IDENTITÉ
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un dialogue afro-asiatique

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L’intolérance apparaît une fois de plus pour presque devenir la «nouvelle norme. Cela est vrai non seulement dans le cas des États-Unis, où Donald Trump, loin d’aider à le contenir, en fait l’aliment, tweetant en 280 caractères ou moins ses pensées sur l’immigration, les Hispaniques, les Musulmans, les femmes, le changement climatique, les Arabes, l’Iran et la politique mondiale. Mais cela est vrai pour une multitude d’autres leaders, y compris Narendra Modi, Rodrigo Duterte, Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud, et quelques autres. L’affaire n’est pas différente en ce qui concerne le Kenya et la politique identitaire, comme l’affirme Fiona Ngarachu dans son article sur la politique kenyane. Bien que Ngarachu se concentre sur les attitudes des jeunes envers la politique, qui espèrent un avenir meilleur compte tenu du fait que les jeunes, contrairement à leurs parents, éprouvent des «espaces démocratiques plus grands» et s’engagent activement dans politique. On peut certainement apprécier l’optimisme de Ngarachu, mais le fait reste que les «nouveaux normaux» et les «espaces démocratiques» sont le produit de la «politique électorale», où gagner une élection a moins à voir avec obtenir des votes de la majorité et plus à faire avec la manipulation de la nombres, comme cela a été le cas avec Trump (obtenant moins de 3 millions voix que Hillary Clinton mais remportant la présidence) et modi (obtenant seulement 36 pour cent des votes populaires mais remportant la majorité deux-troisième au Parlement). La question est donc beaucoup plus

From the Editors’ Desk

Intolerance once again is creeping in, and almost becoming the 'new normal.' This is true not only in the case of the United States, where Donald Trump, far from helping to contain it, is actually involved in the business of fueling it, at times astonishingly by tweeting in 280 characters or less his thoughts on immigration, Hispanics, Muslims, women, climate change, Arabs, Iran, and world politics. But this is true for a host of other leaders as well, including Narendra Modi, Rodrigo Duterte, Mohammad Bin Salman Al Saud, and a few more. The case is no different when it comes to Kenya and the reproduction of identity politics, as Fiona Ngarachu contends in her paper on Kenyan politics. Insightfully though Ngarachu focuses on the young’s people’s attitudes towards politics, where she is hopeful of a brighter future given the fact that the young people, unlike their parents, are experiencing 'greater democratic spaces' and actively engaged in politics. One can certainly appreciate Ngarachu’s optimism, but the fact remains that the 'new normal' and 'democratic spaces' are product of 'electoral politics,' where winning an election has less to do with getting votes of the majority and more to do with manipulating the numbers, as it has been the case with both Trump (getting less than three million votes than Hillary Clinton but winning the presidency) and Modi (getting only 36 percent of the popular votes but winning two-third majority in the parliament). The matter is therefore much more complex than what meets our eyes.
Intolerance is also on the rise when it comes to treating religious minorities across the world, an issue which Ainoon Nahar critically flagged by highlighting the case of the Ahmadiyya community in Bangladesh. Interestingly, although the members of the Ahmadiyya community "lived in relative peace since it took root from the early part of the 20th century," as Nahar explains, it is only in the later part of the 20th century, more specifically from the 1980s onwards, do we see hostilities rising against them. Apart from the fact that the Wahhabization of Islam, sponsored by Saudi Arabia and the Wahhabis, who were historically virulently anti-Ahmadiyya, made the Ahmadis target of Muslim zealots, the complicity of the state cannot be ruled out. But then dialectically this is where the hope lies! The state, if it were in the business of promoting or tolerating anti-Ahmadiyya campaign, as it had been the case in Bangladesh, it is possible then for the same state, if it were to pursue and undertake measures, to contain the agitation against the Ahmadis.

The next two papers deal with intolerance at its most extreme form. This refers to the atrocities committed by the Myanmar military against the Rohingya population, which made the latter flee Myanmar and take shelter in Bangladesh, now numbering 1.2 million of them. This is precisely the reason why Mizanur Rahman in his paper explores the possibility of applying the provisions of R2P - Responsibility to Protect, a global political commitment endorsed by all member states of the United Nations.
Mizanur Rahman dans son article explore la possibilité d’appliquer les dispositions de la responsabilité de protéger, un engagement politique mondial approuvé par tous les États membres de l’Organisation des Nations Unies lors du Sommet mondial de 2005, principalement contre le génocide, les crimes contre l’humanité, les crimes de guerre et le nettoyage ethnique. Le scepticisme de Rahman vient du fait que les dispositions de la protection ont été invoquées de manière sélective, le Conseil de sécurité n’agissant que sur cinq cas parmi les dix les plus meurtriers entre 2006-2011. Dans ce contexte, la crise des Rohingyas est un test décisif pour la lutte contre la discrimination, dont la non-application rendra non seulement le R2P non idoine mais aussi se traduira également par un recul sérieux pour la communauté internationale essayant de contenir des atrocités contre les civils.

Ishrat Sultana signale aussi la "persécution systématique" à l’encontre des Rohingyas au Myanmar, mais son article aborde le sort de l’apatridie de ce côté de la frontière. Dans le cas des Rohingyas résidant au Bangladesh, cela inclurait, parmi beaucoup d’autres, la difficulté que rencontrent les enfants Rohingyas pour accéder à l’éducation. Sultana est critique à l’égard du gouvernement bangladais, en particulier quand ce pays est signataire de la Convention des Nations Unies sur les droits de l’enfant. Celle-ci oblige les États à assurer pour les enfants l’accès à l’éducation, quelle que soit leur sexe et leur ethnicité. Celle-ci se limite au cas des «Rohingyas enregistrés», Sultana at the 2005 World Summit, mainly to prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. Rahman’s skepticism comes from the fact that the provisions of R2P has been invoked selectively, with the Security Council acting only on five cases out of ten deadliest cases of anti-civilian violence between 2006-2011. In this context, the Rohingya crisis is a litmus test for R2P, the non-application of which will not only make R2P 'irrelevant' but will also result in a serious setback for the international community trying to contain atrocities against the civilians.

Ishrat Sultana too flags the 'consistent persecution' of the Rohingyas in Myanmar but her paper addresses the plight of statelessness on this side of the border. In the case of the Rohingyas residing in Bangladesh this would include, among many others, the difficulty the Rohingya children face in attaining education. Sultana is critical of the Bangladesh government, particularly in the backdrop of the country being a signatory of UNCRC - UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which obligates "states to ensure children’s access to education regardless of their gender and ethnicity." But then compulsion creates conditions for creativity! Limiting her case to the 'registered Rohingyas,' Sultana uncovers something that 'raises hope in the midst of their statelessness,' and that is, "social relations and network with local people often help them to get out of this trap." Indeed, as the saying goes, where there's a will, there's a way!
révèle un élément qui «soulève l’espoir. En effet "les relations sociales et les gens locaux les aident souvent à sortir de ce piège. " Justifiant le dicton qui dit que là où il y a volonté, il y a moyen!

Solofo Randrianja
Imtiaz Ahmed

Are we then losing our battle against intolerance? Or, are states incapable of containing intolerance and the only hope now for tolerance is the goodwill of the 'local people'? There is, indeed, some hope in putting faith on the people, as Adama Djigo also tries to argue, although on a subject markedly different from the rest of the papers, while "shedding light on new efforts to reclaim and redefine heritage and cultural expressions of identity." Djigo contends that the 'heritagization and appreciation of cultural heritage' are reproduced differently, with the state limiting itself to the 'recognition and protection,' while the population or people are more interested in preserving or reinventing "a social or ancestral legacy." The statist position is bound to invite intolerance, while people's active engagement has the potential of reproducing tolerance. Indeed, all options ought to be kept open for containing the rising intolerance on earth!

Imtiaz Ahmed
Solofo Randrianja
A FIRST CUT AT UNDERSTANDING YOUNG PEOPLE’S ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLITICS IN KENYA

Fiona W. Ngarechu

Abstract

Cet article soutient qu’il est essentiel de comprendre les différentes postures des enfants face à la politique. Cela afin de nous aider à comprendre comment la socialisation politique contemporaine fonctionne dans l’attitude critique et durant la période de formation de l'identité de l’adolescence. Le document présente les conclusions d’une étude qualitative à petite échelle menée en 2012 en Kenya sur les perspectives des enfants, hommes et femmes, âgés de 14 à 18 ans, à propos des attitudes possibles envers la politique et leur identité ethnique. Les données, collectées par le biais de groupes de discussion et d’entretiens approfondis, seront présentées à travers les quatre dimensions de la politique africaine de Chebti et de Keur, à savoir les limites de la politique, la notion d’identité, la notion de légitimité politique et la question de la représentation. L’objectif est d’appuyer une réflexion contemporaine sur ces points de vue de la politique africaine, dans la perspective des jeunes, afin de déterminer s’ils constituent un moyen pertinent d’analyser les attentes populaires sur le sujet.

Ethnity and politics are intertwined in the Kenyan political space. An attempt to explain the details and nuances of the Kenyan political context would be a thesis itself. Key in understanding the Kenyan political system is an understanding of the colonial and post-colonial contexts. Fundamental to this is the politicisation of ethnicity. The politicisation of ethnicity, as Mahmoud Mamdani terms it, the 'politicisation of politics' covers a wide range of relevant issues ranging from generational politics to ethnic group demands for land rights and...
political recognition\textsuperscript{1}. With 42 ethnic groups in Kenya, it is easy to see why this has become a political issue. The common thread that runs throughout this literature is the fact that ethnicity has been transformed from a purely local cultural and social resource to a "political resource" that has often hindered the democratisation process.

The paper will look at more detail into this feature of Kenyan politics, among other salient features by adopting, as a theoretical frame, Chabal and Daloz’s\textsuperscript{2} four dimensions that they put forth in understanding African identity politics (there were five in their book but the last which is the meaning of political opposition will not be discussed in this paper.) These are: the boundaries of politics, the notion of the individual, the issue of political legitimacy and the question of representation. These features have been recurring attributes in some quarters of Africanist political science in the last ten years. The aim of this paper is to test their current validity by applying them to young people’s opinions of politics and ethnicity. These opinions were collected during a pilot study conducted from the 10th of September to the 10th of October in one urban and one rural area of Kenya. The young people (both women and men) were between the aged of 14 and 17 and were recruited through secondary schools in the research areas.

The main research question that guided the study was: How do children perceive and exercise their ethnicity [in relation to politics]?

Methods

Focus group discussions and in depth interviews were used as the primary data collection methods and these were conducted in one urban school girls school in the capital Nairobi and one rural boys school in Nyeri Kenya. The method also involved a narrative exercise, where the participants in the focus groups were asked to write on flash cards, what they would like to tell the presidential candidates. These methods were underpinned by a peer led framework. There has been a growing trend towards young people’s participation in the research process. The method that was adapted for this study is that which has been used in

\textsuperscript{1} Mahmood Mamdani (2001), Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 651-664.

\textsuperscript{2} Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (2012), Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument, Indiana University Press.
peer training for HIV prevention where young people are trained in HIV prevention methods and allowed to facilitate informal sessions with their peers. In my case the peer educators have been reorganized as peer researchers. The following section will be an analysis of the findings from the interviews, using the four themes from Chabal's and Daloz's work.

The boundaries of politics

In Kenya, the divisions are less clear between politics, religion, culture and ethnicity. As Young would term it, ethnicity is “an enduring attribute of African political dynamics” which is needed to win elections, gain power and sometimes even successfully operate a government. This is because of particular communities benefiting and others being marginalized depending on who is in power. For instance, in one constituency in the western region of Kenya, the party primaries for the recently concluded elections (March 2013) for the CORD alliance highlighted this fact. The majority ethnic group in that area has dominated politics to the perceived detriment of the minority community. The elders of the latter have stated that in the forthcoming elections, it should be one of their members who will succeed to political office in order to secure their interests which they claim have not been taken into account. The boundaries of politics are therefore about how different identities come into play in the political space.

As was mentioned in the introduction, Mamdani among others have spoken of the “politicisation of ethnicity.” This is a two way street where negative ethnic elements are activated by politics as well as ethnicity in itself directly influencing political options. An example of the former can be seen during election periods in various African countries where citizens are more likely to ascribe to their ethnic communities than at other times or in other situations. On the other side of the coin, community interests are often times paramount and there is a strong pressure for politicians from below to conform to the needs and interests of their communities. But over and above the politicisation of identity there has also been a criminalisation of identity as is referenced in Brilliant Mhlanga’s work on ethnicity in Zimbabwe. In the colonial era, ethnicity in the form of the various traditions espoused by tribes was seen as backwards and it was the duty of the colonisers through missionaries and educational institutions to modernise the African. This is still prevalent today with talk about tribes and tribalism being seen as not a useful endeavour. This was clear when

3 Ibid.
before young people were interviewed in one rural school, they asked me why I was interested in talking about ethnicity, as there was no use. They considered themselves Kenyans and to them, thinking in tribal terms was backward.

What will be looked at below is how these ideas of ethnicity play out among young people before looking at its influence on their attitudes towards politics in Kenya. This will look at the dynamism of identities, ethnic stereotypes as well as attitudes towards national and ethnic identity.

**Dynamism of identities**

There is a dynamism that is associated with young people’s identities. The term “aspectival” may come into play here, with identities not being an objective constant term, but open to negotiation and indeed in a state of flux. This is illustrated by the statement below from one of the participants saying he is seventy-five percent from one community.

*Ok, me I am seventy-five percent kikuyu. We are people who like money most of the time.*

While he did not elaborate on this particular statement, this is an interesting phrase that illustrates that ethnic identities are not static, neither are they fixed to one particular community, but can shift between them depending on the situation and context. With increases in inter-marriages between communities and rural-urban migration, this is perhaps fast becoming a salient feature of this particular generation. They are not as tied to the past as their predecessors and are free to mould and merge their identities as it suits them in their different contexts.

Another instance was in an interview where one of the participants noted in her life history that her mother had separated from her father. This was a painful event, as he had left them abruptly and without warning. What was interesting from this story is when she mentioned that immediately after the separation her mother told her that she was no longer a member of her father’s ethnic group. I should mention here that her parents were from two separate ethnic groups. It seemed that she had initially taken on the identity of the father as is common in most societies, particularly patriarchal ones, but she was asked to revert back to her mother’s ethnic identity. She did not see this as unusual, as her mother had brought her
up with an appreciation of the traditions of both communities. This is illustrated by her statement below;

My real tribe I am Kamba but my mum does not appreciate that she always told me that I am no longer a Kamba but I am a Luhya. As she is my mum, I had to respect but from my Luhya tribe, it does not have hard rules to follow and it’s a good tribe that does not rely mostly on tribalism.

Language was one of the ways through which identities were expressed. There was, however, a conflict between being able to speak your ethnic language with someone who speaks the same language versus only speaking Kiswahili. It seems in the school setting, speaking ethnic languages is discouraged and there was debate about this policy. As one participant highlighted, there was a need to speak the national language as “we are cosmopolitan here” and do not want to "marginalise anyone" as there are people from other communities. On the other side of the argument was the need for freedom of expression.

Feel free when you are speaking kikuyu in school [...] when it is the language that you understand.

There was a feeling that this freedom was clashing with the need for a more “national” outlook as will be seen from the other sections in this paper. For example, one participant noted that he had to learn the language of the dominant ethnic group (Kikuyu) when he moved to that area to study, because, outside of the classroom in the dormitory and around the area that was what was spoken and he had to adapt. His tone was one of lament for this situation and he would have liked wider use of the national language – Kiswahili. One of the potential effects of this is a sense of imbalance that these young people have where on the one hand, they are told to be proud of their communities but on the other, they are told to ignore them.

**Ethnic stereotypes as determinants of future prospects**

Ethnic stereotypes are common in the Kenyan context and indeed they are the subject of a number of comedic episodes in various local shows. They are taken quite for granted and as self-evident, though in the general public discourse, not all tribes are included in this, mainly those that are dominant in the political discourse. For instance, Kikuyus are seen to be “money hungry misers” Luo’s to have “class” and Luhya’s to be “strong bodied”. In the African context, this kind of stereotyping has had
a negative association with violence as can be cited with the Rwandan case where the Tutsi community were cast as cockroaches that needed to be eradicated. While there are some decidedly negative stereotypes out there, what is interesting is it seems that there is a perception among the young people that they can play a role in determining your life prospects. For instance, Luhyas are apparently known as watchmen and “Kikuyu’s are business oriented.”

This quote was followed by an explanation where one of the participants highlighted that they felt that they were under an obligation to fulfill this scenario. When he came to high school he felt that he should open a small business to make some money, because that is what is expected of his group. This also brings to the fore, the notion of habitus in their identities. That subconscious way in which we are socialized that helps us act in certain ways within our social habitat. It seems that habitus of ethnicity serves as an indicator of their future prospects.

“I feel like all these things that we hear they compel you towards a certain path in life. For example, like myself, the way I have been raised, I have been hearing that the Kikuyu love money, until it becomes a part of my soul until one feels that I was born to make money, therefore you go and make it because you have to prove it to others. Also the Luo’s you see them on the street, talking very good English, and the way they act, it is something that is expected of them.”

**National versus ethnic identity**

There were references that were made to how national identity, ethnic identity and more personal identities are linked. It emerged that there is some understanding of the reality of living within a state. Some of the participants highlighted that they live within a country, with common laws, rules, language and regulations and that is what makes them feel Kenyan. A national identity is seen as acquired by birth. You are born a Kenyan. But, different aspects of life in Kenya either make them proud of this fact or not. The participants used what was a national unity campaign slogan to highlight their thoughts, with Najivunia kuwa mkenya (I am proud to be Kenyan) emerging as good climate, dominance in the East African economic market and Olympic prowess. The latter brings in the issue of context (and in this case local context) being key when these identities come into play. For those who were from conflict hotspots such as Eldoret and more recently the Tana River region. For instance, one participant contested the view of Kenya as peaceful when he stated;
There were clashes in Eldoret. So let me ask you, these children that are born in that place and that time, during the post-election violence, does it mean that they will view Kenyan as peaceful?

This was further highlighted in a ranking that participants were asked to take part in that was not in the original focus group guide. They were asked to rank family, tribe and country in order. The majority ranked it as family – country – tribe though there were dissenting opinions such as "without that tribe there would be no Kenya." and "propaganda of the government is one tribe one Kenya." One of these dissenting views reflected quite clearly how their day to day existence affects their outlook by stating, “What is the Kenyan spirit?” Which is similar to sentiments expressed in Dalozs’ chapter “can we eat democracy?” For this participant he did not feel Kenyan the state did not provide for his needs. This kind of instrumental identity would perhaps explain the view of effective politics as “performance politics” that will be explained in the later sections of this paper. In addition, they recognize identity as situational and dependent on the context. A respondent mentions the case of David Rudisha (Olympic gold medallist from the Kalenjin ethnic group) stating that this gave him pride in being a Kenyan identity but if the Olympics had been during the 2007 post-election violence, then he may have felt more Kalenjin than Kenyan. Ethnicity is therefore a key feature in social life, more so in politics as is seen from the views below of politics as being inherently ethnic.

**Politics as inherently ethnic**

From the perspectives of the young people, one of the problems with politics and local administration was tribalism. This was especially highlighted among local administrators such as chiefs who are appointed rather than elected. The interests of the politicians group it seems come first to the interest of those of other groups.

[...] we are all Luo’s but in that our area there are different clans, so the chief the chief that we have is chosen he came from another clan and, whenever you are found with any case I don’t think if he will, he cannot even help you. He only helps those people who come from his clan.

The other feature of this inherent tribalism was that it was essentially negative to vote along tribal lines and was a sign of backwardness with development only coming when this was at and end. The blame for this
was laid squarely on the door of the politicians and what they term their “elders” who include their parents and those older than them who have the power to vote and effect change.

 [...] the people who are standing for ODM (party) in that constituency [Ndhiwa constituency] had to win; [...] tribalism here is still there. We can't do away with it. If the elder people have not come together to say that we should stop tribalism because us the new generation will follow the same chain as we found there so I don’t think tribalism will ever end.

Linked to this view of politics as ethnic was the notion of “dirty politics” in terms of politicians as selfish and self-interested and not effective with the political “game” consisting of underhand tactics. There is a feeling of frustration and anger with this status quo, which they know is not right, but feel helpless to be able to do anything about it.

Respondent one: Mostly the politicians, they are just playing a dirty game here. They trying to black mail people but it's like - they are just trying to blackmail people with their sweet words, with their money.

Respondent 2: I think politicians are very corrupt, you know they don't consider the teachers which are now striking but them – them they are continuing to campaigning for themselves to get some votes and some people are suffering.

Ethnicity and ethnic identity is, however, not only viewed in negative terms. The importance of the young people's ethnic identities is highlighted with a reference to modernity by one of the participants who stated that modern life is disassociating people and the fact that people were still helping each other out was a key indicator of what ones tribe means to someone. From this, it seems it is the point of contact and trust and a form of social capital that is drawn upon both in times of joy, through the celebration of traditional rituals of marriage and circumcision but also in times of crisis. What these identities mean for us is in their interaction with the field of politics, and what emerges from this interaction. What emerges is that the lived realities of citizens cannot be divorced from the practice of politics. Young people especially are aware of the nuances of political discourse and therefore any attempt at civic education needs to take this into account. Focusing only on ideal types of how democracy and politics should work while important, does not take into account how democracy and politics works now. If we are to
have the successful political engagement of young people for democratic transition, then this is essential.

**The notion of the individual**

According to Chabal and Daloz, “individuals are not seen as being [...] meaningfully separated from the communities to which they belong.” To understand politics on the continent, we must understand how Africans can “be both modern and non-individualist.” This is not to imply an inherent socialism to African politics but to situate ethnicity and the implicit allegiance to one’s ethnic group as a core part of an individual, especially as they interact with politics and society. In addition, there is the concept of the ‘cult of the individual’ where the politician that is sanctioned by the community commands a large amount of loyalty and has the ability to carry that communities vote in an election. The following sections will illustrate this theme in terms of the interviewee’s narratives on the responsibility for the negative status quo of Kenyan politics.

**Politicians to blame vs. people to blame**

All the respondents agreed that there is something essentially wrong with Kenyan politics. They do not go into detail on the particulars of this, but it is taken as self-evident fact and the question that arises then is who then is to blame for this state of affairs. Two definitive schools of thought emerged from the focus groups. One was what I term the “politicians are to blame camp” while the other was the “people are to blame”. The former opinion can be illustrated by this argument presented by one of the participants:

It is our own opinion for us to elect the members but you see us Kenyans we don’t have any option. These politicians they can grab somebody’s votes and say that they were voted for. So what I can say is that the problem is not the Kenyans, the problem is the government because they are promising things and they are not doing it. Those money which the government is using peoples’ taxes and taking them to the ministers, when they give an member of parliament money to give the people in the slums he is taking the money so I think the government is the problem not the people.

On the other side of the coin, the blame the people camp can be illustrated by the following extract from the same focus group conversation
With me I want to say us citizens we are the ones who are stupid because let's take for example –this election I have been wondering let's take for example [...] in Nyanza and you will never hear like [...] a Luhya winning the seat you will just find like it is the Luo’s who are the ones who are supposed to win these seats. Now me I see the citizens are the ones who are stupid because they have that mentality that we are staying in Luo Nyanza now our person is the one who is supposed to win the seat, nobody (else) can come because they are just like encouraging tribalism.

The blame the people camp also included the argument that their parents and other elders were to blame for being gullible and allowing themselves to be lied to by the politicians as well as those who were uneducated not being able to make informed decisions. In addition, there seemed to be a cult of the individual, with political personalities being seen as representing their parties. In addition, it was highlighted, though not quite as strongly, that the politicians were representatives not only of their constituencies, but of their communities. Any embarrassment does not only reflect on the individual or the area they represent but on their entire ethnic group. This is highlighted by the following statement from one of the respondent’s letters to political candidates.

Am not being tribalistic but even if we are in the same tribe but you aren’t representing us well.

The issue of political legitimacy

What may be understood as political legitimacy in other contexts may not be the same for the Kenyan/African context. Weber would define it at the basic level as “faith in a particular social order.” Legitimacy in the state and government is not universal, mainly because of unequal distribution of resources and perceived election malpractice. For instance, those in the northern arid parts of Kenya may have issues with the legitimacy of the government as they consider themselves marginalized by it. In addition, legitimacy in the African context is about “performance” and therefore authoritarian governments can be seen as legitimate as long as there is positive economic performance or positive performance to a particular support group. The key thing is the responsiveness of government can be seen as the ability of the government to “perform” and provide the basic necessities to the people.

From this initial data in the pilot study, legitimacy is implicitly touched upon and confirms Chabal’ s view of legitimacy as performance, with
statements such as “To improve and take care of common citizens life standards as first priority” for politicians but also highlighted Nasong’o’s view of legitimacy as fairness, with call for equal distribution of resources confirmed by statements such as “To all aspiring candidates: Please let us use our energy for positive gain of this country as a whole.” (Letter to political candidates, Rural Peer led FGD) In addition, legitimacy is gained not only from performance but also from a sense of visibility. Participants reference a politics that you can taste, touch and feel. They judge politicians on what they have done for the community. And this has to be seen, more especially in a material way. One participant noted of a particular politician, "Peter Kenneth, most developed constituency but don’t see him [...] talking." This can be illustrated from the data extract below where participants were questioning what work that their political representatives have done;

Respondent one: Let me ask you. Peter Kenneth is an M.P for Gatanga. The most developed constituency. But he is rarely seen in his constituency. Most developed. What have you seen the politician here doing?

Respondent two: the majority thing [...] am telling you that is simply walking the talk. Talk less but you act most.

Respondent three: She has only built a big house for herself [...] But there are also people who have received a bursary?

Respondent one: I want something I can see. At least a general hospital, a good one. Seriously

It is therefore easy to see why a politician, who takes care of these needs, would have the support of the people, regardless of his/her other vices including corruption. Therefore, corruption in certain cases can become an acceptable practice though in most cases that we have seen, it is an indicator of legitimacy and more often than not threatens the politician who engages in it. Corruption will be looked at in more detail below.

**Corruption**

Politics is seen as inherently corrupt with self-serving politicians at the helm. For instance corruption was the most mentioned issue of concern in the narrative exercise when they were asked to write a note to the political candidates who were standing for election. While this is not a
surprising finding in and of itself, the different ways that they understand corruption is. It was highlighted that certain cases of corruption such as voter buying were acceptable. For example one respondent stated that politicians often come to the constituency and give money to the people, especially during election time. They said that their vote, or rather voting cannot help them, but the money that the politician would give them would enable them to get some food to eat. This reinforces the idea of sustained economic development leading to poverty reduction as one of the factors in ending corruption as poverty is what leads this to be an acceptable and indeed expected practice as illustrated in the quote below.

When this minister come even if it is me I will take the money but what I can say to the people is this; even if you take the money but during the election just [...] vote for the one who can change (things)

What this illustrates is a sense of expectation of this practice. It is often said that corruption, like tribalism is perpetuated by the elites and it is at the elite level that we should concentrate prevention mechanisms. It is legitimated as an instrumental reality. It is a case of, I may never see the politician again (as is common, politicians are only ever present during election time) so I might as well get something out of this encounter. The implication for politicians is that those who do not engage in this practice will be at a disadvantage. In addition, there was the perception in the urban areas that one of the reasons that is given for this state of affairs is a lack of education, it being seen as a practice that is predominant in rural areas.

The more recent literature on ethnicity has shown that pressures from below can contribute to politician's rhetoric on tribalism and it seems this can be said to be the same on certain practices associated with corruption. Though, as has been shown by the second respondent, citizens should be “smart” about it and still vote for the person who will cater to their needs and bring about change. The key thing to note here is that personal and material needs have to be taken care of, thus the need to accept politician's money. This theme also has a generational element to it, with the elders (read parents, and generally anyone older than them) being perceives as being more gullible to this political machination that younger people.
The question of representation

“In mature democracies the function of the representative is to act on behalf of [...] a given constituency, in Africa the situation is more complex.” For instance, the current coalition building in anticipation of the March 2013 elections features power sharing agreements that are geared towards not only representing diverse communities but also the ability of the politicians to ‘pull’ voters from their various communities. Therefore, the Jubilee alliance consists of two key principals, Uhuru Kenyatta, a Kikuyu to bring in his community as well as William Ruto, a Kalenjin who is supposed to focus his campaign in his particular ethnic stronghold. “Representation, therefore is necessarily communal” and takes can take on ethnic dimension.

Some political analysts such as Mutahi Ngunyi term this “ethnic mathematics” and though he has been criticised quite heavily in the media for his views, he did an analysis that showed possible scenarios if registered voters voted purely along ethnic lines for the presidential candidates. He was proved somewhat prophetic as his calculations did not fall wide of the mark in the recently concluded elections. The relevance for this here is that it serves to reinforce the ethnic nature of representation in Kenyan politics. In addition, there is a resource mobilization value attached to ethnicity. This is not necessarily different from other countries for instance the phenomenon of African Americans trend of supporting the Democratic Party but how it is manifested is what is unique because of the African context. It is about interests being fulfilled and the perception is that, as has been highlighted in the previous section of this paper, there is an element of trust that a member of your ethnic group will fulfil your interests rather than one from another community of which you may have no knowledge. As Chabal emphasizes,

Indeed, formal democratic theory would stress the need for individual representation. However, for reasons having to do with the importance of communal, racial, regional, ethnic and religious forms of identity, any system of representation operates within a collective rather than individual context—by which I mean that either representatives are chosen for reasons having to do with their communal affiliations or that elections are interpreted on particularistic grounds.

While the young people seem to understand that the MP’s represent both their constituencies and their “people” for instance, with one of the participants saying in the letter to the President that one of the political
candidates, Raila Odinga should not embarrass members of their community, but should represent them well, they are aware, that in the background, this is all a political game and the enmity that the politicians engage in by pitting one community against the other is driven by political pressures, not personal or ethnic dislikes.

To add on that the way she said on air, they (politicians) are not like talking to one another so when they the citizens are watching television, they will just say ah, this one is not a friend to this one so let me follow this one and leave the other one so they will find like citizens are following this one and the other one are following the other one. So it creates enmity.

Conclusion

The paper above has provided contemporary illustrations on four key themes of African identity politics namely the boundaries of politics, the notion of the individual, the issue of political legitimacy and the question of representation. This has been done by looking at young people’s attitudes along these dimensions. This has shown that young people are essential to our understanding of African politics and can serve as a reflection of the status of the political system. What is clear is that young people’s identities are a key influence on their political attitudes and these identities are as a result of their daily lived realities especially those of poverty, marginalisation and economic disenfranchisement. What this paper reflects is the status quo of Kenyan politics, explained by looking at young people as indicators of the political culture and political attitudes in the Kenyan context. The scope of this paper does not include a prescription for a solution or the effects of these attitudes, specifically regarding to those negative elements that have emerged but perhaps in future research, this normative component will be pursued. Young people are also not ignorant of the practice of politics and show a high awareness of its nuances and realities. What then, are the implications of this?

Firstly, this work is relevant for any civic education initiatives. At the moment, there is no specific civic/citizenship education component in the Kenyan secondary school curriculum though there have been curriculum reviews conducted that have suggested that it needs to be introduced as a compulsory subject in secondary schools. Any such curriculum would benefit from this understanding of young people’s political attitudes in order to formulate it in a way that will encourage political engagement.
Secondly, this paper opens up opportunities for future research in children's political attitudes both in Kenya and the wider African context. With the opening up of greater democratic spaces, young people have the opportunities that perhaps their parents did not to actively engage in politics. Researching this phenomenon could provide greater insights into the future of democracy in Africa.
CONTESTED IDENTITY: THE AHMADIYYA COMMUNITY OF BANGLADESH

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Abstract

Ahmadiyya Muslims - or Ahmadis - of Bangladesh form part of a community that originated in the Punjab region under British India at the end of the 19th century, and is dispersed globally at present. Although influential quarters from among mainstream Muslim populations in many countries in the subcontinent and beyond refuse to accept them as Muslims, members of the Ahmadiyya community insist that they are true Muslims, and that they too are Sunnis in the sense of following Sunnah or the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad.
The beliefs and practices of the Ahmadis do in fact have close affinity with that of the mainstream Sunni Muslims in most respects, though there are also some differences that many orthodox religious leaders have been opposed to from the beginning. However, political persecution of the Ahmadis is a relatively recent phenomenon that cannot be solely explained in terms of differences of beliefs and practices. Instead, as I will argue in this paper in the context of Bangladesh, the social and political marginalization of the Ahmadiyyas, and growing demands to declare them to be 'non-Muslims', have to be understood in the context of wider trends operating at national, regional and global levels.

In Bangladesh, the Ahmadiyya Muslims (or 'Qadianis' as they are known more commonly, with derogatory connotations) presently constitute a highly marginalized religious community that is estimated to have some 100,000 followers. Organized attempts to have them officially declared to be 'non-Muslims' has been continuing in this country since the late 1980s. The quarters making such demands did not just stop at calling for state interference to declare the Ahmadiya a community as 'non-Muslim', but they also initiated organized campaigns of verbal attacks, social exclusion and even physical violence against the Ahmadis. Amidst a rising trend of such hostilities, the Ahmadiyya Muslims of Bangladesh have experienced multiple dimensions of identity crisis and marginalization at various levels, ranging from local communities to the state. Though the state has not declared the Ahmadiyya community to be 'non-Muslim' as demanded by some active elements from within the mainstream Sunni Muslim community of the country, law enforcement authorities have often been perceived as having acted in a biased manner against the embattled religious minority. In this context, in this paper the nature of marginality of the Ahmadiyya Muslims living in Bangladesh is examined in relation to the state, social processes of identity formation and marginalization, and other relevant factors. We begin with a brief overview of the relevant historical background, starting with the emergence of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community, and some of the major events that signalled a rise of hostilities towards the Ahmadis in the subcontinent generally, and in Bangladesh in particular. After this descriptive section, we try to analyze the rising tide of anti-Ahmadiyya socio political orchestrations in Bangladesh in relation to broader trends operating in Bangladesh and beyond. In this context, we pay special attention to how Bangladesh came to be increasingly perceived and represented as a 'Muslim' country, and the associated social and political ramifications that this process has had, particularly in terms of increasing marginalization of the Ahmadiyya community of the country.
A brief history of the Ahmadiyya Muslims in Bangladesh

The emergence of the Ahmadiyya community dates back to a messianic movement founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908), who was born in Qadian, a small town that is now situated inside the Indian state of Punjab. Available historical accounts (e.g. Khan 2015) suggest that this movement, which came to be known as Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat, was both revivalist and reformist in nature, at least in so far as conceived by its founder. However, some of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s prophetic claims proved to be controversial from the beginning not only from the point of view of orthodox Islamic scholars, but also from that of the adherents of other religions. In stating the nature of this controversy briefly, Khan (2015:1) writes:

Ahmadiyya Muslims believe that their community was founded by the second coming of Jesus Christ, who was sent to the world by God to reform society in advance of the final judgment. This belief has shaped the development of the Ahmadiyya movement and has framed questions of legitimacy surrounding its interpretations of Islam as it continues to spread throughout the world. The transnational scope of the movement today has enabled this controversy to have lasting repercussions for conceptions of Muslim identity worldwide by helping many Muslims delineate what contemporary Islam is not.

Having been founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in Ludhiana, India on March 23, 1889 through the allegiance of 40 followers who believed in the claims made by the revivalist leader, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat began to attract followers in other parts of the subcontinent as well, and is said to have some 10,000 branches or local communities of Ahmadiyyas around the globe in present. After the Ahmadiyyas were officially declared to be non-Muslims in Pakistan, its main leadership relocated to England, where the movement presently has its headquarters.

In what is Bangladesh today, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat began to attract a few followers by the first decade of the 1900s, and began to gain momentum by 1912 when a spiritual leader named Moulana Syed Muhammad Abdul Wahed, of Brahmanbaria, joined the movement. He initiated the formation of the first organization of Ahmadiyyas in this part of the subcontinent upon instructions from the center of the movement. At present, members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat of Bangladesh are
found in different parts of the country, including Dhaka and its outskirts, Brahmanbaria, Khulna, Shatkhira, and Panchagarh. Within Bangladesh, the headquarters of the community has been located in Dhaka since the 1950s. At present, the Ahmadiyya community of Bangladesh is reported to consist of 103 locally organized Jamaats, which carried out different activities of their communities under the leadership of local Amirs who are elected with approval from the leadership of the national Jamaat. The community also utilizes three age grade based organizations for males, and one organization for women, for carrying out different activities. Financially, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat relies on contributions from members who are said to donate one sixteenth of their incomes towards common funds, which are put to used for community affairs and for welfare of members if and as needed. As in other parts of the world, annual religious gatherings known as Salana Jalsa, organized both locally and centrally, constitute an important religious event for the Ahmadiyya community of Bangladesh. While central Salana Jalsas were organized in Brahmanbaria from 1917-1949, from 1950 onwards these events have been organized in Dhaka. However, in recent years, the Ahmadis of Bangladesh have faced obstacles in organizing these annual gatherings in different parts of the country.

In the subcontinent as a whole, although opposition to the Ahmadiyya movement was observed from the outset, organized acts of violence against its followers were not very common during the period of British colonial rule. However, after Pakistan was created on the basis of Muslim nationalism, notions about ‘proper’ Islam took on increasing political significance in the new state. It was in this context that in 1953, in the western wing of Pakistan, violent anti-Ahmadiyya riots broke out. Eventually, through a constitutional amendment undertaken in 1974, and a presidential ordinance in 1984, the Ahmadis were officially declared to be non-Muslim in Pakistan. In Bangladesh, however, organized hostilities towards the Ahmadis were rarely observed before the late 1980s. During the entire Pakistan period (1947-1971), only one single anti-Ahmadiyya incident, which took place in Brahmanbaria in 1963, is said to have been recorded in the eastern wing that would later emerge as independent Bangladesh (Hasan 2011:74). Following independence in 1971, the rise of anti-Ahmadiyya hostilities in Bangladesh mainly took place during the late 1980s, when developments at home as well as abroad influenced the turn of events within the country. We will describe and analyze these factors more fully in relevant sections below.
The changing nature of the state, religion in politics, and democracy in Bangladesh

One of the most populous countries of the world, Bangladesh is a nation with a Muslim majority population. According to the census of 2011 (GOB 2015), out of a total population of over 144 million, 90.4% of Bangladeshis were Muslim. However, at the time of independence in 1971, it was Bengali nationalism – as opposed to Muslim identity that was more important within the state of Pakistan – that had acted as a major driving force behind the emergence of Bangladesh as the new nation-state. Nonetheless, soon after independence, specifically during the period from 1975–1990, Islam re-emerged as an increasingly important factor in national politics of Bangladesh and as a defining feature of the state.

Some of the main reasons behind the turns of events noted above are relatively well-known: e.g. appealing to religion was a ploy by military regimes that sought legitimacy for their rules; and the main Islamist political party of the country, Jamaat-i-Islami, which had opposed the independence of Bangladesh, was able to regroup and gain increasing influence in national politics under new regimes since the second half of the 1970s (Naher 2011, Jahangir 1990, 2002). Here it may be mentioned that although secularism was adopted as one of the founding principles of the Bangladesh through its constitution of 1972, it had been dropped in 1977 and would not restored until 2010, when the Supreme Court of the country declared past measures to remove it illegal. However, when the constitution was amended with the re-insertion of secularism as one of the founding principles, the amended constitution also kept Islam as the state religion, which was adopted in 1988. This may be seen as an indication of a growing acceptance of the common tendency within Bangladesh and beyond to represent the country as a ‘Muslim’ country.

Now, the growing emphasis on the ‘Islamic’ dimension of the nation-state has had different consequences. To many, this is seen as going against the ‘secularist’ orientation of the state as many hoped for. To others, this amounted to political marginalization of the non-Muslim religious minorities of the country. However, the adoption of Islam as the state religion has also had the effect of bringing to the political center dominant voices and views that promote a rather homogenous conception of Islam, and in the process, has ended up marginalizing forms of Islam that are considered to be either not ‘proper’ or outside of the
‘mainstream’. It was in this context that groups that view the Ahmadiyya community to be heretics or non-Muslims came to raise their voices in national politics of Bangladesh. What was particularly disturbing was the fact that at one point, some Islamists parties that were part of a ruling coalition, were believed to be behind a violent campaign launched against the Ahmadiyya community.

It may be mentioned that among Bengali Muslims, the overwhelming majority may be classified as ‘Sunnis’. However, although there are some ‘Shia’ Muslims as well, unlike in some other parts of the world, the Shia-Sunni divide has rarely become a political issue in Bangladesh. For most Bengali Muslims, being ‘Suni’ and being ‘Muslim’ may be considered as more or less the same. However, as noted in passing earlier, the Ahmadis too seem themselves as being ‘real Sunnis’, in the sense of practicing the Islamic tradition founded by the prophet Muhammad.

Contrary to attempts to promote dominant and homogeneous conceptions of a certain kind of Islamic identity for the majority of Bangladeshis, we know that historically, following Islam or being Muslim has not meant adhering to any fixed set of beliefs and practices. This is as true for Bengali Muslims as in other parts of the world (Ahmed 1981, cf. Eaton 1993). In the history of the Bengal region, debates and arguments over different interpretations or strands of Islam may be observed in different times and contexts (as in terms of identities of Muslims of humble/local origins vs. Muslims of aristocratic/exogenous descent; Shia vs. Sunni, Bengali Muslim vs. non-Bengali Muslims). Considering such realities, we have to acknowledge that the meaning of Islam and of being a Muslim have not been the same to all or in different times, a fact that is still more or less true today. Thus the dichotomy between ‘mainstream’ (Sunni) Muslims and Ahmadiyya Muslims that came to be emphasized in Bangladesh in recent times need to be understood in the backdrop of the relevant historical background as well as contemporarily realities. In this regard, other forms of dichotomies – e.g. separation between religious and secular domains or conceptions – have to be taken into account as well.

On the question of the role of religion in politics and public life, it has been argued that conception of religion and politics as belonging to separate domains (private and public respectively) is a highly Western development, which emerged as part of the modernization project of the West. This is actually a form of cultural hegemony, the façade of which begins to break down once the state begins to take an open stance,
either directly or indirectly, on the question of particular sets of religious beliefs and practices (Asad 1993). In Bangladesh, according to the constitution, the state is bound to ensure the security of every citizen living within its borders, and on the other hand, every citizen has the right to follow their own religious beliefs and practices. Constitutionally, Bangladesh is a secular democracy where the Ahmadiyya Muslims too are free to believe in and practice a form of religion that they consider to be Islam. The government has a duty to protect this right of the members of the Ahmadiyya community. However, in the face of repeated calls by some quarters to have the Ahmadis to be declared as 'non-Muslims', even though no government has accommodated such demands yet, when the members of this community are told by law enforcement officials to refrain from observing certain rituals in the name of public safety, then we have to question whether the government or the state is performing its role as it should. Such questions become more inevitable in the context of tendencies such as already noted, when some Islamist parties that were part of the government in the past, were believed to have been part of the violent campaigns against the Ahmadiyya community in Bangladesh. The following observations, in particular, raised many questions:

- Passive and ineffective role of the law enforcement agencies during the attacks on Ahmadiyya mosques.
- After the eruption of violence, members of the Ahmadiyya community being advised to remain calm, and expression of 'sympathy' towards the sentiments of the majority.

Since organized campaigns to have the Ahmadiyya community to be declared as non-Muslim began around 1987, numerous incidents of violent attacks – leading to deaths, injuries and destruction of mosques and homes – also took place and governments under different regimes were found short of offering full support to Ahmadis that they are entitled as citizens of Bangladesh as well as in terms of their human rights. If we analyze various incidents of anti-Ahmadiyya attacks that have taken place over more than two decades since the late 1980s, we have to conclude that steps taken by law enforcement agencies under different governments did not suggest that the state was prepared to protect the religious freedoms and practices of all communities. On the question of the religious beliefs and practices of the Ahmadiyya community in particular, agencies of the state continued to send various signals.
indicating that they were not prepared to give equal considerations to the sentiments and sensibilities of all segments of the population, and that the biases and prejudices of the ‘majority’ mattered in law enforcement. In this context, the question of how far the state would go in upholding abstract ideas of equal rights for all citizens or human rights is a matter that remains to be tested on the ground. In reality, no country, not even a state that defines itself as a secular democracy, can fully ensure tolerance of all forms religious or other forms of diversity. In this context, the following observation made by Asad (2003:8) is pertinent:

A secular state does not guarantee tolerance; it puts into play different structures of ambition and fear. The law never seeks to eliminate violence since its objective is always to regulate violence.

Viewed from the kinds of perspectives indicated by the brief quote above, it becomes necessary to examine the theoretical frameworks that are implicit in the way matters such as the marginalization and persecution of the Ahmadis are commonly discussed. In this context, it may be noted that such matters are often addressed in the context of the discourse of human rights and equality of all citizens before the law. In such cases, the questions that are raised are usually of the following kind: “Are the Ahmadis being treated as equal with others in terms of human rights standards or their rights as citizens?” However, for us, it may be useful to take a deeper look at the matter by posing different questions such as the following: “Who decides that all citizens have equal rights and what is the nature and extent of the notion of ‘equal rights’?” Instead of treating the constitution as given, the second type of question helps us to examine the very language that is used in framing laws in liberal democracies, how citizens relate to notions of rights, and how such matters are related to wider issues of social inclusion/exclusion that are present in daily life practices (Das and Poole 2004:13). In examining the predicament faced by a minority group such as the Ahmadiyya community, it is important to look beyond what is written into the constitution, and how the state can strengthen its position by going beyond written laws and drawing upon inherent biases towards dominant or majority groups. As stated by Asad, “it is this alien authority and not the written rule itself that constitutes the law of the state” (quoted in Das and Poole 2004:287). In case of the Bangladesh, it is not difficult to see what Asad means by the ‘alien authority’ of the state. At any rate, as far as marginalized and embattled communities like the Ahmadiyya Jamaat are concerned, agencies of the state rely less on written laws, and more on the biases and wishes of dominant groups.
Anti-Ahmadiyya agitations: Broader trends in South Asia and beyond

When organized hostilities against the Ahmadiyya community in Bangladesh began to draw public attention in the late 1980s, one of the organizations found to be leading the campaign was the International Khatme Nabuwat Movement, which was affiliated with/inspired by a similarly named movement that emerged in Pakistan. It may be mentioned that since the period of British rule, two organizations that were at the forefront of the opposition to the Ahmadiyya movement in the subcontinent were Majlis-e Ahrar-e Islam (Ahrar in short) and Jamaat-e-Islami. Originally founded in British India by Syed Ata Ullah Shah Bukhari and Abu Ala Maududi respectively, both the organizations were originally opposed to the idea of Pakistan as a separate state for Indian Muslims, but when Pakistan was created, both the leader relocated to the new state. Despite some differences, both organizations were actively opposed to the Ahmadiyya community. In 1952, Maududi wrote a book on the 'Qadiani Problem' which was seen as having been a major source of an anti-Ahmadiyya campaign that eventually led to violent riots in 1953, bringing about martial law in Punjab at that time. Subsequently, a military tribunal sentenced Maududi to death, although this was not carried out in the end. Following the anti-Ahmadiyya riots of 1953, when Majlis-e Ahrar-e Islam was banned in 1954, some members of this organization regrouped under a newly named organization called Alami Majlis-e Tahaffuz-e-Khatm-e-Nubuwat to operate worldwide against the Ahmadis (cf. Khan 2015:152). This movement, along with political efforts of the Jamaat-i-Islami, led the government of Julfikar Ali Bhutto to declare the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaatasa 'non-Muslim' minority group through a constitutional amendment undertaken in 1974 (Saeed 2007). Later, General Ziaul Huq passed an ordinance in 1984, imposing further restrictions on the Ahmadiyya community’s self-identification and religious practice (for details, see Talbot 2005, Ali 2002 and Kaushik 1996).

In Pakistan, the political persecution of the Ahmadiyya community under active state support may be seen as part of a more general trend of appealing to ‘Islam’ by the rulers, including the military governments, to legitimate and consolidate their hold on power. Parallel developments may be observed in the context of Bangladesh, for example in having Islam declared, constitutionally, as the state religion in 1988 under the rule of General Ershad. It was also no coincidence that organizations such as the Khatme Nabuwat Movement became active since the late 1980s.
through anti-Ahmadiyya agitations in different parts of Bangladesh, and through calls to have the Ahmadiyya community of the country to be officially declared as non-Muslim.

In Bangladesh, the Khatme Nabwat movement began their activities in 1987 by voicing demands to have the Ahmadis declared as ‘Non-Muslims’, and through the forceful takeover of six Ahmadiyya mosques in Brahmanbaria during the same year. Later, in 1992, they organized attacks against Ahmadiyya community at a residential area in Khulna. It may be mentioned that it was the same year when there was a huge nation-wide outcry as a court ruling granted citizenship rights in Bangladesh to the leader of Jamaat-e-Islami Golam Azam. In that context, the rise of anti-Ahmadiyya hostilities within the country may be seen as an attempt by different Islamist groups, including the Khatme Nabuwat movement and possibly Jamaat-e-Islami as well, to assert themselves further in national politics. Against this backdrop, the followers of the Khatme Nabuwat movement carried out violent attacks against the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat at their headquarters in Dhaka on October 29, 1992, injuring some 35 Ahmadis, and burning down their library that contained 40,000 books. These acts of violence were discussed in the then National Parliament, but no firm action was taken by the government against the perpetrators.

The Khatme Nabuwat movement and other anti-Ahmadia forces of Bangladesh became quite active again around the years from 2003 – 2005, which fell under the period when a four party alliance which included the Jamaat-e-Islami was in power. Attacks on Ahmadiyya Muslims of Bangladesh carried out during this period included a conference in Dhaka in January 2003, when the Khatme Nabuwat movement reiterated their demand to have the Ahmadis declared as ‘Non-Muslims’. Violent attacks against Ahmadiyya mosques and members of the community were launched in Dhaka and in other parts of the country as well. In October 2003, two local leaders of the Ahmadiyya community in Jessore were killed as a result of violent attacks. It was alleged that a local leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami directed this attack. Then, in 2004, the government banned all the publications of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat by bowing the demands made by some of the alliance members or their affiliates. Then, in 2005, after attacks carried out against a local Ahmadiyya community and their mosques in Satkhira, a signboard with the following announcement (in Bangla) was hung in front of the targeted mosques:
This is a Qadiani place of worship. Do not enter here assuming that this is a Muslim mosque.

The rise of hostilities towards the Ahmadiyya community during the above-mentioned period helps one to understand the political environment of Bangladesh at that time. Of the two Islamist political parties that were part of the alliance government, one known as the Islamic Joint Alliance (led by Fazlul Huq Amini) was overtly active in anti-Ahmadiyya movements; as for the other party, namely Jamaat-e-Islami, which was part of the ruling alliance, its central leaders had claimed that they were not involved in anti-Ahmadiyya agitations, but their local leaders were often found to have been behind such activities either directly or indirectly. In any case, as a matter of strategy, it is important to note that in Pakistan, anti-Ahmadiyya campaigns proved to be useful in expanding the political base of the Jamaat-e-Islami. It is safe to assume that parties with similar historical roots or ideological orientations may have sought to pursue similar strategies in Bangladesh as well.

As a matter of fact, subsequent governments of Bangladesh did not prove to be proactive either in protecting the security and basic rights of the Ahmadiyya community of the country. Thus, during in 2007 when a caretaker government was in power, there was an order against holding of the annual Salana Jalsa of the Ahmadiyya Muslims on grounds of security threats. Later on, the same thing happened in two different places under a different government in 2010 and 2011 as well. In all such cases, organized anti-Ahmadiyya groups were often able to enlist the tacit approval, if not active support, of many officials as well as ordinary members of the mainstream Muslim community through active propaganda that sought to discredit the claim of the Ahmadiyya community to be ‘true’ Muslims. Instead, members of this embattled community were presented as dangerous ‘heretics’ who needed to be shunned socially as well. Given this, we review below some of the ways in which misconceptions about and dominant representations of the beliefs and practices of the Ahmadiyya Muslims were used to marginalize them in Bangladeshi society. However, before we turn to this topic, there are a couple of general observations about broader political trends that are worth noting here.

Hardening of political positions and collective identities by invoking dominant sets of religious beliefs and practices (or other areas of cultural differences) is actually part of broader trends going beyond communities of Muslims or countries in South Asia. The rise of xenophobia, including
Islamophobia, in various parts of the world, unresolved tensions between secular-religious dichotomy in different countries (e.g. in present day India), perceived failures of various forms of secularist ideas and nation-building projects, all are important contexts to keep in mind. Against this broader backdrop, one final point that may be noted about rising hostilities towards the Ahmadiyya community in Bangladesh is that on at least one occasion – in the form of a suicidal bomb attack on a Ahmadiyya mosque in Bagmara, Rajshai on December 25, 2015 – we have come across unverified claims about the involvement of the ‘ISIS’ as well. It is also worth noting that a suspected accomplice of the suicide bomber of Bagmara was later reported to have been killed in a ‘shootout’ with law enforcement personnel. Such incidents are part of a larger trend that has been on the rise in Bangladesh with respect to violence against a host of other targets in recent times (e.g. the killing ‘atheist bloggers’ and an LGBT activist, attacks against bauls, first ever attack on the Shia community on the eve of Ashura, not to mention numerous forms of attacks against religious and ethnic minorities of the country).

Beliefs and practices involved in the social marginalization of the Ahmadis

In terms of actual religious beliefs, one key area of opposition towards the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community by ‘mainstream’ Muslims relates to the question of whether the former accept the status of Prophet Muhammad as the last prophet, and the acceptability of the claims by the founder of the Ahmadiyya community, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, to be the Mahdi as prophesied within Islam and other religions. Some of these questions and the answers given to them are somewhat esoteric in nature, and are open to divergent interpretations for which ordinary Muslims usually look up to recognized scholars and religious leaders. In this context, while proponents of the Ahmadiyya community do not deny that there are some differences in matters of belief, they insist that they never question the authority and established status of the Prophet Muhammad, his fundamental teachings and the divine guidance revealed through him in the form of the Quraan. In this sense, they are keen to stress their own claim to be true Muslims (or ‘Sunnis’ for that matter).

Apart from divergent interpretations of some matters of Islamic religious beliefs – e.g. relating to matters of prophecy and some key concepts such as that of jihad – some of the differences between the Ahmadiyya community and mainstream Muslims of the subcontinent concerns matters
of religious practices that came to be accepted as part of Islamic tradition, e.g. customary practices relating to observance of Shab-e-Barat and rituals such as qulkhani and milaad. Religious leaders of the Ahmadiyya community dismiss many such practices as unnecessary and as mixtures of local customs with ‘real Islamic practices’. On the other hand, many religious scholars of the mainstream Sunni Muslim tradition consider these practices to be legal according to the Hadith. However, as an Alem of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat of Bangladesh claimed during discussion on this matter, nowadays many erudite scholars of the mainstream Sunni Muslim groups too are critical of many such practices.

Generally speaking, within the ‘mainstream’ Muslims in Bangladesh, who consider themselves to be Sunni, ordinary people as well as religious scholars expressed some commonly held views, such as the following, about the Ahmadiyya community:

- Ahmadis do not believe that Prophet Muhammad was the Last Prophet.
- Ahmadis say their prayers by facing a different direction than that used by other Muslims.
- The Ahmadiyya community lure its members with promises of benefits and privileges.
- Ahmadis watch television in their mosques.
- Ahmadis do not observe the Shab-e-Barat.

Our observations indicate that perceptions and representations such as those noted above are propagated actively as means of organizing propaganda and violent attacks against the Ahmadiyya community in Bangladesh. The effect of the campaign to portray the Ahmadis to be non-Muslim was highlighted to me through a personal encounter when a senior professor of Jahangirnagar University, upon reading a research report of mine on the Ahmadiyya community, asked me to recite “Tauba Astaghfirullah” (to beg forgiveness of God in acknowledgement of a sinful mistake) for having referred to the Ahmadiyya community as ‘Muslim’ in my report!

While a growing number of Bangladeshis seem to be prepared to accept the claim being propagated by organized groups that the Ahmadiyyas are ‘not really Muslims’, in reality the boundaries between Islam and non-Islam have never been very clear or fixed, particularly in the context of Bengali Muslims, as noted earlier. In revisiting this point, we may take
note of an anecdote shared by Huq (1999:15), who became curious upon finding a Bangla book (novel) written by a prominent Bengali Hindu writer in an Islamic book fair. When expressed her curiosity, the bookseller reportedly told her:

Yes, the author is a [Hindu]. But whatever he may be, he is not against Islam. I am sure you understand that there is a huge difference [between being labeled as a Muslim and following Islam]. A non-Muslim is not necessarily against Islam, whereas someone can turn against Islam despite being a Muslim. This author does not attack or belittle Islam in his book; rather, he depicts Islam respectfully in his work.

The attitude of tolerance, mutual respect and inclusiveness indicated in the above remarks of a bookseller is by no means uncommon in Bangladesh. However, for reasons including developments that we have touched upon, in recent decades more rigid views of what it means to be ‘proper’ Muslims, or to follow ‘true’ Islam, seem to have become increasingly common in Bangladeshi society. In this context, apart from facing mounting pressures from political groups, the members of the Ahmadiyya community in Bangladesh have experienced various forms of discrimination in social interactions with their colleagues and neighbors as well.

While religious minorities of all kinds may experience different degrees of exclusion or marginalization in everyday social interactions with the Muslim majority in Bangladesh, the experience of the Ahmadis are different in one respect. Because of relentless propaganda against them, many ordinary Muslims may not be sure of how to deal with someone if they come to know he or she is a Muslim. In case of a Hindu or a Christian, there are known or established boundaries across which all kinds of social transactions and interactions can take place. But an Ahmadiyya individual may pose the challenge as to whether he or she should be treated as ‘one of us’ or as representing the ‘other’. In the course of my research, I came across many accounts of the Ahmadiys of Bangladesh being treated as the latter by members of the ‘mainstream’ Bengal Muslim community. For example, during field work, we (I worked with a research assistant) came across a former bank official who told us that he was forced to leave his job at a bank for being an Ahmadiyya Muslim. His employer had not known this before, and told him, “I did not know this”, implying that he would not have been hired if his identity had
Contested Identity: The Ahmadiyya Community of Bangladesh

been known earlier. Our respondent wondered, “If there is no problem hiring a Hindu or a Christian, why should it be a problem to employ an Ahmadi?”

Although possibly an extreme case, the experience narrated above was not exceptional. Thus we came to know that an Ahmadiyya Muslim woman too lost her job because of her religious identity. Her story was narrated to us by colleagues who knew her. The woman under consideration worked as the principal of a kindergarten for many years, but was reportedly fired once her religious affiliation came to light. As in the previous story, the owners of the school did not know that the principal that they had hired was an Ahmadi. Some of her co-workers did know about this but the matter did not attract greater attention until her husband died. At that point, as the question of attending the deceased’s funeral came up, the principal’s identity as a Ahmadi became known to many more people. Reportedly she was tricked into leaving her job by first being given paid three months’ paid leave in an ostensible gesture of sympathy, but at the end of the period of her leave, she was asked not to return to her job!

Another woman (she worked at a school for the disabled) whom we met during the course of our fieldwork informed us that during the anti-Ahmadiyya agitations in 2003, she had to keep silent even after hearing many offensive remarks against members of her community. She added, “it was a terrible experience to have to live in constant fear by concealing one’s identity.” Another respondent, who worked as a school teacher in Narayanganj, told us that their family had to flee their ancestral village in Kishoreganj after his grandfather and along with a brother of his joined the Ahmadiyya Jamaat. The rest of his family now lives in Natore, Rajshahi, although he himself lives in Narayanganj with his wife. He told us that many of his friends distanced themselves for his family’s faith, and that it is difficult for them to live by having to conceal their Ahmadiyya identity.

From a student of Islamic Studies at a renowned public college in Dhaka, it was learned that he was humiliated upon expressing his disagreement over what he thought was misrepresentation of the Ahmadiyya community by a teacher in the classroom. After his reaction, the teacher asked him “Are you Qadiani?”, and when the student responded by saying that he was a Ahmadiyya Muslim, the teacher announced to the class, “All of you listen and keep in mind that he is a Qadiani!” The teacher made this remark deliberately, in a humiliating manner, with full knowledge of the
fact that the label ‘Qadiani’ is used in a derogatory manner for the Ahmadiyya community. The teacher’s remarks came as a silent provocation for his classmates and other teachers, many of whom began to maintain a distance in interactions with him.

The experiences of discrimination, social exclusion and different forms of persecution, as experienced by ordinary members of the Ahmadiyya community, are well captured in a documentary film titled “Muslims or Heretics?” made by Naeem Mohaiemen. In one part of this documentary, we come across a father’s confession that a fatwa had been issued to him to disown his son and kick him out of the house for joining the Ahmadiyya Jamaat. He was forced to oblige. But, afterwards, the father himself was not allowed to cultivate his own land! Different accounts of similar acts of discrimination, not to mention instances of more violent attacks, against the Ahmadiyya communities can be found in different newspaper reports published over the past two decades or so.

Based on various accounts that we have come across, it is clear that the Ahmadiyya community in Bangladesh have been subjected to rising levels of hostility not only politically, but in the context of everyday social interactions that used to be marked with greater degrees of tolerance and peaceful co-existence in the past. The level of increasing marginalization of the Ahmadis may have reinforced a greater degree of internal cohesion or solidarity among members of this community, but the possibility remains that experiences of discrimination may vary to some extent depending on factors such as class and gender. For example, Hasan (2011) has suggested that the effects of what he calls 'an unholy alliance of secular politics and religious extremism' has intensified the experiences of being 'doubly oppressed' by Ahmadiyya women of Bangladesh, a situation that is quite common in diverse contexts (cf. Gualtieri2004).

Conclusion

In an essay titled “Time for Intellectual Honesty: There Are Many Islams” (2001), Edward Said observes that in the post-9/11 world, the US tried to hide its material (geopolitical, economic) interests by invoking abstract ideas like terrorism and freedom, which were used to justify their unwanted interferences in several Muslim countries. In this context, perceptions and representations of Islam keep changing, and become a matter of contest. Apart from different faces of Islam that existed in the past, what is known or presented as Islam in the contemporary world
acquire seven newer dimensions under changing circumstances. In many ways, the contested identity of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, either in the context of its emergence in late nineteenth century Punjab, or in contemporary Bangladesh, may be viewed from the same perspectives as that of Said.

In this paper, we have seen that while the Ahmadiyya Muslim community faced opposition since its emergence as a religious movement under British rule, the nature and extent of hostilities towards them have not been the same in different times and places. In the territory that is now Bangladesh, the Ahmadiyya community has lived in relative peace since it took root from the early part of the 20th century. Even when their counterparts in Pakistan were subjected to vicious forms of persecution and were eventually declared to be non-Muslim, the same kind of hostilities were uncommon in Bangladesh until the 1980s. Nonetheless, there are several parallels and in fact historical as well as political links between developments in Pakistan, Bangladesh and elsewhere. Some of these parallels relate to the changing nature of the Bangladeshi state itself, a process that has to be understood in terms of political and economic forces operating at national, regional and global levels. At the same time, there are also social processes of exclusion and marginalization that have added new dimensions to the contested nature of what it means to be a Ahmadiyya Muslim in contemporary Bangladesh.
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RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT FROM 'INAPPROPRIATE ACTION' TO 'APPROPRIATE INACTION': A REFLECTION ON THE ROHINGYA CRISIS

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Abstract

The responsibility to protect (R2P) has been the subject of debate and discussion at different levels. Most of the critiques of R2P found in the literature have focused on its conceptual framework. This article traces the history of its conceptualization. While most of the critiques have not identified that the elements of atrocities committed against the Rohingya justified the application of R2P, the government's response to the community internationally has not given much weight to this. The document analyzes the case of the crisis of the Rohingya and examines whether the R2P was an effective tool to prevent such atrocities. The relevant analysis shows that the Myanmar government, in its official capacity, has accepted the concept of R2P. In contrast, it has been found that the东盟 has not been able to influence the action of the R2P on account of the fact that the issue of the Rohingya has not been raised at the heart of the conflict. This article concludes that the R2P is not a permanent and effective tool to protect human rights in the region.

The last few decades have seen a depressing history of mass atrocity. Preventing these crimes has always received attention from international community, but it has made a 'only modest progress' in stopping these atrocities. Although mass atrocity troubled human being since a long time, it is the genocide in Rwanda, which forced the international community to have a global consensus of developing...
some arrangements to stop atrocity crimes. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is one of these arrangements. It aims to create a normative obligation for states and international community to protect people from atrocity crimes.

Immediately after the unanimous adoption of R2P at the United Nations, this doctrine has been subject to debates and discussions in both national and international levels. It has been criticised mainly for its inappropriate interventions, very recently in Libya when on the other hand, it has also been scolded for its inaction in Syria. However, some global leaders and scholars see it as an important international mechanism for ending mass atrocity. R2P, it has been argued, has created a habit for the Security Council for protecting humans from atrocity crimes. Others, on the other hand, see it as a tool for new interventionism where weak states are posed with a threat of invasion by the stronger ones. From 2006 to 2011, Bellamy finds, out of the ten deadliest cases of anti-civilian violence, R2P was invoked in relation to seven and the Security Council acted on five cases.

After the controversial R2P implementation in Libya, many people have been anxious about the future of R2P and its acceptance to the wider community. Scholars like David Chandler become very critical of the role of R2P and claims that the attack on Libya was the 'first success for military intervention without responsibility'. According to him, even the bombing of Syria and Iraq is the conclusion of a process through which the R2P doctrine completely achieved its goal of facilitating military intervention to escape the legal and normative concerns of sovereignty and intervention and therefore, 'R2P is dead'. This anxiety of Chandler raises grave concerns about the future of R2P and still, there is no visible consensus among international actors on how R2P can be used to stop atrocity crimes in a legitimate way.

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4 Bellamy, 'Responsibility to Protect'.
6 Ibid.
Inappropriate application of R2P has generated a significant level of debates in both academia and international politics. But on the other side, the failure of international community in applying R2P in Syria raised same question and it is argued that R2P is not applied where it demands application. This context provokes a question: why R2P is not applied to a certain case where it seems an appropriate action and if it cannot act where it should do so, does it lose its relevance and validity in international humanitarian protection. To answer this question, this paper takes the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar as a case. It first, discusses what is R2P and how it envisions to stop atrocity crimes and then it analyses whether R2P is an international norm or not. It then goes on to explain the crimes committed against the Rohingya and finally why R2P cannot protect the Rohingya from these crimes. It argues that not only 'inappropriate action' but also 'appropriate inaction' damages credibility of a doctrine like R2P. It further notes that when the legitimacy of R2P has widely been questioned at the international and domestic level if the crisis like Rohingya remains unaddressed with R2P after so many pieces of evidences of atrocity crimes against them, the doctrine will face questions regarding its validity and legitimacy more seriously.

What is R2P and how it envisions stopping atrocity crimes?

R2P is often seen as one of the most significant innovations in human rights protection for decades. It challenged the impunity of states or heads of state for the atrocity crimes they commit towards their citizens. After observing the impact of Rwanda and Kosovo, then Secretary General Kofi Annan urged 'the member states to come up with a new consensus on the competing visions of national and popular sovereignty'. In response to this, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyed Axworthy set The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) introduced the term R2P to the wider audience. This R2P framework, according to the ICISS report, has three fundamental responsibilities: responsibility to

prevent, responsibility to protect and responsibility to rebuild.\textsuperscript{10} R2P 'establishes a normative link between sovereignty and human rights at a time when controversy has clouded the practice of humanitarian intervention'.\textsuperscript{11}

With the adoption of the R2P doctrine, all the UN members accept that each individual state has the primary responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. It sheds light on the responsibilities of the international community through the United Nations, 'to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity'.\textsuperscript{12} According to Bellamy 'the principle of R2P rests on three equally weighted and non-sequential pillars: (1) the primary responsibility of states to protect their own populations from the four crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, as well as from their incitement; (2) the international community’s responsibility to assist a state to fulfil its R2P; and (3) the international community’s responsibility to take timely and decisive action, in accordance with the UN Charter, in cases where the state has manifestly failed to protect its population from one or more of the four crimes'.\textsuperscript{13} Put another way, R2P ‘acknowledges that responsibility rests primarily with the state concerned; only if the state is unable or unwilling to fulfil this responsibility, or is itself the perpetrator, does it become the responsibility of others to act in its place'.\textsuperscript{14}

The ICISS report was presented and unanimously approved in the United Nations World Summit 2005. Since then, states, non-governmental organizations, and the international media have advocated for international action by invoking R2P in response in various crises including Darfur, Kenya, Burma, Sri Lanka, Cote d’Ivorie, and recently, Libya and

\textsuperscript{14} Thakur, ‘Outlook’, 328.
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Syria. But a body of evidence suggests that political leaders and humanitarian activists have strategically used the language of R2P to persuade others to undertake certain actions. Some advocates invoked R2P to mobilise political will to intervene in Darfur, in Myanmar, it was invoked for delivering humanitarian aid, in Kenya for pursuing the stepping back of the political leaders, in North Korea to urge the international community to undertake tougher action against Pyongyang. From 2006 to 2013, R2P has been invoked for 35 times in relation to human rights violation by states, UN offices, and NGOs. However, the recent status of R2P is quite static and after more than a decade, ‘R2P’s potential for preventing conflict and rights violations remains limited and oft-ignored’.

At a normative level, the R2P is a set of human rights standards transformed into international law under mandated within the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) aimed at preventing acts of genocide against ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority groups within any country in which these crimes may be committed. 2005 ushered in the commitment of all UN member-states to sign onto the Outcome Document of the 2005 United Nations World Summit suggesting that ‘a state carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement’ that the world at large ‘has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility’ and finally the international community also ‘has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes’.

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16 Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to Protect’.
19 Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to Protect’.
20 Ibid.
22 A/RES/60/1, 30.
importantly, ‘if a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations’. Referred to as the three pillars of R2P, these principles and norms have generated much controversy since their inception and the uses of R2P in international humanitarian intervention, particularly the most famous example of its use in Libya in 2011.

On a similarly broader level, the supranational institutionalization of humanitarian intervention embedded within UN treaties entails that if the state fails to live up to its responsibility to protect its citizens from the infringement on their basic human rights, the international community has a responsibility to intervene and protect them in the state’s place mandating some sort of action to protect vulnerable people. Nonetheless, this is not necessarily a call for what the 2009 Report of the General Secretary refers to as ‘a false choice between two extremes’ being the either standing by in the face of mounting civilian deaths or deploying coercive military force to protect the vulnerable and threatened populations. Other options do exist such as buffering state institutions and capacity building embedded within the second pillar. Unfortunately, as the same report admits, ‘if the political leadership of the State is determined to commit crimes and violations relating to the responsibility to protect, then assistance measures under pillar two would be of little use’. This brings us to the third pillar. What does R2P offer as protections for vulnerable groups against human rights violating states and sub-national groups short of military intervention after crimes are being committed or during the process in which these crimes are being carried out?

After the downfall of humanitarian intervention due to the vehement criticism by many, R2P evolved with a very promising note of stopping atrocity crimes and prevent the humanitarian crisis. It offered a framework for the legitimate actor to act upon but at the same time, it created an opportunity for the states and state heads to understand their responsibility to protect their citizens from atrocity crimes. Further, it also created a legitimate stake for the international community to support and intervene, at the last resort, in individual state’s territory to avoid massive humanitarian crisis. But to what extent, R2P has met that expectation is an unanswered question.

23 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 15.
R2P as a structural international norm

In international relations theory, norms are considered one of the fundamental bedrocks of the ways in which states interact with one another. Defined as ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’, norms are forged through a lengthy process before they can shape the terms of conduct in the international community. They are developed through shared history, social construction, culture, institutions, and sometimes they have developed arbitrarily. However, the norm of accepting fundamental human rights was embedded within the post-World War II global order under the leadership of the UN and articulated through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These norms, buttressed by international law, were accepted by all 48 signatory nations including major powers such as the United States, China, Great Britain, France, and even minor nation-states such as Myanmar then known as Burma.

Finnemore and Sikkink distinguish three stages in this cycle: norm emergence, norm cascade, and norm internalisation. At the emergence level, the norm entrepreneurs introduce and spread the concept to mobilise a critical mass of countries to endorse it. When the norm is endorsed, it leads to a norm cascade stage where countries try to spread it to the remaining countries. Norm cascading happens after it is institutionalised or goes through the procedures of international organisations. At the final stage, it gains a status when no one challenges its validity and compliance become automatic.

The extent to which R2P has been a norm has been the subject of various debates. Part of this relates to the differences in interpretation of norms. Different levels of understanding and interpretation among the concerned states and regional bodies underpin evolution of a norm. While it can be argued that the norm of R2P has emerged and cascaded in the United Nations, it remains contentious whether such norms have been practiced on the level of compliance. Bellamy claims that after ten years of its adoption in the General Assembly, R2P has become 'an established

27 Ibid., 887-917.
international norm’. With few exceptions, ‘states accept that they have committed to R2P and agree to the principle’s core elements’. Even the states who initially raised some concerns with this principle are now the supporters of it and they acknowledge the necessity of R2P in preventing mass atrocities.

On the other hand, Jason Ralph and James Souter, however, have taken a more modest assessment of R2P, suggesting that R2P is a normative inspiration, but not yet an international norm. ‘Norm building,’ as Cristina Badescu suggests, ‘requires a number of successful cases’. It is evident that R2P has not been able to have several successful cases rather it has been criticised significantly for its failure and therefore, it may seem unfair to label it as an international norm. Lack of confidence on R2P has inspired some states to come with the notion of Responsibility while Protecting. Moreover, R2P falls short in Keck and Sikkink’s final stage of compliance as the compliance to R2P has not been automatic rather the world is significantly divided on not only on applicability but also on the legitimacy of the concept. Further, it can be argued that even before the adoption of R2P, states and their citizens enter into a social contract where states are automatically obliged to protect their citizens and this sense of responsibility is inbuilt in the states’ behaviour. There is rarely any evidence that R2P has influenced this behaviour of states to be more conscious of protecting their population.

**Crime against the Rohingya**

The Rohingya constitute an ethnic, linguistic, and religious minority and have been subject to a long history of systematized persecution and destruction in Myanmar. They constitute 1 percent of the total

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31 Ibid.
population, and 4 percent of the Arakan state population of Myanmar. Nonetheless, some townships in the Northern Rakhine consist of 98 percent Rohingya peoples. They have been pushed by the wayside in the game of colonial and post-colonial politics and are stateless because of the history over which they have been victimized. However, the word ‘Rohingya’ is an ethno-religious term which means Muslim people whose ancestral home is in Arakan, Myanmar.

Evidence suggests that over the past few decades local and national groups within Myanmar have intentionally formulated, pursued, and executed national and state-level plans aimed at destroying the Rohingya people. Atrocities committed against them include various acts of violence including widespread socio-economic discrimination, destruction of property, systematic rape, and murder. Patterson notes in a report that there is no doubt that the plight of the Rohingya ranks among the very worst humanitarian situations today and without appropriate action, Rakhine State may come to be listed alongside Kosovo or Darfur. Zarni and Cowley also claim that the violence against Rohingya

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36 A. Habibollahi, H. McLean, and Y. Diker, Crimes Against Humanity: The Case of the Rohingya People in Burma (Ottawa: Norman Peterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 2013).
37 J. P. Leider, ‘Rohingya: The Name, the Movement, the Quest for Identity’, Nation Building in Myanmar (2014): 204-55.
42 Zarni and Cowley, ‘Slow-Burning Genocide’.
people is state sponsored and legalized in Myanmar. They argue that the Rohingya people in Myanmar are the victim of a slow burning genocide which is jointly carried out by the state itself and the nationalist Buddhists. While the applicability of the term ‘genocide’ continues to undergo debate, many scholars argue that the situation in Myanmar by definition can be called as genocide, ethnic cleansing, and also a crime against humanity as per the international law. Even, depriving a minority of its identity represent a step towards genocide. Zawacki notes that among the eleven acts listed in the Rome Statute, nine are somehow relevant to the situation with the Rohingya. There is little doubt about ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity against the Rohingya (specifically in 2012 and 2016, but is also ongoing) carried out by local mobs and sometimes with the help of the state apparatus according to a report conducted by Human Rights Watch. Additionally, a 2015 report conducted by a group from Yale Law School in conjunction with the NGO Fortify Rights found ‘strong evidence of intent to destroy the Rohingya group’ by local extremist Buddhist groups. Despite the acknowledging of the crimes committed against the Rohingya, so far, ‘the international community has been unwilling and unable to offer an effective solution to their predicament’. Strong evidence of targeted violence against the Rohingya minority has been significantly documented over the past years begs the question, why has the UN failed to intervene through an R2P mechanism in any major capacity to protect these people from systematic discrimination, rape, and murder? The newly elected government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) does not even acknowledge the term ‘Rohingya’ as an ethnic minority depriving them of rights like social welfare other ethnic minorities receive from the state. Recent crises and the extremism

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44 Zarni and Cowley, 'Slow-Burning Genocide'.
47 Zawacki, 'Defining'.
51 Pittaway, 'Rohingya Refugees', 83.
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propagated by some extremist Buddhist monks, most notably Ashin Wirathu, has exacerbated the problem adding a religious element to the ethnic conflict. Furthermore, other internal political dynamics are at play regarding the reasoning behind why no major actions at the international level have been implemented despite the international community’s knowledge of crimes against humanity being committed against the Rohingya minority. From the humanitarian ground, their statelessness and lack of recognition have made it very difficult to address their status and plight as refugees.\(^{52}\) And thus, the Rohingya crisis remains unaddressed both domestically and internationally.

**R2P for protecting Rohingya from atrocity crimes**

Several investigations and analyses have clearly signposted various human right violations of the Rohingya by the hands of the state and local groups for several decades but ‘this case has not yet been actively considered under the auspices of R2P’.\(^{53}\) Kingston finds the understanding of R2P as equivalent to military intervention as one of the major challenges for implementing R2P in Myanmar but it appears to be far more complex than that.\(^{54}\) Internally within Myanmar and externally within the Security Council, the R2P doctrine has yet to be considered despite the crimes against humanity and potential genocidal acts committed against the Rohingya community.\(^{55}\) These pieces of evidence offer a ground for discussing the applicability of R2P in protecting the Rohingya. The first resort of R2P is to make the state responsible for protecting its populations from four major crimes i.e. genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Afterward, R2P involves regional bodies or international community if that state cannot protect or is not willing to protect its populations from these crimes. Therefore, this case analysis of Rohingya first engages the Burmese government, it then goes to the regional body ASEAN and neighbouring countries and finally to the international community or eventually the UNSC.

Myanmar, as a state, is not properly oriented or prepared for R2P to be implemented internally. When it is true that the country is going through a transition and reconciliation among the ethnic groups, an ego-centric and nationalistic view of the common Buddhist people observe the Rohingya

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\(^{52}\) Cheung, ‘Migration Control’; Pittaway, ‘Rohingya Refugees’.

\(^{53}\) Kingston, ‘Protecting’, 1169.

\(^{54}\) Ibid., 1163-75.

\(^{55}\) Genser and Cotler (2012).
as a threat of Muslim invasion. With the gradual fall of the military junta and rise of the pro-democratic opposition party, the NLD, many observers such as human rights advocates were very hopeful—the new government would be much more accommodating or helpful to the plight of the Rohingya minority. However, the NLD’s de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, has been widely criticized for the way in which she has not greatly stepped up efforts to prevent the continued persecution of the minority group.

There are different opinions on why Suu Kyi is keeping silent on the issue. There is little doubt that she does not gain at all politically in a majority Buddhist country to speak up for a comparatively small minority group. Electorally, the NLD would face consequences down the road in future elections if Aung San Suu Kyi was too vocal of coming out against violence being committed by Buddhists against these Muslim minorities. The NLD would likely lose popularity among the majority Buddhist population for sticking up for this small group. Even after the election, she is less interested to displease the majority Buddhists of this country. Moreover, the military is still very powerful in the parliament and therefore retains the capacity to influence NLD policy significantly. Despite this or perhaps with these considerations in mind, her silence is quite a stain on her reputation as a champion of human rights. Her political calculations are, from a human rights perspective, highly disappointing considering her rise in Myanmar politics as a proponent for the universal dignity of all human beings.

The rise of egoistic Buddhist nationalism promoted by Ma Ba Tha has added another dimension to this crisis. This group could successfully mobilise mass people by infusing a fear of invasion by the others. The recent visit of Kofi Annan to Myanmar was protested by some people as

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they thought that was a threat to their sovereignty and it was foreign intervention to the country. By the name of protecting the race and religion from the perceived threat, Ma Ba Tha is instigating violence against the non-Buddhists especially Muslims. Not only in the Buddhist society, but also in the Burmese politics, monks play a crucial role and they 'have been considered the champions of not only moral order but also political affairs'.

The influence of Ma Ba Tha is perceived looking at their successful lobby for the passing of four laws popularly known as race and religion laws. Ma Ba Tha is thought to be an ally of the past military government and Ma Ba Tha leader Wirathu directly went against NLD during the election. Critiques thought that after the election, this group would be weakened. But except some criticism towards the hate speech of Wirathu, NLD government has done hardly anything significant to control or restrict them.

Therefore, domestically there is rarely any congenital environment which can indicate Burmese government’s willingness to act upon the issue with the principle of R2P. Further, the denial of the term ‘Rohingya’ by Suu Kyi and many others in Myanmar has made the situation more critical. When the Burmese government disowns the Rohingyas, protecting these people from atrocity crimes becomes irrelevant. Aung San also recognizes how coming out too greatly in favour of communal plurality would bruise her electorally and could put the NLD in a difficult position in upcoming elections. Such are the problems of democratic societies; democracies are often quite fragile to xenophobia combined with religious nationalism as can be seen throughout Europe and the United States in recent elections. Further, the Burmese government has denied access to the journalists, humanitarian workers and even humanitarian aid to the affected Rohingyas. These movements of Burmese government epitomise the absence of the core notions of R2P in Myanmar or within the government.

At the regional level, the Association of Southwest Asian Nations (ASEAN) is also not an appropriate platform which can invoke R2P. Although R2P has not been invoked in Southeast Asia, this region has been subject to wider discussion in regards to this doctrine because of the uniqueness of the regional body here. State sovereignty and non-interference are the

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strong norms preached within ASEAN mandates, the complexities of which R2P curtails to protect vulnerable minority groups subject to violent persecution like the Rohingya minority groups. It is argued that to gain traction in Southeast Asia, R2P needs to be compatible with regional norms, but it is not likely to happen considering the incompatibility between ASEAN's strict adherence to state sovereignty. Bellamy and Drummond argue that ASEAN governments are trying to accommodate both ASEAN and R2P norms in their practices but localisation of this global norm is crucial. The region is not prepared for the internalisation of R2P which, according to them, need to be “reconciled with the principle of non-interference and applied in a manner consistent with it”.

This issue is further taken by David Capie who takes a closer look at the Southeast Asian region to see how this global principle is being localised in this regional level. He explains that for two reasons R2P as a norm has not been localised here: the local actors are not driving R2P to make it institutionalised; rather it is the outsider agents who are the advocates and many states see R2P as a threat to their sovereignty and regime and that is why they are not willing to internalise the entire concept. Some of the states are only interested in dealing with the segments of R2P which are less threatening to their national interests and some of them view it as a threat to their sovereignty. The author also notes that unlike Africa or Latin America, none of the Southeast Asian Countries are willing or have decided to put R2P at the centre of their foreign policy. Kraft examined the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and found that the principle of AICHR is in contradiction with the notion of R2P. The Terms of Reference (TOR) of AICHR specifies the adherence of it to the principle of sovereignty, non-interference, consultation and consensus. It also focusses on human rights promotion rather than human


65 Bellamy and Beeson, ‘Responsibility to Protect’, 275.


67 Ibid.

rights protection. Similar scepticism has also been expressed by Caballero-Anthony.

While Malaysia and Indonesia, majority Muslim countries, have cried out against what they fear may be ethnic cleansing, other non-Muslim majority countries within ASEAN have not signalled nearly as much concern. Like many collective problems within international organizations, all parties seem to be interested in the Rohingya crisis being fixed, but the countries have a different level of understanding of both the crisis and the doctrine. This has caused discussion on a policy path forward within ASEAN to have virtually come to a standstill, but also because there is very little political will within Myanmar itself to alleviate human rights violations in their own country. Even sending international aid within proper permission when it is greatly needed such as after the disaster of the 2008 Cyclone Nargis which killed more than 100,000 people in Myanmar alone would be considered ‘humanitarian intervention’, a term that is now all but negative whenever it is used (Ibid., para. 1). Because ASEAN struggles to negotiate for humanitarian relief for natural disasters in Myanmar, it appears nearly impossible to implement R2P at even a regional level.

The position of R2P at international level is yet not very stable and it has got both legal and practical criticisms from different scholars and politicians. From the international law standpoint, R2P does not have a legislative status, it is not even equivalent to an international treaty, it does not have the status of legally binding norm. In practical terms, as some critiques claim, R2P can create an easily abused framework for Western intervention under the veil of humanitarian intervention which can advance ‘moral principles’ but not ‘selfish interest’. David Chandler and Mohammed Ayoob warns about deleterious impact of R2P. Hehir

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69 Ibid. 
73 Africa and Pretorius, ‘South Africa’. 
74 Pape, 45. 
argues that when R2P has quickly ‘pervaded political discourse’, it lacks substance and is little more than ‘slogan’.\textsuperscript{76} Since the nineties, humanitarian issues have played a historically unprecedented role in international politics and R2P is nothing different.\textsuperscript{77} It is also viewed as ‘blank cheque for intervention’.\textsuperscript{78} Due to these legal and practical limitations, R2P has not got appropriate traction both at national and international levels.

Apart from the weakness of R2P itself as an international principle, there are several other issues which stop international community to consider R2P for protecting Rohingya. Bellamy confesses that the action of the Security Council is highly ‘influenced by the contextual factors relating to the complexities of the situation at hand, relations between Council members and parties to the situation at hand, the availability of feasible policy options, expectations about the likely costs of various policy options, and the importance attached to the situation relative to other situations at the time’.\textsuperscript{79} The historical analysis implies that R2P cannot be applied to all in an objective way, rather the very criticism of selectivity of R2P lies in it and the geopolitical interest of the Security Council members or big international powers have the scope of defining the course of action in line with R2P. This limitation of R2P has also been noted by Ayoob.\textsuperscript{80} He notes that when people perceive that interventions are undertaken as selective basis and same criteria are not applied uniformly and universally in every case, such intervention loses credibility in the international system. Mamdani calls it an absence of ‘rule of law’.\textsuperscript{81} Ayoob argues that R2P excludes the possibility to intervene against the veto power holding countries or against their allies.\textsuperscript{82} According to him, because of the power disparity among the states, humanitarian intervention has a strong potential to be the tool of interference of the strong states in the issues of weaker states.

\textsuperscript{76} Hehir, ‘Permanence of Inconsistency’, 219.
\textsuperscript{78} Hehir, ‘Permanence of Inconsistency’, 223.
\textsuperscript{79} Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to Protect’, 235.
\textsuperscript{80} Ayoob, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’.
\textsuperscript{82} Ayoob, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’.
Some scholars have pointed out the Rohingya crisis and called for R2P to stop atrocity against them. For example, apart from Kingston,83 Alison McCormick notes it as an ideal case study for the application of R2P.84 The writer analysed the historical evidence of ethnic cleansing and atrocity in Myanmar and tried to fit R2P in this context. McCormick notes, ‘it is hard to imagine how forced displacement, burning villages, raping women, and systematically slaughtering thousands of Burmese people is not enough to apply the Responsibility to Protect’.85 Jeremy Sarkin and Marek Pietschmann and Katherine Southwick also find a similar situation of massive human rights violation in Myanmar and note that there is a significant ground for humanitarian intervention in Myanmar under the Genocide Convention, United Nations charter and customary International Law.86

From historical perspective, it is assumable that the international communities are more unlikely to agree upon R2P invocation in Myanmar. When the Western powers are very optimistic about the democratic opening up of the country, China and Russia have always supported Burmese government and blocked any initiative from the international community especially from the Security Council. Haacke presents a thorough analysis of Myanmar’s foreign affairs and the influence of other counties in its domestic affairs.87 The writer argues that Myanmar has significantly benefited from the development of its relationship with two giant nations China and India. At the UN General Assembly in 1990, Beijing prevented the adoption of first ever draft resolution on the human rights situation in Myanmar. This is how China became the ‘most trusted friend’ of Myanmar. The author finds that Myanmar has also developed defence relationship with Israel, Pakistan, and Singapore and has broadened its arm supply sources to India, North Korea, Serbia and Ukraine.

83 Kingston, ‘Protecting’.
85 Ibid., 139.
However, in the fall of 2015, the crisis finally entered a more mainstream discussion as it entered the minds of the world writ large when mainstream international media outlets, already focused on the refugee crisis in Europe, began paying attention to and reporting on the crisis and issues surrounding Rohingya fleeing Myanmar to neighbouring countries.\(^88\) It was reported that thousands of Rohingya on overcrowded boats would sail down the Siam Peninsula looking for any place or any country that would take them to Thailand, Malaysia and even as far south as Indonesia.\(^89\) For the most part, these countries’ governments implemented a policy of letting them land on their shores, but they could not stay. While some were given supplies such as food and water, others were simply shoed away being forced to disembark from their shores after only briefly being allowed onto shore, but not being able to enter the countries in which they landed (Ibid.).

Yet while the crisis gripped the minority group and communities across Southeast Asia, the UN, with the obligation of the international community to protect vulnerable minority groups, decided not to take a hard line against the recently formed government under the postulation that the country, now under the leadership of a democratic administration, would do something to curtail the violence. Unfortunately for those who thought SuuKyi would take a further democratic step towards pluralism proved wrong. Suu Kyi fell ominously silent on the topic of violence against the Rohingya and when probed further during a Channel 4 news interview when she suggested the issue of violence against the Rohingya was ‘very complex’, but then went on to assert that Buddhist extremists were attempting to paint her as sympathetic to the Muslim minority groups.\(^90\) So, the international community would not like for Myanmar to fall into renewed conflict as had been seen in violent government anti-democratic crackdowns in 1989 or 2007.

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Therefore, when it is true that predominant understanding of R2P as military intervention dismisses its applicability to the case of Rohingya, there are more dimensions which abstain international community from associating R2P for protecting Rohingya in Myanmar. When in a simplistic level, that the international community does not want to disrupt the process of democratization in Myanmar, its strategic alliances with powerful states has also subdued the crisis at international level.

Conclusion

Suu Kyi has taken two significant initiatives: she sat down with many ethnic group representatives at the Panglong Conference in Naypyitaw and invited Kofi Annan Foundation for an independent investigation in Rakhine state. However, these may seem to demonstrate her willingness of reuniting country with all its ethnic division. But unfortunately, none from the Rohingya community was invited to the Panglong Conference and the actions based on Kofi Annan’s recommendations will also highly reply on the goodwill of the government. Prior to this commission, Myanmar Foreign Minister WunnaMaungLwin also announced a separate inquiry by three government-appointed groups into the circumstances that led to the violence in Rakhine state but these could not bring a lasting solution to the simmering tensions between the Muslims and Buddhists in Rakhine state.91 These initiatives partly failed because the government does not have substantive plans to address the core issues of identity and citizenship crisis of the Rohingyas.92

Furthermore, Aung San’s electoral issues with the unpopularity of supporting minority rights in the country would put the NLD in a challenging position during the elections. Being supportive of the plurality is an unpopular position in the majority-Buddhist country, a country that also happens to be at the mercy of a particularly unique extreme Buddhist ideology. The UN and major pro-democratic international states recognize these internal political dynamics and would prefer not to take a hard-line stance against a government they see friendly to their pro-democratic values.

92 Ibid.
Furthermore, regional implementation of humanitarianism such as ASEAN leadership on these issues also seems to have fallen short for the Rohingya minority group. While some Muslim-majority countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia have voiced their concerns over the abuses of the Rohingya minority community, it can be concluded ASEAN is of little help to the Rohingya people in a similar manner that the UN is in relation to the implementation of an effective R2P campaign to alleviate the suffering of the Rohingya people.

At the international level, there is not much discussion of protecting the Rohingya from these atrocity crimes with R2P. It appears that Rohingya are victims of atrocity crimes and R2P can be an appropriate tool, as it promises, can stop these. But, because of the internal political issues and the recent democratization of Myanmar, the international community is more concerned with the democratic development and stabilisation in the country. In some way, the democratic transition and NLD empowerment overshadowed the Rohingya crisis. Therefore, protection of the Rohingya from atrocity crimes with R2P norm remains a far cry.

It is because of this that R2P has not been implemented in Myanmar and why this policy, while seemingly created to address exactly these problems, does not address how to protect minority groups subjected to violent discrimination in countries with friendly pro-democratic governments. In fact, this is one of the main criticisms of R2P; the policy has mostly been used as a legitimization for cracking down on unfriendly regimes or regimes in which major Western Powers wish to remove such as in Libya. While many R2P advocates vehemently deny this to be the case, Myanmar proves to be yet another example of why R2P and ‘humanitarian intervention’ is just another way to articulate ‘regime change’ against an unfriendly regime.

However, it appears that R2P remains far-reaching from the discussion of protecting the Rohingya either in domestic, regional or international level. R2P has severely been criticised as it was applied for some inappropriate situation and now it is facing challenges for not being able to act in some appropriate case like the Rohingya crisis. The ‘inappropriate action’ and the ‘appropriate inaction’ equally damage the doctrine. If R2P is preserved as a weapon to be used against some specific country and context, this important innovation for protecting human being will soon be irrelevant to the discussion of humanitarianism and protection of human being from atrocity crimes.
ROHINGYA REFUGEE EDUCATION, SOCIAL RELATIONS AND GOVERNMENTALITY IN BANGLADESH

Isaact I. Juktana

Abstract

Sur la base de mon travail de terrain ethnographique mené dans les camps de réfugiés Rohingya installés à Cox’s Bazar, au Bangladesh en 2016, cet article examine comment les réfugiés rohingya utilisent les réseaux sociaux avec les Bangladais pour accéder à l’enseignement général au-delà des camps de réfugiés. Il révèle de quelle manière le partage des réseaux de médias sociaux ne peut révéler leur identité de réfugiés afin de poursuivre leurs études, en raison de la stigmatisation. L’utiliser la notion de gouvernamentalité de Foucault pour expliquer les relations de conduite du gouvernement en interpellant l’éducation des rohingyas dans les institutions du Bangladesh.

In the last few years, scholars, media, and members of the international communities have expressed concern about Burmese rohingyas, one of the most persecuted communities in the world. Their frightening experience of persecution in Burma have forced many to leave their country and take refuge in neighboring Bangladesh. Burma’s refusal to recognize them as citizens and Bangladesh’s unwillingness to accept them as residents turn rohingyas into a stateless and unwanted population. Although the Bangladeshi government has officially banned rohingyas from remaining in the country permanently, a few of them are registered as temporary residents and housed in two government-run makeshift camps in Cox’s Bazar, the coastal district of the country located near the Bangladesh–Burma border. This article focuses on registered...
Rohingyas’ efforts to attain education in Bangladeshi mainstream institutions.

Unlike Kilis and Nizip camps for Syrian refugees in Turkey\(^1\) where comfort, cleanliness and impressive facilities have resulted in these camps being labeled “perfect,” significant concerns have been raised about the structural and functional aspects of government-run refugee camps in Bangladesh where lack of security, a minimum living standard, the risk of engaging into criminal activities and disease transmission are common. Because they are people without status—unidentified, undocumented and unrecognized by the state they are from—they are considered undeserving of education by the host country, and lack of education is one of the many contested issues registered Rohingyas are concerned about. While the Bangladeshi Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief on its website includes education as one of the “basic supports/services provided to the refugees,” it actually restricts Rohingyas’ access to education in Bangladesh. Because the government of Bangladesh has made provisions for registered Rohingyas education up to grade 7 only, there is no answer of the question, ‘What’s next’? My research findings show that after grade 7, the refugees are neither allowed to seek admission to mainstream education institutions outside the camps nor utilize their grade 7 completion certificate in the job market in Bangladesh. This restriction confirms that Rohingya refugees are unable to access a fundamental right—the right to education. The Bangladeshi government, UNHCR, and the international community have remained silent on the woefully inadequate education being provided for the Rohingyas inside the camps. Such silence hints at the power of the apparatuses of the government—the governmentality—which are used through discriminatory policies. These strategies and techniques, in Foucault’s word, keep a society or a community governable. According to Foucault, these “techniques of power” are essential “to observe, monitor, shape and control the behavior of individuals situated within a range of social and economic institutions such as the school, the factory and the prison”\(^2\).


For anyone, it is difficult to escape the apparatuses of the government in modern world. Because of their statelessness and vulnerability, it is even more difficult for Rohingyas to make their getaway. Yet many Rohingyas are desperate to pursue further education outside the camps and find their own way, but they must hide their refugee identity to accomplish this. This article reveals how Rohingya refugees establish networks with local Bangladeshi people and utilize these social relations to attain additional education beyond that what is available in refugee camps even while the Bangladeshi government is concerned about applying strategies and tactics to exclude Rohingyas from pursuing education in Bangladeshi institutions. It also addresses the question of how the stigmatization results in them not disclosing their identity as Rohingya refugees. Using a lens of governmentality, the article also addresses the Bangladesh government’s position on banning Rohingya’s education in mainstream institutions.

Rohingyas’ ability to establish social relations with Bangladeshi people for the purpose of acquiring education for their children not only demonstrates their networking skills but also their perspective of life—a determination to pursue education so that they can leave a life associated with the stereotypes of “stateless,” “illegal,” and “unwanted” for a stable and secure life.

This article is divided into five sections: 1) the methodology of the study, 2) an overview of the history of Rohingyas, 3) a description of the existing situation of education in registered camps in Bangladesh, 4) a conceptual framework of Foucault’s governmentality, and 5) a discussion of how Rohingya’s social relations with Bangladeshi citizens make their education in Bangladeshi institutions possible.

Methodology

While the main objective of my research was to explore how Rohingyas construct their identity amid statelessness, one of the key focus of my study was to examine how registered Rohingyas establish and utilize their social relations and networks with local people for their children’s access to Bangladeshi education institutions amid government restrictions. I undertook nine months of ethnographic fieldwork in two refugee camps in Bangladesh in 2016. These camps are located in Kutupalong at Ukhia and in Nayapara at Teknaf. Ukhia and Teknaf are sub-districts of Cox’s Bazar district in Bangladesh. I conducted thirty individual interviews and four focus group discussions (FGD) with Rohingya refugees eighteen years old and older. Sixteen males and fourteen females participated in the
individual interviews. I conducted two FGDs with men and two with women with a total of eighteen participants, nine men and nine women. Altogether, I had direct in-depth discussions with forty-eight participants while many others were involved with my study indirectly.

Some ethnographic studies have focused on younger generations and their education effort among the refugee population. Such as Vietnamese and Cambodian immigrant and refugee students’ understanding of their participation in a creative community service-learning experience, young refugees’ capabilities to manage their precarious and uncertain living conditions in Nairobi\(^3\), navigation of resettled Somali young refugees in a new country in relation to their social identities within the realm of sport in Australia\(^4\), examining the results of literacy and social development approach undertaken for the African refugee high school students based on small group tutoring by the secondary teacher education students in after-school homework centers in Australia\(^5\), and how the high school refugee students in Vietnamese central highlands navigate their identities\(^6\). However, none of these works focuses on refugees who have been in camps for a long time. Doing ethnography with vulnerable populations always requires special attention. In order to pay special attention to my work, I employed participant observation, an important technique of ethnography that “seeks to uncover, make accessible, and reveal the meanings (realities) people use to make sense out of their daily lives”\(^7\). Besides individual interviews and FGDs, participant observation was helpful for me to accomplish three activities: making access to the field, unearthing realities grounded in the everyday life, and describing what occurs.

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Who are Rohingyas?

Rohingyas have been historically excluded in their own country of Burma. Although there are controversies over the origin of Rohingya people, most scholars agree that Rohingyas are the descendants of Arab and Persian traders as well as the descendants of Indian and Bengali migrants who settled in the Arakan region (in present-day Burma) between the ninth and fifteenth centuries\(^8\). Today the use of the term “Rohingya” is offensive to the Burmese government. Both Burmese historians and politicians deny the existence of the term “Rohingya” ignoring multiple references of the wide spread use of the term long before they conquered Arakan. Available references suffice that the origin of the term “Rohingya” is rooted in Arakan. In fact, “Rohingya” is a phonological derivation of words like “Rakhanga”\(^9\); “Reng,” “Roung,” “Rossawn,” “Russawn,” “Rung”\(^10\) and others. Today’s stateless Muslim Rohingyas have been living in Burma as a native of Rohang, or Arakan, or Burma. Following passage provides a historical overview of Rohingyas in Arakan from 1784 until 1962\(^11\).

The Muslim kingdom of Arakan was occupied by the Burmese during 1784–1785. The first exodus of two-thirds of Muslim Arakanese into


neighboring Chittagong area (one of the regions of Bangladesh) happened in 1796 as a result of mass killing by the Burmese. Later, the British incorporated Arakan into its empire in 1885 and many Arakanese returned from Chittagong. However, “the British Empire in Burma created identities based on people’s religions and ethnicities, as evident through the creation of the census in 1872”\textsuperscript{12}. This census did not record people’s identity according to their birthplace, which created a greater division between local Burmese and other ethnicities in Burma. Another census conducted in 1891 by the British left the Arakanese outside of the count. During the Second World War, Japanese brutality, in collaboration with Rakhine Buddhists, Muslim massacre happened in Arakan in 1942. Burma’s independence in 1948 brought further suffering into the lives of Rohingyas as the Burmese government continued treating Rohingyas as illegal migrants denying them citizenship\textsuperscript{13}. After military junta sized power in Burma in 1962, violence against Rohingyas increased.

Finally, in order to exclude the Rohingyas, the Burmese military registered all of its citizens prior to a national census in 1977\textsuperscript{14}. This event caused extreme violence, widespread killings and rape, and 200,000 stateless Rohingyas were pushed to Bangladesh by the military authority of Burma in 1978\textsuperscript{15}. Because of consistent persecution in Burma, another major wave of Rohingyas refugees fled Burma from December 1991 to March 1992 when between 210,000 and 250,000 Rohingya fled from Burma to neighboring Bangladesh\textsuperscript{16}. Geographical proximity between the two countries has enabled Rohingyas’ easy access to Bangladesh. However, from the beginning, they were unwanted in Bangladesh.


\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.


There are debates on what served as the basis of a small number of Rohingya refugees being granted temporary residence, labelling them “registered,” while a large number of them remained unregistered. I shall clarify the definition of the terms “registered” and “unregistered”. Immediately after their arrival, “the Bangladesh government allowed the refugees to enter its territory and provided them shelter and relief”\textsuperscript{17}. Since then, they have been known as registered refugees. However, a forced repatriation took place during 1992–1994\textsuperscript{18}. But because of insurmountable violence against Rohingyas in Burma, a large number of them came back to Bangladesh despite the repatriation. These Rohingyas became and remain unregistered under the Bangladeshi government who formed their own camp beside the government-run registered camp in both locations. The registered camps receive support from the government, the UNHCR, and other national and international agencies. The unregistered camps receive nothing and yet manage to survive.

This article now moves on to discuss the existing education situation for registered Rohingyas in Bangladesh followed by a discussion of how they attain education in mainstream institutions.

**Education for registered Rohingyas in Bangladesh**

There is no law explicitly denying Rohingyas access to Bangladeshi schools, but it is implied because lacking proof of identity, they are ineligible to study in Bangladeshi schools.

The government of Bangladesh claims that registered Rohingya refugees are being provided the support needed to fulfil their educational basic needs\textsuperscript{19}. Education inside the camp is free, and is available up to grade 7. According to the government website, there are twenty-three schools in two camps, twenty-one elementary schools and two middle schools. I came up with similar findings in my research: eleven schools in Nayapara camp for 18,777 students and twelve schools in Kutupalong camp for 13,102


\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.

students. The NGO Save the Children used to fund Rohingya's education in the past. Now CODEC, a Bangladeshi NGO, finances it. The education program in the camp expanded gradually from 1992 to 2000.

In the past, most of the teachers were from among the registered Rohingyas but at present, as my research participants complained, the majority of the teachers are Bangladeshis. Many of my participants believe that this is due to the decision of the camp management which is strongly influenced by the decisions of local political leaders. Rohingyas are unhappy about having Bangladeshi teachers because it affects Rohingyas' employment inside the camp. Grade 7 is the highest level of education Rohingyas can acquire in the camps and their grade 7 completion certificate does not allow them to gain admission to mainstream schools in Bangladesh.

This tragic situation raises the question of what ways such a limited scope of education can fulfill one of the Rohingyas' basic needs: the right to education as claimed by the government of Bangladesh? The existing situation of education in the registered camp is, perhaps, one of the leading factors that forces Rohingyas to find alternative paths to acquiring education outside the camp. What shaped the strategies of the government to allow such limited scope of education for registered refugees? The following theoretical framework explains it.

**Governmentality: Delegitimization and the denial of the Right to Education**

Rohingyas' access to Bangladeshi education institutions is a story of denial and delegitimization. The denial of Rohingya's right to education is guided by the perspective of the Bangladesh government of considering Rohingyas as temporary residents. I choose governmentality as my conceptual framework as it explains the "conducts of conduct" of the government in excluding Rohingyas from education. By "conducts of conduct", Foucault indicates "a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons". Governmentality includes various forms of means and techniques to exercise power over people. Based on Foucault's theory of power, governmentality is considered as the

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dominant mode of power that asks how certain goals of the government can be achieved through certain ways.

For Foucault, power is neither a commodity nor a resource, rather it is “something that is exercised, not possessed”\(^{21}\). Depending on the broader historical context, different governments in different regimes use discourses and knowledge to hold and exercise power to control citizens in order to achieve the government’s specific goal. For instance, the government of Bangladesh recognizes equal rights of all children in its territory, however the legal instruments (such as its policies) of this state do not guarantee Rohingya children’s right to education. The Foucauldian model of power shows that the vulnerability of Rohingya children is usual, they deserve to be excluded from basic entitlements because they are not citizens, rather are stateless and temporary residents in Bangladesh. What goes unnoticed is they are made stateless and vulnerable by laws of Burma, not by the children themselves.

Foucault uses governmentality in both specific and general ways: “in a broader sense, governmentality is a heading for a project that examines the exercise of power in terms of the conduct of conduct”\(^{22}\). But Foucault is more concerned with the art and the practice of government rather than the government itself since governmentality applies a variety of apparatuses with a focus on power relations in different contexts. This is what Foucault calls techniques of government or arts of government. Since power and knowledge are the essential elements of the art of governance, people like Rohingya refugees are labelled as “powerless” and the dominance of governance determines these people’s fate. Foucault argues that power is cultivated through dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques and functioning, and thus policies are one of the powerful tactics in modern states.

Foucault uses “paradoxical phenomenon”\(^{23}\) to refer to the governmentality of the state. A state without any policies, laws or rule has no authority to exercise power. On the other hand, policies are used as tactics to recognize and/or deny people’s rights. The complex form of


power makes the governmentalization of the state paradoxical. Such paradoxical phenomenon is sometimes visible, sometimes hidden. The National Education Policy 2010 of Bangladesh is an example of this paradox. Its introduction says:

We cannot push the life of a learner into a path without a destination. We cannot allow any learner to drop out or get lost in the middle of her/his learning process until s/he has acquired the minimum level of skills or quality education.  

However, there are two kinds of “learners” in Bangladesh, which this statement does not acknowledge: a student in general and a student with Bangladeshi citizenship. The above statement uses the term to refer to the former but in actuality means the latter. This is demonstrated in the way Rohingya refugees are excluded from receiving “quality education” and not falling under the second category, that is, they are not Bangladeshi citizens. Drawing on Foucault’s governmentality, it is clear that Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are delegitimized and denied access to education in mainstream institutions. According to Foucault, a government formulates policies based on its own rationality and knowledge to govern others. Knowledge reinforces power and power produces knowledge. In this cyclical relationship, there is very little room for those who are governed to raise their voice and claim their access to fundamental human rights.

The government of Bangladesh states that The Bangladesh’s National Children Policy of 2011 “shall be applicable to all children—the citizen of Bangladesh without any discrimination”25. Therefore, according to the National Children Policy, Burmese Rohingya children, by virtue of their displacement, cannot be considered citizens of Bangladesh. The Citizenship Act of 1951 (amended in 2009) lists ten categories of citizenship of Bangladesh: 1) citizenship at the date of commencement of this Act, 2) citizenship by birth, 3) citizenship by descent, 4) citizenship by migration, 5) citizenship for persons migrating from the territories of

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Bangladesh, 6) citizenship of certain persons resident abroad, 7) citizenship by naturalization, 8) citizenship of minors through registration, 9) citizenship by registration to begin on date of registration, and 10) citizenship by incorporation of territory\textsuperscript{26}. None of them directly applies to Rohingya refugees because of their statelessness.

The power of government apparatuses is reflected in strategies and techniques. Interestingly while governments construct some strategies to control and/or govern a community or a society, sometimes they refrain themselves from signing certain conventions and treaties to remain in the safe position and continue governing the society. By being the non-signatories of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees, both countries' efforts in ignoring responsibilities of the Rohingyas is noticeable. In Burma, this paved the way for exploitation and violation of the rights of Rohingyas, denying their existence for many hundred years, and ultimately ethnic cleansing. The 1982 Citizenship Act of Burma that excludes Rohingyas is a powerful apparatus. For Bangladesh, its non-signatory status has made it easier to deny Rohingyas' fundamental rights. According to Human Rights Watch, although Bangladesh is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, it is a party to other treaties and conventions related to human rights, including the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)\textsuperscript{27}. Among them, Article 2 of the UNCRC establishes the obligation of states to ensure children's access to education regardless of their gender and ethnicity.

**States parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.**


Being a signatory of the UNCRC, Bangladesh is committed to protect the rights of all children within its territory. Despite living within its territory, Rohingya children do not fall under the category of “deserving” due to their parents’ statelessness. De-legitimization is the art of government here. I argue that Burmese Rohingya children, especially those who were born and raised in Bangladesh, should be considered full members of their host country, at least temporarily if not permanently, in order to pursue education in Bangladesh. In addition, category 7 in the above list – citizenship by naturalization – offers an option for making Rohingya children citizens: “the government may register any minor as a citizen of Bangladesh” (11.2). This supports Article 8 (2), Article 27 (1–4), and Article 28 (1) of the UNCRC, since all these articles reinforce a child’s right to social citizenship as well as access to education. Yet Rohingya refugees’ access to education in Bangladeshi schools is denied to them by the apparatuses of governmentality. Surprisingly, Rohingyas’ social relations and network with local people often help them to get out of this trap, albeit partially. In the following sections, I highlight how they accomplish this.

How Rohingyas make possible the education of their children

Establishing social relations and networks with Bangladeshi citizens is possible for Rohingyas because of three factors: similar physical appearances with Bangladeshis, similarities in dialect, and religious similarities. Rohingyas’ physical appearance and mannerisms are similar to that of local residents in Bangladesh, especially residents living in the south-eastern region. Similarities in appearance conveniently position Rohingyas to facilitate interaction with local people. Secondly, linguistic similarities play a key role in furthering the interaction established between Rohingyas and local Bangladeshi people. Except for the nuances of expression and tone and a few word-choice differences, it is difficult to distinguish dialectically between these two groups. Finally, religious similarity also advances social relations between Rohingyas and Bangladeshi. Both groups are Muslims, observe common rituals, and possess similar strong religious sentiments.

Despite the difficult circumstances in refugee camps, Rohingyas are informed about the necessity of education for their children. Because of the existing constraints of Rohingya’s education in Bangladeshi institutions, they engage local people for support and utilize their ability in forming social networks with local people to gain admission to Bangladeshi education institutions for their children. But how do they do it?
Parents’ aspirations for their children’s education

Most Rohingya parents living in registered camps think that their children’s situation will not be as bad as theirs if they (the children) are educated. Many of the Rohingyas I met during my fieldwork had little or no education. They were unaware that it is one of their fundamental human rights. Yet they were aware that it is an important element if they are to live with dignity. Their bitter experience in Burma has contributed in generating such awareness. Some of my participants informed me that the Burmese military shut down their schools, burned them, and destroyed books and education materials. This kind of action made it difficult, even impossible, for Rohingyas to enrol and continue their study in Burma even though they were interested in pursuing education.

Upon coming to Bangladesh, Rohingyas notice that the educational situation in Bangladesh is superior to that of Burma. Education is not interrupted, and schools are not destroyed by the military. Although education in Bangladesh is not interrupted as it is in Burma, how policies and regulations affect Rohingya’s access to education remains invisible until they attempt to enrol their children in Bangladeshi schools. In other words, the effect of Foucault’s governmentality is not always visible. At one point, they come up against the restrictions and obstacles in education. Knowing that they are in Bangladesh only temporarily, parents want to ensure their children have better options which is possible with adequate academic credentials. With such aspiration, enthusiastic Rohingya parents look for opportunities to utilize their social networks with Bangladeshi local people. The path is not easy but they are able to find the necessary connections.

In Bangladesh, a birth registration certificate, which is proof of national identity, is a prerequisite for school admission. This is a government issued document that certifies the name, date, and place of the birth of a child in Bangladesh. Because of the government’s ban on Rohingya’s stay, no Rohingya is eligible for a birth registration certificate even though most Rohingya youth were born in Bangladesh. Clearly, this is an example of government exercising power on a group of people to limit their access to services. According to Foucault, power can be so complex that it hardly allows people to question whether the legal apparatuses – the strategies and policies – legitimize or delegitimize the decision. In terms of the debate on whether Rohingya children born in Bangladesh can be called Bangladeshi by birth, the Bangladeshi government was undecided about issuing birth registration certificates to Rohingya children until another
wave of fresh Rohingya inflow in 2017. This, however, did not stop Rohingyas from searching for alternative routes for pursuing education in mainstream institutions.

**Establishing social relations and using false identity**

One of the strategies Rohingya parents use is negotiating with influential people, such as local elites and Union Parishad members/chairmen, in order to acquire a birth registration certificate for their children born in Bangladesh. This is not only done unofficially between Rohingyas and local elites, but it is also a guarded matter as it violates government regulations regarding Rohingya's admission to Bangladeshi schools. However, negotiation works. All the participants who undertook such negotiation were successful in obtaining birth registration certificates and gaining admission to Bangladeshi education institutions for their children.

The negotiation between Rohingyas and local elites does not happen overnight. Rohingya parents are often referred by other Rohingyas to a particular local elite, a community leader, or a local businessman under whom the referrer has worked as a laborer. Such working relationships create trust and a positive attitude towards each other, which encourages Rohingyas to ask for a favor to enhance the possibility of their children being admitted to a local school. Both parties know that Rohingyas' status in Bangladesh does not allow them to obtain government issued ID in a legal way. Hence, the entire matter depends on the goodwill of the local elite. The elites may be local businessmen, religious leaders, even political leaders, and school teachers. Once Rohingya parents are able to convince such a person about the importance of their child's education, they apply their own strategies to find out a way assisting the Rohingya. For instance, M7, a resident youth from Kutupalong camp, applied for a Bangladeshi ID card with the help of his Bangladeshi friend. He was born in Bangladesh and lives with his parents and siblings in the camp. During this research, he was doing his undergraduate in a local university as well as working as a teacher in the camp school. Although he completed his education in the local Bangladeshi school successfully, things erupted at the end of his high school studies. His name, along with others, was published in the local newspaper accusing them of enrolling in the mainstream institution. Local villagers marched to the school, enquired about the identity of all suspected students, and finally accused M7 of committing an illegal act by enrolling in the local school. According to the villagers, this was illegal because he was a son of a Rohingya. He defended himself against the allegation and claimed a Bangladeshi
identity. A local individual who was known to his family and whom he used to call uncle came forward and stood beside him. The individual assured the agitated crowd that it was his nephew. Thus, he saved the day for M7.

Rohingyas also need to use a local address in the admission application to prove their identity as Bangladeshi. I asked M7 which address he used in his applications:

Cox’s Bazar for both my current and permanent address. In fact, my friend’s father told me that he would help me in getting an ID card. So he let me use his address, and...he had a son who died long ago, so he told me that it would be done in his [the son] name.

He is a resident of Kutupalong refugee camp which is almost thirty-five kilometres from Cox’s Bazar, yet he used it as his current and permanent address. A camp address would never work for getting a Bangladeshi ID card, rather, it would jeopardize the entire process. Therefore, using a false name and address is the only option for Rohingyas to acquire a Bangladeshi ID needed to complete the admission application.

Clearly, social relations and networks override the implied restriction regarding Rohingyas’ education in Bangladeshi institutions. It is interesting to see how local Bangladeshi people support Rohingya refugees in their pursuit of education. M11, another Rohingya youth, confirmed that using a false name and address was helpful in pursuing education in Bangladeshi institutions, and that it was possible when Rohingyas had good relations with local people. M11 is a thirty-five-year-old male living in Kutupalong registered camp. He was born in Burma and came to Bangladesh in 1992 as a child with his parents; his family left everything behind. The school authority in Burma had forced him to adopt a Burmese name as no one was allowed admission into a Burmese school with a Rohingya name. The overall situation of exploitation forced his family to move to Bangladesh soon after he completed grade 4.

After coming from Burma, he got admitted to a local school in Bangladesh because there was no school in the camp at that time. His admission was possible with the help of local school teachers but in a secret manner. Initially, I had assumed that he had the required proof of Bangladeshi citizenship by that time. He explained:
M11: No, no, no, I used fake information. I did not use my actual name and address of this camp, because you know they won’t accept it. So I used a different name, different address like a village address.

Author: And you got your SSC [Secondary School Certificate] with your fake name?

M11: Yes, and continued to HSC [Higher Secondary Certificate] with the same fake name, I passed from Chittagong College.

Information provided to the school regarding his identity was false. He was not able to use his actual name and address because the school would not officially accept them. Therefore, he used a different name and a different local village address, completed his education at school. Following this, he was admitted into HSC in Chittagong. He used a false name throughout his academic career in Bangladesh. However, once his HSC was done he had to come back to the camp because at that time the camp authority imposed strict rules, forcing the residents to stay within the camp. He was also informed that a group of local villagers, camp residents, and a few staff of local NGOs working with refugees were working together to identify Rohingyas who lived outside the camp. This situation forced him to discontinue his studies and return to living inside the camp. In the meantime, he had taken preparation for a TOEFL exam as he planned to go abroad.

In Bangladesh, both SSC (high school final exam) and HSC (college final exam) are nationwide exams that take place once a year. Students sitting for these exams have to register with the government education board, submitting many pieces of ID including proof of a permanent address and nationality. As the information printed on one’s SSC or HSC certificate is unchangeable, M11 had to go through this process with false documents knowing that he would not be able to change his false name in the future. He was fortunate to enrol in Chittagong College, which is one of Bangladesh’s most renowned education institutions, established in 1869. It is located in the city of Chittagong, approximately two hundred kilometres away from M11’s camp, and offers secondary education, bachelor’s degrees, and master’s degrees. M11’s story indicates that registered Rohingya refugees are capable of being admitted to even reputed institutions using the strength of their networks with local Bangladeshi people.
Bribing: A helpful way

Along with social networks, bribing is often necessary to complete admission procedures in mainstream schools. Rohingya parents bribe local political leaders, school authorities, or local elites, which not only helps them to acquire a Bangladeshi ID for their children but also guarantees their admission to a local school, albeit with a false name. However, there is a risk for the institutions of being caught by law enforcement agency as the ID is false, therefore it is preserved with the institutions instead of the client as was the experience of F8, a young lady from one of the two camps. She was born in the camp, had completed her Dakhil (a degree that is considered equivalent to a high school final. It is the most important public examination of Madrasa Education Board in Bangladesh), and was now aiming to pursue her Alim (equivalent to college level education in Bangladesh that prepares one for the grade 12 level public examination of the Madrasa Education Board). She told me how she managed to acquire a birth registration certificate for her admission to a local madrasa, a religious education institution. But, the madrasa authority kept it. I asked whether she was aware of the amount her father had to pay for this. She said, “I…I don’t know, it was between the teacher and my father.”

F8’s cousins and some other students from another block of the same camp have had similar experiences—obtaining a birth registration certificate, gaining admission into local institutions, and leaving the certificate with the institution. Although bribing is considered “elderly people’s business” and is kept hidden from the younger ones, there are instances when such information is known to them. A similar experience was shared by M13, a Nayapara registered camp refugee who was born and brought up in the camp like many others. His narrative also indicates that negotiation sometimes requires the intervention of local middlemen with whom Rohingya parents have established a social network. In his words:

M13: My father had a good friend in the village, so he [the father] told him [the friend] about this, and the friend agreed to help my father. My father had to pay for it.
Author: Do you know how much was it?
M13: Um…my father…it was I think 2,000 taka28 or something like that.

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28 Approximately $30–35 CDN. However, this event took place six years ago, when the exchange rate was different than it is today.
Social networks among Rohingya and local people open the door to bribing, which can be vital in ensuring the enrolment of Rohingya youth in mainstream institutions in Bangladesh. Besides networking between parents and local people as well as between parents and local teachers, bribing also plays a role in making Rohingya children’s education possible in mainstream institutions. Since the camp school provides a completion certificate, I was curious to know how this document was used and whether it helped get Rohingya children admitted to mainstream schools without bribing. I asked M11, a camp school teacher, whether such certificates were useful for Rohingya students’ admission into the mainstream institutions. He disclosed the secret:

Um...not really, but bribing [the education institutions] may help....If an amount of 2,000 taka [approx. CAD $30–35] or something like that is paid [to the school], my students are allowed to enrol in the school

One should not naïvely assume that the camp administration is unaware of the strategies Rohingyas adopt to pursue education in Bangladeshi institutions. It is an open secret. The camp administration works under the direction and supervision of the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC), which is a wing of the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief. My research design did not allow me to dig into why, despite knowing that this bribing is taking place, the camp administration and the RRRC office remain silent. I was interested instead to know in what ways parents managed to not disclose their identity as refugees to overcome stigmatization.

It is all about disguising oneself and keeping safe

It is undoubtedly a big challenge for Rohingyas to balance friendships with local Bangladeshis and keeping their identity concealed. However, their experience of statelessness—in the paradox “of rights and rightlessness, of inclusion and exclusion”—has taught them how to deal with this challenge and conceal own identity.

As it turns out, everyone among the local community knows the actual identity of the Rohingya children, yet these children have to falsify their identity in the education system in order to legalize their status on paper.

This is not a choice for Rohingya. Rather, they are compelled to do so in order to advance their education. The participants who were successful in gaining admission to mainstream institutions were careful about their false identities. F8 admitted that to her teachers and Bangladeshi friends, she is identified as a Bangladeshi because if she discloses her real identity, they will not let her study in the school.

When establishing networks with local people, Rohingya parents use their true identity. But the younger generation, particularly those who attend Bangladeshi education institutions, maintain friendship with their Bangladeshi peers using a false identity. Within his Bangladeshi friend circle, M7 is known as a Bangladeshi and a resident from Coat Bazar.30 He has good relationship with his Bangladeshi friends, even with their families. He often visits friends' houses but never brings them to his house. How did he feel when he visited his Bangladeshi friends' house? His honest response:

I enjoyed it, they used to tell that they would come to my place someday, and I replied that okay, I would take you all someday. But I never brought them.

M7 believes that he is welcomed at his Bangladeshi friend's house because he passes himself off as a Bangladeshi. This double identity is why, as a Rohingya youth, he is cautious in maintaining a line to protect himself to avoid social stigma. He therefore never invites Bangladeshi friends to his camp. Rohingyas disclose their true identity to establish social relations with Bangladeshi people in order to benefit themselves, and they know when to hide it to serve a particular interest.

It is undeniable that despite the apparent similarities between local Bangladeshi and Rohingyas, the latter are sometimes treated by the former as illegal people, as they are stateless and have no proof of identity. Local villagers often accuse unregistered Rohingyas of occupying land and destroying the resources of Bangladesh. Such allegations are directed at registered Rohingya, too even though they are recognized and supported by the Bangladeshi government and UNHCR. On the one hand, Rohingyas are capable of maintaining social relations with Bangladeshi people because of linguistic, religious, and outward similarities between themselves and local Bangladeshi. On the other hand,

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30 Coat Bazar (Court Bazar) is one of the 139 villages in Ukhia upazila that takes more than an hour to get to by bus from Kutupalong camp.
the allegations instil a fear within Rohingyas of being stigmatized or even abused. This fear exists among the Rohingyas in spite of their having social ties with local people and makes them cautious about whether or not to disclose their true identity. Instead of protesting the discrimination they experience, they accept and cope with the situation they find themselves in. These are the lessons they have learned from their experience of statelessness, delegitimization, and persecution. Rohingyas parents pass this concern to the next generation so that they also learn not to challenge the existing system but to cope with it.

Are Rohingyas always able to maintain their double identity? And if not, what happens when their “disguise” is revealed? Being bullied or attacked by Bangladeshi children is more or less common for Rohingya students who attend local schools. But they prefer not to engage in arguments or fights with local youth even if they (Rohingyas) win the competition in the playground or excel in school. Protesting this kind of situation would invite a negative response, hence, keeping quiet or protecting oneself seems the best tactic. M7, when asked whether he was afraid that his Bangladeshi friends might not accept him if his actual identity was revealed, said:

Well, that’s one thing, but most importantly, it would create a problem for me in my college. I might be forced to withdraw, the administration won’t accept it....That’s why I maintained the same identity everywhere, be it with my friends or at my college.

M13 expressed similar sentiments regarding hiding his identity. Both M7 and M13 indicated that ensuring their safety was the most important. Being safe is preferable over winning an argument. Similarly, M13 believes in passivity as he never protests when Bangladeshi youths of his age attack him and engage in disputes or fight with him. His response to my question whether he fought back was immediate:

Oh no, we are from a different country, if I chase after them or do anything, they will hit me, no? We don’t even tell anyone in the school that we are from the camp, if we disclose it, we will be kicked out from the school.

In order to avoid stigmatization or being kicked out of the institution, Rohingyas resort to passivity. Social networks help Rohingyas gain
admission to Bangladeshi education institutions but their educational success is threatened when their Rohingya identity is revealed.

Conclusion

Using both a sociological and anthropological perspective, this article has demonstrated that stateless people may not know that they, as human beings, are eligible to claim and fulfil their basic rights. However, they are concerned about their well-being, and such concerns enable them to pursue ways to better their lives in spite of the discriminatory policies they are subjected to by the state that leave them with an unclear identity and uncertain legal status. States create uncertainty around one’s legal status and states exercise power to monitor, regulate and control people’s behaviour within the state as part of government rationality. The government apparatuses are useful tools of exercising power to delegitimize people’s right to education. Bangladesh considers it an illegal act for Rohingyas to acquire false identity documents in order to enrol in Bangladeshi education institutions. However, from a human rights perspective, it is clear that Rohingyas have the capacity to determine their own strategy in their pursuit of fulfilling their fundamental right to education by establishing relations with Bangladeshi people and negotiating with them for a false identity that allows them to obtain education in the face of their vulnerabilities and government restrictions. Rohingyas pursuing education in mainstream institutions in Bangladesh may not overthrow the apparatuses of the government, yet by using social networks they have learned how to navigate the strategies and techniques of governmentality and raise hopes in the midst of their statelessness.
CULTURAL POLICY AND THE HERITAGIZATION IN SENEGAL: FROM INSTITUTIONAL PRESCRIPTIONS TO THE RE-EVALUATION OF VALUES

Adam D. Seck

Abstract:

L'heritagisation des valeurs et des biens culturels, ou l'appropriation d'un objet patrimonial n'est jamais neutre, elles sont évoquées à partir d'enjeux culturels, identitaires, sociologiques ou politiques. Il semble qu'au Sénégal, les campagnes visant à édifier l'héritage et le développement du patrimoine culturel, initiées par l'État ou par les communautés, ont suivi les idéologies politiques et les préoccupations socio-économiques. Cet article tente d'examiner les mécanismes et le logique qui ont conduit l'institutionnalisation, la production du patrimoine culturel issu du registre officiel ou les entreprises en quête de références identitaires. L'analyse s'articule autour de l'État (colonial et post-indépendant) créant, restructurant et normalisant les souvenirs et les traditions historiques. Le début porte également sur les nouvelles imaginations et la récupération des valeurs identitaires - déployées dans le système public - et provoquent la réévaluation des systèmes politiques et socio-culturels ou les tentatives de réforme des valeurs.

Senegal has a diverse cultural heritage which is shown by its complex, heterogeneous and global character. This cultural heritage has considerably changed over time and in composition. Dynamics have been at work in this heritage, linked in particular to religious influences (Islam, Christianity), colonization, urban development, globalization and to socio-economic crises. Senegalese heritage contains a variety of historical monuments and sites, practices and know-how which, to some, go far back in the past. French colonization...
in particular has strongly marked the cultural structures and heritagization\(^1\) of Senegal's cultural heritage using the State. As in all former colonies, French became the official language and France spatial, sociocultural and judicial references became the norm. The introduction of these new concepts in Senegal triggered a process of heritagization on a vast scale and created a new identity from a colonial perspective. On the one hand, it formed a colonial memory, structured around strategic buildings and urban architecture in Senegal's colonial towns of Gorée, Saint Louis, Dakar and Rufisque (also known as the Four Communes, those held the same legal status as communes in metropolitan France). On the other hand, it stimulated scientific research in the field of colonial ethnography, the formation of ethnographical and archaeological collections, the creation of cultural institutions and legal provisions for the protection of cultural heritage. The history and legacy of the colonial period have been appropriated by the political authorities of the Senegalese post-independence state, following different logics and ideologies. For the construction of a nation-state identity, the leaders have drawn from the repertoire of symbols and emblematic values inherited from their ancestors and the black-African history. Their challenge was to incorporate the duality by the constructing and deconstructing of memories, legacy and identities of Senegal. This has provoked the amalgamation, reorganisation, and rehabilitation of different roots, as well as representations and historical memories. Through institutional decisions, cultural models, places, memories, symbols, traditions and values have been promoted as national, and indeed universal, cultural heritage. A serious economic crisis has shaken the country starting from the 1980s, provoking budget restrictions and structural adjustments imposed by the international financial institutions. The economic problems, the deterioration in the standards of living and morals values have resulted in the exploitation of cultural heritage by communities and political leaders. The staging of cultural heritage is rendered by constructing or re-appropriating glorious myths, and by reinventing or re-evaluating the acquired or imposed identity values. Many attempts have been made to reformulate the past and regain control over heritage. This has triggered a blossoming of identities and fragmented heritages. This study aims to analyze the evolution of the official cultural discourse in the operations of construction and heritagization of the colonial and post

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\(^1\) Heritagization refers to the processes by which heritage is constructed, heritagization is also a social or political process whose final outcome is the presentation and interpretation of heritage (Rogerio-Candelera, Lazzari and Cano, 2013: 388–389; Poria, 2010: 217–228).
independent memories and identities. This dissertation also sheds light on new efforts to reclaim and redefine heritage and cultural expressions of identity.

**Composition of colonial references and heritage status**

The French colonial authorities imposed a strategy of territorial and humanistic exploitation, while using cultural (civilizing mission) and economic progress as an excuse. Spatial and socio-historic restructuring, as well as the cultural values and other imported models of reference were transferred to Senegal from France. Indeed, the imperialist aims and the functioning needs of the colonial bureaucracy led to the introduction of new references of identity across historical, memorial, institutional, spatial and sociocultural lines. Amongst these imported ideas, was the Western and Eurocentric concept of heritage. However, before the introduction of the French culture and ideology, it was necessary to implement an important mechanism which enabled them to impose and consolidate their colonial power. The foundation of Senegal as a colony from 1816 (Mbaye, 1991: 5–32) was preceded by the instigation of a series of strategic measures that aimed to facilitate the territorial conquest and profitable exploitation of the colony, its protection and expansion. By creating military fortifications (forts, military posts and watchtowers) and salvaging the architectural heritage, constructed during the Atlantic trade period, the colonial authorities tried to achieve this goal. After the creation of strategic military bases came the urban developments, notably in the coastal towns of Gorée, Saint-Louis, Dakar and Rufisque. In addition to creating a new urban structure, these projects provided to the colonial towns a development plan and architectural forms (Sinou, 1993). They introduced new representations of identity construction and memory, new codes of recognition and exclusion. The colonial developments created memorial signs: for example the naming of streets and urban squares, the building of monuments commemorating important people or events. The new architectural constructions and the spatial organisation influenced the transformation of community relations and the formation of new identity barriers within the traditional social networks. The colonial urbanisation (inspired by European towns) introduced boundaries within the urban communities, and a distinction between solid buildings and straw dwellings, residential quarters and shanty towns. This process contributed to the emergence of a citizenship sentiment, within the Four Communes of Senegal (for more on this subject see, for example, Johnson [1971] and Jones [2013]), and introduced
segregation at the heart of the colonised population (French citizens and French subjects).

This resulted in the establishment of an urban society, achieving the cultural aims of colonial rule through the institutions, spatial organisation, architectural creations and urban infrastructures. The architectural monuments produced by the colonial occupation were subsequently identified as part of the heritage and historic memory which merited conservation. With the passing of time and the adoption of statutory texts\(^2\) for the protection of heritage in the France's overseas territories, certain colonial architectural sites were ranked on a list of natural monuments and historical sites in French West Africa. They were considered to be heritage because they testified to a colonial memory. Thus, the Gorée Island was declared an historical island and classified by decree no. 2272 from the 15th of November 1944\(^3\). The heritagization of Gorée was significant because the island is symbolic and full of memories for the colonial power. The site was the object of interest of several Europeans (Portugal, Holland, England and France) but the French succeeded in consolidating their power. The Commission des Monuments Historiques et des Arts Indigènes (Commission for Historical Monuments and Indigenous Arts of the French West Africa) proposed other colonial monuments, archaeological sites, as well as symbolic places of the Lebu community of Dakar\(^4\) (sacred trees and meeting places of dignitaries from the first Lebu village of Dakar) for classification on the official list\(^5\). One

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\(^2\) For example the decree of 25 August 1937 for the protection of natural monuments and historic sites, which have scientific, legendary or picturesque characters and found in the colonies, protectorates and mandated territories governed by the Ministry of Colonies, stretches the protection of monumental heritage in French West Africa. The metropolitan law of 27 September 1941 concerning the regulation of archeological excavations was extended in French West Africa by the decree of 25 January 1944 concerning the classification of historic objects and the regulation of archeological excavations. See Journal Officiel de l’Afrique Occidentale Française no.1744, 16 October 1937, pp. 1063–1065; Journal Officiel de l’Afrique Occidentale Française no.2166, 2 June 1945, pp. 402–405.

\(^3\) Journal Officiel de l’Afrique Occidentale Française, 9 December 1944, 834.

\(^4\) The relations between the Lebu community of Dakar and the colonial government were marked by incessant confrontations and settlements pertaining to the land ownership of the Cap Vert Peninsula off the coast of Dakar. The official heritagization of certain places, where the memories were taken over and kept alive by the Lebu community, seems to be a part of the attempt at appeasement in the relations between the colonial authorities and the Lebu dignitaries.

\(^5\) See Letter by Monod, Theordore (no.580/IFAN) addressed to the Director of Political, Administrative and Social Affairs for the French Government, dated the 26th of February 1947. Senegal Archives O625(31).
exemple is the house of the chevalier Stanislas Jean de Boufflers located in Gorée. The watchtower of Dialakhar, a small fort located approximately 40km southeast of Saint-Louis, was also proposed for classification. This fortified tower was built in 1856 on the orders of Faidherbe, governor of Senegal, to protect Saint-Louis against attacks by the indigenous rulers of the Walo, Fouta, Cayor and especially those incessant attacks by the King Moors of Trarza Mohammed-el Habib and his son Ely (resulting from the marriage with the princess Guimbotte), heir to the Wolof kingdom of Walo.

The colonial administrative needs led the government to introduce a policy of get acquainted with the indigenous societies. This policy depended on collecting the oral and historical traditions that was the cultural heritage of the submissive population. Knowledge of their languages, customs, habits, and indigenous traditions aimed to satisfy their intellectual curiosity. This knowledge was used to implement a lasting and efficient management from the colonial power. It is within this framework that the army and the colonial administration distinguished themselves with the research and publication of studies dedicated to the ethnography and local history. The oral traditions were recorded, translated into French, written down in manuscripts and made public in renowned scientific reviews. This represented a new form of heritagization of the oral and historical traditions of different ethno-linguistic groups, which were written down and archived to create a colonial memory to be preserved for ethnographic and administrative needs. Because these oral traditions were changing, owing to the dominant position held of the written used by the new power (notably in the administration and education sectors) and especially because of the profound dynamics of the indigenous societies, they were affected by colonial references and values. The majority of researchers from the IFAN

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6 Boufflers was a naval officer, renowned novelist and poet; he arrived in Saint-Louis as governor of Senegal on 21 January 1786. Boufflers stayed in Saint-Louis for a few months and then left for Gorée, where he established the new capital of the colony of Senegal. During his governorship in Senegal (from 1785 to 1787) he corresponded regularly with his French lover and future wife, Anne de Sabran. Signare Anne Pépin became Boufflers's companion while he lived in Gorée. See Bouteiller, 1995 and Delcourt, 1984.

7 Faidherbe served as governor of Senegal in two terms, from 1854 to 1861 and from 1863 to 1865. See Brunel, 1892 and Coursier, 1989.

8 The Moniteur du Sénégal et Dépendances (the official newspaper published by the administration), the Revue d'Ethnographie, the Bulletin de l'Enseignement de l'Afrique Occidentale, the Bulletin du Comité d'Etudes Historiques et Scientifiques de l'AOF, the Bulletin de l'IFAN, the Notes Africaines.
Cultural Policy and the Heritagization in Senegal

(Institut Français d’Afrique Noire/ African Institute of Basic research)—particularly, Théodore Monod, Raymond Mauny, Charles and Vincent Monteil—and French officials, such as Faidherbe, Binger, Gaden, Delafosse, Houdas and Clozel, contributed greatly to the pioneering operation of heritagization of the African oral sources. Their work constituted indisputable sources for historical, sociological and cultural research in Senegal. The Dakar IFAN had the privilege of preserving a collection of manuscripts written or recorded, collected by the French administration and their collaborators. These included the collections of Brévié, Figaret, Vieillard and Kamara (Diallo, 1966).

The wars for territorial conquest and the need for knowledge about the indigenous societies instigated the collection of ethnographical and archaeological objects from Senegal. The colonial army and administration built up a private collection of objects for domestic use, emblems of power, finery and weaponry belonging to the local warriors and aristocrats (Dembélé, 2001: 108–135; Mbaye, 1995: 41–43). The distinguished collections by Louis Faidherbe (engineering officer), have been preserved and can be seen at the Muséum d’Histoire Naturelle (Natural History Museum) in Lille. There are also the collections of Cyprien Monborgne, Reichenberg and Archinard. These are preserved at the Museum in Le Havre and the Musée de l’Homme (Museum of Man) in Paris, whose collections from outside of Europe were transferred to the Quai Branly Museum (opened in Paris in 2006). These different collections compiled by French officials and transferred to metropolitan museums (which reinforced the African collections in French museums) testify of a patrimonial perception towards the collected objects. Archaeological and ethnographical Senegalese objects have been critically reviewed on their heritagization and conservation methods, in reference to the history, civilisation and arts. Subsequently, the official missions have multiplied to collect relics and ethnographical objects in the French West Africa. These missions were organised within the framework of colonial or World Fairs and initiatives to create museum laboratories in France and in the

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9 The Scientific Missions of Henri Labouret (1932–1936), of Lhote (1933–1941), of Georges Waterlot (1935–1937), as well as those of Marcel Griaule (1931-1933), can be cited among others, as having instigated the important collections of Senegalese and French-speaking African cultural heritage. See Senegal Archives, O604(31). Voyages et missions scientifiques (Travels and scientific missions), 1932–1942.

10 In France, many national and global exhibitions were organised in Paris (in 1855, 1867, 1878, 1895, 1889, 1900, 1907), in Lyon (in 1894, 1914), in Marseilles (in 1906, 1922), and the most successful was the 1931 Colonial Exhibition which was held in Paris (see, e.g., David [2006: 44–51] on this subject).
The colonial policy created in Senegal a new culture of identification, the production and management of cultural heritage. This new way of heritagization was implemented by the collection, preservation and formalisation of certain formal and symbolic signs of local culture. The new concept generated a growth of the heritage field in this country, but also put in place institutional and statutory devices for the preservation of cultural goods. This patrimonial perception imported by the coloniser introduced new elements, those of getting to know the archaeological sites and objects, the architectural monuments, the archives and the museums. This form of composition and preservation of cultural heritage was assimilated by the leaders of the postcolonial nation in their strategies of building a new national identity and of reaffirming the ancestral values marginalised by colonization. The blooming of local identities within the process of national development. The government of the young republic of Senegal, led by President Léopold Sédar Senghor (see, for example, Vaillant [1990] for the biography of Léopold Sédar Senghor), undertook quickly the blooming of local and African values in order to build and demonstrate the national identity. The first president, Léopold Sédar Senghor, sought to establish the postcolonial nation on new foundations by using traditional frameworks of identity and advocating national unity in spite of linguistic, cultural, social and religious diversity. The building of the nation state, upheld by the notion of negritude, had as its basis the rehabilitation of the inherited ancestral values of the African past (Mbengue, 1973). The new emblems of the young Republic were created from the local identities and memories promoted in the national heritage, notably the flag, the national anthem and youth hymn, the decoration (Ordre National du Lion), the seals and mottoes. These emblems symbolise the Sahel-Sudanese savannah and the African mythology (the colours, the lion and the baobab), all the while praising the heroes of the colonial resistance. These figureheads are institutionalised and constantly remembered in the symbols and mottoes of local identities.

In 1863, Louis Faidherbe created the Musée industriel, ethnographique et d'histoire naturelle (an Industrial, Ethnographic and Natural History Museum) in Saint-Louis (Senegal). With the disappearance of this first museum of Saint-Louis, the funds were transferred to Dakar in 1869, under the name of Dakar Museum. These collections were integrated into the institute for scientific research named the African Institute of Basic research (Institut Français d'Afrique Noire, IFAN), created in 1936 in Dakar. They were subsequently enriched by vast collections coming from the different colonies of AOF and AEF; temporary exhibitions were regularly organised. In 1954, the Musée historique de l'Afrique Occidentale Française (Historical Museum of French West Africa) was inaugurated in Gorée. Furthermore, a new ethnological museum named Musée Michel Adanson was opened in Saint-Louis in 1956.
Senegal. They are vital identity indicators to affirming the grandeur of the nation and their virtues were perceived as references that can help to realize the dream of developing the country. At the same time, the authorities started collecting, preserving and promoting cultural and artistic forms of expression from the different linguistic communities in the country. Simultaneously, they were led by initiatives to define a coherent policy on promoting national languages. The independent State also benefited from the colonial legacy within the cultural, administrative, and institutional infrastructure and intellectual domain. The ruling elite endorsed the different forms of cultural development, and so the methods of heritagization and the arguments for classification on the historical monuments list were established by the colonial authorities. In 1975, the Senegalese State classified forty eight historical sites and monuments on the national monuments list. In 1978, UNESCO classified the Gorée.

12 The jom, the ngor, the muñ, the kersa and the teranga (these Wolof terms meaning respectively courage, honour, patience, dignity and hospitality) are the virtues which constitute the collective, moral philosophy and are still the pride of the Senegalese. In fact, in the collective memories, the exploits of the resistance against the colonization exalted the morals of warfare and the virtues, fundamentally essential to the Senegalese identity and nationalism.

13 It is within this framework that the following institutions were created: the Archives Culturelles du Sénégal (Cultural Archives of Senegal) in 1967; Centre de Linguistique Appliquée de Dakar (the Applied Linguistic Centre of Dakar) in 1963; the Direction de l'Alphabétisation (the Directorate for Teaching Literacy) in 1970; Centre d'Études des Civilisations (Centre for Civilisation Studies) in 1970; Laboratoire des littératures et civilisations de l'IFAN (the Research Centre for Literature and Civilisations of IFAN) in 1975; Ensemble lyrique traditionnel and Ensemble national de ballets (the Traditional Lyrical Ensemble and the Traditional Ballet Ensemble) La Linguère and Sira Badral in 1961.

14 Six languages—Wolof, Pulaar, Seereer, Joola, Manding, Soninke—were promoted to the level of national languages by the presidential decree no.71–566 from the 21st of May 1971. The codification of these languages was consolidated and they developed an alphabet using Latin letters. Some of these languages were taught at educational establishments.

15 Following the work initiated during the colonization, the Directorate of Historical Heritage and Ethnography (Direction du Patrimoine Historique et Ethnographique, DPHE) set about taking censuses of the historical sites and monuments in Senegal. At the conclusion of these censuses, two new laws were written governing cultural heritage (repealing the Colonial Law no.56–1106 from the 3rd of November 1956). These include law no.71–12 from the 25th of January 1971, attributing to the regime historical monuments and those of excavations and discoveries; and the Decree of Implementation no.73–746 from the 8th of August 1973, which allows an inscription on the national list according to historical, scientific, legendary or scenic interest. The Ministerial Decree no.12619 MC-DPN-DSMH-BE dated the 15th of October 1975 published a list of fortyeight historically classified monuments and sites.
Island on the World Heritage List. With this choice, the State incorporated the Western values and ideas surrounding the definition of cultural heritage. Furthermore, at the point of gaining independence, Senegal chose French as the official language of the country, because it appeared to be the language most readily available and operational. The cultural establishments inherited from the colonization were restructured and reinforced in numbers to promote the Negritude and richness of black-African heritage, cultural diversity, unity of the Senegalese nation and the Pan Africanism. The government of President Senghor was very active in creating new infrastructures and in organising cultural events, some of which contributed to making Senegal a meeting point for numerous artists and international scholars. With the creation of cultural establishments, such as l'Ecole des arts (School of Arts), which became Institut national des arts (the Institute of National Arts); the National Theatre Company Daniel Sorano; Musée Dynamique (Museum of Contemporary Art); the Manufacture nationale de tapisserie (the National Manufacture of Tapestry) and the School of Mudra-African Dance, President Senghor favoured the creation of new arts, such as plastic arts, visual and scenic arts, stemming from the fusion of authentic black art with western culture (Harney, 2004). These new arts are meant to take inspiration and ideas from the ancestral heritage (rhythm and dance, emotionalism and sensitivity, analogical imagery and parallel asymmetry, socio-cultural experience), all the while being in harmony with western and contemporary artistic methods and forms of expression. They should show and spread the cultural identity and African heritage. The successors of Léopold Sédar Senghor, in particular Presidents Abdou Diouf (1981–2000) and Abdoulaye Wade (2000–2012), followed the model of managing the heritage and cultural development as specified by the colonial authorities. Senegal received new registrations on the World Heritage List of UNESCO: the Niokolo-Koba National Park in 1981, the Island of Saint-Louis in 2000, the Kankurang or Manding Initiatory Rite in 2006, the Megalithic Circles of Senegambia in 2006, the Saloum Delta in 2011, the cultural landscapes of Bassari, Peul and Bedik in 2012. However the lack of financial resources—created by the economic crisis of 1980–1990 (Diop and Diouf, 1990: 151–183), which was reinforced by the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994—constituted a break in the continuity of the ambitious cultural policy deployed during the first two

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16 The Island of Gorée was exploited by the post-colonial Senegalese authorities as a symbol of the Black race suffering from prejudice (the Slave Treaty and colonization)

17 The World Festival of Black Arts was organised in Dakar in 1966. Many symposia and exhibitions, initiated by President Senghor were held in Dakar.
decades after independence. The insufficient funds complicated the continuation of building a network of infrastructures and hindered all policies of maintenance, servicing and rehabilitation of cultural heritage and existing equipment. The policy of cultural development and preservation of heritage, set in motion by President Senghor, was adversely affected by the economic climate. It suffered the consequences of a plan to redress the economic and financial situation, which was implemented in 1979. This was followed in 1980 by structural adjustments, applied in Senegal owing to the budgetary constraints. Consistent with the need to cut down on State expenses, the cultural institutions became immobilized and inactive. Certain establishments were privatized, others were dissolved in 1990: the Musée Dynamique, the Centre d'Études des Civilisations (Centre for Civilisation Studies), the Archives Cultural Policy and the Heritagization in Senegal Culturelles du Sénégal (Cultural Archives) and the Commissariat General des Expositions d'Art Sénégalais à l'Etranger (the General Committee for Senegalese Art Exhibitions Abroad). The surviving institutions were confronted with practical and financial difficulties and a reduction in their staff (which translated into voluntary dismissals by certain agents while others were appointed to National Education). With the scarcity of resources, which accentuated the social divisions and the degradation of traditional values, the government of President Abdou Diouf was forced to adopt a new strategy. His approach was designed to cope with the afflictions and to safeguard Senegalese identity. The only alternative to maintain unity and fraternity within the nation appeared to be a return to the historical and cultural heritage and the ancestral values. These are the foundation of national identity. In this way, the ideology of a sursaut national emerged, which led to the drafting of a National Cultural Charter, published in 1989, by a commission which had a variety of expertise at their disposal. Whereas the negritude of Senghor spilled over the national frontiers by giving priority to promoting Black-African cultural heritage, the sursaut national of Diouf announced a return to the basics of Senegalese values. From the '90s onwards, the State revived cultural development\textsuperscript{18}, the

\textsuperscript{18} The revitalisation of cultural development by the State gave impetus to the creation of new infrastructures and cultural initiatives: Galerie nationale d'art (the National Art Gallery), Village des arts (the Art Village), Maison de la culture Douta Seck (Douta Seck House of Culture) were established; the Musée d'Art africain de Dakar (African Art Museum of Dakar) was extended; the dramatic art section of the Dakar Conservatory was re-opened. The National Book and Reading Fair, the International Jazz Festival of Saint Louis, the International Book and Educational Material Fair, and the Cinematographic Meetings of Dakar, were, among others, launched as new cultural development initiatives
promotion of national languages and their improved transcription\(^\text{19}\), the appreciation of heritage and the national pantheon. The creation of national emblems and "national and local heroes" was set into motion. These collective identities were recaptured as a model for the youth and touchstones for future enterprises. The State ordered the commemoration of the centenary of the death of Lat Dior Ngoné Latyr Diop in October 1986. Following this same logic, the streets, squares and schools were baptised or re-baptised under the name of local celebrities who were close to the people and distinguished in their community. In addition, the colonial statues were dismantled and moved to other locations and were replaced by new works from Senegalese artists\(^\text{20}\). The government of Abdou Diouf invested a great deal in favour of returning to Senegalese roots and promoting local historical figures as a way of facing up to the challenges created by the economic crisis. The administration of President Abdoulaye Wade is marked by a rereading of the colonial memory; as well as by his showmanship, his ideas on Pan-Africanism and liberal democracy. Owing to his strategy of political hegemony and social appeasement, he initiated commemorations and ambitious cultural projects. These initiatives took their inspiration from the repertoire of colonial heritage and cultural projects of President Senghor. Under the jurisdiction of President Wade, the budgets allocated to the culture sector were known to be generally on the rise, notably between 2006 and 2009\(^\text{21}\). This increase is linked to the organisation of the third edition of

by the Abdou Diouf Government. The annual Grand Prix for Arts and Literature was instituted in 1990 by the President of the Republic. This was followed by the extension of the Grand Prix to include stage arts, such as music, dance and theatre. The same year, the State launched a cultural event which was revived in the Senghor years: the Biennial Event of Dakar Arts and Literature, becoming from 1996 The Biennial Event of Contemporary African Art, or Dak’Art

\(^\text{19}\) In 1991, a Ministry of Education was created, which was responsible for basic education and the promotion of the national languages of Senegal.

\(^\text{20}\) This was the case in Dakar relating to the colonial statue communally known as Demba and Dupont, which represents two soldiers: one French, the other symbolising a Senegalese infantryman. It was erected in 1923 in memory of the dead troops from the AOF who participated in the First World War; it was standing at the Star Roundabout in Tascher Square, renamed Soweto Square. The measure also concerned the statue representing Faidherbe, which was standing in front of the Republican Palace. These statues were dismantled at night from the 13th to the 14th of August 1983 and transferred to the Catholic cemetery in Bel-air; the one representing Faidherbe is currently preserved at the Armed Forces Museum (created in 1997) and that of Demba and Dupont was recovered under the Wade administration. The history of these statues is related in the National Archives of Senegal, sub-series 4P1501 to 4P1507. “Les statues de la place Tascher et de Faidherbe.” Le Soleil from the 17th of August 1983, 3.

\(^\text{21}\) The budget was nearly 6 billion CFA Francs in 2006 and 17 billion CFA Francs in 2009.
the World Black Arts Festival (Festival mondial des arts nègres, FESMAN), which was postponed many times, held in Dakar from the 10th to 31st of December 2010. In spite of the increase in his budget, the Ministry of Culture was known to be somewhat unpredictable, also in the option of naming there selection of candidates (ten ministers were named from 2000 to 2010). These resuffles stalled the establishment of a real cultural policy with clearly defined objectives. Nevertheless, in 2005, a National Plan of Cultural Development (Plan National de Développement Culturel, PNDC) spread over five years was launched; in 2004, an Agenda Culturel National (National Cultural Agenda) was mapped out, the inventory of a national cultural heritage was pursued, the digitalisation of the Cultural Archive funds was triggered. The celebration of Journée des Tirailleurs Sénégalais (national day to commemorate the Senegalese and African soldiers, held for the first time on the 23rd of August 2004) was instigated by President Abdoulaye Wade and resulted in the rehabilitation of the colonial statue of Demba and Dupont. The statue—dismantled under the administration of Abdou Diouf—gave the decor of Dakar city a new lease of life by simultaneously changing the location and the memorial themes. The statue stands in the former Station Square, where now renamed Place du Tirailleur. This aimed to immortalise and reinstate the commendable effort and participation by African soldiers in liberating France from the Nazi empire. By celebrating Journée des Tirailleurs Sénégalais, President Wade also meant to redefine the relations between France and Africa—beginning by recognising and bringing justice by raising their pensions of former African fighters. The duty of recognition served also as a basis for the planning of the African Remembrance Square and the erection of an African Renaissance Monument. These majestic works advocated the

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22 Since 2000, the choice of names for the Ministry in charge of Culture kept changing. Thus it existed successively as the Ministry for: Culture and Communication; Culture, Tourism and Leisure; Culture; Culture and Historically Classified Heritage; and finally Culture, Historically Classified Heritage, National and French-speaking Languages.

23 After the sinking of the Joola boat which took place on the night of the 26th of September 2002, a Senegal in mourning paid tribute to the missing people by organising national funerals on the Western cliff of Dakar. The State decided to dedicate this place as a place of welcoming and meditation, which commemorates the victims of the Joola sinking, as well as the heroes, Resistance fighters and iconic figures of Senegal and of Africa. The Place of Remembrance, which had billions spent on building it, features an esplanade in the shape of a geographical map of Africa, and sits on the rocks above the ocean.

24 The decree no.2003–593 from the 16th of July 2003 planned to bring about the creation of the African Renaissance Monument. It was the source of many debates, formulated notably by the sculptor Ousmane Sow (who was the designer of the model
reorganisation of the colonial memory, the rehabilitation of a Black cultural identity and of the national, historical and Pan-African sources. The presidents, who led the nation state of Senegal from 1960 to 2012, embodied varying the rehabilitation of identities and local values. These frameworks of reference were highlighted in the national development, the restructuring of colonial legacy and political hegemony. In spite of official attempts to increase the standing of local heritage, the political authorities remained subjected to the concepts and forms of heritagization advocated by the coloniser. The reference to traditions and ancient values became more remote from what they hoped to achieve (Diagne, 1992). They also use the heritagization for political and ideological purposes. The cultural policies were not adapted to the local operational forms, nor to the development of local heritage. As a consequence, the population still had trouble understanding and absorbing the institutional heritage. The ideologies and grandiose cultural projects imposed on the population often stirred up criticism and harsh reactions. Commissions and cultural events organised by the political authorities, accentuated the shortage of resources, the poverty and precariousness of the common people, the cultural disintegration and the job slump. These constraints obliged the young people to resort to set-setal, to Hiphop, to bulfaale, to the Y’en a marre (We’re fed up) movement or even to clandestine immigration to Europe—via canoes in the sea—with the slogan Barça wala Barsàq. The challenges and tensions, created by the financial constraints, further stimulated a fragmentation of identities and a rehabilitation of rural traditions by communities.

and suggested the idea to Mr Wade) and by politicians, economists, members of the civil and religious society, etc. The African Renaissance Monument is an important bronze structure of about fifty metres. The project was entrusted to the architect Pierre Goudiaby Atepa. The monument was erected on one of the Mamelles hills, which were already inscribed in the national protected heritage since the administration of Senghor and they still figured on the classification list (under the name: Les Mamelles, geological site). On the 4th of April 2010, the Renaissance Monument was inaugurated in celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of Senegal's independence in the presence of many heads of State and of the government. The cost of the monument is estimated at 16 billion CFA Francs. President Wade asked for 35% of the revenue that was going to be generated by this monument. Sources: Debates on public and private television channels, and the written press on the internet. See also De Jong and Foucher, 2010: 187–204.

25 In the Wolof national language, set means clean and setal means to make clean
26 Bul-faale is a Wolof expression which is equivalent to “don’t be concerned”, “don’t worry”, “it doesn’t matter” or even “don’t bother”.
27 Wolof term which means “Barcelona or death”.
The emergence of new dynamics in self-reclamation

Since the end of the 1980s, observers and researchers noticed, steadily growing, a flourishing diversity within community, the professional and societal structures. They witnessed different forms of cultural expressions that were linked to newly created identities. Their activities were expressed in cultural shows (festivals, cultural days, commemorative events) which stemmed from the traditional to the religious, from the civic through to the local and familial. The ceremonies brought traditions, languages, memorial places, historical and cultural symbols of communities together. This identity heritage was reinvented and reintegrated into a new network of acknowledgment, development and institutionalisation. These activities aimed to rejuvenate the ancient cultural values and traditions which were destroyed under the influence of historical constraints (the Atlantic slave trade, Islamization, Christianization, colonization), or devalued by the effects of urbanisation and globalisation. These memorial representations, propelled by cultural figures within a context of economic and moral crises, served to reinforce the local identity and to reconnect the youth in this heritage. There was an emphasis on intangible heritage: initiation rituals, know-how, clothing or ornamental technology, songs, dances and rhythms. The portrayals gave the image of a well-preserved secular tradition, coming back to life even though it had been interrupted. The portraits or enactments referred more often to a pre-colonial past, partly reinvented or idealised. This production of identity appeared to be in line with the perspective of re-evaluating foreign values—very often because they were imposed—and pre-existing values. Collective memory, conveyed through the media and the speeches by traditional, spiritual or worldly authorities, exasperated reports of the disintegration and poor transmission over generations of the norms and traditionally stated values. They urged the population, particularly the youth, to regain control over ancient values, to preserve their individual and communal identities. The production of ancient heritage brought up the re-invention of oneself and the fabrication of new identities. This is the case in the Set-Setal (Moral Cleanliness) and Bul-Faale (Don't Worry) movements initiated by the urban youth in pursuit of new points of reference. At the turn of 1990, a movement was born in Dakar and was baptised Set-Setal, which subsequently spread throughout other urban centres in the country. Infuriated by the squalor and deterioration of urban structures that were underlying the socio-politics and morale crisis, the youth launched the Set-Setal with the aim of cleaning up the environment and the conscience of men (Enda, 1991; Diouf, 1992). The young people assembled at their murals and sculptures,
embellishing the perfectly clean urban space, diverse symbols from the
local or sometimes even international memory. They devoted themselves
to a mission of reinventing and wisely reclaiming local symbols and
virtuous individuals who were responsible for making history. Their efforts
towards identity recreation set them apart from the memories and
ideologies produced by generations of colonial and nationalist elites,
which accompanied the attainment of Senegal’s independence. These two
generations of elite classes were considered by the youth to be
responsible for their marginalisation and for their growing
impoverishment linked to the abuse of power and the failure of
development policies. The youth declared the new ideological
watchwords to be: work and resourcefulness. This mission to reformulate
identities is equally evident in the Hip-Hop and bulfaale movements
(Havard, 2005). These phenomena developed disparaging attitudes
towards the State, which had failed in its public service mission, with
regard to the order and to the traditional, social systems (seniority, social
status, the idea of providential fate). These old-fashioned references
were perceived by the youth as socio-cultural obstacles inhibiting their will
to develop economically and to open up to the global civilisation. The
cultural imaginations, used in the urban space by a youth in search of
autonomy, are conveyed by a synthesis of elements stemming from local
heritage and readapted to the dynamics of global times (Diouf, 2003).
These urban cultures are reinventing artistic expressions and local symbols
(the rhythms, outfits, iconography), all while staying connected to an
idealised modernity imported from the West or America. It is within the
scope of this same anti-authority and autonomous dynamic that the Y’en a
marre (We’re Fed Up) movement came to be (Diaw, 2013). It was
initiated in January 2011, by a group of journalists (notably Cheikh Fadel
Barro and Alioune Sané), rappers (including the famous Malal Almamy
Tall (also known as Fou malade), Babacar Niang (also known as
Matador), Landing Mbessane Seck (also known as Kilifeu) and Cyrille
Oumar Touré (also known as Thiét) and students. This network, which
succeeded in rallying the demands of the youth and Senegalese public

28 The iconography evokes scenes of the traditional and mythological African life, the
heroes of the colonial resistance, religious saints, figures of the nationalist intellectual elite,
freedom and civil rights fighters.
29 The spokesperson for the movement Y’en a marre (We’re fed up) is Thiét from the rap
group Keur Gui, created during the school year 1996–1997, which was greatly disrupted
by the strikes of the pupil and student movements. In 1998, during the time of the Abdou
Diouf regime, Thiét and Kilifeu, of the group Keur gui, were imprisoned for criticising
the management of their town (Kaolack) by the Socialist Mayor Abdoulaye Diack. See Niang,
2011; Binet, 2011.
opinion, emerged as a reaction to intensive power cuts, embezzlement by the Abdoulaye Wade regime, and scandals linked to the African Renaissance Monument commissioned by the President. It is a group which calls itself secular, apolitical and peaceful; it means to break from the ideologies of bad governance and self-proclaimed pères de l'indépendance (Fathers of the Independence). This movement aims to build a new citizenship by forging a nouveau type de Sénégalais (a new type of Senegalese–NTS), who is active and champions the values of change, development, freedom and democracy. Y'en a marre organised various demonstrations in 2011–2012, of which the most popular were the Foire aux problèmes (Problem Fairs)\textsuperscript{30} and the sitting/spectacles (sit-in/shows) at the Dakar Obelisk Square. Their awareness-raising campaign to convince young people to endorse their voting cards\textsuperscript{31}, the only peaceful guarantee to dismantle the current regime, largely contributed to the failure of Abdoulaye Wade in the presidential elections in 2012 (Dieng, 2015).

Conclusion

The cultural heritage of Senegal has for a long time been produced according to different perspectives. The State has responded with initiatives of heritagization and appreciation of cultural heritage. Concerned with the fixation of the memory and identity the French colonial power introduced the notion of heritage in Senegal so that it is perceivable in the scientific and official circles. The implementation of this idea was at the base of the official protection of colonial architectural monuments, archaeological and historical sites, objects and traditions which were symbolic of the local societies. This model of institutional heritagization was reproduced by the independent Senegalese authorities during the development of the nation state. The cultural and economic challenges, as well as the will to preserve the Senegalese identity while capitalising on the colonial heritage, led the leaders to

\textsuperscript{30} The stalls were specially arranged for the occasion and the imaginative performances aimed to divert the attention away from the concerns of the population which were at the heart of public debate. They denounced the rising prices of the prime necessities, the transhumance of politicians (movement back and forth between different political parties), the speculations and financial embezzlement notably in Dakar, the hypocrisy in the management of the conflict in Casamance (the region south of Senegal), the difficulties of students and unemployed graduates, the problems of shopkeepers, gypsies and drivers of cars rapides (minibuses), impunity, the lack of individual and collective freedom, etc.

\textsuperscript{31} The organisers of the movement launched the slogans “my electoral card, my vote”, daas fanaanal (Wolof term which means to protect yourself).
collect historical sources and documentary evidence. The reinvention of ancient heritage by different stakeholders restored the will to build or reveal identities, to reclaim the self and the need to retrace lost roots. Through these varied initiatives of heritagization and appreciation of cultural heritage, different types of heritage emerged: an institutional heritage, very often material, of which the recognition and protection remained solely a matter of concern in the State domain; and a social or ancestral legacy, preserved or reinvented by the population.
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