessary to create a nation corresponding with the state are available. Thus, nation-making can only be carried out under conditions similar to those in Europe, that is, under the auspices of a dominant ethnic group bent on imposing unification. This is hardly an acceptable solution, since it goes against the grain of democracy. Indeed, spokespeople for ethnic minorities cut off from power have just that reproach to make against the present government, is reawakening and bringing the times of monocratic and autocratic rule. What form of democracy? Whatever form is chosen. It seems necessary, according to the logic of a pluralistic society, that democracy itself be pluralistic, whether it is seen as a means, or tool; or as an end in itself, or philosophical value. From this standpoint, democracy cannot be arbitrarily reduced to its judicial-political aspects alone, since these are too easily borrowed from foreign systems. Economic, social and cultural democracy remains to be invented, and will require deep reflection in order to define the respective roles of the state apparatus and the various organizations representing civil society which have recently mushroomed in Af rica and which have been the object of countless studies (see especially the Dakar conference, March 15-17, 1993).

Debates on the concept of civil society have occasionally blurred the distinction between ‘state’ and ‘civil society’. But that means ignoring the idea of a totality which implies, as Gramsci demonstrated that a society which has reached the level of a state necessarily includes both a state (in the sense of a state apparatus), and a civil society, which is the social sector voluntarily and spontaneously organized, to a great degree independently from the state. Naturally, the state and civil society cannot be dissociated and must work together for the greater good of society as a whole, civil society, which was absorbed by the state (apparatus) during the times of monocratic and autocratic government, is reawakening and bringing social contradictions to the fore, including pluralism in Af rican societies.

This reawakening of civil society, manifested by a sort of ritual slaying of the state by society in sovereign national conferences, which are dreaded by some
governments, should not mean the state is sacrificed to civil society, or vice-versa. Given the current state of the Democratization Process, democratization reached by African societies, a strong and well-structured civil society has an irreplaceable role to play in consolidating democracy and thwarting attempts of former monocrats to regain their monopoly on power. Conversely, too strong an emphasis on civil society leads to a risk of weakening the state. In Africa, civil society could hold back the development of a strong state if the process of making or remaking the state does not keep up with that of civil society. In a democratic system, a strong state and a strong civil society must coexist in a situation which necessarily includes both tension and conflicts as well as cooperation. Such a system is dangerous and its results are difficult to predict, but that is the price that must be paid to prevent Africa from the recolonization proposed by Professor A. M. Azrui.


Concerning Archie Mafeje’s Reinvention of Anthropology and Africa*

A pparently Anthropology and Africa irritates Archie Mafeje. It does so to the point of provoking him to say, ‘the whole book could be described as a lie intelligently told. This does not reside so much in what the book says but in not saying what it means’ (Mafeje, p. 7) Mafeje then takes it upon himself to say what it means. In fact, he presents Anthropology and Africa as meaning just the opposite of what it says. He seems to think I am hiding something. He says that there is a concealed subtext that he intends to make explicit (p. 7). I can only react by protesting that he misrepresents Anthropology and Africa for his own purposes by pretending that the book and anthropology in general fit a stereotype he wants to knock down.

I wonder how much current anthropological work he has read. He certainly has read my book rather carelessly. Thus he rebukes me (Mafeje, p. 9) for not referring to Talal Asad’s Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter. But, in fact, I refer to three of the articles in that book that deal with Africa, those by Brown, James and Lackner. Similarly, on the same page, Mafeje says ‘she does not refer to any African authors except Mudimbe’. A little more care and he would have noticed references to Busia, Danquah, Deng, Dike, Diop, Houotondji, Mabogunje, Obbo, Oppong and Kenyatta. Could it be that he means that I do not refer to him? Mafeje also says of the qualifications of anthropologists that one becomes an anthropologist by ‘declaring oneself an anthropologist’ (page 9). And where, I wonder, is that the way it is done?

Anthropology today does not resemble the entity Mafeje seems to have in mind. It is a very diverse field encompassing many sub-specializations, geographical, topical, and theoretical. Mafeje’s arguments attack an outdated vision of the discipline. He needs to prop up that vision to legitimize his hostility. The preoccupations of the colonial period are not representative of current thinking.

In Anthropology and Africa I say that, ‘The sub-specializations of anthropology have proliferated to the point where they often have more in common with parallel topics in other disciplines than with other sectors within anthropology’ (M. Moore, p. 122). Mafeje echoes my statement but treats it as an assertion of his own which like most of his commentary turns into a complaint. He says, ‘There is no observable theoretical framework at the moment which characterizes anthropology as a discipline nor are there emerging paradigms at least in Africa which distinguish what passes as anthropology from other social science disciplines’ (Mafeje, p. 9). And how much does that add to what I said?

The common ground within social anthropology is the basic commitment to fieldwork as a major form of knowledge production. Such research is not only informed by a background knowledge of earlier and comparative work, it is infused which the habit of problematizing cultural and theoretical concepts and categories. The topics and sites of recent anthropological fieldwork in Africa are very diverse, as diverse as the African scene itself. Recent ethnographic studies look at everything from local systems of land tenure to refugee camps, from ritual practice to legal ideas, from the economy of rural households to the nature of the tourist art market, from population issues to gender ideology. Many of these studies are of very high quality. The topical diversity with regard to work in Africa reflects a more general state of affairs in the discipline. A look at the themes addressed in the Annual Review of Anthropology over the past ten years shows that this breadth of topical and theoretical interest is manifest whether the anthropologists are working in Europe, the Middle East, in Malaysia, China, Peru, Mexico, Africa or Texas. This is not a question of my ‘taking refuge in thematic questions’ nor is the intersection with many disciplines something I must ‘admit’ because ‘there is no place to hide’ (Mafeje, 12). This is a description of the multiple preoccupations of the discipline today.

Like all other Africanist anthropologists I hope that there will soon be many more Africans in the profession (M. Moore, p. 133). Their absence in recent decades is not due to exclusion by ‘Europeans’, but to the fact that for political reasons formal training in anthropology has not been available in many African universities for a long while. There is no longer any political reason to treat anthropology as a form of knowledge to be avoided by African intellectuals. Books that give an overview of a discipline, its history and current debates should help to open up the arena of discourse to many more entrants.

The history of the division of intellectual labour in the academy is of intellectual interest in itself. A critical understanding of the past of a discipline exposes present academic practice to similar critical inspec-
tion. A central point in *Anthropology and Africa* is that there are many critical debates current in anthropology today. These debates centre around at least five critiques. I describe them this way:

The first critique is the attack on colonialism, no longer, of course, in its old political form because that is in fact long since over, but in the form of neo-colonial relationships and ideas or metaphorical frameworks of ‘recolonization’. The second is the global economy critique, which has many different versions and subversions, including classical economic, dependency oriented, Marxist, world system, and other. The third is the gender critique, which prescribes a re-understanding of the literature, a recasting of ethnographic observation, and a redesign of the ethnographic imagination to repair the distortions of the past and prevent their repetition? The fourth argues that all reading and discussion should be rethought in light of the Foucauldian discourse of power. The fifth is the post-modern, literary-critical understanding of the problematic of meaning, which for the anthropologist is associated with all the many dilemmas of dialogue, translation, representation, and textual reading ...

(Mâteje p. 86-87).

Mâteje not only has nothing to add to this, he wants to reduce the debate to one theme, the colonial mentality argument. He says that ‘one scorns this critique’ (Mâteje p 12). I do nothing of the sort. I say:

The colonial mentality argument was one of the earliest themes in a series of major post-1960s attacks on anthropology from within. These attacks found much the same audience as did the contention that independence had not delivered what it had seemed to promise, that post-colonial African economies were neo-colonial i.e. instances of continued economic domination without formal administrative control. Thus, as one looks at subsequent critiques it becomes clear that the colonial mentality attack had implications that went far beyond its initial focus. It gave relative weight to the power of frameworks of thought over the appearance of facts. It was a statement about the nonautonomy of intellec tion. Some of the elaboration of Antonio Gramsci’s ideas about hegemony and about domination through cultural supremacy also percolated into anthropology. The unwilling and unwitting captivity of consciousness has also recently engaged Africanists interested in the historical products of the European-African dialogue for example, John and Jean Comaroff (1991), (*Anthropology and Africa* p. 79).

Mâteje asks on page 7. Why ‘Anthropology and Africa’ and not ‘Anthropology and Europe or America’? In fact, there is a great deal of anthropological fieldwork being done currently in Europe and in America and indeed, all over the world. A long with this world-wide ethnographic work, there also has been a good deal of interest in the distinctive histories of anthropological work in different regions (Fardon, R. *Localizing Strategies*, 1990). Surely Africa should not be left out of this kind of review.

But back to Mâteje’s essay and its invidious comments. He opens by saying on page 6 ‘it came as a surprise, at least to me, that of all the anthropologists who have worked in Africa she was the one who elected to make the final pronouncement on anthropology and Africa. The book is not offered as a final pronouncement. As I say very clearly in the preface, “Other authors might have written different versions of the story, and no doubt they will”. (vii). Mâteje is as much at liberty to write his own version as any one else. His comment that for me to write this book was foolishly both professionally and politically (Mâteje, p 7) moves me to tell your readers how this book happened to be written.

Some time in 1990 or early 1991 I was asked by V.Y. Mudimbe, Robert Bates and Jean O’ Barr to contribute a chapter a book they were going to edit to be called *Africa and the Disciplines: The Contributions of Research in Africa to the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1993). I was asked to write the chapter on anthropology. The idea behind the book was that such a volume might persuade colleges and universities in the United States to maintain the study of Africa on their campuses. There has been some anxiety about the future of such studies in American universities. Downsizing of faculties and spiralling costs have obliged administrators to choose in which disciplines and in which areas instruction and training will be offered and which to drop. The editors of *Africa and the Disciplines* wanted the intellectual importance of Africa to many disciplines brought home to those who would be making such choices.

A nyone interested in the current institutional state of affairs in the US should have a look at Ian O’Barr’s *African Studies in the United States: A Perspective* (African Studies Association Press 1966). African Studies encompasses all the disciplines that offer instruction relevant to Africa from agriculture to urban planning. Anthropology is only one of them. The preface to O’Barr’s report says that ‘the African continent risks becoming increasingly marginalized in (American) academic life’ (1966: viii), were the contributors to and the editors of *Africa and the Disciplines* wrong in wanting this not to happen?

When I had nearly finished the chapter Mudimbe and his colleagues had requested, I happened to be asked what I was working on by a publisher visiting Harvard. This is a common experience of faculty members in many American universities, since publishers are always soliciting manuscripts. I explained what I had been writing. They asked to see it. Since no bibliographical book of this kind existed, they thought the anthropology material might be of interest outside the multidisciplinary volume, standing by itself in a slightly enlarged version. I requested permission of the editors of the interdisciplinaty volume to publish a spin-off book and I was granted it.

Now, to turn to the more substantive issues of anthropological history discussed in the CODESRIA essay. One of the histories traced in *Anthropology and Africa* is the story of how, by the 1960s, many anthropologists had moved away from using the ‘tribe’ either as a descriptor or as an analytic concept. Not only what was the ‘tribe’ understood as a construct of colonial administration, but the ‘tribes-and-traditions’ anthropology that was preoccupied with ‘custom’ was gradually replaced by an anthropology preoccupied with change and social transformation. In the discipline as a whole (i.e. not just in African studies) the structural-functional paradigm went under.

*Anthropology and Africa* shows that one of the early shifts away from the ‘tribes-and-traditions’ model was the result of the challenge of urban fieldwork, the study of African labour migrants in towns and cities. This urban fieldwork began well before 1950, began to alter the question anthropology was asking and the methods...
it used to try to find answers. Some ‘tribes-and-traditions’ anthropology continued alongside of this advance, and there were some curious theoretical contradictions and mixtures. But ‘tribes-and-traditions’ anthropology was on the way out. By the early 1960s the achievement of African independence radically shifted the intellectual ground. Political and economic change in Africa altered the basic terms of academic analysis.

Mafeje pretends that I offer justification for the continued use of the idea of the ‘tribe’ (Mafeje, p. 12). That is not so. He imputes to me the opinions of persons whose views I describe. He goes so far as to misplace a quotation mark to make me appear to be agreeing with Gulliver in a sentence in which I was in fact criticizing him for not emphasizing the colonial context of tribe (Mafeje, 12 citing page 92 of Anthropology and Africa). Mafeje also alleges that I do not take note of the historical conjuncture that led to the intellectual transformations associated with decolonization (Mafeje, p. 9). Mafeje may have reasons of personal vanity for making these allegations. He states without modesty that he was responsible for the alteration of anthropological thinking, for the backing off from the idea of tribes and tribalism. He says, alluding to the social anthropologists, ‘Despite Sally Moore’s Euro-centric pretensions, they did not deconstruct the concept of “tribe” in anthropological discourse. The Africans did in my person in 1971 when I published my article on the ideology of Tribalism’ (Mafeje, p. 12).

This claim Mafeje makes about his influence is exaggerated, to say the least. The critique of the idea of tribalism had been on the table for at least a decade before Mafeje wrote his article. This was true inside and outside of academic circles, inside and outside of Africa I call Mafeje’s attention to Joan Vincent’s remarks in her history of political anthropology when she says, ‘By 1968 political anthropologists’ stance was almost wholly revisionist. The politics of ethnicity emerged and began to replace what had previously been called tribalism (1990:334). For a cogent example, one has only to look at Pluralism in Africa, edited by Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith (1969) to see how engaged with colonialism and the ethnic issue the contributing scholars were in the sixties. Without the benefit of instruction from Mafeje’s very brief 1971 articles.

The intellectual history of anthropology has always been connected with its political context and historical moment. That is a central argument in Anthropology and Africa. That is why I have periodized the history of the discipline in colonial and post-colonial chunks. I agree with Mafeje that academic thought is a historically determined process (Mafeje, p. 9, see my statement from p. 79 quoted above about the non-autonomy of intellec). But by definition, political contexts change and historical moments succeed one another. A great deal has happened in Africa since the nineteen sixties. Some obviously wish to relive the glory of their youth when they protested the anthropology of the colonial era in the Oxbridge seminars of the late 1960s. Mafeje has every right to continue reliving that happy moment when he and his friends joined many others in expressing their critique of the anthropology of the colonial period and some (such as Mafeje) conceived themselves not only to be instructing their elders but changing the field. Never mind that the field was already changing radically and that he and his friends were getting on a bandwagon that was already occupied by many others. In transitional periods old and new paradigms overlap. That fact and the way various anthropologists dealt with the logical inconsistencies between and among their models, was one of the points I was making in my historical account of the discipline. This is not something that happened then and only then) and only in anthropology. It was (and is) true of all the social sciences, and of many other disciplines. It was something that surfaced in many countries, not just in Africa, but in France the United States and elsewhere. A great wave of self-consciousness about paradigmatic change was under way. It was surely not an accident that Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was published in 1961. Today, in 1996, must there be only one orthodoxy, one acceptable social science paradigm? What king of conception of open academic discourse is that?

By creatively misrepresenting Anthropology and Africa Mafeje manufactures an opportunity to credential himself. He lists for us the names of many of the anthropologists he has known and not only refers to his collaboration with Monica Wilson on a 1963 book on Langa township in South Africa, but alleges that he changed her mind, too (about what I wonder). The Preface to Monica Wilson’s book acknowledges the fieldwork Archie Mafeje did but says, ‘The formulation of the problems, the direction of the fieldwork, and the writing of the book was done by professor Monica Wilson’ (p. viii). As far as I can tell (from their titles and catalogue notes in the library) since the Langa study, Mafeje’s books have concerned political theory and development, and have not involved any ethnographic fieldwork of his own. His most recent book, The Theory and Ethnography of African Social Formation (London, CODESRIA, 1991), is a rereading and reinterpretation of classical, colonial period, anthropological texts on the interlacustrine kingdoms. The issues he raises in that book are very interesting. He obviously thinks the history of anthropology is important and that reanalysing the old classics can be turned to present purposes. I agree. His book could be an advertisement for Anthropology and Africa had he read mine without so much animus.

Mafeje chides me for omitting various articles and books I did not cite. I can only reply that I had to make choices. Several hundred entries are not enough to be all-inclusive I focussed on books rather than on the periodical literature, and on ethnographies and fieldwork monographs rather than on commentary. No doubt I left out as many interesting pieces of work as I included. A short book cannot include everything.

I should add that I am saddened by the fact that Mafeje’s tone is so insulting. I realise that there are audiences for which one has only to shout: ‘colonialist, racist, Eurocentrist’ as he does referring to me, and it is like shouting fire in a crowded theatre. There are some people who respond instantly to this kind of name-calling and many namecallers who legitimate themselves by doing the labelling. I believe that the social science community represented by CODESRIA is more sober in its judgments than that. Surely this undignified display does not pass for scholarly disagreement. There is so much work to be done, there are so many research themes to be explored, so much current history to be recorded, so many serious questions about methods and models to be debated, so many difficulties in the way of open communication, it is a pity to have to waste time on crude invective.

Some Comments on the Mafeje–Moore Debate*

Several issues from the Mafeje–Moore debate in CODESRIA Bulletin nos. 2 and 3 (1996). One relates to the place of African scholars in African studies as conceived in the West. Second, concerns the unending emphasis by African scholars on colonial period anthropology in Africa. Last is the general question of historical process in anthropology studies on Africa.

The Mafeje–Moore debate must be seen in the light of the discussion on the role and relevance of Africanists in African studies today. The central thrust of Mafeje’s argument (1996) is that Western scholarship has always neglected or discriminated against contributions by African scholars to African studies. He illustrates this discrimination by putting his experience at the centre of the critique of Sally M. Moore’s book on Anthropology in Africa. He opines that this omission leaves her book lacking important perspectives of anthropology and Africa which totters her analysis.

Moore on the other hand finds Mafeje’s personalizing of the critique mere wish to relive the glory of their youth when they protested the anthropology of the colonial era in the Oxbridge seminar of the late 1960s (1996:22). Her response scat's from the pertinent issue of the place of the African scholar vis-à-vis Africanist scholars in the production of anthropological knowledge on Africa. She does not respond to the important issue of the role African scholars play in transforming the study of anthropology in Africa and the discipline at large. Instead she points out Moore’s sense of sober judgment and uninsulting reserve and which nobody denies her. However, in the process of making choices, she denies others the right of understanding their self-reflections. The fact of making choices is not contestable, but which choices, why and for whom?

What is evident is that the Western perception of Africa influenced Moore’s disproportionate emphasis on Western texts which were suitable for cementing her argument. By dismissing the colonial anthropological theme, Moore achieves the aim of not saying what she intends to mean. Colonial anthropology has a lot of relevance for anthropology and Africa even today. This is where many African scholars deserve a fair hearing. Do the likes of P. Bteke (1970), Mafeje (1971) and M. gabone (1971) deserve any place in this? Or are they the ‘inventive vituperations’ fair and adequate summaries of their long-term labour of debunking Eurocentric and racist notions of Africa by anthropologists? It makes one wonder what happened to Sally M. Moore’s sense of sober judgment and uninsulting commitment to scholarship (p. 23).

It is true as M. amandine (1995:609) puts it that: ‘I have always taken it for granted that, should I want to study North American society, I would approach it through its own intelligentsia, through their writing, their self-reflection’. This is not so for African scholars who seem to believe that African scholars have no ability of self-reflection and identification. They hold that studies by Africans suffer certain defects. This has become a very critical issue in the attempts by African scholars to publish their views on Africa. Recently Hyden (1996:5) bluntly put it that:

Africans wishing to publish with European and North American companies often run into difficulties because their manuscripts have usually not gone through the same rigorous peer scrutiny and advising as the case is with those submitted by scholars based in these countries.

This of course is an untenable and discriminatory excuse that cannot effectively stand fair judgment. What is true is that often, African scholars have been forced to include Africanist texts in their bibliographies (Yankah 1995) while on occasions they have been denied journal space on the pretext that their sources are old and outdated. On other occasions, editorial double-standards have worked to effectively shut out most Africans, from publishing. Such was the case with the Journal of African History until Nigerian scholars decided to boycott it en masse (Johnson 1995). The consequence of all these is that most African scholars are unable to publish thereby giving Africanists disproportionate say on things African. Does this say something about Moore’s choices?

There is therefore no justifiable and fair reason why Sally M. Moore could state that her choices are representative of anthropological scholarship in Africa. African scholars are the main doors to understanding anthropology in and on Africa. They are significant to the transformations in anthropology as a discipline. Thus it was important that their reflections and personal experience be put at the centre of any discussion on Africa. Many of these early African scholars like M. Mafeje had intriguing experience in Western academies of learning which provide extensive corpus of testimony for upcoming scholars.
Western scholars, perhaps with the exception of those who have gone beyond the short-lived participant anthropologists’ tenure in Africa, perform Western studies of Africa for Euro-American audiences. New evidence suggests that most of them have a general dislike for fieldwork in Africa (Hyden 1996:4). For instance, forty per cent of British African historians had not visited Africa since 1983 (McCracken 1993:243). Instead they depend on official documents which give official and distorted versions of African realities. Such presentations must necessarily be counter-checked by African realities and African scholars are in the best position to provide this data. That is one reason why no effective study of Africa can avoid African scholars and Africans in Africa.

Secondly, Sally Moore mentions five critical debates current in anthropology today (1996:21). She uses them to demonstrate that anthropology as a discipline is up and alive in Africa. It was Mafeje’s contention that: ‘there is no observable theoretical framework at the moment which characterizes anthropology as a discipline...’ (1996:9). Moore found Mafeje’s emphasis on ‘colonial mentality argument’ reductionist and wrong. She includes the five themes i.e. colonial, global economy, gender, Foucaultian and post-modern critiques to illustrate Mafeje’s reductionism. But the question remains as to whether there exists any conceivable way of extricating these critiques from colonialism and its legacy in Africa’s historical experience.

In retrospect, Mafeje had emphatically argued that Moore’s book was ‘alive intelligently told’. This was not so much in what the book says but in not saying what it meant. The argument that Mafeje reduces all these themes to one colonial mentality argument indeed illustrates that Moore runs away from saying what she meant. Let us demonstrate this by showing how colonial the above five themes are and why Moore prefers to emphasize others and not the colonial one.

The fact that neo-colonialism exists in the developing countries today imply that colonialism never died. The themes which Moore highlights as current in anthropological discourse today bear witness to the persuasiveness of situation imperialism in Africa’s intellectual and social fabric. In the first place, all the five themes she mentions are of Western origin. African struggles to intellectually command their discourses have always been thwarted by Western economic, political and intellectual conspiracies. Unfair economic arrangements and discriminatory political decisions make sure that the West defines areas of social inquiry. It is because of this that the Western vision of the global is defended and assured of dominating world scholarship (Saltier 1995).

Given the centrality of power in the production of knowledge, discourses are hegemonically defined in Western terms. The postmodernist critique, for instance, is the latest neo-colonial mirage designed to put the least important as priority on African development agenda. Also, gender studies as defined by Africanists are cast in modernist terms, using African women as examples to validate Western theoretical approaches (Amadiume 1987:2-4). They reduce African women into examples, infuse in their lives irrelevant analytical tools which never permeate into the social fabric of African societies. Such analytical tools have no superior ability of combating the many exploitative programmes which African women face from external imperialist agencies and internal cultural trappings.

Postmodernism is therefore a leap forward in modernisation theory where themes like gender studies are being presented in new and sophisticated terms but they retain their initial modernist objective. What is defeating is that it does not answer the question of whether Africans have attained modernism or is it a case of premodern postmodernism (Aseka 1996:22). Such postmodernist themes like the Foucaultian critique have a hegemonic agenda in Africa and must therefore be interrogated. Foucault was a French poststructuralist who was greatly fascinated by Bentham’s elaborate architectural and administrative plan for constructing a model prison called the panopticon (Aseka 1997). He envisioned the building of a disciplined society to characterise the leap from the enlightenment to modern between the ‘power to’ and the ‘power over’ in Foucault which has been assertively expressed in the history of progress and modernity through western incursions of non-western societies. Power over other societies has been codified and legitimated under signs of manifest destiny and civilising mission. This further reduces the Foucaultian critique to colonialism.

In our view, some of these postmodernist critiques are misplaced in Africa. In their premodern variant, recolonization is the objective while in their postmodernist perspective, anthropology is being historicised while history is being anthropologised. The two objectives are however inextricable and are going hand in hand. This is distorting the historical method and seeking to replace it with anthropology. Indeed in Moore’s book, anthropology is finding new assertive ground. Some scholars are wondering why history has been a target of postmodernist onslaught especially as fronted by the donor community and world financial institutions. It is because the systematic collective memory of a people finds expression in history, yet it is the intention of these donors to capitalise on the alleged African ‘short memory of hate’.

Consequently, Africa is being invented through language games, fracturing and fragmentation of discourse. There is an Afro-pessimist emphasis to justify recolonization. Through postmodernist eclecticism, facts are selectively being used to explain poverty, war and anarchy in Africa. Colonialism is sacrosanctly left out as an explanation. Thus, Africa’s alleged mentality for war and genocide is used to validate the colonial era as good benevolent and to vouch for a recolonisation prophylactic. ‘Even the degree of dependent modernization achieved under colonial rule’, we are told, ‘is being reversed’ (Mzrui 1995:36). The core of Africa’s current problems emanating from colonialism is overlooked. That is why Sally Moore would rather we emphasize other themes and leave out the colonial one. But some of the critiques that Moore offers are mirages, defined in Western academies of learning and couched in Western ideologies. They are a product of Western hegemonic intentions in Africa, designed to perpetuate neo-colonialism. By overlooking colonial anthropology, Moore participates in overshadowing eye opening historical experiences for Africans. By neglecting African anthropologists Moore hoped to set aside an inspiring and memorable historiographical past whose significance exists to date and
offers redeeming inspirations to Africans and Europeans of real good will. Just how successful she does it is illustrated by Mafeje’s critique.

Thirdly, methodology demands that Moore explains which anthropology for which Africa. History has the method to unravel this question. As a discipline, anthropology was intended to study the primitive other. The ‘other’ as distinct from the European was an object of intellectual curiosity and fascination. The African other was studied ‘to illustrate the past conditions of life which have existed in our own country and in Southern and Western Europe...’ At least that is the message we so clearly get from Harry Johnson. But anthropology first came to Africa for the benefit of colonialism. British anthropologists were mainly trained at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) for the benefit of advising colonial administration. It also had to elaborate the myth of the primitive African for whom colonialism was meant to civilise and modernise (P’ Bitek, 1970). Colonial structures and institutions became indices of measuring change. It would be too much to expect Moore to quote P’ Bitek (1970) and Magubane (1971) given that they don’t share her anti-colonial mentality cup of tea. But this is the cup of tea that Africans will never forget.

Magubane’s article (1971) revolutionised the perception of change and process in anthropology. The diachronic structural functionalist approach innovative as it may have been merely took static snapshots of events. Social change was studied against the background of culture contact where they committed the ‘fallacy of the ethnographic present’ (Smith n.d:82). African values and institutions were seen asunchanging traditional given which further reinforced the view of the ahistorical Africa awaiting the modernism of colonial rule. These were very feeble attempts at historicising anthropology which failed to achieve much. It is because of these failures that Mwanzi (1972:1) suggested that anthropology must either become history or nothing at all because whenever anthropology is associated which history, there has been nothing but recognizable error.

First, colonial rule was premised on the view that Africa had no history. It was given impetus by the alleged ‘ahistorical’, ‘stagnant’ and uncivilised nature of Africans. Colonial rule was further justified on the basis of the binary logic of civilised/barbaric, traditional/modern, static/dynamic etc. The contribution of anthropology in colonial times was to study the small self-contained units called ‘tribes’ and explain how colonialism detribalised them. However, African anthropologists contested the phraseology of colonial discourse. The early and most extensive challenges to this phraseology were Magubane’s and Mafeje’s 1971 articles. Other scholars may have talked about these distortions, but not with the experiential thoroughness evident in the above two articles. In their view anthropology was misplaced in Africa given its lack of appreciation of change in Africa. Anthropology, they argued was the curse of African studies. Moore can explain if anthropology has shed off these hideous scales since then.

In a nutshell, the experience of anthropology in Africa may be long and enriching to Western scholarship but racist and imperialist to Africa. Everyday discourse in any human society is shaped by the historical experience of that society. Africans may not have been the most brutalised people in history but they are probably the most humiliated in their dehumanising experiences of enslavement, colonialism and neocolonialism (Asea 1995:1). It is definitely too much for Sally Moore to expect us to forget about the relationship between anthropology and colonialism. In terms of scholarship, decision-making and social justice, neo-colonialism is still rampant. We cannot therefore fail to interpret Africa’s challenges from a colonial angle, yet we experience neo-colonialism from our houses to the streets, from the offices to eating places, from lecture halls to publishing houses and even from the kitchen to sleeping places. Our determination as Africans is that nobody including Sally Moore takes advantage of our motto of forgiving but not forgetting.

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Self-colonization and *Pax Africana* have begun in Africa. If my critics have not recognized the trend in the role of Uganda and Rwanda in the overthrow of the Mobutu Regime in Zaire (now Congo), my critics have been less than fully alert.

When I started the debate about inter-African colonization earlier, in this decade, few people took me seriously. By the time Archie Mafajje discovered my thesis about self-colonization, Archie went vitriolic and abusive! Other critics in your columns have argued that my thesis was either evil or unreal. Yet by mid-1997 it was evident that history was indeed turning in my direction.

Africans were beginning to assert control over their unruly neighbours.

The most dramatic of these events was Uganda’s role in helping the Tutsi to reassert control over Rwanda in 1994. This was a kind of ‘Bay of Pigs’ operation, African style. The original ‘Bay of Pigs’ project launched by President John F. Kennedy in 1961 consisted of Cuban exiles trained by the United States to invade Cuba in the hope of overthrowing Fidel Castro. They were intended to land in the Bay of Pigs in Cuba and start an anti-Castro revolution. The whole operation was a total fiasco.

More than thirty years later exiled Rwandans trained in Uganda invaded Rwanda in order to overthrow the Hutu regime there and end the genocide against the Hutu. The aim of the Rwanda Patriotic Front from Uganda was not counter-genocide but conquest and control. This particular ‘Bay of Pigs’ operation – African style – was completely successful in 1994.

In the face of the anti-Tutsi genocide in Rwanda, Westerners have sometimes asked: ‘Why don’t A Africans themselves stop this kind of thing?’ The answer in 1994 was: ‘The Africans did stop it. The genocide was ended not by French troops, but by the Rwanda Patriotic Front, aided by Uganda’. It was an impressive case of *Pax Africana*.

Then came the problems of 1996 and early 1997 in what was then Zaire. The Mobutu regime over-reached itself when it tried to empower remnants of the Hutu [Interahamwe] in refugee camps in Zaire, and strip indigenous Zairian Tutsi of their Zairian citizenship. The Zairian Tutsi – helped by Rwanda – decided to resist the intimidation of the Zairian armed forces. To the astonishment of everybody, the Zairian armed forces were a paper monkey, even less than a paper tiger. They were easily defeated by the Tutsi resisters.

Before long the Tutsi rebellion became multi-ethnic. Enter Laurent Kabila with his *rendez-vous* with history. The rebellion also became multinational, aided by Rwanda, Uganda and also Angola. The anti-Mobutu movement was both Pan-African and trans-ethnic. It finally culminated in the overthrow of a dictatorship which had lasted from 1965 to 1996. A least in ousting Mobutu Sese Seko, this was a triumph for *Pax Africana*, though we still do not know how much of an improvement over Mobutu, Laurent Kabila will become.

The optimists see him as another Yoweri Museveni. Museveni too had created a private army to challenge the official army of the state, Museveni’s army like that of Kabila had defeated the army of the state. And then Museveni in power embarked on three strategies of change: first, stabilization of the country; second, restoring the economic health of the country; and third, initiating cautious democratization.

Museveni has had remarkable success in the first two goals, the quest for stability and the restoration of the economic health of Uganda. His progress in both has been faster than most observers (and most Ugandans) ever expected. His third goal of cautious democratization is still in its early stages but so far, so good.

Will Laurent Kabila be another Yoweri Museveni? The answer is only if Kabila is lucky. What is clear is that Kabila’s initial triumph probably would not have occurred without the help of Museveni, both directly, and through Rwanda. For the time being this is a success story for *Pax Africana*, though its long-term future is unclear.

A different kind of successful Pax Africana is the story of Liberia and the role of ECOMOG in ending its civil war leading Liberia towards a relatively peaceful general election in July 1997. Once again this was a case of neighbouring African countries accepting responsibility for a malfunctioning brotherly state, and going into the weaker state to try and do something about it.

ECOMOG’s lack of experience, along with disarray in Lagos, initially resulted in a lot of disastrous false starts in peace-keeping in Liberia. But in the end the mission was relatively successful, and Liberians had their say at the ballot box. While the overwhelming choice of Liberians for Charles Taylor (the architect of the civil war) puzzled most observers, it was at least a free democratic choice. Behind that choice was the fumbling but historic role of ECOMOG in pioneering *Pax Africana*.

How do we discourage African armies from staging military coups against democratically elected governments? The di-
lemma arose with the first black African military coup against Sylvanus Olympio in Togo, which was also post-colonial Africa’s first presidential assassination. This was in 1963.

The initial Pan-African response was in boycotting the successor regime in Togo. At the inaugural meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, there was one vacant seat. It was Togo’s originally intended for the assassinated Sylvanus Olympio. Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania wept publicly for Olympio. And the Charter of the newly formed OAU explicitly included a clause ‘condemning political assassination in all its forms’.

But was anybody prepared to use force to oust the regime which had assassinated Sylvanus Olympio? At that time no one was. Pax Africana was alive but underdeveloped.

Almost exactly ten years later (to the month) a coup took place in Uganda. Idi Amin Dada overthrew the government of Milton Obote. A gain one of those most deeply shattered by the event was President Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania. He roundly condemned the coup, and personally refused to have any dealings with Idi Amin Dada. But was anybody prepared to use force to try and reverse the coup? At that time not even Nyerere was! Pax Africana was indeed sensitive, but not yet forceful.

Eight years later Julius Nyerere was indeed prepared to use force against Idi Amin’s persistent national and regional destabilization. In 1979 Nyerere was at least ready to ordain Tanzania’s army to march all the way to Kampala to overthrow Idi Amin. Nyerere was successful in ousting the Ugandan dictator and in establishing a temporary Tanzanian protectorate in Uganda before multiparty elections could be held. Nyerere made two mistakes in his protectorate over Uganda. He made his Pax Africana too brief, and he tried too hard to ensure the return of Milton Obote to power. Both decisions were catastrophic for Uganda. The interlude of Pax Africana was good but not well-focused.

And the second Obote administration in Uganda turned out to be a tragedy, only to be ended by Yoweri Museveni’s triumph in 1986.

Then came the military coup on Sierra Leone in 1997, which overthrew the elected government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. In this case Pax Africana took a wholly unexpected turn. A military government in Nigeria decided to defend, and attempt to reinstate, a democratically elected government in Sierra Leone.

This was certainly an improvement on the older story of Western democracies propounding military regimes like that of Mobutu Sese Seko which was twice saved militarily by the West in the face of a domestic challenge from its own Shaba province.

I personally would rather see a military regime like that of Nigeria defending democracy in Sierra Leone, than see a democracy like that of France or the United States propping up military dictatorships in less developed countries. Yet for the time being the story of Sierra Leone seems to be a stalemate. Pax Africana has not yet fully triumphed, though the whole of Africa has condemned the June 1997 coup in Freetown.

The idea I have recommended of a Pan-African emergency force is also gathering momentum in the 1990s. The Blue Eagle Project in Southern Africa has involved training the troops of at least eight African countries to be in readiness for special responsibilities in situations of political crisis. Much of the training so far has occurred in Zimbabwe. The Blue Eagle could develop into the ECOMOG of Southern Africa, but with more appropriate training for a peace-keeping role. Here again is a potential arm of Pax Africana.

The Clinton administration in the United States has been championing a rapid deployment African force. It has also been involved in training troops from countries like Senegal and Uganda for peace-keeping roles. My own disagreement with the Clinton paradigm concerns the accountability of the African rapid deployment force. The Clinton administration would like to trace accountability ultimately to the Security Council of the United Nations, which is itself controlled by Western powers. I believe that the Pan-African emergency force should be accountable to Africa itself, through such revised institutions of the OAU as a frica may be able to devise. Alternately, accountability should be towards relevant sub-regional organizations in Africa to ECOMOG in West Africa, to SADEC in Southern Africa, and to a newly evolving Eastern Africa Economic Community. Only such an Afrocentric accountability would save Pax Africana from becoming a mere extension of Pax Americana.

Also relevant to the unfolding saga of self-colonization in Africa is the hesitant hegemonic role of the Republic of South Africa. Within the wider picture of Pan-Africanism is an emerging sub-theme of Pax Pretoriana, the muscle of Pretoria in sorting out political crises in neighbouring countries. Sorting out Lesotho’s problems with its military is one case in point.

In fact the Republic of South Africa is under pressure to be more active in other African crises from helping reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of Congo to pressing UNITA to stop fighting and join the democratic process in Angola, Pax Pretoriana at its best can be a branch of Pax Africana.

Democratic trends in Africa are real, but still very fragile. The remaining military regimes are under pressure to democratize; single party systems have been giving way to multiparty systems; authoritarian systems like that in Kenya are facing angry demands for constitutional reform. Africa is taking hesitant steps towards democracy.

But democratization within individual African countries is only part of the process of resuming control over Africa’s destiny. Pax Africana is the continental face of this self-determination provided the motives, goals and means are in tune with Africa’s ultimate well-being.

The Beast and the Icon:  
No End to Ali Mazrui’s Pax Africana Muddles*

**Prelude**
‘Vitiolic and abusive’ as I might have been in my last exchange with Ali Mazrui, by pretending that he did otherwise he only succeeds in confirming one of my charges against him. Not only did he respond in kind but also went so far as to enlist the services of some Kenyan journalists to spread scurrilous propaganda against me. This was acknowledged by such scholars as Peter Anyang’ Nyong’ o and Andre Mangu who are not necessarily hostile to him, if not in agreement. So, instead of entertaining any hypocritical remarks in a world where virtue is the gift of a few, I propose simply to get on with the fables of Pax Africana as propounded by him. Even ‘vitiolic’ debates seem to have their uses for it transpires from Mazrui’s latest pronouncements that his sense of African nationalism has got enhanced ever since. It is also possible that they revived his faith in ‘pan-Africanism’ which he found difficult to ‘credit’ after his experience in the 7th Pan-African congress in Kampala in 1994, as was shown by his disparaging remarks about my attacking any significance to such events (see CODESRIA Bulletin, no. 3, 1995).

‘Self-Colonisation’ Revisited

In our last encounter Ali Mazrui accused me of ‘changing like chameleon when it suits me’ and of being ‘a little confused’ about his use of the terms, ‘recolonisation’ and ‘self-colonisation’. Without justifying myself or attempting to address the question of whether or not he himself was chameleon-like and rather confusing (not confused), it is noticeable that there is a significant shift in his presentation between now and then. In spite of the fact that in previous polemics he made a special pleading concerning his use of the term ‘recolonisation’ to include ‘self-colonisation’, this time the accent is on ‘self-colonisation to the exclusion of participation by non-Africans whether they be invited trustees or the United Nations. Whether this is an unintended volte face on Ali Mazrui’s part or not, this time he assures us that only ‘an Afrocentric accountability would save Pax Africana from being a mere extension’ of external agents. Although in this context Mazrui had argued that ‘self-colonisation’ could become part of Pax Africana. It would appear then that here we are witnessing a chameleon-like change in shades of meaning from ‘recolonisation’ through ‘self-colonisation’ to ‘Pax Africana’. What remains incomprehensible though to lesser minds like me, as Mazrui has insinuated, is the persistent association of Pax Africana with ‘colonisation’ of any sort. Why is the prospect of regional sub-imperialism any more justifiable morally and politically than imperialism from elsewhere? Is the former part of Ali Mazrui’s pan-Africanist sensibilities? In conformity with the dubious distinction he seeks to make and with a certain amount of nationalistic fervour he declares:

I personally would rather see a military regime like that of Nigeria defending democracy in Sierra Leone, than see a democracy like that of France or the United States propelling military dictatorships in less developed countries (p. 15).

What a Choice! Or is it Ideological Schizophrenia?

After aborting democratic elections in its own country, trampling on the democratic and human rights of its own citizens, and murdering its opponents with impunity, what moral/political justification has the Nigerian military dictatorship to defend in Sierra Leone what it ruthlessly denies at home? Secondly, is it entitled to usurp the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) at will? It is a question of might is right, and then what would be the logical grounds for denying France or the USA the right to invoke the same immoral principle? It is apparent that Ali Mazrui’s perverse African nationalism could only lend to a moral and political abyss. The disturbing thing is that it is consistent with his macabre idea of five ‘pivotal states’ in Africa which he shares with the State Department, without going into its political ethics and the question of democratic rights of small states within ever-increasing processes of regional and global integration. There is a big difference between Mandela’s and Abacha’s intervention in African politics. The question of on what basis and how any intervention is implemented is of cardinal importance.

**Pax Africana Misconceived**

As is shown by his opening remarks in the article under review, Ali Mazrui suffers from grand illusions. Not only does he believe that ‘Pax Africana’ exists because he authored it but also imagines like A polo in the Oracle of Delphi that history can turn at his beckoning. Secondly, most of the time he labours under very serious methodological misconceptions such as treating analogies and metaphors as a valid method of social scientific or historical analysis. For instance, the historical analogy he uses between the Bay of Pigs and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) campaign against the regime in Kigali is not sustainable structurally and substantively. It is merely a flamboyant way of talking and, as I have alleged before, gives Mazrui’s writings an air of superficiality. It would be absurd for Ali Mazrui to postulate that the RPF was a counter-revolutionary force in the service of an imperialist master by name of Yoweri Museveni. It would also make nonsense (which probably it is anyway, as will be shown) of his claim that the RPF campaign, aided by Uganda, was ‘an impressive case of Pax Africana’.

Likewise, while very appealing, the ‘paper monkey’ metaphor does not explain anything. The fact of the matter is that the Zairian army had been for a very long time a national army only on paper. Not only was it demoralised because of very poor service conditions (including unpaid salaries for months) but also was experiencing high rates of disaffection from the Mobutu’s regime like the rest of the oppressed masses in the country. Consequently, as an army, it had no cause to fight for but to back various favoured
political leaders. On the other hand, while the Banyamulenge1 who were being used as scapegoats by the tottering Mobutu’s regime had a genuine cause, their military campaign fitted too well in what was being orchestrated by Museveni and Kagame for them to be portrayed as ‘little tigers’. The movement against Mobutu was not only national but was also regional and trans-ethnic, as Mobutu acknowledged. In the event Kabila’s so-called ‘rendez-vous with history’ could only have been with him as a hyena, a scavenger trailing an army of unknown identity. All this has unsavoury implications for Mazrui’s vaunted Pax Africana.

So far, neither Museveni’s domino game nor the RPF’s enlightened militarism has brought about peace in the affected areas. Regarding Rwanda, Ali Mazrui boldly states that: ‘The aim of the Rwanda Patriotic Front from Uganda was not counter-genocide but conquest and control’. Even so, it is fair to acknowledge that expediency dictated that they stop the large-scale massacres by the Interahamwe (government-sponsored militias). What casts doubt on their Pax Rwandaise is that hardly had they pacified the country before their own enlightened militarism degenerated into mass murders in the refugee camps and roaming death squads. By the time they had joined the war against Mobutu’s regime they had become indistinguishable from ordinary mercenaries and got embroiled in mercenary-like atrocities in eastern Zaire where mass graves were one of the results and later came to hang like an albatross around self-declared President Laurent Kabila’s neck and who as a consequence had to play hide and seek with the proposed UN Commission of Enquiry. Could it be that our hero came to power with his hands dripping with blood? Is it conceivable that Ali Mazrui’s Pax Africana heroes, Museveni and Kagame were actually angels of death who brought neither peace nor democracy in the region? This question cannot be answered by reference to the overthrow of Mobutu with their covert help because that was predetermined by long-standing and intensifying political and social struggles in former Zaire. Mobutu was on his last leg in every sense of the word. It is a matter of logic pace Ali Mazrui that there cannot be Pax Africana, without peace. ‘Good’ intentions, without good deeds are a dead loss.

Democracy: Key to Genuine Pax Africana

Ali Mazrui’s concept of Pax Africana is necessarily undemocratic and reactionary. It refers neither to democracy as a sine qua non for peace nor to equality as a necessary condition for political cooperation among nations. Instead of being people-centred, it is premised on state-power (the bigger, the better) and verges on militarism. It grants the criminal military regime in Nigeria the right to impose its dictatorial will on weaker Sierra Leone. It celebrates militaristic ‘little tigers’ such as the Rwanda Patriotic Front for dispatching to hell ‘paper monkeys’ such as the Zairian army while trampling on citizens’ democratic and human rights both in the camps and in former Zaire. Museveni, the ‘fox’, whose regime undemocratically expelled Ugandan citizens of Rwandese origin2 (notwithstanding the fact that some of them were his erstwhile comrades-in-arms) and thus callously obliging them to join the forced march to Rwanda, also emerges as a shining symbol of Pax Africana. Yet, as the saying goes, charity begins at home. It is indeed extremely unrealistic to suppose that there can be peace in Africa, without democracy. By ‘democracy’ is not meant merely formal individual rights but, above all, collective social responsibility.

It transpires, therefore, that Pax Africana cannot be a matter of individual governments or conspiring presidents deciding unilaterally what is good for their neighbours. It must be a collective responsibility including citizens and based on a well-defined code of conduct. Regional organisations such as ECOMOG and the planned Blue Eagle in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region should not be seen as a ‘potential arm of Pax Africana’ à la Mazrui but as prototypes for peace-keeping in Africa. It is worth noting that, besides lack of an established code of conduct and advance training in peace-keeping, ECOMOG faulted in Liberia partly because of authoritarianism of the Nigerian contingent. Militarisation of national politics in Africa predisposes peace-keeping forces towards making war instead of peace in troubled countries. This is one of the reasons why demilitarisation in Africa should be looked upon as an essential part of the democratisation process. African armies are not known to fight external enemies but their own civilian populations, which is an absolute negation of democracy and ultimate violation of citizenship rights. For this destructive role, African armies are generally accorded budget allocations which exceed those of the ministries of education and health combined in their respective countries. Insofar as African armies have never been tested in battle fighting a real enemy in defence of their citizens (except Egypt and perhaps Tanzania), they are probably all ‘paper monkeys’ (to borrow Mazrui’s metaphor) but in reality are a great political, social and financial liability. Africa must be demilitarised for peace, stability, and collective social development.

Under normal circumstances the responsibility for the coordination of the requisite interventions would devolve upon the OAU for which Ali Mazrui has high but vain aspirations. In the meantime, the OAU has yet to find a way of making itself relevant to genuine Pax Africana and social development in Africa. This might be on its agenda but is definitely not on the cards. In the event what might prove interesting and exciting in the foreseeable future is Pan-Africanist initiatives and deliberate integration at the regional level. This might even give greater scope for participatory democracy than is possible through the ossified structures of the OAU.

Notes

1. It is ironical that Ali Mazrui, like the Mobutu’s regime, refers to Banyamulenge (inhabitants of the Mulege hills) as ‘Tutsis’ after 200 years of settlement and intermarriage in a gold mining area (Kivu). Like Western journalists, he thinks of his African subjects in primordial tribal terms. In contrast to other contemporary African political scientists and Africanist historians who are grappling with the connotations and social implications of supposed tribal identities, he still employs them exactly the same way he did in the 1960s.This makes me wonder what tribe he thinks he belongs to at this stage.

2. Tanzania at the worst time is doing the same to people who settled and were settled in its territory nearly 40 years ago precisely because there is no collective responsibility and established code of conduct among African states. What makes Tanzanian citizens for Bahima/Buhaya, Buha, and Buzinza?

Africana: A Combative Ontology

Prelude
This article is inspired by Out of One, Many Africas (1999), an incredible intellectual insurrection instigated by William M artin and M ichael West. For their courage, persistence, and intellectual integrity, they deserve all the recognition. The best way of appreciating their contribution would have been to review their book in full but for me there was the danger of biting more than I could chew. Therefore, I chose to respond to some of the leading ideas in the book. These include the pending demise of Africana, and the necessity of Afrocentrism. A s would be readily agreed, these issues are as big as they are controversial but intensely that even ‘distinguished elders’ are willing to jump in with both feet, perhaps, to the chagrin of ‘Brave New World’ advocates. Even so, the risk is not too great since they have the advantage of hindsight, unlike neo-phyes who are often too easily infatuated with fashions. Since fashions are very changeable, it stands to reason that ahistoricity is a greater risk than historicity. To evolve lasting meanings, we must be ‘rooted’ in something.

The fashionable ‘free-floating signifier’ is an illusion in a double sense. First, nobody can think and act outside historically determined circumstances and still hope to be a social signifier of any kind. In other words, while we are free to choose the role in which we cast ourselves as active agents of history, we do not put on the agenda the social issues to which we respond. These are imposed on us by history. For example, we would not talk of freedom, if there was no prior condition in which this was denied; we would not be anti-racism if we had not been its victims; we would not proclaim Africana, if it had not been denied or degraded; and we would not insist on Afrocentrism, if it had not been for Eurocentric negations. Second, unlike, the illusory ‘free-floating signifier’, it is the historical juncture which defines us socially and intellectually. At this point in time there are certain critical issues which Afric an scholars have to clarify so as to indicate what might be the underpinnings of the eagerly awaited African renaissance.

Of necessity, under the determinate global conditions an African renaissance must entail a rebellion – a conscious rejection of past transgressions, a determined negation of negations. Initially, such representations will not be credited by those who uphold the status quo. If they be robust and persistent, they will sooner or later elicit a plea from men and women of reason and goodwill for a dialogue. Not surprisingly, this is already happening. Before they have rediscovered themselves and have exercised all the evil spirits that have harboured on the continent for so long, Afric an scholars are being invited to an extravedted contemplation about ‘our common future’. The ostensible reason is that such self-affirming constructs as ‘Afrocentrism’ are too confining and will succeed only in ‘ghettoising’ Afric an intellectuals. These entreaties should be resolutely spurned because the classical liberal idea of a universal (wo)man is like a mirage in the face of self-perpetuation hierarchies in Bush’s and Clinton’s ‘New World Order’. For the Africans who are at bottom of the pile, authentic representations need not connote anything more than that ‘charity begins at home (a very fitting Anglo-Saxon adage) which is a conscious refusal to be turned into ‘free-floating signifiers’. Thus, Africana, if properly understood, has profound political, ideological, cosmological, and intellectual implications.

Africana versus Afrocentrism
Although in current debates the two terms are often used as interchangeable or, at least, as having a common referent, this need not be the case. Conceptually, it is possible to distinguish clearly between the two. Contrary to the suppositions of the Temple University school represented by Tseholo K eto (now back in South Africa) in Out of One, Many Africas which made a fetish of it, Afric anity can be regarded as methodological requirement for decolonising knowledge in Africa or as an antdote to Eurocentrism through which all knowledge about Africa has been filtered. Although this has been justified by appealing to dubious ‘universal standards’, the fact of the matter is that Africa is the only region which has suffered such total paradigmatic domination. In a simple and unpo lemical manner K wesi Prah (1997) in an unpublished but pointed communication makes the same observation:

Rather strikingly, in comparative terms it is remarkable that when Chinese study Chinese culture and society in their own terms and for their own purposes, western scholarship does not protest. This is because the sovereignty of Chinese scholarship on China is accepted. India and the Arab world have almost reached that point. Russians do not look west for understanding their society... Neither do the Japanese.

Interpreted this way, Afrocentrism is nothing more than a legitimate demand that Afric an scholars study their society from inside and cease to be purveyors of alienated intellectual discourse. The underlying belief that this will issue in authentic representations. Indeed, it is only logical to suppose that when Afric ans speak for themselves, the word will hear the authentic voice, and will be forced to come to terms with it in the long-run. This might prove to be a long march, especially under the unfavourable educational conditions in Africa and the prevailing dearth of requisite scholarship. But the principle is a noble one and is worth nurturing. Once again, K wesi Prah (op. cit) has argued that if we are adequately Afrocentric the international implications will not be lost on the others. In this context he recalls M ao Tse Tung’s words of wisdom regarding internationalism: ‘If what we say and do has relevance for our humanity, its international relevance is guaranteed’. As in general is a living example of this. However, mutual awareness or recognition does not breed universality, as the dominant West has been preaching since its ascendency. Contrary to current western...
suppositions about ‘globalisation’, different conceptions of humanity and different ways of ordering human life might well lead to polycentrism rather than homogeneity/homogenisation.

Insofar as this is true, ‘universal knowledge’ can only exist in contradiction. It is perhaps recognition of this historical experience that led to the questioning of classical European epistemological suppositions, especially by the post-modernists who proffered a dialogue between cultures as the only way forward. It seems that, theoretically, even this can only suffice if by ‘culture’ is meant civilisations in which the intellectual and scientific function is primary. By some curious coincidence, Afrocentrism might be an appropriate response. It is this probability which African scholars have to investigate with all seriousness. What forms of accumulated knowledge do African scholars have? Are they serviceable under modern conditions? Modern Africans justifiably reserve the right to address this question themselves. Why not? They fought colonialism successfully and have delivered Southern Africa from white settler tyranny. They are making steady progress in the arts and, as the records of the African Academy of Sciences show, they might yet prove themselves in the field of science, given enough resources and opportunities which are non-existent at the moment. As can be seen, there is absolutely no reason why Afrocentrism as an epistemological/meth-odological issue should be ideologised or demonised. Secondly, it is a mistake to presume that it can be grown on foreign soil or be universalised before its birth. Probably, Kweisi Prah speaks for a significant number of indigenous African scholars when he declares: ‘We must be national before we become international’. This would seem to contradict the supposition that Afrocentrism is or could be trans-Atlantic, short of ideologising it for other reasons – a problem to which we will return.

**Africanity versus vindicationism**

Unlike Afrocentrism, which we argued was basically referential, Africanity has an emotive force. Its connotations are ontological and, therefore, exclusivist. This is to be expected because its ontology is determined by prior existing exclusivist ontologies such as white racist categorisations and supremacist European self-identities in particular. These insinuated that blacks were inherently inferior. Hence, the blacks in the New World, especially, felt the need to prove themselves and thus produced what Martin and West call the ‘vindicational’ intellectual tradition. On this side of the Atlantic this found its greatest ovation in Senghor’s famous concept of ‘Negritude’ and to some extent in Nkrumah’s idea of ‘African personality’. The idea of a distinct inner quality being, a ‘black soul’, if you like, was not an appeal to race but a claim to greater human qualities. For people who had been degraded and accorded a sub-human status, it would not take much effort to fathom this reflex. Probably, even this would not suffice for ordinary Africans who are not vindicationists but firmly believe that they, as a people, are endowed with greater human qualities than the whites. In Bantu languages the collective abstract noun for describing this is *ubuntu*, which is not translatable into English (carelessly translated, it comes out as ‘humanity’ which is a generic term with no social-cultural connotations). Highest among these qualities are human sympathy, willingness to share, and forgiveness. It is interesting that during his African tour His Holiness, Pope John Paul II, acknowledged the same revelation (probably with South Africa in mind) for which he specifically commended and blessed the Africans.

This could not have been of any special significance to his listeners because these are taken for granted. Rather, it is their absence which draws attention and comment. It is a reflexive dialogue which makes it easy for ordinary Africans to make a distinction between themselves and others, without feeling the need to develop it into a discourse. In the hands of modern black intellectuals Africanity has been developed into something much bigger than simply a state of social and spiritual being. It has become a pervasive ontology that straddles space and time. Instead of being limited to continental Africans, it extends to all black of African descent in the Diaspora, especially African-Americans.

Inevitably, it has acquired racial overtones precisely because it is a counter to white racism and domination, especially in America. However, its intellectual project is much wider than this. A mong other things, it aims to gain respectability and recognition for the Africans by establishing the true identity of the historical and cultural African. This has necessitated an excursion into the past, going as far as the beginnings of the Egyptian civilisation in the Nile Valley, and the deciphering of African cosmologies and myths of origin. This is undoubtedly a continuation of the ‘vindicational’ tradition in which the first generation of African-Americans played a leading role. But in the present juncture, African-American scholars have been joined by a younger generation of African scholars and this has presaged a possible rupture in what Martin and West, perhaps unwittingly, refer to as ‘a seamlesstrade’ of all people of African descent. Certain discontinuities are beginning to manifest themselves.

From what one can discern, the idea of Africanity as perceived by African scholars such as Joseph Ki-Zerbo, Kweisi Prah, Paulin Hountondji, and Valentin Mudimbe refer to what is considered to be the essence of Africa, as opposed to distorted images that have been imposed on the continent by others (meaning Europeans and African). The point of reference is the history and cultural underpinnings of contemporary African societies. It is hoped that a genuine understanding of this heritage will enable African scholars to develop theories and paradigms that will help the Africans to combat foreign domination and to forge an independent Pan-African identity. In other words, the emphasis on Africanity struggles for a second independence in Africa or an African renaissance. It has more to do with African meta-nationalism than race or colour. Therefore, those who feel compelled to declare that ‘Africa is not black’ or that ‘Africanity is regressive’ are barking up the wrong tree. In Africa only Southern African white settlers, who are the prime authors of racism, are preoccupied with colour and are unable to deal with their Africanity for they have persistently played ‘European’ to the extent that they unconsciously granted that they were aliens whereas blacks were ‘natives’. Thinking individuals amongst them are acutely aware of this anomaly.

Africanity is an assertion of an identity that has been denied; it is a Pan-Africanist revulsion against external imposition or refusal to be dictated to by others. In this sense it is political and ideological reflex which is meant to inaugurate an African renaissance. In our view, this should not be confused with black solidarity in the original Pan-Africanist sense, which included blacks of African descent in the
Diaspora. This is still valid and desirable. But, socially and conceptually, it is odds with reality. Culturally, socially, and historically the African-Americans and the West Indians have long ceased to be Africans unless we are talking biology, which itself is highly hybridised. Black Americans are first Africans and second anything else they choose, like all Africans. This also applies to the West Indians or Caribbeans. The historical and cultural heritage and contribution of the black Americans to the making of America is largely denied and grossly understudied by American standards. Like Africanity for the Africans, this is a provocation of Black Studies, correctly conceived. Irrespective of what they do, black Americans cannot hope to re-appropriate Africa. Any attempt to do so can only lead to intellectual confusion and conceptual distortions. There is already evidence of this.

Earlier, reference was made to a threatened rupture between black American notions of Africa and those of indigenous Africans. Henry Louis Gates Jr. made a name for himself when he published *The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African-American Literary Criticism* (1988), which made extensive use of Yoruba symbolism, and subsequently established a big Afrocentric empire for himself in Harvard. But in the meantime, the authenticity of his representations had been questioned by Olufemi Taiwo in an article entitled, significantly enough, 'A appropriating Africa: An Essay on New Africanist Schools' (1995). Using very fine tools indeed and relying on greater command of Yoruba semiotics, he demonstrated that Gates had done less than full justice to his chosen texts. There is no doubt that what gave Taiwo enough courage to tackle a black American celebrity such as Gates is the fact he was standing on home ground, the ultimate firma terra. Nonetheless, it is not Taiwo who goes on a space odyssey riding trains from Kampala to Mombassa or Timbuktu in glorification of Africa on TV. Has' Skip’ Gates Jr. become an intellectual tourist in the name of Afrocentrism? Anthony K. Wame Appiah, the author of the celebrated *In My Father’s House* (1992), who is Ghanaian by origin but ended up in Harvard as a member of Gates’ ‘Dream Team’, suffered a similar interrogation in the hands of a fellow-Ghanaian, Kwesi Prah. Surprisingly enough, Prah questioned the authenticity of Appiah’s conception of the African and eventually accused him of holding the stick from the wrong end by ‘accusing the victims’ for what had been imposed on them by colonialism. Here, the only possible conclusion to draw is that Appiah’s discourse is extraported precisely because it is not Afrocentric in Phiri’s sense of the term. In the meantime, African students in the United States have complained that Appiah is not accessible to them because he has priced himself out of their reach and that he is unwilling to stoop to conquer – another instance of ‘accusing the victims’. Certainly, there is something afoot but as yet has not been problematised.

Towards the end the Civil Rights Movement, black Americans came to Africa in droves. They found it very different and by their confession preferred home, despite their initial romantic desire to rediscover their roots in Africa. On their part, the Africans complained that the black Americans thought and behaved like whites, including the tendency by some to raid the continent for exotic artefacts and sell in America. In Tanzania they were referred to outrightly as bazungu (whites), their colour notwithstanding. In the States black Americans find the Africans a bit strange and say as much. This is not simply a problem of false consciousness, as some idealist Pan-Africanists would like us to believe. Over time the two cousins have grown apart and in reality their common African identity cannot be assumed. We have the experience of Liberia and Sierra Leone where the arbitrary return of ex-slaves by Britain and the United States led to the establishment of a dual society, wherein the westernised ex-slaves reserved the right to lord it over the natives. The rest is well-known to the Africans but they are too embarrassed to talk about it openly. But one thing certain, judging by the turn of events in both countries, The creation of Liberia and Sierra Leone by foreign powers was not a felicitous event by any means. This marks the limits of transcendental Africanism.

For the time being, it can be stated with a fair amount of certainty that, whereas at the political level there is a great deal that co-joins Africans and the blacks in the Diaspora, namely, what Skinner identifies as white racism and ‘paradigmatic hegemony’ of the West, historically, culturally, and sociologically a significant, and sociologically a significant disjunction exists between the two. Skinner, who is an unflinching defender of Africanity in the vindicationalist tradition, is equally convinced that ontological claims to a universal African culture are unsustainable and that African-Americans distort certain aspects of African culture to suit their needs. To K wanzza which, according to the *Economist* as quoted by him (Martin and West, op. cit, p. 80), the founder ‘concocted his festival by borrowing from a number of cultural sources… His idea was to create a ritual for America’s blacks to express pride in their African roots’. Of course, Skinner does not say anything about continental Africans who trade in African' culture in America for their own opportunistic purposes. All this makes nonsense of ontological claims to authenticity and African cultural identity which transcends all boundaries. If not fraudulent, these claims are nothing more than an adulteration of the truth.

In the totality of things, Afrocentrism in America is a contradiction in terms. Black Americans, no matter how well-intentioned they are, cannot make indigenous knowledge for Africans in America nor could continental Africans do the same for any length of time in America. While individual African-Americans can become 'experts' on Afrika, they cannot in the name of Africanity speak for the Africans. Africanity, as is perceived by the African scholars mentioned earlier, is an insistence that the Africans themselves have a willingness to learn from others but a refusal to be hegemonised by others, irrespective of colour or race.

In one of his many political pamphlets, Kwesi Prah once remarked regretfully that in the past African presidents have always had foreign advisers. In the case of Nkrumah, to one’s surprise, he included George Padmore, one of the founders of Pan-Africanism. This is a strong indication that in the new Africanity the primacy is on African self-autonomy. In spite of any possible temptation, this cannot be described as chauvinistic or parochial because it is the right of all peoples of the world. The only difference is that under the present international and racial dispensation some have more and some have much less. That is the rub, and the only rub. By insisting on Africanity the Africans are staking their claim. For this reason, it would be incongruous, if the instruments for establishing Africanity were...
forged elsewhere. In the same way that Afrocentrism cannot be imported from America, Africanity cannot be nurtured outside Africa. As an ontology, it is inseparable from the projected African renaissance. It is a necessary condition for the mooted African renaissance, the second independence of African meta-nationalists.

One is aware of the fact that in making the various distinctions and sociological observations in the preceding section, one is treading on hallowed ground and that one might incur the wrath of black essentialists and black intellectual careerists alike. But that is no reason why black intellectuals with any integrity at all should forsover and deceive themselves or bury their heads in the sand in an ostrich-like fashion. The truth is staring them in their faces, despite any grand illusions about a universal African culture immune to fashion. The truth is staring them in their eyes, and that is the question. There is nothing Martin and West know about the history of African Studies in America that Jane Guyer does not know. She knows as well as anybody else that what she proclaims has never been the case and that is why African Studies is in a big crisis at this historical juncture. African scholars predicted this not because of their own growing intellectual maturity. The article written by Mahmood Mamdani, ‘A Glimpse at African Studies, Made in USA’, which appeared in CODESRIA Bulletin, No. 2, 1990, was a clear signal and spoke for a sizeable constituency of African scholars. The turning point was the meeting of thirty Africanist scholars at the Carter Centre in Atlanta in February, 1989. The designs of the American Africanists were thoroughly exposed. Instead of looking at themselves, they treated the whole indictment as an individual aberration (see Goran Hyden’s rejoinder: ‘Mamdani’s One-eyed Glimpse’, CODESRIA Bulletin, 4, 1990). Nevertheless, the rebellion continued and reached a climax in a meeting organised by Martin and West at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign in 1994. The African participants rejected in no uncertain terms the idea of African Studies ‘made in the USA’. Most outspoken amongst them was Micere Mugo from Kenya. The Africanist antithesis, as can be seen in the introduction to Out of One, Many Africas, vindicated the position of those American scholars such as Martin and West who had been arguing for developing a new concept of African studies. Although there are some Africanists such as Jane Guyer who sincerely believe that African Studies ‘made in the USA’ can still be redeemed, it is apparent that the rise of Africanity and Afrocentrism is its ultimate negation.

This in itself does not mark an end to the study of Africa by white American scholars. It marks the end of their taken-for-granted intellectual hegemony and institutionalised domination in African Studies. One suspects that there will be forced retreat into traditional disciplines from which they were run by African scholars themselves and not be held by any government. If they prove viable, it might be appropriate for foreign scholars to work through them, while waiting for the revival of the collapsed African universities. In other words, they hold prospects for intellectual and scientific cooperation which could be of great mutual benefit, as against the historical imperialistic appropriation of Africa by others.

The irony of all these developments is that there might never be any African Studies anywhere in the future. Christopher Fyfe and Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch in Out of One, Many Africas both report the decline of African Studies in Britain and France, respectively, as a sequel to the end of empire and growing self-assertion by Africans. Americans as the last-empire builders might suffer the same fate. Coquery-Vidrovitch thinks that the collapse of empires, whether political or intellectual, is an auspicious event since it creates opportunities for new initiates, especially by those who had been denied. In the Francophonie she sees a new universalism spear-headed by the youth from the former French colonies. While one shares Coquery-Vidrovitch’s revolutionary optimism, one is inclined to think that she underestimates nationalism in the developing world as a reaction to one-dimensional globalisation from the West, which transcends any supposed division between Francophone and Anglophone. Theoretically, it is arguable that the national democratic revolution had been aborted in Africa. Responses are symptomatic of this. As was suggested earlier, this has nothing to do with colour or race but with domination and the resultant
politics of independence. It is predictable
that in this millennium everybody will pay
lip-service to universalism but it is equally
evident that all comers are going to pursue
their parochial interests. Naturally,
this will happen under different guises.

As was hinted above, African Studies will
certainly be one of the casualties of the
new millennium. It has reached its atro-
phy in Europe and America and it cannot
be resurrected in Africa. There has never
been any ‘African Studies’ in African uni-
versities, except in the damned Southern
African settler societies. There, they had
replicated the colonial paradigm, wherein
white subjects studied black objects. In
the ensuing process of subordination and
subordination black were not allowed to
study themselves, except as aids. After
independence in the sub-region it was
supposed that African Studies could be
rehabilitated by upgrading the African
handy boys and girls. Those who so
thought were courting trouble for they
had not clearly discerned the rising tide
of Africana in the aftermath of the fall of
the old order. They thought that they
could stage-manage the whole thing. How
mistaken they were, as is shown by the
Makgoba affair at the University of Witwatersrand and the Mamdani fiasco
and the ensuing debacle of the envisaged
African Studies at the University of Cape
Town which blew in their faces.

Owing to either their insularity or isola-
tion, the South African white academic
community behaved as if they lived in a
cuckoo-land of their own. They could
have learnt from the experience of the Brit-
ish and French colonialists and fellow-
American upstarts in Africa. This is apart
from the fact that they were caught be-
tween the devil and the deep sea and
could not define themselves as they were
neither European nor African. In the
newly conceived but doomed ‘African
Studies’ who is going to study whom?
Africana predicates that there shall be
neither white subjects nor black objects.
Therefore, a plague upon both their
houses and everlasting blazes upon
Gomorrah and Sodom.

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Archie Mafeje and his wife, Shahida El Baz
Africanity: A Commentary by Way of Conclusion*

Socio-Historical Context
The publication of a special issue of the CODESRIA Bulletin on Africanity could not have come at a better time for a number of reasons. Repeated publication of solely editorial pronouncements had already generated great concern among African scholars, as shown by Zeleza’s unpublished letter to the former Executive Secretary of CODESRIA and its ramifications on the Internet. Privileged editorial declarations had truly become an intellectual hindrance and threatened to degenerate into a self-satisfied monologue. Therefore, according space to a variety of representations on the question of Africanity was a felicitous and facilitative event. It gave those concerned an opportunity to find out if there were still any real issues to be addressed, apart from personal fantasies or unnecessary mystification. Judging by the tenor of the general discussion in the Bulletin, it is apparent that Africanity is not a controversial issue in the philosophical sense but simply a historically determined political and social construct. It is an assertion of an independent identity under the present determinate conditions.

A cursory glance would show that its resurgence among radical African scholars is traceable to three important events in contemporary African history. These are (a) the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the World Bank, (b) the intellectual negation of African studies and (c) the demise of apartheid in South Africa. These events are not related to one another but their impact on the consciousness of African scholars, particularly in the social sciences, was the same. Whereas in the 1980s the World Bank Programmes in Africa and African Studies ‘made in USA’ came to be seen as imposition from outside, continued white domination in post-Apartheid South Africa in the 1990s is perceived as a denial of Africanity. The latter is particularly true of those African academics who came from outside and had no first-hand experience of white-settler societies and mistook majority-rule for independence, as is known elsewhere in Africa. Mahmood Mamdani’s vicissitudes at the University of Cape Town and in Africa. Mahmood Mamdani’s vicissitudes at the University of Cape Town and elsewhere, as known elsewhere, continued white domination in post-Apartheid South Africa in the 1990s is perceived as imposition from outside. Therefore, the African scholars, particularly in the social sciences, were challenged. If Southern African whites and their kin overseas might genuinely believe that events such as land occupation in Zimbabwe are a transposition of ‘otherness’ by Africans, then they are the mark of their failure to adjust under changed conditions wherein pre-existing relations of social domination are being challenged. If Southern African whites, like Bradley & Leeman, are impelled to grab everything and, in pursuit of their avarice, are predisposed to treat the other with absolute callousness, then they can only succeed in confirming their historically-determined ‘otherness’. This is exemplified by the white interviewee from Johannesburg who, after nearly two years of majority-rule in South Africa, insisted that, to her, South Africa is a South African swimming pools and picnics. This made Mandela’s frequent declaration, ‘There shall not be any trains of gravy any longer’, sound like a voice crying in the wilderness.

This is not a philosophical or technical question, as some apologists have to make us believe. It is a straightforward political and social issue determined by the march of times. It has nothing to do with race either, it is a social-construct. Fabien Boulaga presents the matter in its true perspective when he states: ‘History shows that race is not a logical or scientific problem, but a political problem in

Kwesi Prah’s preoccupation with Africanity in the same environment testify to this.

For testimony of Africanist revulsion against the intellectual and practical imposition of the World Bank, reference could be made to the starting representations of ECA in 1989 in a document entitled ‘African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation’. This created a great stir within the Bretton Woods institutions, as nobody had ever imagined, that representatives of African client-states could be so defiant in their rejection of what they saw as the excesses of the West.

The second example of an Africanist challenge to the economic presumptions of the World Bank came from a research group of about 20 African economists whose primary intention was to stake their intellectual claim against the World Bank and its mischief in Africa. This is clearly reflected in the title of their final product: Our Continent, Our Future: African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment, edited by Thandika M Kandwirde and Charles Soludo (1999). As far as African Studies is concerned, reference has already been made in my contribution in the Bulletin to Mamdani’s authentic representation, ‘A Glimpse at African Studies Made in USA’ (1990) and to the final requiem for an Africanity, entitled Out of One, Many Africans (1999).

Authenticity and Historical Conjuncture
The representations cited above are not random impulses. They are a culmination of political forces which have been at work over the last 20 years. In other words, Africanity is an expression of a common will. It is a historically-determined rebellion against domination by others. There is nothing new about it, except the historical conjuncture. Since the era of white colonialism, Africans have always referred to themselves as Africans in contradistinction to their foreign oppressors and exploiters. At no stage did this imply a desire to oppress others: the underlying sentiment has always been self-liberation. At the present historical juncture, what has made Africanity appear otherwise is the political insecurity of Southern African whites who for so long had treated the Africans as the ‘other’ now that the chickens have come to roost, they want the Africans to think of themselves as something other than what they think they are. This is a thoroughly perverse reaction. Properly understood, the problem is not Africanity but rather the ‘otherness’ on which the whites thrived and still do, as a socio-economic category. Whereas Southern African whites and their kin overseas might genuinely believe that events such as land occupation in Zimbabwe are a transposition of ‘otherness’ by Africans, in fact, they are a mark of their failure to adjust under changed conditions wherein pre-existing relations of social domination are being challenged. If Southern African whites, like Bradley & Leeman, are impelled to grab everything and, in pursuit of their avarice, are predisposed to treat the other with absolute callousness, then they can only succeed in confirming their historically-determined ‘otherness’. This is exemplified by the white interviewee from Johannesburg who, after nearly two years of majority-rule in South Africa, insisted that, to her, South Africa is a South African swimming pools and picnics. This made Mandela’s frequent declaration, ‘There shall not be any trains of gravy any longer’, sound like a voice crying in the wilderness.

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search of an absolute, metaphysical justification. Who should command and who should obey? In the name of what? (CODESRIA Bulletin, 1, 2000). But then our philosopher detracts from this insight by giving the impression that both the subjects and the objects of racism are guilty of the same crime. Rejecting racial subordination or being treated as the other cannot be construed as the reverse side of the same coin. Rather, it is a negation of a prevailing socio-construct and an affirmation of what is denied. This can be achieved only by proffering new self-identities. A fricancy and the proclaimed ‘African Renaissance’ feature very strongly in this search for a ‘second independence’. In the African context there is no evidence that these are aimed at debasing others expropriating them, yes, if that is the only way social equity and justice can be guaranteed. It is, therefore, false to suppose that those who had been victimised necessarily use this as a moral justification to debase or to dehumanise others. For that matter, M mbembe committed a gross sociological transgression by giving even the vaguest impression that there is a similarity between ‘Jewish Messianism’ (if by that he means Zionism) and A fricancy. In contemporary history, it is only the Israelis who used their victimisation as a moral justification for visiting the Palestinians and the A rabs in general the same sins as had been visited upon them during the holocaust. This does not seem to have earned them as much disapprobation from the A mericans, the British and the South A fricans as A fricancy is threatening to in the case of the Pan- A fricanists. The moral duplicity implicit in this is not lost to the A fricans.

Race as a Form of Mystification

It is interesting to note that, while social scientists and philosophers have still to contend with the problem of the concept of ‘race’. Once again, Boulaga assures us that ‘there is only one human species or race’ and marshals a great deal of up-to-date scientific evidence to prove his case. But even I as a biology student in the late 1950s at the University of Cape Town had been taught the same by my white pro-fessors, who nonetheless regarded or treated me as the ‘other’. Even anthropologists suffered from the same intellectual schizophrenia, despite the persuasive writings by Ruth Benedict and Ralph Linton in the 1930s.

This is proof of the fact that the theory of difference is not based on scientific knowledge. It is socially-founded. For instance, to justify their claim to superiority, racists seize upon morphological differences or phenotypes, as Boulaga points out. The most pervasive of these is colour, which manifests itself as an essential difference between black and white. Yet, in reality, colour is the most indefinite human feature. This is made worse by the fact that human beings do not breed true. It is for this reason that, contrary to Boulaga’s suggestion, they cannot be divided into subspecies or ‘sub-races’. At best, we can talk of human varieties that run into one another, i.e. they constitute a continuum. For instance, the people who are called ‘black’ in Africa and America (not in South India or Sri Lanka) are mostly not black. They vary from dark brown to very light brown. This is particularly true of Southern A fricans and A frican-American. The phenomenon is mostly attributed to continuous miscegenation among human varieties. In South Africa, it is significant that an uncompromising A fricanist such as Winnie M andela would lay claim to the so-called Coloured, as ‘our cousins, children of our mothers raped by whites’. In insisting on A fricancy the advocates are not blinded by sheer colour.

It is therefore surprising that, all of a sudden, a long-standing member of CODESRIA, Mahmood Romdhane, finds itself necessary to make apologies for being a ‘non-black A frican’. Is he afflicted by social amnesia or has he been infected by a new virus in CODESRIA? If so, it is well to remember him not only did he become a bona fide member of CODESRIA but that the issues he is raising had long been resolved before his time. If he did not know, CODESRIA was founded by North A fricans led by Samir A min as a Pan-Africanist organisation. The Sub-Saharan A fricans took the latter at face-value and embraced CODESRIA with both hands and became its backbone. Although latter-day reactionaries tried to introduce ‘race’ in the organisation by making references to strange notions such as ‘A rabophone’, CODESRIA circles North A fricans were referred to as such. This was consistent with the division of A frica into four sub-regions. West, North, East, and Southern A frican for purposes of representation. Not only this, if Romdhane’s memory is failing him, it is well to remember that the North A fricans played a very prominent role in the formation of OAU. Figures such as Gamal A bdel N asser and A hmed Ben Bella became shining symbols of the Pan-Africanist movement and, to this day, nobody in his/her right sense could question their A fricancy. In passing, it is also worth noting that, during the Congo cri-sis in 1960, which led to Lumumba’s assassina-tion, the victim’s sons were immediately given permanent custody by an Egyptian family, ‘black’ as they might have been. Hence, pathetic and tenden-tious responses from old colleagues such as Romdhane, who should know better, are to be regretted. In contrast, novices such as A chille M mbembe, who believe that ‘Pan-Africanism defines the native and the citizen by identifying them with black people’, are to be forgiven, for they know not.

As it has been reiterated, the object of A fricancy is white racism as a pernicious social-construct, not non-black peoples. While in the ensuing political discourses the terms of reference are ‘black’ and ‘white’, especially in South Africa and A merica, it is important to note that both terms are used metaphorically. As was indicated earlier, ‘black’ is a social cate-gory and ‘African’ is a social identity used in opposition to ‘white’, whether this be European settlers in Southern Africa or the imperialist West. However, in reality, ‘whites’ are not white. They vary from pink to tan and olive-brown. What distinguishes them is that they have been hegemonic over the last five hundred years and still insist on it, as shown by the new generalissimo dubbed ‘globalisation’. As would be expected, this has produced its own antithesis. It is the latter which should be the focus of discus-sion and not the illusion of colour or race. The whites in Southern Africa have not been denied citizenship by black govern-ments. But inexorably they are being de-nied the right to dominate the blacks, how-ever defined. Nevertheless, as the new developments in Zimbabwe demonstrate, this does not automatically confer upon ascendant blacks the right to dominate others. This has been made abundantly clear to President Robert M ugabe, despite his un-flinching stand on white racism, as is socially defined. This contradicts M mbembe’s metaphysical inscription that: ‘The victim (meaning the A frican), full of virtue, is supposed to be incapable of vio-lence, terror, and corruption’. Supposed by whom and where? As shown by the intense struggles for democratisation sub-sequent to the disillusionment with inde-pendence, for the last 20 years, A fricans
have been fighting their own dictators and African scholars have spent an inordinate amount of time writing about dictatorship and corruption in Africa. This is so much so that they have been blamed for being long on criticisms and short on positive suggestions.

**The Way Forward**

In their concept paper, ‘Race and Identity in Africa’, Wambui Mwangi and Andre Zaaamn contrived to make race and African identity a problem for research. Scientifically, it is agreed that ‘race’ is a meaningless concept. Therefore, it cannot be a subject for research. Secondly, the African identity is a self-imposing concept. In the same way as Europeans, Aians or Latin-Americans take their identity for granted, Africans know and have always known that they are Africans at least since the colonial imposition. Otherwise, the independence movement would have been inconceivable. The problem of identity concerns those who live in Africa but do not know whether they are Africans or not. Even this is not a problem for research but rather for introspection. Once this problem has been resolved, there would be no need to talk about ‘minority groups’.

Indeed, this might not be for protection of the human rights of minorities but an excuse for preservation of privilege. It is common knowledge that, in Africa, there is a number of the so-called minority groups that came to dominate the indigenous people. As pointed out earlier, this was often achieved through racism in one form or another. Thus, the issue is not ‘minority’ or ‘majority’ but social equality and equity. These latter two know no colour.

Therefore, it comes as no surprise that those Afican intellectuals who insist on Africanness do not think of it only as a necessary condition for resisting external domination but also as a necessary condition for instituting social democracy in Africa. In support of this supposition, reference could be made to the works of African scholars such as Joseph Ki-Zerbo, Claude Ake, Kwesi Prah, Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba, Jacques Dpekelch and many less obvious examples. Theirs is a call for a new Pan-Africanism that breaks neither external dependence nor internal authoritarianism and social deprivation. Currently, this is metaphorically referred to as ‘second independence’ or ‘African renaissance’. These are glimpses of utopia that need to be translated into actionable programmes.

When the movement for democracy swept throughout the continent towards the end of 1980s and in the early 1990s, it seemed that this movement was going to usher a new era in Africa. Alas! This did not happen. The movement only succeeded in authoritarianism, namely ‘democratic authoritarianism’ since the two main criteria for instituting it were multi-partyism and regular elections. Both turned out to be fraudulent and the African citizens were back to square one. As far as African scholars have not been able to explain why this was the case.

Unconvincing references have been made to the frailty of civil society in Africa. The intriguing question though is, if the same civil society had been strong enough to sweep away the older generation of African dictators, why has it not been able to contend with the new petty dictators? Furthermore, not all African societies can be said to have weak civil societies. For instance, South Africa (and Zimbabwe for that matter) can hardly be accused of having a weak civil society. Yet, while formal liberal democracy prevails in the country, it cannot be claimed that its civil society has been able to guarantee social democracy. When President-elect, Thabo Mbeki, in his movement of glory proclaimed that the South African revolution ‘has not been completed’ and, accordingly, declared his great aspiration for an ‘African renaissance’, what was he actually alluding to? Whatever it was and still is, it is apparent that he cannot realise his dream, without significant intellectual labours or inputs.

Therefore, it would appear that, instead of wasting their time debating sterile issues such as race and how black or not so black Africans are, African intellectuals could devote their energies to more relevant conceptual problems. For instance, the question of social democracy vis-à-vis social development has to all intents and purposes not been clarified. Furthermore, it could be asked: in the name of Africanness, how do Africans combat racism, without being drawn into unwarranted discourses such as are being proposed by some self-appointed universalists? Secondly, in the name of Pan-Africanism, how do Africans reconcile statehood and regional integration? The existence of sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS and SADC notwithstanding, it is obvious that African metamnationalists have no clear formula for resolving the manifest tension between parochialism and universalism in their own context, let alone in the global context. These are some of the issues that could give Africanness a substantive referent. As it is, it is conceivably the case that their resolve could not have been more self-inflicted.

Moreover, it could be asked: in the name of Africanness, how do Africans combat racism, without being drawn into unwarranted discourses such as are being proposed by some self-appointed universalists? Secondly, in the name of Pan-Africanism, how do Africans reconcile statehood and regional integration? The existence of sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS and SADC notwithstanding, it is obvious that African metamnationalists have no clear formula for resolving the manifest tension between parochialism and universalism in their own context, let alone in the global context. These are some of the issues that could give Africanness a substantive referent. As it is, it is conceivably the case that their resolve could not have been more self-inflicted.

Therefore, it would appear that, instead of wasting their time debating sterile issues such as race and how black or not so black Africans are, African intellectuals could devote their energies to more relevant conceptual problems. For instance, the question of social democracy vis-à-vis social development has to all intents and purposes not been clarified. Furthermore, it could be asked: in the name of Africanness, how do Africans combat racism, without being drawn into unwarranted discourses such as are being proposed by some self-appointed universalists? Secondly, in the name of Pan-Africanism, how do Africans reconcile statehood and regional integration? The existence of sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS and SADC notwithstanding, it is obvious that African metamnationalists have no clear formula for resolving the manifest tension between parochialism and universalism in their own context, let alone in the global context. These are some of the issues that could give Africanness a substantive referent. As it is, it is conceivably the case that their resolve could not have been more self-inflicted.

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Mafeje receiving the CODESRIA Lifetime Membership Award from Samir Amin at the 30th Anniversary Conference, Dakar, 2003

Tandeka Mkiwane and Archie Mafeje

Archie Mafeje and Thandika Mkandawire at the Conference on the Social Effects of the Economic Crisis and Reactions in Africa (Dakar, July 21-23, 1986)

Archie Mafeje Ebrima Sall

Jimmy Adesina, John Foye and Archie Mafeje