



IDENTITÉ CULTURE ^{et} POLITIQUE



un dialogue afro-asiatique

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an afro-asian dialogue

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Le mot des rédacteurs-en-chef

Le 26 juin 2009, le Président Barack Obama a présenté ses vœux au peuple malgache lors de l'anniversaire de l'Indépendance de Madagascar en souhaitant qu'il recouvre à nouveau sa souveraineté, allusion à peine voilée au rôle plus ou moins occulte des officiels français dans le coup d'Etat militaire. Celui-ci a conduit au renversement d'un président élu et à mi chemin de son mandat.

Ce régime se préparait à accueillir le sommet de l'Union Africaine, pour la première fois dans l'histoire d Madagascar, une nouvelle étape dans ses tentatives de redéfinition de ses liens avec l'ancienne puissance coloniale. Les enjeux sont nombreux : des gisements de pétrole disputés par les compagnies chinoises, américaines et l'inévitable Total français, mais aussi une influence de la francophonie qui apparaît de plus en plus anachronique dans la constitution des alliances économiques régionales. Madagascar est entouré de pays anglophones dont l'émergente Afrique du sud sans parler des pays asiatiques. ...etc.

Les conséquences d'un tel bouleversement sont multiples et durables car le champion des Français s'avère plus beau parleur qu'efficace. Le constat est sans appel, un recul général des libertés démocratiques et une régression économique rapide. Dans le futur proche, il sera certainement difficile de remettre en ordre une armée dont les officiers sont sous l'autorité musclés de sous officiers.

Pour la population l'ambiance est délétère : couvre feu, menaces et arrestations, assassinats, développement de mafias locaux au sommet de l'Etat, oppression contre les opposants et les citoyens, dégradation de la situation économique, ...etc.

Notes from the editors

On June 26, 2009, the anniversary of Madagascar Independence, President Barack Obama wished to the Malagasy people to recover its sovereignty. He referred to the role of French secret services in the military coup that deposed an elected president still in duty.

For the first time in Madagascar History, his government was preparing to host the summit of the African Union, a new step in the attempts to redefine the relationships with the former colonial power. Stakes of that coup are numerous : competition between Chinese, American and inevitable French Total oil companies for the control of newly discovered oil fields, declining influence of the *Francophonie* which appears increasingly anachronistic while it has to face the formation of regional economic alliances. Madagascar is surrounded by English-speaking countries including the emerging South Africa, not to mention the Asian countries. ...etc.

The consequences of such a change are numerous and long-lasting as the champion of the French government is more talkative than efficient. The general situation is getting worse : an impressive decline of democratic freedoms and a fast economic deterioration. In the near future, it will certainly be difficult to restore order in the army in which high ranking officers are under the authority of simple but heavily armed lieutenants.

For ordinary people, the general situation is worsening : curfew, threats and arrests, assassinations, development of local mafias at the top of the state, repression against opponents and citizens, deterioration of the economic situation, ...etc.

Même la sortie de ce numéro a pâti de ce que les locaux appellent pudiquement *la crise*. Celle-ci a réveillé les vieux démons d'un impérialisme anachronique qui tente de préserver ses anciens domaines à travers le monde pour garder un semblant de prestige. Les leçons de morale démocratique sonnent hypocritement lorsque des enseignants chercheurs dont un de plus de 70 ans est arrêté et brutalisé par des jeunes soldats grassement payés.

Les Malgaches font partie de cette grande part de l'humanité qui, à des degrés divers, vivent dans l'instabilité et l'angoisse.

Pour cette partie du monde, ceci n'est pas une nouveauté.

Plus d'un demi-siècle après la Conférence de Bandung, la situation n'a que peu évolué en dépit de quelques "miracles" économiques qui semblent bien fragiles.

Néanmoins, la nouveauté est la position de l'Union africaine, entraînée par la SADC, qui a appliqué des sanctions ciblées à l'encontre des dirigeants putschistes. Renouant avec les valeurs qui ont présidé à sa création ainsi qu'avec celles de Bandung, l'UA semble se remettre à l'anti impérialisme avec les précautions d'usage.

Face aux tentacules de la *Françafrique*, enterrée prématurément par certains, l'U.A. tente d'entraîner dans ces sanctions l'Union Européenne pour obliger les putschistes à organiser des élections.

En attendant, les forêts primaires des réserves naturelles de l'île disparaissent à une allure jamais égalée auparavant. Les autorités de fait organisent officiellement l'abattage de bois précieux vendus clandestinement en Asie. Mais ce n'est là qu'un des aspects de cet Etat devenu criminel avec la bénédiction de ceux qui donnent des leçons de démocratie et de bonne gouvernance.

Printing this ICP issue has suffered from what locals euphemistically qualify as *the crisis*. This latter awakened the old demons of an archaic imperialism which attempts to preserve what is left from its former empire to try to maintain a lost prestige. Its lessons on democratic moral and good governance sound hypocritical when academics, among them a 70 years respectable old man, are publicly arrested and beaten by young soldiers, paid by the putch organisers.

The Malagasy people are part of this huge component of mankind which, to varying degrees, live in instability and anxiety.

For this part of the world, these events are the essence of daily life.

More than half a century after the Bandung Conference, the situation has changed little despite some economic 'miracles' that seem very fragile.

However, what is new is the position of the African Union. It implemented targeted sanctions against coup leaders. Reviving the values that inspired its creation as well as those of Bandung, the AU seems to come back to the anti imperialist fight.

To counter the powerful *Françafrique* network, prematurely buried by some authors, AU tries to convince the EU to compel the coup leaders to elections.

Meanwhile, the primary forests of the island's natural reserves are disappearing at a pace never seen before. The *de facto* authorities officially organize the slaughter of precious woods which are illegally sold in Asia. But this is only one aspect of this state which is becoming criminal with the blessing of those who are giving lessons of democracy and good governance.

Aussi quoiqu'on en dise, le monde actuel ainsi que les sociétés humaines qui la composent sont loin de vivre dans un minimum de dignité. La grande majorité des êtres humains survit dans la frustration. Les conflits internes servent d'exutoire. Ce constat date pratiquement de la veille des indépendances.

Pour échapper à cette situation, plusieurs générations ont tenté de répondre à cette question que nous reprenons de la contribution de Rumana Monzur :

" Comment transformer la douleur et la rage en courage ? "

Les interrogations autour de cette question sont l'une des préoccupations communes à tous les contributeurs de ce numéro.

Rumana Monzur pose cette question en évoquant la situation du Sri Lanka. Mais il s'inscrit aussi dans la recherche des voies du salut pour cette majorité des êtres humains, à un moment où le libéralisme triomphant globalisé est loin d'avoir honoré toutes ses promesses de bien être pour l'humanité.

Pendant des années, ce pays fut l'île d'émeraude qui a enchanté les visiteurs. Il est devenu soudainement et brutalement le centre d'une actualité sanglante.

Dans le monde globalisé, le nouvel acteur qu'est la communauté internationale représenté par les diplomates des pays puissants et les bailleurs de fonds reste incapable d'imposer une paix durable garant de la sécurité économique. Les positions sont variées et quelques fois divergentes.

Le Sri Lankais comme la communauté internationale ne peuvent ils pas tenter de tirer les leçons de plusieurs années de destruction pour transformer la violence en paix durable s'interroge Rumana Monzur. Les pistes à explorer sont nombreuses et complexes. La non violence que le Mahatma Gandhi avait professé dans la région est elle devenue lettre morte ?

So whatever could be said, the current world and human societies that compose it are far from living in a minimum of dignity. The vast majority of human beings survive in frustration. Internal conflicts are an outlet. The independences did not affect this statement.

From that period on, several generations attempted to answer this question raised by Rumana Monzur's contribution :

" How to transform pain and rage into courage ? "

This question raises several issues which are the common concern to all contributors of this ICP issue.

While referring to the situation in Sri Lanka, Rumana Monzur is wondering how violence could be transformed into peace. But he is also participating to the debates about the situation of human beings living elsewhere while triumphant globalized liberalism is far from having fulfilled all its promises of well-being.

For years, Sri Lanka was the Emerald Isle that has delighted visitors. He suddenly and brutally became the center of bloody news.

In the globalized world, the new actor, the international community represented by diplomats from powerful countries and the donors, is still unable to impose a permanent peace which can guarantee economic security. The positions of its components are varied and most of the times divergent.

Rumana Monzur wonders if The Sri Lankans and the international community would be able to draw lessons from years of destruction in order to transform violence into a lasting peace. Ways to explore are numerous and complex. Among them, Mahatma Gandhi's non-violence ?

Pourtant selon Anil Nauriya, le célèbre apôtre de la non-violence a bâti ses conceptions à travers ses expériences hors de l'Inde, spécialement dans l'Afrique du Sud de l'apartheid. Si l'épisode est bien connu du train à Pietermaritzburg, l'influence du français Jean Finot sur les conceptions du Mahatma l'est moins.

De plus l'expérience du Mahatma à travers le monde dont 21 ans (1893-1914) en Afrique, a certainement contribué à forger sa vision non raciale et non confessionnelle de la nation. Celle-ci serait alors exempte ainsi de préjugés et plus capable de se développer durablement dans l'harmonie et la paix.

Ces aspects " internationalistes " du parcours et de la pensée du Mahatma sont peu connus. Cet auteur rend justice à une figure qui a été phagocytée par le nationalisme indien. Le discours du Mahatma est universel car conçu à partir d'un parcours atypique et hybride.

Olajide Oloyede reprend cette notion de développement durable, devenue d'un usage courant, pour y introduire la dimension culturelle dans l'acception la plus large du mot culture. En effet selon lui, subvenir aux besoins sociaux implique aussi la satisfaction du bien être culturel et la prise en compte de celui-ci dans les stratégies de développement. Il jette un regard critique sur les approches étroitement économicistes des bailleurs internationaux et des gouvernants africains.

L'amélioration des ressources endogènes comme la capacité des communautés locales à résoudre leurs problèmes sociaux et à subvenir à leur bien-être culturel, le renforcement de la viabilité économique de l'agriculture en raffermissant les manières locales de protéger les écosystèmes des effets de l'agriculture, etc..., sont autant de points qui peuvent servir de base au cadre de développement durable de communautés au niveau local.

According to Anil Nauriya, the famous nonviolence apostle forged his conception from his experiences outside India, especially in South Africa. If the Pietermaritzburg train episode is well known in the building of the Mahatma non violent anticolonialism, Jean Finot's influence is less taken into consideration.

The Mahatma's experience, including 21 years (1893-1914) spend in Africa, contributed to shape his vision of a non racial and non-denominational nationhood and peoplehood. They would be free of prejudice and thus more able to develop sustainably in harmony and peace.

These " internationalists " aspects of the Mahatma's conceptions are little known. This author reveals then a figure that has been swallowed up by the Indian nationalism. Anil Nauriya reveals a more universal Gandhi who is slightly different from the Indian nationalistic representation. His message is atypical and hybrid.

Olajide Oloyede addresses the concept of sustainable community which derives from that of sustainable development, now commonly used, to introduce the cultural dimension in the broadest sense of the word culture. Indeed according to him, to meet social needs implies also the satisfaction of cultural well-being and its inclusion in development strategies. He criticises economic approaches of donors and African governments.

The idea of a sustainable community, signalled a shift of focus on sustainability to the local level. It implies to take into account the activities that the rural communities in Africa can sustain and which they want and can afford. They are quite different from the activities of the communities in Europe and America

La contribution de Jean-Jacques Ngor Sène s'attache aussi à étudier ces alternatives et ces politiques d'épanouissement endogènes. Ce faisant il répond indirectement à la question posée par Rumana Monzur. Critiquant vigoureusement les conceptions de Fukuyama sur la fin de l'histoire, il voit dans les parcours groupes politiques agissant dans l'ancien Tiers monde les germes d'un espoir et surtout les jalons d'une quête d'une nouvelle humanité.

La rébellion maoïste Naxal en Inde, la pensée politique d'Amilcar Cabral, le zapatisme, la percée politique des combattants maoïstes au Népal et le réveil de la Gauche en Amérique Latine sont solidairement unifiés dans cette quête et perpétuent l'esprit de Bandung.

L'histoire ne s'est pas terminée avec la victoire du libéralisme démocratique occidental, qualifié de phénomène antihumaniste. C'est avancé-t- il avec humour plutôt la fin de la fin de l'histoire

Jung, Young-Tae n'est pas loin de penser similairement en évoquant le " miracle coréen ". Selon lui, la Corée du sud n'est pas du tout à l'abri d'un retour à une situation non démocratique. Et ce sont les éléments qui ont permis le miracle qui semblent le fragiliser, le régionalisme, le parti autoritaire, la faiblesse du respect du droit et la confiance aveugle accordée au néolibéralisme.

La classe politique coréenne n'a pas su surmonter ces éléments de la transition démocratique. Elle a favorisé le retour au gouvernement de groupes autoritaires qui tentent de mener la société coréenne à la situation pré démocratique.

Au vu de l'état du monde, elle n'est pas la seule.

Solofo Randrianja
Imtiaz Ahmed

Jean-Jacques Ngor Sène's contribution also seeks to explore these alternatives and policies of endogenous growth. In doing so he indirectly answered the Rumana Monzur's question. Strongly criticizing Fukuyama "end of history", he sees in the course of political groups operating in the former Third World the seeds of hope, and especially the quest of a new civilization.

Naxal Maoist rebellion in India, Amilcar Cabral political thought, the Zapatistas, the political breakthrough of Maoist combatants in Nepal and the revival of the Left wing in Latin America are jointly unified in this quest and perpetuate the spirit of Bandung.

History did not end with the victory of Western liberal democracy, which is described as an antihumanist phenomenon. With humor, Jean-Jacques Ngor Sène states that it is rather the end of " the end of the history "

Jung, Young-Tae is not far from thinking similarly, referring to the " Korean miracle. " According to his conclusions, South Korea is not immune to a return to undemocratic situation. And the elements that are at the origin of the miracle, seem to weaken it now : regionalism, the authoritarian party, weak rule of law and blind faith given to neoliberalism.

The Korean political class has failed to overcome those elements of the democratic transition. It has encouraged the return of groups trying to lead Korean society to the pre democratic situation and to authoritarian government.

It does not seem to be an exception.

Imtiaz Ahmed
Solofo Randrianja

L'intercontinentale de la fin de la fin de l'Histoire et les contours d'un nouvel humanisme antilibéral : Naxal, Cabral, San Cristobal et Népal

Jean-Jacques Ngor Sène, Chatham University, Pittsburgh,

Abstract

This article establishes a historical continuity and a theoretical framework solidly linking the Naxalite Maoist rebellion in India, Amílcar Cabral's political thinking, Zapatismo, the breakthroughs of Maoists fighters in Nepal, and the rebirth of the left in Latin America. The author suggests practical references in order to identify patterns of contemporary militancy that account for the end of the end of history. For all their spectacular impact on the redefinition of modern politics and the direction of world history, sabotaging the penetration of industrial labor in traditional communities, producing semiotic references for a postmodern understanding of "popular sovereignty", and dismissing western democratic liberalism as anti-humanistic may not crystallize into a desirable, consolidated alternative, an intellectual capital plainly able to escort policies of self-fulfillment throughout the Third World in our age.

Résumé

Cet article établit une continuité historique et un cadre théorique pour rendre solidaires la rébellion maoïste Naxal en Inde, la pensée politique d'Amílcar Cabral, le zapatisme, la percée politique des combattants maoïstes au Népal, et le réveil de la Gauche en Amérique Latine. L'auteur propose des références pratiques pour identifier des schémas d'engagement politique contemporains qui s'agrègent pour définir la fin de la fin de l'histoire. Malgré leur impact spectaculaire sur la conception de la politique aujourd'hui et les réflexions sur le sens de l'histoire globale ; saboter la pénétration du salariat industriel dans les communautés traditionnelles, sécréter une sémiotique postmoderne du concept de « souveraineté populaire », et condamner le libéralisme démocratique occidental comme phénomène antihumaniste ne suffiront pas à formaliser une alternative attrayante, un capital intellectuel capable d'accompagner valablement des politiques d'épanouissement endogènes à travers le Tiers-Monde.

If the misery of our poor be caused not by the laws of nature, but by our institutions, great is our sin.

Charles Darwin, Voyage of the Beagle.

La condition essentielle, il faut la chercher dans la rectitude ou l'immoralité des desseins idéologiques et politiques. Si les desseins sont corrects tout se met en place. Si les desseins sont tronqués, le sujet perdra tout ce qu'il possédait et maîtrisait naguère.

Mao Tsé-toung, Discours.

At one plane, the criticisms continued to be directed at the hypocrisy, greed and contradictions of the bourgeois life, but less and less at the cognitive categories that sustained and gave meaning to that life and justified the disproportionate power and

privileges of the class being criticized. [...] As a result, what these criticisms offered with one hand, they took away with another. After all moral criticisms of hypocrisy and greed are merely moral criticisms; they can be safely forgotten when the mean but unavoidable principles of realpolitik and economic interests come into play.

Ashis Nandy, *The Savage Freud*.

Le problème des sciences historiques est celui de la conscience individuelle et collective. Comment faire preuve de rationalité quand le sujet est lui-même constamment dans et hors du processus historique ? Les classes sociales antagonistes n'existent que dans la possibilité d'une « conscience sociale » bien définie alors que les classes économiques ; les inégalités qui motivent ces luttes (de classes), existent objectivement, en elles-mêmes. La figure emblématique de la rébellion zapatiste du Chiapas, le sous-commandant Marcos, n'a jamais révélé l'identité véritable qu'il dissimule sous sa cagoule qui est devenue le symbole saugrenu de son leadership charismatique du mouvement insurrectionnel antilibéral. Le gouvernement mexicain affirme cependant qu'il s'agit de Rafael Sebastian GuilléVicente, ancien membre actif du Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) alors qu'il enseignait la philosophie à l'Université Métropolitaine Autonome de Mexico (UAM). En tout état de cause, Marcos a très tôt insisté sur la dimension conscientisatrice de la révolte en martelant que le « zapatisme est plus une question d'idées qu'une question de fusils ».

Naxal, Cabral, San Cristobal et Népal : l'unité thématique dépasse la convenance d'une assonance. On trouvera une logique formelle dans ce qui sous-tend et justifie l'utilisation de la notion de *fin de la fin de l'histoire* pour exprimer l'idée de *refondation* l'histoire contemporaine telle que manifestée en Inde et en Guinée-Bissau à partir des années 1970, et plus récemment dans le sud mexicain et au Népal ; une refondation politique qui a des dimensions transcontinentales. On retrouve dans cette idée là, la nécessité de situer la de la « conscience de classe » qui occupe toujours une fonction importante dans les évolutions politiques intra et interétatiques. Il y a une continuité historique des crispations idéologiques (d'abord à la fin du dix-huitième siècle ; puis à partir du milieu du vingtième siècle) ; surtout dans les sphères atlantiques ; principalement, comme un *aftershock* de la dissolution de l'empire britannique -la fin de la *Pax Britannica* et l'apogée progressive de l'empire américain cherchant à se doter d'une nouvelle idéologie (*Novus Ordo Seclorum*). Dans *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, Samuel Huntington rappelle l'aveuglement des grandes puissances à l'inévitabilité de leur déclin. Arnold Toynbee appelle cette myopie politique/idéologique « le mirage d'immortalité ». La certitude subjective d'être auteurs conscients de la fin de l'histoire. A la fin du dix-neuvième siècle, les classes moyennes en Angleterre avaient toutes les bonnes raisons de se féliciter de la fin de l'histoire : commerce intercontinental ; raffinements de la culture ; éducation généralisée ; état permanent et définitif de félicité. L'empire romain, les califes abbassides, les princes Mughal, et l'empire ottoman ont-ils eu leurs temps- entretenus des positions idéologiques similaires (Huntington, 1995). La civilisation occidentale capitaliste est-elle qualitativement différente des civilisations qui l'ont précédée, et celles qui aujourd'hui cohabitent avec elle ? Son expansion continue depuis le milieu du dix-neuvième siècle dans tous les continents en fait-elle une menace ou un catalyseur pour le développement des autres civilisations de la planète ?

Pour mieux comprendre les sociétés contemporaines, il devient toujours plus essentiel de comprendre et situer le phénomène du radicalisme ; qu'il soit de tradition réformiste ou révolutionnaire. Quelles sont les aspirations des mouvements dits radicaux, leurs stratégies et leurs tactiques ; leur impact sur les évolutions identitaires et culturelles ; politiques ? Quels rapports entretiennent ces mouvements entre eux ? Quel sens donner à leurs desseins ?

Hegel et Marx sont incontournables pour continuer les débats sur le sens de l'histoire. Leurs théories respectives, nourries par trois siècles d'histoire et d'historiographie européennes, de la révolution puritaine aux totalitarismes du vingtième siècle, en passant par la révolution française et les systématisations intellectuelles du dix-neuvième siècle, conditionnent l'étude des méthodes par lesquels a) expliquer le monde, puis b) le *changer* et le rendre plus équitable. Pour Marx et pour tout hégélien, le monde de l'expérience empirique est une prise de conscience imparfaite. Le réel est presque une caricature du monde véritable et rationnel ou l'homme se soustrait à la perception de ses propres initiatives. L'histoire n'informe donc pas les sujets de la réalité empirique. Ce qui informe le sens de la totalité du processus, c'est la réflexion critique, philosophique. L'expérience immédiate considère les phénomènes comme la guerre, la pauvreté, les luttes de pouvoir, les conflits de classe, comme des intemporels de l'histoire, au lieu de les (Naxalbari, guérilla anticoloniale en Guinée Bissau, insurrection au Chiapas, fin de la guérilla népalaise) voir comme des subjectivités ponctuelles, sur un chemin pénible : *away from the detreminisms of Nature*.

Les richesses exubérantes des élites politico-commerciales et financières proviennent directement de l'appauvrissement organisé de la grande majorité de la population mondiale. Les formes prédatrices de spéculation sur les flux financiers, les produits de base, la propriété foncière, la monnaie ; le recours systématique aux licenciements massifs² ; les détournements de fonds publics provoquent sans surprises, une opposition de masse avec par exemple, des émeutes de la faim dans plus de 60 pays entre 2007 et 2009. Le radicalisme, qu'il soit d'essence bourgeoise (France et Italie 1950-1968) ou d'extraction paysanne (Naxal, Cabral, Chiapas, Népal) comporte l'apport d'une « nouvelle » dimension dans la modernité : la fin de la fin de l'histoire. La fin de la fin de l'histoire révèle le caractère *visionnaire* radicalisme, celui présentant les contours d'un nouvel humanisme antilibéral fondé sur le désir de créer la « Bonne Société ». L'inspiration première et les méthodes des naxalistes indiens, d'Amilcar Lopes Cabral en Afrique occidentale, du Sous-commandant Marcos dans le sud mexicain, et des idéologues maoïstes du Népal doivent se chercher dans cette image la « Bonne Société » :

A présent nous nous concentrons sur le mouvement de masse... Nous pouvons maintenant vraiment pratiquer ce que nous avons enseigné. Cela signifie la fusion de la stratégie de Guerre Populaire Prolongée et de la tactique d'insurrection générale. Ce que nous avons fait depuis 2005 est le chemin de préparation pour l'insurrection générale par notre travail dans les zones urbaines et notre participation dans le gouvernement de codition.³

Sur les plans de la politique, de la culture, et des identités, l'insurrection de Naxalbari de 1967 et ses excroissances actuelles en Inde ; la guerre anticoloniale telle que pensée par Amilcar Cabral en Guinée Bissau (1965-1973) et son extension, dans un contexte très différent au Burkina Faso (1983-1987) ; l'insurrection indépendantiste de l'Armée Zapatiste de Libération Nationale (EZLN) lancée de San Cristobal de las Casas en Janvier 1994, et les fortunes électorales actuelles des maoïstes au Népal participent, avec des répercussions dans plusieurs autres états « satellites » du phénomène, d'une *intercontinentale de la fin de la fin de l'histoire* : rhétoriques comparables ; Némésis commune (le Grand Capital) ; réseaux globaux solidaires ; idéaux intemporels, universalistes. Le cas de la Guinée Bissau est particulièrement probant. Avec sa fameuse théorie du « suicide de classe » et du socialisme humaniste révolutionnaire, Amilcar Lopes Cabral dépasse en intensité la portée de l'insurrection zapatiste. Il s'agit, avec Cabral, d'une *guerre totale*, de libération nationale, guerre permanente d'émancipation culturelle. Quelques années seulement après sa mort, le droit international viendra confirmer et légitimer ses conclusions. Dans le cadre de la Convention de Genève, le premier Protocole de 1977 sur les Droits à l'Autodétermination maintient que les peuples luttant contre la domination coloniale,

les occupations étrangères et les régimes ségrégationnistes doivent être traités comme forces armées engagées dans des conflits *internationaux* non des « guerres civiles ». La distinction n'est pas une convenance théorique ; elle conditionne, comme dans le cas de la South West African People Organization (SWAPO) de Sam Nujoma en Namibie dans les années 1980, à des applications pratiques foncièrement différentes sur le terrain. Nationalisme d'extrême-gauche et impérialisme, a priori antithétiques ont pourtant fait bon ménage en URSS (1945-1991) : le nationalisme ethnique y a résisté, malgré la lourdeur de la propagande bolchevik, à toutes les tentatives d'annihilation. Partout où ils sont apparus dans les républiques fédérées par l'idéologie communiste (Ukraine, pays du Caucase, Tchétchénie, etc.), les mouvements politiques identitaires ont été réprimés dans le sang par les Soviétiques, malgré un serment anti-impérialiste supposé. Cabral insiste aussi sur le fait que les peuples qui se libèrent de la domination étrangère n'accéderont à l'indépendance politique qu'à la condition *sine qua non* ; faux-fuyants, sans complexes et sans rejeter l'ensemble de l'héritage laissé par l'opresseur et les autres cultures ; qu'en entreprenant de *refonder* l'avenir sur l'appréciation de leurs propres valeurs culturelles, nourrie par l'expérience de la révolte. Cabral se fait l'auteur d'une théorie selon laquelle la révolution doit être *culturelle* pour contrer efficacement les effets néfastes de la domination : ici, la libération nationale est donc aussi, comme aujourd'hui au Chiapas, fondamentalement, une entreprise intellectuelle. En 1966, la révolution Bissau guinéenne en accélération se dit logiquement encouragée par les succès tangibles des années de consolidation du régime Castro à Cuba⁴.

A partir de « l'intercontinentale de la fin de la fin de l'histoire et les contours d'un nouvel humanisme antilibéral : Naxal, Cabral, San Cristobal et Népal », on pourrait faire plus tard des parallélismes avec le concept et la praxis de « souveraineté populaire » dans les idéologies sociopolitiques courantes dans le Brésil de Lula da Silva, le Venezuela d'Hugo Chavez, et la Bolivie d'Evo Morales. L'importance universaliste de la pensée politique – « les armes théoriques » – d'Amílcar Cabral peuvent, plus que jamais, informer les ambitions du mouvement Naxal inspirées par le maoïsme. San Cristobal (la « capitale » zapatiste) est au cœur vivant de l'intercontinentale, en crise permanente, tout comme la toute nouvelle république du Népal dont les ex-rebelles maoïstes, après près de 15 ans dans le maquis, apprennent maintenant, douloureusement, à gouverner.

Francis Fukuyama et la nouvelle tectonique du capital intellectuel mondial

Les grandes évolutions idéologiques qui ont secoué le vingtième siècle ont fait l'objet de moultes analyses synthétiques mais l'article séminal écrit par le philosophe-historien américain Francis Fukuyama à l'été 1989 a fait le point sur des considérations fondamentales quant à la compréhension de la direction l'expérience historique. Fukuyama rappelle clairement ce qu'il y a lieu de retenir de la pensée de deux philosophes incontournables : Hegel, et puis Marx⁵. Dans la philosophie hégélienne, qui se définit comme la volonté de comprendre la Révolution, on trouve déjà les germes de la notion selon laquelle, « les formes de conscience sociale fonctionnent des réalités politiques changeantes, mouvantes et évolutives »⁶. Le caractère d'universalité est fourni – doit être reconstruit tout au moins – par la personne du chef, à partir de tous les fossiles historiques disponibles si l'on peut dire, y compris, *inter alia*, les visées subjectives de celle ou celui qui occupe le devant de la scène.

Contrairement aux thèses de Fukuyama selon lesquelles il y ait (eu) une *fin de l'histoire* à laquelle nous serions arrivés avec le triomphe du modèle démocratique libéral occidental, il y a, de toute évidence, de multiples objectifs politiques qu'on peut dire *contradictaires* à cette pensée. En effet, la pensée de Fukuyama bute sur les idéaux d'extrême-gauche. Ces idéaux d'extrême-gauche précèdent et prédisent la pensée de Fukuyama et la gardent en ligne de

mire chaque fois qu'elle apparaît puissamment dans le discours de la philosophie de l'histoire (Hegel – 1860 ; Fukuyama – 1990).

En fait, faut-il le rappeler, le modèle de « développement démocratique » libéral n'a aucune ascendance qualitative sur les quatre modèles révolutionnaires qui font l'objet de mon attention dans cet article. On peut dire, pour parler simplement, que le modèle libéral est loin de faire l'unanimité. On a vu, ici et là (Corée du Sud, Indonésie, Japon, Kenya, Malaisie, Seychelles, Singapour, etc.), des états qui ont adopté avec succès le modèle de développement économique et social à l'occidental avec un impact direct, incontestable, et durable sur les niveaux de vie des populations, la réduction des tensions ethnico-claniques, l'élévation du niveau d'éducation, et la garantie des libertés individuelles. Leurs expériences sont autant de satisfecit la validité des *Modernization Theories* sans cesse vantées au Tiers-Monde. Mais, depuis la popularisation des thèses de Fukuyama, la Chine continue pourtant de se défendre d'adopter un modèle de développement à la yankee pour assumer toutes les prérogatives de son hégémonie. La Chine ! Pendant toute la durée de la Seconde guerre mondiale, le pays a dû non seulement lutter contre les armées d'invasion japonaises, mais dénouer les enlèvements de la guerre civile entre le gouvernement nationaliste de Jiang Jieshi (alias Kai-Chek?) et les forces communistes sous l'exorde de Mao Tsé-toung. Les États-Unis d'Amérique supportèrent le gouvernement de Jiang sans complexes, lui fournissant armes, liquidités, et conseillers militaires⁸. Cependant, pendant toute la Seconde guerre mondiale et même dans la période de l'après-guerre de nombreuses langues autorisées au sein du Département d'État américain se délient pour remarquer que le système administratif de Jiang est trop incompetent et trop corrompu pour l'emporter malgré un nombre de combattants double par rapport aux communistes, et trois à quatre fois plus d'armes. L'aide américaine masquait très difficilement l'impopularité intenable du gouvernement. Le scénario précédent s'est répété, jusqu'à la caricature, un demi-siècle plus tard dans le Népal contemporain.

En vérité, on ne peut parler – comme Fukuyama – d'achèvement du processus universel sans postuler, idéologiquement, d'un certain nombre de certitudes plutôt précises sur les conditions idéales que cherchent à mettre en œuvre ; *grosso modo* depuis le milieu du dix-neuvième siècle, les gouvernements des pays d'Europe occidentale, d'Amérique du Nord, de l'Australie, d'Israël, du Japon, des Dragons Asiatiques ; de l'Inde, du Brésil, de la Russie postsoviétique, et de la Chine ; bien que plus récemment – 1987 – pour cette dernière). L'autre alternative, celle que j'appelle ici *la fin de la fin de l'histoire* la formule popularisée par l'insurrection socialisante zapatiste, conclut plutôt que l'histoire n'a pas de sens –précis.

New Delhi, le 9 août 2008. Dans le cadre de la convention nationale sur le « rôle de la Gauche dans le scénario des évolutions politiques en Inde » ; conférence organisée par le *Revolutionary Socialist Party* (RSP) avec à sa tête T.J. Chandrachoodan ; le secrétaire général national du Parti Communiste Indien, tendance marxiste (CPI-M) a déclaré que, de son point de vue, les trois défis majeurs en cette aube du vingt-et-unième siècle étaient :

- l'impact de la globalisation et des politiques néolibérales sur les populations ;
- la collaboration toujours plus active des classes dirigeantes et commerciales avec « les forces impérialistes qui menacent la souveraineté nationale » ;
- et les plans « communautaristes qui menacent la laïcité ».

Le *Communist Party of India* (CPI), par la voix de son dirigeant A.B. Barhan ; présenta aussi une allocution dans la même veine, ainsi que C. Debarajan pour le Forward Bloc – le Bloc Progressiste. Dans les envolées verbales qui sont très prisées dans la culture politique indienne, il était question, de façon récurrente, d'« invasion du pays par les multinationales étrangères avec la complicité active des partis bourgeois » ; du sort qui doit être réservé aux « traîtres à la cause du peuple » et même plus, de l'« exigence impérieuse d'extrémisme » ; du « devoir de violence » qui incombe aux leaders de la gauche pour contrer les desseins du *Congress Party* Manmohan

Singh. Scènes, tirades et paroles d'un autre temps ? Certains voudraient bien le croire. Sans surprise, à ces mêmes conclaves, la récente victoire électorale des maoïstes au Népal (2007) fut non seulement évoquée, mais l'objet d'analyses enflammées. Les accords avec les États-Unis de George W. Bush sur le « nucléaire civil » y furent, comme on pouvait s'y attendre, violemment fustigés. Le nœud gordien de ces assises de Delhi peut être situé sur l'opportunité offerte par les célébrations, en grandes pompes, une semaine plus tôt, du 61^e anniversaire de l'indépendance nationale indienne de poser de grandes questions : sur quelles bases, et dans quelles proportions – *Common Minimum Program* – réaliser une large union de la gauche ? Comment réconcilier les réalistes-modérés aux extrémistes Naxalites – ennemis jurés du « compromis avec l'ordre libéral bourgeois corrompu » ?

En Amérique latine, c'est à l'échelle continentale que les *mêmes débats* se posent depuis près de vingt ans. Avec toujours plus d'acuité, une flopée de nouveaux symboles et réalités politiques afférentes se font l'écho du désir de résistance au *Washington Consensus*. On note une volonté de revenir en « arrière » sur les vagues de privatisation jugées excessives, des appels à un plus grand rôle modérateur, nécessaire, indispensable de l'État dans la redistribution sociale des revenus de la croissance. Le besoin de résolution des conflits de classe, le sens profond de la souveraineté nationale, la nécessité de comprendre et bénéficier du jeu des alliances géostratégiques planétaires, et, peut-être au sommet de la pyramide des *desiderata* l'extrême-gauche latino-américaine : définir et mettre en pratique les formes de participation populaire au pouvoir d'État sont autant de phénomènes qui occupent le paysage. Ainsi, le cas de la rébellion séparatiste zapatiste dans le sud du Mexique et les politiques identitaires universalistes qui ont émergé depuis lors avec Lula au Brésil, Chavez au Venezuela et Evo Morales en Bolivie participent directement, activement, solidairement, comme un sous-ensemble de mon groupe théorique : l'intercontinentale de la fin de la fin de l'histoire. Dans la sphère du second sous-ensemble de ce groupe théorique, la révolution inachevée de Cabral en Guinée Bissau apparaît comme un modèle pour orienter le parachèvement de la lutte des Naxalites en Inde et des maoïstes népalais.

En novembre 2009 par exemple, après avoir suffisamment repris en main la situation sociale suite aux manifestations violemment réprimées des mois précédents, Mahmoud Ahmedinjad entreprit un tour du monde pour recoller les amitiés de son pays avec quelques partenaires clés. Sans surprises, après l'Afrique, son calendrier l'emmène au Brésil, au Venezuela, et bien-sûr, en Bolivie. Dans chaque pays, sa visite revêt des objectifs diplomatiques différents. S'il est reçu en grandes pompes et sans embarras à San Paulo, c'est que Lula compte renforcer le rôle (les ambitions) du Brésil comme nouvel acteur décisif dans la diplomatie internationale multilatérale ; rôle dont le pays se targue d'avoir l'insigne vocation : être un pont entre les pays développés et le Tiers-Monde. A Caracas, le leader iranien est moins à l'aise. Pourtant, son hôte Hugo Chávez, comme lui, profère régulièrement des diatribes outrageantes sur ce qu'ils appellent « le monde dominé par l'Amérique » et les autres tenants de la théorie de « la fin de l'histoire ». Chavez est malgré tout trop radioactif. Il fit naguère l'apologie de figures universellement reconnues comme des despotes sanguinaires : Robert Mugabe du Zimbabwe et Idi Amin Dada de l'Ouganda ; et le président iranien n'a pas besoin d'une telle publicité après le scandale des élections contestées. L'Iran ne peut pas s'autoriser non-plus, dans le contexte des négociations internationales tendues sur ses programmes nucléaires civils et militaires, de se voir associé à des positions idéologiques par trop marginales comme celles prônées par Chavez : « [Illich Ramírez Sánchez *alias* Carlos le Chacal] est un combattant révolutionnaire et un compatriote respecté » (Discours. Novembre 2009). L'intercontinentale de la fin de la fin de l'histoire souffre d'un éclatement politique qui rend ses réseaux de solidarité fragiles et aléatoires.

En Afrique, depuis la fin de la Guerre Froide, partout, on gère comme on peut les incertitudes (Gabon, Kenya, Mauritanie, Niger, Nigéria, Sénégal, Tchad, etc.) et les politiques de l'absurde dans des bateaux à la dérive (Cameroun, Côte d'Ivoire, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinée-Bissau, Guinée-Conakry, République Démocratique du Congo, Somalie, Zimbabwe, etc.), si ce n'est la confusion idéologique dilatoire (la Gambie de Yaya Jammeh, la Lybie de Mouammar El-Kadhafi, le Burkina Faso de Blaise Compaoré, le Togo de Faure Gnassingbé, le Gabon de Ali Bongo, le Niger de Mamadou Tanja auquel ont *justement* fin un groupe de militaires patriotes en février 2010, etc.) . Ces incertitudes politiques sont autant d'obstacles aux conditions de restauration d'une conscience historique (pan) africaine révolutionnaire. La pensée politique de Cabral dont l'épicentre est la Guinée-Bissau (devenue depuis lors un quasi narco-état), ses ersatz dans les autres colonies lusophones (surtout au Mozambique), et son épigone burkinabé (Thomas Sankara à la présidence du Faso entre 1983 et 1987) une décennie plus tard font figures d'exceptions.

Plus que jamais, les développements politiques hors normes actuels en Inde, en Afrique noire, au Mexique, et au Népal rappellent que les conditions objectives du « laboratoire de la vie » exigent de plus en plus que les analyses historiques et sociologiques éclairent le grand public sur la nature des forces en œuvre pour limiter ou accroître l'expression de la souveraineté populaire parmi les nations du Tiers-Monde. Séparément, l'Histoire, la Sociologie, ou l'Anthropologie Sociale et Culturelle ne sont pas à la mesure de la tâche. Ensemble cependant, pour ainsi dire, surtout en Afrique noire, en Amérique Latine, et en Asie du Sud Est où les corpus de connaissances en sciences sociales sont sous-développés ; ensemble, tout est possible. L'Histoire se base logiquement sur des perspectives et tendances (*patterns*) appliquées à des théories politiques. La Sociologie quand à elle, opère des généralisations rigoureuses mais, puisqu'elle est encline à voir le groupe politique intrinsèque (partis, mouvements, coalitions, etc.) comme la limite, la norme et le champ exclusifs du changement total ; elle restreint, biaise et déforme l'analyse historique. L'anthropologie sociale et culturelle (Ernest Renan, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Clifford Geertz), et la politologie (Alexis de Tocqueville, Max Weber, Jürgen Habermas) sont certainement indispensables pour comprendre le jeu des alternatives idéologiques de notre ère qui a eu trop tôt fait d'espérer la fin des idéologies.

Où va-ton ? Quel est le sens de l'histoire ? Quelle est la portée des changements contemporains, analysés dans le contexte des études sur la philosophie de l'histoire depuis les années 1780 ? Les situations existentielles dans lesquelles les analystes cherchent des réponses fonctionnelles réservent à l'occasion, des surprises de taille.

Le thème central de la réunion du Parti Communiste Chinois (PCC) du premier semestre 2009 se résumait -qui l'eut cru ? - en ces termes : « démocratie interne ». Les dirigeants suprêmes de la Chine d'aujourd'hui y déclarèrent que «la démocratie interne est le système nerveux du parti», et le gage de sa survie. Les directives qui y furent adoptées spécifient que les instances du parti doivent s'autogouverner avec plus de discipline, plus d'assurance, et le script fut placé dans une perspective historique : « cette question est aujourd'hui plus urgente qu'à n'importe quel stade d'évolution antérieur dans toute l'histoire du parti ». Les partisans de réformes plus audacieuses (élections libres parmi les instances de l'*Establishment*) contrôlent maintenant le calendrier politique. D'une part, la démocratie interne est un moyen d'institutionnaliser les nouvelles directives et règlements qui garantissent la culture de consommation de l'élite politique en République Populaire de Chine ; d'autre part, elle pourrait fournir les bases d'une expérience à la chinoise dans l'histoire universelle de la démocratie. Le succès ou l'échec de ces expérimentations politiques et culturelles aura des implications profondes sur le futur du géant chinois ; et sur le reste du monde accroché au poulx de la Chine dont les universités et instituts d'enseignement supérieur mettent sur le marché de l'emploi quelques 351.000 ingénieurs chaque année. Dans quel but ? Peut-être pour demain, comme l'Amérique depuis 100 ans, utiliser les leviers

d'un capital intellectuel sans précédent pour organiser et maintenir son essor politico-culturel et scientifique. Il est impossible de prévoir quelle(s) direction(s) prendra, chez le géant chinois, le débat sur les sens de l'histoire et son rapport avec les concepts de souveraineté populaire ; et bien-sur leurs réverbérations sur les aires de l'intercontinentale de la fin de la fin de l'histoire.

Les relents religieux et nationalistes de la fin du vingtième siècle et de ces dix dernières années sont relativement irrationnels parce que basés sur des distinctions arbitraires les choses sacrées et les choses profanes ; dogmes et compromis. Au contraire, l'ambition majeure de l'Etat libéral démocratique est basée sur la viabilité d'un modèle de développement humain de masse, universaliste, sur le rationalisme scientifique. Les institutions qui garantissent la rationalité sont en priorité, à priori, justement, les institutions d'enseignement supérieur.

En Octobre 2005, le *New York Times* et *Fortune Magazine* ont révélé un chiffre que répétèrent bientôt plusieurs membres du gouvernement américain et de nombreux politiciens partout dans le monde : la Chine produit chaque année 600,000 nouveaux ingénieurs ! Les révélations des media citèrent un éventail de récipiendaires du prix Nobel et autres scientifiques, attirant tous l'attention du Congrès américain sur l'érosion des avantages économiques de leur pays, au moment même où les compétiteurs gagnent du terrain. Ce chiffre agit comme une mise en garde pour les USA par rapport à leur statut d'économie la plus puissante au monde et le centre des innovations scientifiques et technologiques. Une étude conduite par une équipe de chercheurs à Duke University (Superviseurs : Vivek Wadwha, ingénieur, entrepreneur et professeur d'engineering ; et Gary Gereffi, Directeur du Centre d'Études sur la Globalisation, la Gouvernance, et la Compétitivité à Duke) a contredit ce chiffre pour le ramener à celui plus crédible de 351.000 [à comparer avec les performances des deux grands rivaux : USA (137.000), Inde (+/- 100.000)]. Les chercheurs de Duke firent quelques découvertes intéressantes sur la sociologie des écoles de formation dans les 3 pays, mais encore, ils identifièrent l'origine du chiffre gonflé de 600.000. En 2005, le gouvernement (les structures du Parti Communiste Chinois) avait décidé qu'il fallait un nombre de 600.000 par an pour maintenir la forte croissance (+/- 10% par an). Afin de répondre à cette requête *administrative* incontournable, les universités gonflèrent les listes avec des noms de tous ceux qui étaient « indirectement » liés la filière Engineering, selon le résultat des enquêtes. Dans les provinces où les nombres étaient beaucoup trop bas, le gouvernement local inclut dans ses rapports les mécaniciens et les ouvriers d'usine comme « ingénieurs ». Cette découverte emmena les chercheurs américains à se poser une question essentielle, culturellement pertinente dans le contexte de la globalisation : « Qu'est-ce qu'un ingénieur » ? Les chercheurs en vinrent à redéfinir la profession de l'ingéniorat comme « capacité à traduire en innovations pratiques, un certain savoir technologique, afin de servir l'humanité comme visée finale » ; une phraséologie accidentellement très récurrente du jargon des mouvements d'extrême-gauche ; des termes que l'on pourrait trouver *verbatim* sous la plume de Jean-Paul Sartre ou Frantz Fanon en référence aux desseins ultimes des leaders radicaux du Tiers-Monde.

Quand l'État s'aborde sa propre autorité sous la pression du marché comme dans le cas des concessions d'exploitation pétrolière, surtout en Afrique ; [ou au contraire prend le risque du néo-socialisme]⁹, les multinationales étrangères sont toujours préparées à assumer, indirectement (corruption) ou frontalement (denses réseaux administratifs qui infiltrent l'appareil d'État) ces fonctions. Ces inféodations sociopolitiques acceptées par des nations entières des corollaires dévastateurs : destruction des syndicats, militarisation des rapports état-société, attisement des conflits ethnico-religieux, tolérance, voire légalisation des abus des droits de l'homme. Les contours d'un nouvel humanisme antilibéral ; notamment dans leur dimension qu'on pourrait appeler avec nos collègues (la préservation de) « l'esprit de Bandung » (solidarités multiformes Afro-asiatiques)¹⁰ seraient cruciales pour rééquilibrer les effets de la libéralisation économique dans ces zones et dans toutes les régions du monde, redistribuer plus équitablement, par exemple, la rente pétro-

lière par des politiques similaires à celles que le Suède poursuit depuis plus de 30 ans (80% de la population active y est syndiquée). Les syndicats y ont le droit statutaire d'élire 2 représentants syndicaux au conseil d'administration de toute entreprise suédoise de plus de 25 employés.

Oui. Il a été dit, écrit et répété à satiété : les plus grands scandales de l'ordre économique mondial installé par les accords de Bretton Woods (1948), renforcé pendant les années 1980 ; « la détérioration des termes de l'échange », l'effet agrandissant des sources d'inégalités, ce sont les secteurs de l'agriculture et l'alimentation. En maintenant sous perfusion l'agro-business parmi leurs administrés, les gouvernements des pays riches permettent, de facto, aux géants de l'agro-alimentaire (Nestlé, par exemple, qui a 42 usines en Afrique Noire : Côte d'Ivoire, Éthiopie, Nigéria, Sénégal, etc.) de contrôler le prix des produits et leurs canaux de distribution ; et de ce fait, tenir le sort des paysans du Tiers-Monde dans la comptabilité qui se fait dans leurs conseils d'administration¹¹. Les USA par exemple, contrôlent 40% du commerce mondial du coton grâce aux subventions quasiment illimitées accordées aux producteurs ; occasionnant sciemment pour les producteurs vulnérables de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (Mali, Burkina Faso, Sénégal) un manque à gagner de US\$ 200 millions par an à l'export. L'Union Européenne donne en moyenne US\$ 900 par vache aux éleveurs comparés aux US \$ 9 par habitant au titre de l'aide publique aux nations africaines.

L'intercontinentale antilibérale apprécie et prend orgueil de la souveraineté nationale de la Chine et de son développement durable fortifié par ses performances économiques. Elle s'en sert – surtout théoriquement – comme un modèle. Qu'il s'agisse de questions politiques (le Tibet, le Soudan, l'Iran) ; économiques (pénétration tous azimuts du marché des matières premières en Afrique) ; militaires (Corée du Nord, Taiwan) ; culturelles (l'accueil des Jeux Olympiques à Beijing en 2008) ; les moindres mouvements de la Chine dérangeant la *Pax Americana* près de plus de 20 ans ; et suscitent l'admiration du Tiers-Monde.

Les pays à économie intermédiaire doivent-ils suivre le modèle déroutant du *laissez-faire* à la chinoise ses corollaires de privations des libertés individuelles ? Quelles régulations imposer aux investisseurs étrangers ? Deux questions qui sont au centre de la *prescription for prosperity* selon les orientations idéologiques des maîtres de Beijing. On remarque pourtant une certaine continuité idéologique entre la Chine capitaliste d'aujourd'hui et la Chine maoïste d'il y a 50 ans : l'administration centrale domine toute l'économie même si les modes d'intervention sont maintenant dits « indirects » ; les entreprises d'état contrôlent le marché même si on y recense de nos jours moins d'employés salariés que dans le secteur privé. Les réserves financières religieusement maintenues par le gouvernement – avantage suprême de la Chine sur les USA, le Japon, le Canada, et le reste du monde – s'ajoutent à des avoirs colossaux dans les places financières internationales. La Chine aurait-elle discrètement, à la barbe de ses objecteurs de conscience domestiques et internationaux, dans les milieux politiques, académiques, syndicaux et dans la conscience politique des classes dirigeantes du Tiers-Monde ; scrupuleusement appliqué le grand principe socialiste de développement autocentré promulgué à Bandung (Indonésie) en 1955 ? Plusieurs constats militent en la faveur d'une réponse par l'affirmative. Le pays n'est pas (totalement) dépendant des mouvements de capitaux internationaux, même s'il reste au premier rang des bénéficiaires d'investissements étrangers directs (plus de US\$ 40 milliards par an) et que le gouvernement tient bien en rennes les règles d'entrée des investisseurs sur le territoire national. L'Inde à l'opposé, qui ne recule devant aucune manœuvre de charme pour attirer les investissements étrangers directs, accueille pourtant des montants moindres (estimés à US 18 milliards pour l'année fiscale 2009-2010 selon le ministre indien du commerce Anand Sharma) ; bien en deçà de ses objectifs. Pourtant, le succès économique paradoxal du géant « socialiste » chinois serait illusoire sans l'alliance discrète avec les USA sur le dos de l'URSS depuis la rencontre historique du président américain Richard Nixon avec le Secrétaire Général Mao Tsé-toung à Beijing en 1972. Trois ans à peine après cette visite d'« ouverture bilatérale », les

exportations de la Chine vers l'occident firent un bon de 25%! Néanmoins, la logique d'une économie axée sur l'exportation a inégalement enrichi les zones côtières aux dépens des zones rurales de l'intérieur, surtout dans l'Ouest du pays. Le niveau de vie des classes bénéficiant de la croissance à Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, etc. rivalise avec celui des classes moyennes dans les pays riches, alors que dans les zones rurales dépeuplées la précarité persistante, similaire à celle que l'on trouve dans les pays du Quart Monde, fait craindre des émeutes.

En 1980, quand Ronald Reagan entre à la Maison Blanche pour y lancer son programme de destruction systématique des politiques sociales du *New Deal* (1933-1945) de Franklin Delano Roosevelt, la Chine est peut-être formellement une des nations avec le moins d'inégalités sociales (sanctionnées par l'État). De nos jours, selon l'indice de Gini, c'est évidemment tout le contraire¹².

L'ordre économique mondial fragilise les moyens de subsistance des classes laborieuses dans les économies émergentes, intermédiaires et préindustrielles.

L'esprit de Bandung, franchement moribond depuis 30 ans, offre à tous ces pays tels que la Chine, l'Inde, le Brésil, l'Indonésie, l'Iran, l'Afrique du Sud, le Mexique, le Venezuela, etc. une ligne théorique pour collaborer, non pas seulement avec la conscience de leur « intérêt national » étrié dans la balance ; mais aussi avec l'esprit militant d'œuvrer à ouvrir des espaces durables de renégociation des accords internationaux (ONU, Front Monétaire International, Banque Mondiale, Organisation Mondiale du Commerce, Organisation pour la Coopération Économique et le Développement – OCDE, Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, Traité de Non-prolifération des Armes Nucléaires, le GATT, etc.) tout en sponsorisant la popularisation de méthodes de formation syndicales, intellectuelles, culturelles pour les acteurs sociaux et la société civile.

Sans allusion aux systèmes d'exploitation qui permirent l'accumulation capitaliste et aux idéologies ethnocentristes qui assujettirent des pans entiers de l'humanité, la thèse de Fukuyama peut se résumer comme suit :

*Economic development produces increases in living standards that are universally desirable. The proof of this is simply the way people «vote with their feet». Every year, millions of people in poor, less developed societies seek to move to Western Europe, to the United States, to Japan, or to the other developed countries, because they see that the possibilities for human happiness are much greater in a wealthy society than a poor one.*¹³

Les contours de l'humanisme antilibéral qui nourrit la conscience historique des membres de l'intercontinentale ; les entreprises politiques radicales de ses divers pôles, suggèrent que le problème est mal posé. Il convient que les sciences sociales et les acteurs politiques encouragent la quête suivante : quelles révolutions solidaires pour créer le bonheur *sur place*, sur le lieu de vote ? Quelles révolutions pour que les peuples qui sont l'orbite de Naxal, de Cabral, de San Cristobal, du Népal et de tout le Tiers-Monde votent avec leur tête plutôt qu'avec leur ventre ou avec leurs pieds ?

Les motifs de rupture

L'immense majorité des habitants de la planète habite dans le Tiers-Monde, le « Monde en Développement », – il appartient au lecteur d'adopter l'une ou l'autre formule qui contient chacune ses implications sémiologiques propres. Je parle pour ma part plus volontiers de Tiers-Monde et de Tiers-mondisme.

Le destin économique ; les « performances économiques du Tiers-Monde » sont essentielles à la survie de l'ordre mondial hérité de la fin de la guerre froide. Pourtant, c'est précisément dans ces régions que l'on observe, en partie à cause poids démographique, depuis les années 1900, de fréquentes crises et conflits humanitaires, politiques, religieuses, écologiques. Il semble que les défis du développement, à quelques exceptions notables (Corée

du Sud, Dubaï, Hong Kong, Îles Maurice, Japon, Seychelles, Singapour, Taiwan, etc.) soient insurmontables, ou alors, au moins, peu compris. Ces défis du développement sont nourris à des sources communautaires, nationales et supranationales très complexes qui expliquent les circonstances historiques actuelles : surarmement, course vers l'espace, absence de paix et sécurité, guerres du pétrole, républiques bananières, droit du commerce tronqué, fuite des devises, dette, pauvreté, et rôle ambigu des nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication (NTIC). En parallèle, l'intérêt pour le Tiers-Monde dans les priorités de la communauté internationale (avec, par exemple, l'entrée de pays comme l'Afrique du Sud, le Brésil, le Mexique, la Turquie – et bientôt peut-être, le Nigéria – dans le G20) est souvent tronqué par les besoins *objectifs* des canaux de relations entre les grandes puissances elles-mêmes.

La structure du système économique mondial contemporain s'est mise en place dans un contexte de colonisation avec des objectifs clairs : approvisionnement en matières premières et produits de la terre bon marché ; et accès à une main-d'œuvre corvéable à peu de frais. A cause de ce qu'il était convenu d'appeler « la détérioration des termes de l'échange » dans les années 1980 (la dépendance exacerbée sur les revenus des exportations), les pays en développement ont eu à faire face à la fluctuation des prix des matières premières et à la baisse des cours de leurs produits. Dans le même temps, les coûts d'importation des éléments « indispensables » au progrès et à la souveraineté (armement ; matériau de support logistique au transport aérien, maritime, fluvial, ferroviaire et routier ; machine-outil ; appareils ménagers, bâtiment ; raffineries ; etc.) n'ont cessé de grimper de façon vertigineuse. L'organisation Mondiale du Commerce (OMC) a été expressément fondée pour standardiser les régulations, et promouvoir les échanges commerciaux, même si ses détracteurs jugent que l'OMC légalise et cautionne le viol du Tiers-Monde et la spoliation de ses ressources en prenant d'assaut toutes les barrières douanières sans concéder en retour, la réforme nécessaire des vieux mécanismes protectionnistes sournoisement entretenus par Washington, Tokyo, Bonn, Rome, Moscou, Paris, Ottawa, et Londres. Pourtant, tous les maux du développement dans le Tiers-Monde ne sont pas le fait de l'héritage colonial et le protectionnisme des riches. Les politiques économiques nées de la décolonisation, quand elles existaient, surtout en matière de commerce et d'industrialisation, ont été prises, au berceau, dans les pièges de la mauvaise gestion et de la corruption (*L'Afrique Noire est mal partie*, René Dumont : 1960). Cette inefficience dans la gestion de leurs économies nationales, c'est « l'ennemi juré » des sycophantes de la croisade pour les réformes néolibérales. L'Etat, presque partout patrimonial, se voit marginalisé par la mise en œuvre des réformes visant la privatisation de larges secteurs de l'économie avec pour conséquences la réduction des investissements dans les secteurs dits « non-productifs » (éducation et santé) et les licenciements massifs dans la Fonction Publique.

A la Conférence de Colombo au Sri Lanka (28 avril – 2 mai 1954) qui réunit cinq premiers ministres (Sri Lanka, Inde, Pakistan, Birmanie et Indonésie), le Premier Ministre indonésien Ali Sastroamidjojo proposa d'en élargir la participation en invitant des représentants des pays nouvellement indépendants, mais surtout, aussi, les représentants des peuples en lutte pour leur indépendance nationale, autant en Asie qu'en Afrique. La Chine fut invitée à la conférence suivante (Bogor, Indonésie ; décembre 1954) avec un statut particulier : République Populaire nouvellement indépendante, plus grand pays d'Extrême-Orient avec une population d'environ 1 milliard d'habitants. La tectonique de la Guerre Froide dicta la prudence dans la définition des buts et objectifs de la conférence. Certains considéraient que l'accession à la souveraineté nationale correspondait clairement au triomphe des idéaux révolutionnaires et le consensus se fit alors sur des objectifs génériques multilatéraux : 1. Exprimer les intérêts communs des nations précédemment ou actuellement sous domination coloniale ; 2. Exprimer la volonté de développer des réseaux d'aide et de coopération mutuelles dans tous les domaines ; et 3. d'établir des instruments de coopération multilatérales entre les nations Afro-asiatiques.

A Bandung, le moment paroxystique du tiers-mondisme global, l'hôte indonésien Sukarno (nom de guerre « Bung Karno », le combattant de la liberté), avait une conscience claire des vestiges du colonialisme et des ravages du néo-colonialisme. Le féodalisme, après tout, en Indonésie, régissait le plus clair des relations sociales au delà du cercle restreint des instances dirigeantes. Il se fit le théoricien d'une « révolution non terminée » en parlant de son propre pays, remarquant que la suite de la révolution devait viser à faire reculer définitivement l'oppression, les superstitions, l'inculture, et la pauvreté. La conférence de Bandung de 1955 fut un succès éclatant, inattendu, inespéré. Sukarno et son Premier Ministre en sortent extrêmement forts, politiquement, à l'intérieur comme sur la scène internationale de la Guerre Froide. En militant pour une forme de nationalisme antilibéral solidaire parmi les peuples victimes de la colonisation, la Chine y fait une apparition tonitruante dans l'histoire moderne en pesant fortement sur l'orientation des Accords de Bandung¹⁴, encourageant d'autres, jusqu'en Europe (la Yougoslavie de Josip Broz Tito) à reconsidérer le leadership controversé de l'URSS sur les conditions optimales du « progrès du socialisme international au vingtième siècle », et toujours selon les mots de Sukarno, la création d'« un monde indépendant, libéré de l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme, prospère et pacifique ». La doctrine de « coexistence pacifique » entre les blocs Est-Ouest et la liberté de choix des « non-alignés » introduit dans la conscience politique du Tiers-Monde un nouvel axiome : la lutte n'est pas entre l'Est et l'Ouest, elle n'est pas entre le Nord et le Sud. La lutte est une lutte sur soi-même et contre soi-même finalement, pour tenter d'enfanter un nouvel humanisme antilibéral et une ère nouvelle. La fin de la fin de l'histoire procure ici bien entendu, un espace mental plutôt qu'un point sur une courbe chronologique. La lutte a pour protagonistes, encore selon le jargon idéologique de Sukarno à consommation locale et internationale, les institutions du Vieux Monde (*oldefo* – les Forces Anciennes Établies) contre les forces de la civilisation socialisante de demain (*nefo*, – les Forces Nouvelles Émergentes)¹⁵.

Dans les années 1970, à la faveur de la guerre froide, l'abondance des pétrodollars sur le marché mondial et les quelques « progrès » dans les performances économiques du Tiers-Monde ont pu faire penser que l'adoption tacite des préceptes néolibéraux avait commencé à sceller la fin l'histoire ; rien n'est moins sûr aujourd'hui.

En octobre 2009, deux organismes des Nations unies ont rapporté que plus d'un milliard de personnes, soit un sixième de l'humanité, auront souffert de sous-alimentation dans l'année. Le nombre d'affamés a grimpé de quelque 100 millions de personnes en un an, le résultat nous dit-on, de la plus sévère crise économique depuis la Grande Dépression.

L'état de l'insécurité alimentaire produit par l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'Alimentation et l'Agriculture (FAO) et le Programme Alimentaire Mondial (PAM), explique que l'augmentation notable de la faim dans le monde n'est pas le résultat de mauvaises récoltes ni de désastres naturels. Il provient de l'inflation sur les prix des produits du panier de la ménagère, de la hausse du chômage et de la baisse des salaires, causés par des décisions identifiables, si l'on peut dire, maintenues et défendues par les organisations internationales telles que la Banque Mondiale, le Front Monétaire International (FMI), le G20, l'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce (OMC) l'OCDE, les multinationales de l'agro-alimentaire et par une grande majorité des dirigeants du Tiers-Monde eux-mêmes, y compris, peut-être à contrecœur, les plus progressistes et les plus populaires.

Le rapport indique que la hausse marquée de la sous-alimentation représente une intensification d'une tendance à long terme, avec une augmentation nette et constante depuis le début des années 1990 :

Même avant les crises alimentaire et économique qui se sont succédé, le nombre de personnes sous-alimentées dans le monde a augmenté lentement, mais constamment.¹⁶

La majeure partie de l'augmentation de la sous-alimentation a pris place dans les régions les plus pauvres du monde (l'Asie, l'Afrique subsaharienne, l'Amérique latine et les Caraïbes ainsi que le Moyen-Orient et l'Afrique du Nord), touchant fortement les membres de notre intercontinentale. Les pays pauvres ont été touchés par une série de problèmes, notamment un manque d'aide et d'investissements étrangers, une baisse des salaires et une multiplication des licenciements, une réduction mondiale sans précédent des transferts de fonds des émigrants vers des parents demeurés sur place, et des prix systématiquement élevés pour la nourriture.

Les plus démunis souffrent toujours des effets de la spéculation (2006 à 2008) sur les denrées qui a fait grimper les prix de produits de base tels que le riz, le blé et le maïs hors de la portée de centaines de millions de personnes. Même si les prix ont quelque peu reculé avec les mesures de relance de 2009, ils demeurent en moyenne 17% plus élevés qu'en 2005.

Les prix élevés de la nourriture ne causent pas seulement la faim. Selon le rapport, la difficulté à se procurer de la nourriture force des familles à adopter plusieurs « mécanismes d'adaptation », dont « le remplacement d'aliments nutritifs par des aliments moins nutritifs, la vente des moyens de production », et « le renoncement aux soins de santé ou à l'éducation ». Ces mécanismes d'adaptation produisent aussi, selon la thèse de Jean Ziegler, une forme de honte sociologique globale qui est typique de la fin de la fin de l'histoire dans son acception postmoderne¹⁷

Le chômage en hausse dans les économies avancées a affecté, de manière disproportionnée, certaines couches de la population comme les jeunes, les travailleurs non-qualifiés et, bien entendu, les immigrants. Les immigrants, en réduisant leurs rémittences, aggravent involontairement la crise de la faim dans les pays plus pauvres dont ils sont ressortissants.

Les transferts de fonds comptent pour plus de 6% du produit intérieur brut (PIB) dans la plupart des pays en développement selon l'*État de l'insécurité alimentaire*. Pour certains pays, la statistique est beaucoup plus élevée. Au Tadjikistan, les transferts de fonds comptent pour 46% du PIB ; au Honduras et au Liban, pour environ 25%. Environ le cinquième de tous les ménages en Albanie, aux Philippines, au Salvador et en Haïti dépend des rémittences pour leur subsistance.

Dans les pays d'Asie du Sud, les transferts de fonds comptent pour bien plus que la moitié de toutes les entrées de capitaux étrangers. De manière surprenante, cela est particulièrement vrai pour l'Inde – qui est pourtant vue comme ayant un rôle de premier plan dans la nouvelle économie mondiale – où les transferts de fonds comptent pour plus de 3/4 de toutes les entrées d'argent, éclipsant les investissements étrangers directs.

Ces perturbations provoquent des réactions anticapitalistes, antilibérales. Que dire, dans un tel contexte de la conviction puriste développée par Amílcar Cabral au début des années 1970 que ce n'est pas la lutte des classes qui est le moteur de l'histoire, mais plutôt les *modes de production* spécifiques à telle ou telle société ? En opérant une harmonisation forcée des modes de production selon des principes mercantilistes, le libéralisme nie aux peuples de l'intercontinentale, aux peuples du Tiers-Monde, la liberté de l'éducation et la possibilité d'exercer un pouvoir réel sur leur environnement social, culturel, et politique. C'est le message central du *Manifeste du parti communiste* dont le titre fait peur aujourd'hui de montrer que dans l'évolution des sociétés humaines, le capitalisme représente une étape arrogante, mais pas définitive de systématisation de certains modes de production et de concentration des richesses. Le nouvel humanisme aux contours imprécis que proposent Naxal, Cabral, les zapatistes et les maoïstes antimonarchistes népalais est un modèle de société internationaliste préposé à la satisfaction équitable du « désir de reconnaissance » du plus grand nombre plutôt qu'à la maximisation des profits entrepreneuriaux. La pertinence de la pensée politique de Cabral dans la définition d'un nouvel humanisme dans l'histoire moderne, doit être située dans la volonté de créer une réalité structurelle à *démocratiser* tôt que d'espérer une génération spontanée de structures progressistes quand les forces du marché sont effectivement mises sous contrôle. C'est l'horizon théorique le plus pur, visuellement et méthodologiquement.

La logique synthétique qui prévaut dans les structures dirigeantes de l'intercontinentale cache à peine un idéal néo-socialiste postmoderne présentant des variations significatives. Hésitant ou décevant au Brésil ; armé, militant, périphérique et marginalisé en Inde et au Mexique ; étouffé avant d'avoir éclos dans toutes ses potentialités en Afrique occidentale (Guinée Bissau et Burkina Faso) ; cet idéal néo-socialiste postmoderne bute sur la capacité de définir le processus historique qu'il promeut avec des paramètres transnationaux ; et la capacité de les traduire en mesures opérationnelles viables, rentables. Ainsi, l'intercontinentale de la fin de la fin de l'histoire est essentiellement, un néo-socialisme d'intention ; un nouvel humanisme antilibéral en devenir. Cependant, une victoire qui se dessine toujours plus clairement est le retour paradoxal, surtout à la faveur des mesures prises pour endiguer les effets de la crise financière mondiale de 2008, du capitalisme d'état, le rejet des principes dé-régulatrices, et un durcissement certain de la main de l'état. Mis à part l'Inde, les nouveaux centres d'accumulation de richesse dans l'ancienne périphérie de l'ordre économique international comme la Chine, les pays du Golf, la Russie, le Venezuela ne sont pas des modèles de démocratie au sens de la transparence consensuelle des systèmes électoraux. Le capitalisme d'état est donc un fait marquant de la fin de la fin de l'histoire. Il avait imprégné le développement économique de nations asiatiques comme la Corée du Sud, Taiwan, et Singapour pendant la Guerre Froide, et est érigé, peut-être plus que partout ailleurs dans le monde en doctrine de gouvernance et de politique étrangère en Malaisie depuis plus d'une décennie¹⁸.

Naxal, violence, identités et le sens de l'histoire

La nation indienne dont on a pu dire qu'elle offre l'insigne exemple d'un « nationalisme sans nation »¹⁹ fourmille en idéologies de gauche mal comprises, très présentes, mais finalement mal intégrées dans l'exercice du pouvoir exécutif tant au niveau des Etats qu'au niveau fédéral. Le poids démographique, bien que mitigé par les bonnes performances économiques explique à bien des égards ce qui fait le lit de l'extrême-gauche dans le pays. La population a quasiment triplé, passant de 361 millions en 1951 à 1,28 milliards en 2001. Selon les chiffres du recensement de 2001, 35% de la population a entre 0 et quatorze ans ; 8% a plus de 60 ans, avec une population active de 57% (15-59 ans). Respectivement, 16% de citoyens sont rangés parmi les " Scheduled Casts " et 8% parmi les " Scheduled Tribes " (comprendre " les basses castes ") ; les communautés historiquement opprimées et victimes de discrimination. Le pays profite de taux de croissance parmi les 10 les plus élevés au monde. Le PIB est passé de 20.7 à 32.5 billions de Roupies entre 2001-2 et 2005-6. Dans le même temps, à la faveur de la Révolution Verte des années 1970, l'agriculture indienne a quadruplé ses rendements. Le nombre des habitants vivant en deçà du seuil de pauvreté a presque été réduit de moitié (+/- 55.5% en 1973-4 ; +/- 36% en 1993-4 ; aujourd'hui estimé à 22%). La libéralisation progressive de l'économie à partir de 1970 a eu un effet positif sur la stabilité politique et les performances économiques.

Comment assurer dans le contexte contemporain, pour les pays souverains du Tiers-Monde, un essor politico-économique durable ; un " Grand Bond en Avant " ou un " Nouveau Grand Bond en Avant " ? Dans les années 1966-68, la révolution culturelle bat son plein en Chine sous la houlette du Secrétaire-Général du Parti, Mao Tsé-toung, et, malgré une opposition jamais totalement neutralisée (ex : Deng Xiaoping entre 1966 et 1973), le combat pour la pureté révolutionnaire et le musellement des " nouveaux mandarins pro-capitalistes " continuera jusqu'à sa mort en septembre 1976. Issu de la tradition de la Révolution Culturelle chinoise, le modèle du " soulèvement populaire " rationnel promulgué couramment au Népal (Octobre 2009) pour réclamer la fin définitive des " privilèges féodaux " et les mainmises impérialistes sur certains secteurs de l'économie a toujours fait des émules dans le monde entier. Le voisin taciturne de la Chine, l'Inde, n'est pas en reste. Les ingrédients d'une nouvelle prise de conscience de l'exploitation des masses paysannes par les féodalités multiséculaires fermentaient depuis la période

du *British Raj* (domination coloniale anglaise formellement établie sur les territoires de l'Inde, du Pakistan et du Bangladesh entre 1858 et 1947) avec des soulèvements sporadiques dans lesquels les mêmes causes produisirent les mêmes effets à travers tous les districts du sous-continent. Petits et grands soubresauts de l'histoire, de la fin de l'histoire, et de la fin de la fin de l'histoire. L'année 1966 marque un tournant dans l'histoire politique de l'Inde. Cette rupture s'inscrit précisément dans la plus large histoire de la contestation de l'ordre capitaliste international et de l'histoire des controverses idéologiques relatives au statut de l'État. Ces controverses, – de nombreuses études – dont certaines ne sont pas toujours bien connues²⁰ – l'ont montré, occasionnent la naissance et fournissent un élan idéologique à de larges formations politiques surtout dans les milieux étudiants. Ici et là, dans tous les continents (Argentine, France, Mexique, Sénégal, USA, Viet Nam, Yougoslavie par exemples), on assiste à des expérimentations de la pratique révolutionnaire marxisante, émancipée du modèle soviétique tel qu'il se déployait alors sur la scène internationale. En Inde, le *Congress Party*, bien que miné par la corruption, dominait les urnes depuis les années 1950 mais fait les frais de ce rééquilibrage idéologique. Pour la première fois depuis 1951, un espace de changement réel se fait jour. La ligne politique du Parti Communiste Indien (CPI) ne satisfait plus les strates de l'intelligentsia qui se veulent plus militantes, ni les paysans surexploités par le servage qui, eux-aussi aspirent à des changements radicaux et en entrevoyent vaguement, pour ne pas dire en toisent, la réelle possibilité. Le CPI est taxé par ses nouveaux détracteurs d'être un " parti de collaboration avec l'ordre bourgeois ". Les nouveaux leaders de l'extrême gauche posent des questions directes, impérieuses, à leurs militants et à l'électorat : Quelle révolution pour la nation indienne ? La fédération indienne remplit-elle sa vocation unificatrice ? Quel est le profil sociologique ; quelles sont les classes sociales structurelles de la nation ? En quoi la nation indienne, sur le plan du matérialisme dialectique/scientifique diffère-t-elle de l'URSS et de la Chine ? Une analyse liminaire de la courbe d'évolution du mouvement Naxal permet d'exhumer certaines des réponses qui ont été fournies à ces questions.

La violence est le trait dominant des interactions Naxal-État. Né d'une révolte paysanne à Naxalbari dans le district de Darjeeling au Bengale occidental, le mouvement reçut la bénédiction de la grande majorité des dirigeants des sections étatiques du parti communiste. L'exploitation politique de la révolte à Naxalbari fournit l'élan qui permit la création de la *All India Coordination Committee of Revolutionaries* – AICCR, le Comité National Indien de la Coordination [des programmes] Révolutionnaires. Depuis 1967 cependant, une situation de guerre larvée de faible intensité, syntagmatique de la guérilla qu'a connue la Guinée Bissau à la même époque dérange les espoirs de sédimentation du statu quo libéral qui a créé une classe moyenne et commence à pénétrer valablement les milieux ruraux paupérisés.

Depuis la fin septembre 2001, fatalement, toutes les disciplines des sciences humaines et sociales marquent un intérêt accru pour les mouvements politiques radicaux, notamment ceux dits " terroristes " qui établissent des réseaux et sympathies autour d'eux à travers les frontières nationales. Le mouvement maoïste Naxal, ce grand inconnu de la tectonique politique de l'Inde, fait, de prime abord, figure de radicalisme nostalgique, anachronique, dépassé. Dans les poches de l'échiquier politique où il est représenté, le mouvement ne fait pourtant pas toujours preuve de constance idéologique et tactique dans ses ambitions politiques. On peut se poser la question de savoir, même si ça reste une question marginale, s'il y a ou non, une certaine pureté idéologique dans l'évolution du mouvement ; en d'autres termes est-ce qu'il représente un modèle valable de logique et de constance dans la formulation d'une conscience de classe anticapitaliste. Jouant l'irréductibilité dans les campagnes et la conciliation dans les centres urbains ; tantôt révolutionnaire, tantôt politicien, le mouvement Naxal défie les tentations de caricature. Malgré tout, Naxal demeure, avec l'EZLN, parmi les membres de l'intercontinentale et ses satellites, l'illustration par excellence de l'obsolescence de la théorie hégélienne/fukuyamaïenne de la fin de l'histoire. Le mouvement Naxal confirme la permanence des structures qui maintiennent les principes de

la révolution socialiste intemporelle : la fin de la fin de l'histoire au sein de l'actualité politique. Quand les déséquilibres de pouvoir et d'accès aux richesses d'essence féodale dominent les modes de relations sociales, la légitimité des mouvements insurrectionnels socialisants s'en trouve renforcée. La révolte incarne le désir même de justice et de rééquilibrage ; seule réponse totalement populaire (ex : le Chili de Salvador Allende au début des années 1970). Depuis l'avènement de la révolution française, toutes les grandes révolutions ont réclamé la fin des humiliations imposées sur une portion de la population ; souvent, en présentant ces humiliations comme un affront à tout le genre humain. Les révolutions " antiféodales " semblent être universalistes par nature, plus que par choix. Dans les années 1960, l'âge d'or de la révolution postmoderne, on voit, pour la première fois une vaste alliance intercontinentale stratégique conséquente, quoi qu'éphémère, entre les élites intellectuelles, les ouvriers et les paysans pauvres, autant au cœur des démocraties occidentales que dans les pays d'Amérique latine et les nations nouvellement indépendantes d'Afrique et d'Asie. L'impérialisme, dans sa forme la plus brutale, est à l'agonie pendant la décennie 1960-70, et les classes réactionnaires répressives, prédatrices, qui lui sont alliées dans le monde non-occidental se rendent à l'évidence : l'étau de la conscientisation des masses, de la désaliénation, se resserre sur elles.

Après les attentats terroristes de Mumbai (New Delhi) en fin novembre 2008, le gouvernement fédéral indien accéléra radicalement ses plans de mise en place du *Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System* (CCTNS) pour optimiser la recherche, la collecte, l'analyse et le partage de données entre les différents postes de police dans les districts secondaires, et le relais des informations sensibles vers les stations de polices centrales. Les militants Naxal font depuis, encore plus, les frais de l'angoisse sécuritaire. Dans l'Etat de Chhattisgarh, riche en ressources minières (diamant, or, fer, charbon, bauxite, etc.) et forestières, la guérilla Naxal a développé une stratégie d'intimidation et de harcèlement permanent sur des cibles particulières : forces de police, fonctionnaires, et citoyens ordinaires qui ont des sympathies pour l'ordre républicain. Les bilans de la police de Chhattisgarh ont avancé le chiffre de 235 morts dans leurs rangs et parmi les civils entre janvier et novembre 2009... A la mi-juillet 2009, la presse indienne se fit largement l'écho d'une descente spectaculaire d'un petit détachement Naxal dans une fête organisée par une unité de police. Les militants maoïstes exécutèrent sommairement sur place 29 éléments des forces de l'ordre. Telle est l'expression quotidienne d'un conflit larvé, d'une révolution en couveuse qui constitue jusqu'à la caricature, la ligne de front de la guerre antilibérale qui se livre depuis un demi-siècle à partir des ressorts de l'intercontinentale de la fin de la fin de l'histoire.

Pour l'observateur indien non-affilié à ses arcanes protéiformes, le mouvement maoïste Naxal demeure un scandale politique insolvable. Dans " Utopian and Dystopian Elements in the Maoist Vision of the Future " ²¹, tout en critiquant sévèrement les penseurs occidentaux comme J. L. Talmon, Norman Cohn, Daniel Bell, et tous ceux qui ont prématurément célébré « la fin des idéologies », Maurice Meisner conclut néanmoins que le Maoïsme est en dernière analyse une doctrine nihiliste. Le mouvement Naxal aurait donc absorbé de son ascendant chinois ce penchant originel. Il n'a pas d'ambitions structurelles réalistes. Le rejet total de la féodalité et de l'ordre capitaliste n'est pas contrasté par une alternative crédible, réactualisée. Paradoxalement, au-delà du terrain encombré de la rhétorique, le mouvement Naxal n'offre pas jusqu'ici une vision utopique d'un futur radieux en construction. En Inde, les préceptes cardinaux du Maoïsme classique que prônent obstinément les Naxalistes depuis plus de 40 ans, à savoir le bannissement du hiatus entre la valeur du travail intellectuel et la valeur du travail manuel ; le rejet du traitement préférentiel des villes par rapport aux campagnes par les acteurs du jeu politique ; la reconnaissance des masses paysannes comme moteur de tout projet révolutionnaire contrairement au prolétariat urbain jugé parasite ; la condamnation des propensions bourgeoises de l'Etat ; et l'éducation idéologique de masse par l'action militante restent des formules doctrinaires qui cachent mal la dé crédibilisation progressive de l'insurrection. Les rangs des insurgés sont

aujourd'hui estimés entre 10 et 12,000 combattants répartis principalement dans les états de la ceinture centrale du sous-continent : le Maharastra (qui abrite la capitale Mumbai), l'Andhra Pradesh, le Chhattisgarh, l'Orissa, le Jharkhand, et le Bihâr qui est adossé à la frontière Sud du Népal). Poursuivant aveuglément ses tactiques de guérilla de harcèlement, les unités Naxalistes pratiquent aussi, parmi les populations au nom desquelles elles luttent, extorsions et rapines, exécutions sommaires et chantages électoraux. Depuis les années 1970 et jusqu'à une période récente, surtout dans les milieux étudiants et par extension dans certaines franges politisées de la classe moyenne urbanisée, les Naxalistes avaient joui d'une réputation à la Che Guevara : révolutionnaires altruistes intelligents, solidaires des masses exploitées, préparant le « Grand Soir ». Le leader charismatique et parrain du mouvement dans ses premiers pas, Charu Majumdar (1918-1972) lui-même originaire de l'état du West Bengal où la rébellion est née, marqua des points impressionnants entre 1967 et 1972 dans sa propagande anti-bourgeoise, anti-establishment, pour l'éveil idéologique de la jeunesse, et une éthique politique égalitariste. On retrouve dans les positions de l'époque le nihilisme antibureaucratique obsessionnel typique du Maoïsme. Cette neurasthénie de la violence compensatrice qui « vaincra le mal de l'exploitation » trouve d'ailleurs une critique franche et frontale, dans les propres rangs de l'insurrection :

...an idea was propagated that in our country we need not wait long in cities as in China. We can establish red terror in cities as well. For this purpose, annihilation of the class enemy and the state machinery through guerilla methods was necessary immediately. All things were done in the name of the new national and international situation [...]. Sentimental students were used to perform democratic and socialist revolutions simultaneously. Such activities as burning educational institutions, libraries, laboratories and destroying the educational system were prescribed.²²

Qu'en est-il de la préparation à l'exercice du pouvoir ? Aujourd'hui encore, l'impasse politique qui caractérise les desseins maoïstes peut difficilement se poser en alternative à la démocratie parlementaire indienne florissante. Même si elle peine visiblement encore à le faire de façon décisive et irréversible, l'administration centrale (notamment avec l'impulsion de la confiance des électeurs exprimée lors des élections générales de la mi-2009) devrait vaincre Naxal à l'usure, par la systématisation de méthodes de " contre terrorisme " mieux pensées et généreusement financées.

Dans les « zones libérées », les rebelles armés créent des gouvernements parallèles ou des « assemblées populaires souveraines » (*gram sabhas*) et des tribunaux paysans passent en jugement les partisans de la réaction. Les choix politiques du mouvement comme la tendance marquée au boycott des consultations électorales sont de moins en moins populaires et finissent pas être imposés par la force aux populations prises dans l'étau. Les politiciens modérés du Communist Party of India – Marxist (CPI-M) alias CPM qui, en 2008 ont défendu sur l'échiquier nationale la stratégie du Troisième Front (Third Front – paquet de politiques économiques et sociales centristes respectueusement distantes de celles du *Bharatiya Janata Party* – BJP ; Parti du Peuple Indien – des nationalistes hindous et du Congress Party) sont dénoncés par les puristes de la guérilla comme des " opportunistes " et des " traîtres ", prêts à entériner la persistance des schémas sociaux hérités de la féodalité pro-capitaliste. Des voix plus neutres, aux États-Unis par exemple leur font des critiques similaires, même si évidemment la tonalité de la rhétorique en est ici plus courtoise :

India's Communist Party [...] campaigns not for economic growth to benefit the very poor but rather to maintain the relatively privileged conditions of unionized workers and party apparatchiks. In fact, India's left-wing is largely opposed to the policies that have finally reduced mass poverty. In all this ideological and political posturing, the interests of the 800 million Indians who earn less than two dollars a day often fall through the cracks.²³

Depuis quelques années, le recul palpable de la popularité du mouvement Naxal suggère que ses dirigeants s'accrochent largement à des valeurs révolutionnaires anachroniques qui ne correspondent plus au pragmatisme des " masses ". Alors, le mouvement Naxal en cette fin de la fin de l'histoire ; intégrité morale ou cécité idéologique ? La révolution, pour être nationaliste, doit s'articuler sur des aspirations objectives, vérifiables. C'est le cas au Népal où les maoïstes se sont faits les porte-drapeaux du désir authentifié de changement qui couvait parmi la majorité de la population depuis plusieurs décennies. Traditionnellement, le Marxisme-léninisme s'est décliné partout dans le monde comme une analyse fonctionnelle des rapports de classe à l'échelle nationale tels que conditionnés par les réalités géopolitiques internationales afin d'en dériver des recettes théoriques qui aident à comprendre et/ou provoquer les grands changements. Rien n'a changé – ou presque. Les mêmes prismes doivent logiquement être mis à contribution pour aborder les questions attenantes aux réalités de la fin de la fin de l'histoire. Le renoncement au communisme est-il complet et définitif au Viêt-Nam ? Pourquoi la gauche a-t-elle perdu le pouvoir au Chili au début de l'année 2010 ? Depuis près de 15 ans, l'émergence de l'Inde au rang de puissance économique, diplomatique, politico-militaire semble rendre toujours plus obsolètes les projections doctrinales de Naxal alors même que la morale du maître du marché cherche à supplanter l'idéalisme révolutionnaire :

Azim Premji, a technology multibillionaire, has said he will leave the bulk of his fortune in a foundation, much as Bill Gates has. Anil Aggarwal, another self-made billionaire, has announced plans to donate \$1 billion toward setting up a new private university in Orissa, one of India's poorest regions. Private and nonprofit groups are getting involved in health care and education, taking on functions that should be the responsibility of the state. By some measures, more than 25 percent of schools and 80 percent of the health system in India now lie outside the state sector. The software firm Infosys Technologies has started its own corporate foundation to provide rural areas with hospitals, orphanages, classrooms, and schoolbooks.²⁴

La révolution que propose le mouvement Naxal rejette la démocratie parlementaire et suggère de la supplanter par une démocratie populaire car ses idéologues estiment que, dans la configuration actuelle, ce sont quelques puissances d'argent non représentatives qui prennent unilatéralement les décisions qui affectent le destin de la nation et celui des masses défavorisées.

En ce début du vingt-et-unième siècle, le naxalisme indien, et le zapatisme mexicain recouvrent, malgré des contextes radicalement différents, certaines similarités qui les font apparaître à la face du monde comme des mythes en crise. Les objectifs stratégiques visant à saboter la pénétration du salariat industriel dans les zones rurales, ainsi que toutes les autres luttes qui sont inspirées par le désir de conquérir le sens de l'histoire ne semblent pas empêcher la marginalisation continue de ces mouvements d'extrême-gauche dans la course pour le contrôle effectif du pouvoir politique. En Inde, l'option idéologique de la " guerre totale " héritée de la Chine des années 1940 est en décalage avec l'ébullition démocratique et économique du pays. Dans la Chine d'alors, après la scission avec le Kouo-Min-Tang, le Parti Communiste chinois se trouvait de facto à la tête d'une véritable armée et conçut assez naturellement sa stratégie de la conquête du pouvoir comme une campagne militaire. Le recours à la guérilla tenait alors purement du fait que cette stratégie assurait un degré d'efficacité maximale contre l'ennemi. Finalement, tout semble indiquer que, exactement comme à la période de sa fondation en 1964, le Parti Communiste Indien de tendance Marxiste-Léniniste qui est la vitrine légale de Naxal cherchait à créer plutôt que de copier une théorie révolutionnaire (venue de Chine) par rapport au jeu des influences géostratégiques globales, tout en étant incapable de constater de constater son apparente incapacité à jamais réussir cette œuvre de création. La praxis naxaliste n'est vraisem-

blement pas guidée par les résultats de réflexions actualisées sur le rôle de la violence dans la propagation d'objectifs politiques dans le contexte d'un état de droit en pleine croissance ; et de l'évaluation des pratiques qui ont fait – ou non – leurs preuves dans la création de réseaux de solidarité avec/entre les communautés opprimées. A l'occasion des cérémonies grandioses pour marquer le sixantième anniversaire de la révolution du 1^{er} Octobre 1949, le Bureau National de la Statistique produisit des chiffres selon lesquels le revenu moyen des familles chinoises en milieu urbain avait été multiplié par 20 depuis l'avènement de Mao Tsé-toung. La nouveauté et la richesse intellectuelle des slogans maoïstes du milieu du siècle dernier se sont progressivement mutées en slogans de richesses. Comme pour entériner la fin de la fin de l'histoire (euro centrée), la Chine et l'Inde retrouvent aujourd'hui, après deux siècles d'errements économiques, le statut enviable d'être les lieux d'où sont générés plus du tiers des biens et services de la planète. On peut s'attendre à ce que ces nations, en leur centre comme à leurs périphéries, produisent aussi des dynamiques visant à réintroduire une certaine préséance de leur vision du monde dans l'histoire universelle. Selon les chiffres de la Banque Mondiale, 135 millions d'individus se sont hissés au delà du seuil de pauvreté entre 1999 et 2004 dans le monde. Bien évidemment, la grande majorité de ces rescapés de la reféodalisation du monde (" le Consensus de Washington ") sont des citoyens chinois et indiens.

Au Mexique, là où la fin de la fin de la l'histoire a été " théorisée " dans l'action militante, mais surtout en Afrique subsaharienne la majorité des citoyens restent au contraire jusqu'ici criblés par le poids de la mauvaise gouvernance et un isolement certain par rapport à la jouissance de l'explosion de la production de richesses qui découle de la globalisation.

Cabral : le manuel intemporel de la révolution totale

Cabral, Secrétaire-Général du légendaire *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* PAIGC (Parti Africain pour l'Indépendance de la Guinée et du Cap-Vert), fut assassiné le 20 janvier 1973 à Conakry (Guinée dirigée par Ahmed Sékou Touré) par un traître, Innocenta Camida, ayant infiltré la rébellion et le cercle intime du chef comme agent des colonialistes portugais 3 ans auparavant. Cabral reste -avec Frantz Fanon (dont la base était l'Algérie engagée dans une lutte de libération frontale avec la puissance militaire française)- le théoricien qui a le mieux articulé et incarné les valeurs, et expliqué les méthodes optimales de la révolution africaine totale en y joignant une dévotion entière à la lutte armée. Il se présente dans le cycle de la fin de la fin de l'Histoire, avant l'implosion du bloc de l'Est, comme un " dogmatique réaliste " qui sait le besoin de la théorie, tout en comprenant qu'il n'y aura jamais de recettes toutes faites pour la construire. A plusieurs égards, Cabral produit progressivement, dès le début des années 1950 (c'est-à-dire quarante ans avant la fin de l'histoire version Francis Fukuyama), le substrat humaniste de la rébellion zapatiste qui a nommément annoncé la fin de la fin de l'histoire ; notamment quand il instruit les cadres du PAIGC sur l'antimilitarisme et les questions afférentes de conscience politique : " Nous sommes des militants armés, et non des militaristes " un positionnement moral qui est finalement repris littéralement par le Sous-commandant Marcos quand il dit du zapatisme qu'il se réclame d'idées avant de se réclamer de fusils. Cabral proclame aussi le caractère identitaire de la fin de la fin de l'histoire au nom de peuples martyrisés par le colonialisme et le capitalisme.

Quand il meurt en 1973, rien qu'en Afrique Noire, les guérillas indépendantistes en Angola, au Mozambique, au Zimbabwe, en Namibie, et en Afrique du Sud ségrégationniste font des avancées très perceptibles dans leur combats contre le triumvirat de Marcello Caetano (chef du gouvernement portugais de 1968 à 1974), Ian Smith (Premier Ministre de la colonie autogouvernée de la Rhodésie du Sud de 1964 à 1965 ; et premier chef d'état de la Rhodésie ségrégationniste indépendante de 1965 à 1979) ; et de Balthazar Vorster (premier ministre puis président de l'Afrique du Sud entre les années 1966 et 1979) soutenu à bras-le-corps par les

pays occidentaux. Ainsi, l'assassinat de Cabral continue une longue tradition d'élimination des agents de la fin de la fin de l'histoire par les agents de l'impérialisme occidental hâtifs de célébrer l'occurrence d'une impossible fin de l'histoire. Symboliquement, autant que sur le plan empirique, Cabral rejoint paradoxalement la notion hégélienne de " lutte pour la reconnaissance " (de soi) et le combat pour la formation d'une identité satisfaisante pour l'Homme Total. Selon Hegel, la liberté humaine naît et se développe dans le principe directeur de dépassement des besoins naturels pour se projeter dans la satisfaction de besoins plus nobles, plus élevés, plus élusifs, plus *radicaux*, serions-nous tentés de penser. Cabral réalise finalement l'installation dans l'histoire de l'Afrique et du monde, l'application politique de la philosophie hégélienne sur la nature de l'histoire et le triomphe de *thymos* (Fukuyama 1992 : xvi-xvii), le principe du désir de plénitude individuelle. Ce faisant, il met à jour la contradiction fondamentale du système capitaliste mondial qui exprime l'idéologie libérale universaliste prétendant consacrer l'éclosion optimale d'une l'humanité librement assumée par un citoyen émancipé, capable de maîtriser les courbes d'évolution de sa propre conscience sociale. La pensée politique de Cabral, chronologiquement calée entre Hegel et Fukuyama, est le produit d'une époque où il s'agit de faire avancer la critique de la fin de l'histoire par les armes; en s'émancipant – aussi – des institutions occidentales d'extrême-gauche a priori sympathiques de la crise existentielle de l'homme non-européen du vingtième siècle opprimé par les forces du marché. Les principes originaux de la fin de la fin de l'histoire conçus par Cabral peuvent résumer le programme virtuel de notre intercontinentale : retour aux sources ; suicide de classe (renoncement volontaire aux privilèges néocoloniaux de la petite bourgeoisie autochtone exploiteuse) ; élaboration d'une théorie révolutionnaire applicable à des projets sociopolitiques, économiques et culturels précis ; dessin soigneux de la topologie ethno-philosophique du peuple ; élévation des particularismes de l'insurrection contre des forces exploiteuses au rang de principes politiques universels. Contemporain des premières évolutions du mouvement Naxal à une époque où celui-ci est pratiquement inconnu dans la politologie internationale ; annonciateur de l'insurrection altermondialiste des zapatistes mexicains par son imaginaire de la rupture radicale ; et théoricien iconoclaste de la guerre du peuple similaire à celle qu'on conduite avec succès les maoïstes népalais ; Cabral a précocement démontré que le processus de l'Histoire universelle, loin de s'arrêter triomphalement avec l'ascendance du libéralisme, multiplie au contraire les raisons objectives de créer des situations transnationales révolutionnaires pour faire essuyer des défaites militaires aux féodalités capitalistes traditionnelles et réinventer l'avenir. L'Etat bourgeois moderne, selon la pensée marxiste, est toujours générateur d'instruments de subjugation des aspirations des classes laborieuses. Si Amílcar Lopes Cabral n'est marxiste que par le style pour ainsi dire, c'est que la pensée marxiste-léniniste n'a pas de valeur structurelle dans sa démarche et son héritage. En cherchant à installer en Guinée Bissau et dans l'archipel du Cap Vert une nouvelle impulsion historique basée sur la capacité de saccager, en vérité, les ressorts capitalistes de l'exploitation, d'amorcer dans ces sociétés la fin de la fin de l'histoire, l'expérimentation politique de Cabral dépasse en modernité, en pragmatisme, et en sophistication rationaliste toutes les aventures néo-socialistes qui ont germé sur le continent, se rapprochant plus des modèles probants d'émancipation nationale élaborés en Asie :

*In short, [...] the PAIGC and FRELIMO emerged at independence as toughened, effective and self-confident political machines with a clear sense of political identity, realistic ambitions and considerable political experience. As such, the PAIGC and FRELIMO had more in common with the Vietminh or the CCP (China) than with TANU (Tanzania), KANU (Kenya), the CCP (Ghana), the PDCI (Ivory Coast) or even the PDG (Guinée). [...] The party's legitimacy depended on what it did, rather than what it promised to do.*²⁵

Si le langage des architectes de la Commune de Paris (1871) (cette république ouvrière éphémère) et les vitupérations idéologiques d'extrême-gauche du temps de la Guerre Froide sont apparemment désuets, il n'en demeure pas moins que l'apport de Cabral dans les corpus de philosophie politique et les théories identitaires se situent exactement à l'opposé de la notion fukuyamaienne du Dernier Homme – *The End of History and the Last Man*. Cabral est a contrario, le mécène d'un Nouvel Homme, politiquement savant et idéologiquement intègre (comme le Colonel Thomas Sankara qui présida aux destinées du Burkina Faso entre 1983 et 1987), capable de vaincre les phénomènes d'opportunisme personnel qui ont beaucoup contribué jusqu'ici à sceller le sort du Tiers-Monde :

Ainsi, le retour aux sources n'a pas d'importance historique s'il ne se fonde pas sur un engagement véritable dans la lutte pour l'indépendance, mais aussi une identification sans réserves, absolue avec les aspirations des masses qui contestent non seulement la culture étrangère, mais le principe même de toute domination étrangère. Autrement, le retour aux sources n'est rien d'autre –consciemment ou inconsciemment- qu'une tentative de trouver des avantages à court terme ; une espèce d'opportunisme politique.²⁶

Les ambitions démocratiques de Cabral sont essentielles à la circonscription d'un espace dans lequel constituer un héritage solidaire pour une intercontinentale de la fin de la fin de l'histoire qui promeut un humanisme antilibéral. A partir de 1964 déjà, juste après le Congrès historique du PAIGC à Cassacá, quand l'issue victorieuse de la lutte anticoloniale devient palpable, il impulse des changements qui révèlent une inversion progressive des priorités : les exigences de la mobilisation politique commencent alors à laisser la place aux questions économiques et sociales, et le parti amorce une modernisation radicale pour se muer effectivement en force de gouvernement néo-socialiste, abordant de front la question du tribalisme et les dangers de la sédition dans les structures internes. Le Congrès de Cassacá, dans notre perspective humaniste antilibérale est un moment de consécration, en Afrique de l'Ouest, du pouvoir mystifiant de l'histoire dans la même veine que le début de l'insurrection de Naxalbari en 1967. Les succès enregistrés par le PAIGC dans la conscientisation des masses paysannes en Guinée Bissau (et au Cap Vert) et la formation politique des cadres du parti, dans les circonstances extrêmes où ils ont eu lieu, témoignent d'une capacité de dépassement, d'une éthique révolutionnaire, de diligence et de consistance idéologique que peu de nations africaines n'ont jamais su émuler :

Portuguese colonial rule had done virtually nothing to educate Guineans. For all practical purposes, therefore the PAIGC started its education programme from scratch. At the Cassacá Congress the party determined to provide at least basic general primary education in the liberated areas. According to the party, the decision was rapidly implemented thereafter and it is reported that as early as 1964-65 there were 4,000 students in 50 schools. [...] Even a cursory glance at the curriculum shows quite clearly that there was little political indoctrination.²⁷

Dans l'exercice du nationalisme moderne, Cabral est, sans aucun parallèle en Afrique Noire, l'épitomé de la pratique révolutionnaire émancipée des pièges doctrinaires ; et sur le plan international il réussit avant sa mort, la prouesse de mettre le futur Etat guinéen sur une trajectoire non-alignée qui fut maintenue sans difficulté jusqu'à la fin de la guerre froide. A la différence que celle-ci s'est élaborée hors d'un contexte de guérilla indépendantiste, et à une période où l'URSS n'avait plus les moyens de sa propagande active pour contrer les velléités impérialistes de l'occident, la révolution sankariste avortée au Burkina Faso reprend les paradigmes moraux de la révolution totale de Cabral que l'on retrouve peu ou prou dans tous les territoires de l'intercontinentale et leurs satellites institutionnels : " démocratie " populaire ; guerre du peuple contre

les oligarchies financières ; invitation de l'intelligentsia occidentalisée au suicide de classe ; humanisme universaliste. L'instabilité chronique qui a marqué l'histoire politique de la Guinée Bissau depuis les années 1990 montre que les acquis durables du processus en question sont aujourd'hui négligeables.

Gouvernements populaires asymétriques : Le mythe en crise de San Cristobal et les intrigues de la fin de la fin de l'Histoire au Katmandou.

Les zapatistes sont par essence à la périphérie de la nation alors que les maoïstes népalais se sont largement arrogé le contrôle de l'administration centrale nationale. Mis à part le très bref interlude de 1959-60, le Népal, petit pays de 147.000 Km² calé entre le géant chinois au nord-est et le sous-continent indien au sud qui vit son indépendance reconnue par le Royaume Uni en 1923, un quart de siècle avant l'Inde est régi par une monarchie héréditaire pendant la quasi-totalité de son histoire nationale, des années 1760 à nos jours. Avant la déposition récente du roi Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev par l'Assemblée Constituante (Mai 2008), le pays était de facto une monarchie hindoue, vu que près de 90% de la population sont adeptes de cette religion. Aujourd'hui, la croisade victorieuse de la fin de la fin de l'Histoire y est conduite par le Secrétaire Général du Parti Communiste Népalais – maoïste (NCP – M), Pushpa Kamal Dahal qui préfère être reconnu sous son nom de guerre [Camarade] *Prachandra* car, dit-il, son nom à l'état civil est par trop évocateur du *bahunbad* (le brahmanisme féodal). Prachandra a politiquement tué le dernier roi du Népal en gagnant la *jama yuddah* (guerre du peuple) pour installer ce même peuple au pouvoir dans le cadre d'une république populaire, fédérale, égalitariste. Au dernier trimestre de 2001, plus de 24.000 personnes avaient perdu la vie du fait de l'escalade des attaques des maoïstes sur les infrastructures et les officiels de l'Etat, surtout dans les districts de l'ouest (Gorkha, Jajarkot, Salyan, Rolpa, et Rukum) où la poigne de l'administration centrale était beaucoup moins forte. Les accords de cessez-le-feu de novembre 2006 avaient par la suite, inéluctablement balisé le chemin de l'entrée au gouvernement du CPN en janvier 2007.

La déclaration de la fin de la fin de l'histoire qui ébranla les certitudes de l'administration libérale au Mexique fut lancée par le Sous-commandant Marcos le 1er janvier 1994. La " guerre du peuple " qui a eu raison de la monarchie népalaise fut lancée deux ans plus tard, le 13 février 1996. L'essor du libéralisme en Europe (thatchérisme) et en Amérique du nord (sous les gouvernements Reagan-Bush) dans les années 1980 avait balisé le chemin pour la signature des dispositions de libre échange sous la houlette du *North American Free Trade Agreement* (NAFTA). Les contrecoups de ces accords ont été particulièrement dévastateurs pour les paysans indigènes, notamment dans l'Etat du Chiapas au sud du Mexique, provoquant l'éclosion de l'Armée Zapatiste de Libération Nationale mondialement connue sous son sigle espagnol – *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* – EZLN. Malgré son caractère fondamentalement local, sous régional, la rébellion zapatiste apparaît comme l'expression la mieux définie du " manifeste de l'internationale antilibérale ". L'importance de l'insurrection dont certains des symboles de mobilisation se trouvent dans la ville de San Cristobal de las Casas réside dans le fait qu'elle contribue à l'histoire globale un modèle d'hégémonie culturelle paradoxal dans lequel des revendications identitaires circonscrites à un territoire particulier ont généré des créneaux durables de contestations politiques internationales contre l'air du temps. La posture confiante des élites dirigeantes sous le régime de Carlos Salinas de (1988-1994) visant à libéraliser l'économie mexicaine pour attirer les capitaux étrangers se trouvait instantanément menacée d'invalidation. Le gouvernement de Vicente Fox (2000-2006) adoptera une attitude en théorie moins intransigeante avec les paysans insurgés. Pourtant la modernisation/dérégulation de l'économie mexicaine et le " progrès national " avaient été précisément envisagés comme devant annihiler toutes les velléités de replis identitaire basés sur l'ethnie, la race, l'origine régionale, ou les

affiliations politiques ; notamment dans les milieux où les risques d'auto-aliénation étaient perçus comme plus accrus, c'est-à-dire parmi les communautés indigènes :

In the " Quixotic search for the modernity promised by Western civilization ", Salinas' rhetoric attempted to highlight the " modern " and adaptive qualities of the " new " Mexico, in time effectively silencing those in places seen as unmodern and uncivilized.²⁸

De l'année de sa fondation en 1929 jusqu'à son éviction du pouvoir en 2000, le *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (Parti Révolutionnaire Institutionnel – PRI) avait dominé le contrôle de l'appareil d'état au Mexique avec son idéologie nationaliste, centriste, social-démocrate. Partiellement comme une conséquence de la crise pétrolière des années 1970, le parti perdit régulièrement de sa popularité et de sa représentativité du fait de son incapacité à satisfaire les attentes historiques relatives à la qualité des services sociaux. Au milieu des années 1970 déjà, les paysans du Chiapas avaient pris leurs distances du PRI en fondant le *Congreso Nacional Indígena* – CNI – (Congrès National Indigène) et en radicalisant leurs revendications. Ils avaient alors soumis des doléances réclamant le droit à l'auto-détermination. La constitution mexicaine de 1917 avait tracé résolument les voies d'un corporatisme d'Etat prenant en compte les aspirations des ouvriers et des paysans dans les plans de développement. Le corollaire culturel de cette idéologie nationaliste inclusive était donc la glorification du métissage (*mestizaje*) sous l'ingénierie d'un Etat central s'assurant comme vecteur de l'intégration entre les traditions occidentales (d'origine espagnole) et les identités indigènes (historiquement marginalisées) ; et comme arbitre des conflits de classe. En mutant sa doctrine de gouvernance d'un " nationalisme révolutionnaire " vers un " nationalisme libéral ", le PRI et les (nouvelles) élites technocrates qui prirent les rennes du pouvoir à la fin des années 1980 introduisirent, du fait même de la tectonique de l'accumulation capitaliste, des tensions, désillusions, et heurts dans la conduite des programmes de développement économique. Trois-quarts de siècle de corporatisme d'Etat et de social-démocratie avait créé une forte culture du développement autocentré dans les communautés paysannes du Mexique. L'article 27 de la constitution de 1917, portant sur la réforme agraire avait redistribué la terre aux paysans qui la cultivent en réaction aux nationalisations et aux expropriations qui avaient marqué la présidence (1871-1911) du général-dictateur José de la Cruz Porfirio Diaz avant qu'il ne fut défait par la révolution mexicaine. Depuis une vingtaine d'année, encouragés au début par les incitations fiscales des gouvernements Salinas et son successeur Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon (1994-2000), au Chiapas, le défrichement des terres par les *rancheros*, les prospections pétrolières, et les structures d'exploitations forestières ont accru la pression sur le territoire et ont logiquement poussé les paysans pauvres à la remobilisation politique. La rébellion zapatiste est strictement une réponse à la mécanique de la fin de l'histoire. La politique du président Salinas peut se résumer à trois axes symptomatiques du libéralisme triomphant : rupture du contrat social ; courtiser les investisseurs en acceptant l'érosion des mesures protectionnistes ; affaiblir toutes les formes d'opposition politique frontales. Pour ce dernier point par exemple, l'instrumentalisation et le sponsoring de *caciques*, individus d'origines indigènes achetés par le gouvernement fédéral pour saboter les organisations de base de l'intérieur, sont bien connues. Dans une logique contradictoire, l'insurrection de San Cristobal s'appliqua à redéfinir le sens pratique des éléments de la devise nationale : souveraineté, justice, et liberté. Là où l'esthétique narrative de la libéralisation avait bénéficié du financement des multinationales, des gouvernements occidentaux et de la complicité des media pro-capitalistes pour présenter le concept d'un " changement dans la continuité ", l'EZLN développa une savante utilisation des media occidentaux pour dénoncer le subterfuge. Les droits constitutionnels des classes laborieuses et des populations indigènes pouvaient être soumis à une érosion certaine si l'enjeu était la survie même de la nation mexicaine et son intégration dans la communauté (économique) globalisée.

En fait, le désir d'unification nationale, de stabilité, qui répond aux attentes des investisseurs, crée la tentation de forcer des politiques d'homogénéisation artificielle d'une réalité nationale plurielle en termes de relations de classe, ethnicité, expériences de participation politique, visions du monde. La répression des sous-nationalismes d'extrême-gauche correspond presque toujours à une ambition discursive de présenter la nation comme homogène et résolue dans sa marche vers le progrès économique et social. Dans la réalité, au Mexique comme au Népal, les forces antilibérales dénoncent au contraire une marginalisation extrême des minorités ethniques et culturelles. A l'opposé de l'insurrection maoïste népalaise (*Peoples Liberation Army – PLA*) que l'on soupçonnait en 2006-2007 d'être le groupe paramilitaire le plus important du monde avec 15 à 20,000 guérilleros. L'EZLN à une conscience claire qu'il ne peut infliger une défaite militaire à l'armée mexicaine. La rébellion zapatiste est didactique et internationaliste tandis que le maoïsme népalais est essentiellement politicien et nationaliste. Ce que les symboles politiques de San Cristobal ambitionnent, c'est de décrédibiliser la posture d'autosatisfaction des élites mexicaines et de forcer l'acceptation de réformes. Dès 1996 en effet, on enregistre l'effusion de groupes de solidarité et d'assistance aux zapatistes dans des latitudes aussi diverses que les USA, l'Argentine, l'Espagne, l'Italie, l'Angleterre, la Suisse, la France et le Royaume Uni. Dans l'acte fondateur, la " Déclaration de la Selva Lacandon " du 1^{er} janvier 1994, la stratégie de pression politique du Conseil Général de l'EZLN visant à imposer une nouvelle morale constitutionnelle ponctuelle à la nation mexicaine n'en contient pas moins des références transhistoriques empruntées à l'amont de la courbe d'évolution des droits de l'homme dans le monde :

...notre dernier espoir, après avoir épuisé tous les recours pour appliquer la légalité qui émane de notre Magna Carta est de forcer l'application de l'article 39 de notre Constitution [nationale] qui stipule que " La souveraineté nationale est incarnée par le peuple. Tout pouvoir public émane du peuple et est au service du peuple. Le peuple détient en permanence, le droit inaliénable d'altérer ou de modifier la forme de gouvernement en exercice.²⁹

Les Zapatistes manipulent comme à l'accoutumée des symboles politico-culturels forts. Pour attaquer les méfaits idéologiques de la globalisation, lors de la Première Rencontre des Communautés Zapatistes avec les Peuples du Monde en territoire libéré de Oventik en janvier 2007 (célébrations du 13e anniversaire du début de l'insurrection), le sous-commandant Marcos, bien que non-originaire des communautés indigènes, s'adressa à la foule en... Tzotzil. Les maoïstes du Népal eux, ne font pas dans la propagande culturaliste pour la consommation internationale. Le plus grand épanchement internationaliste des ex-rebelles (CPN-M) est peut-être leur implication dans la création du Comité de Coordination des Partis et Organisations Maoïstes d'Asie du Sud (CCOMPOSA) pour permettre des transferts (minimaux) de stratégies révolutionnaires mais cette organisation a toujours été moribonde (Vanaik, fév. 2008 : 56). Le maoïsme au Népal est fondamentalement un mouvement qui a absorbé, plus qu'il n'a jamais projeté des valeurs universelles. Il est d'envergure intra-national et cette réalité tient aussi du fait que le pays n'a bénéficié que d'une intégration marginale dans les structures administratives idoines des anciennes colonies de l'empire britannique durant toute son histoire.

Si en l'espace de cinq courtes années, la nation népalaise de 27 millions d'habitants a célébré une spectaculaire fin de la fin de l'histoire en métamorphosant la dernière monarchie hindoue du monde vieille de deux siècles et demi en une république " populaire ", fédérale, démocratique et séculaire dont l'Assemblée Constituante est sous l'emprise des ex-rebelles maoïstes qui détiennent quelques 220 sièges sur les 601 que comptent l'organe législatif ; le phénomène zapatiste, de la même manière a indirectement participé à précipiter la chute du PRI au Mexique (après trois-quarts de siècle de consolidation d'oligarchies clientélistes, affairistes, expertes en fraudes électorales) avec l'élection de Vicente Fox en juillet 2000. Les crispations

identitaires parmi les Mayas se posent comme une réponse idéologique au développement des identités supranationales qui émergent avec les réarrangements économiques ultralibéraux (exemple : les desseins politiques des *Caciques*, indigènes coptés pour démolir la mobilisation politique des communautés traditionnelles, ou les *Coletos*, les communautés conservatrices de *rancheros*, exploitants agricoles dont les intérêts culturels et financiers sont aux antipodes de ceux des zapatistes). À l'inverse des institutions du capitalisme international qui deviennent toujours plus " invisibles " (au sens keynésien) grâce à la multiplicité de leurs réseaux protéiformes et leurs aspirations diffuses, l'EZLN s'évertue à formuler et introduire des griefs et revendications foncièrement spécifiques et opérationnelles. La série de " déclarations de la jungle Lacandon " qui sont comme les stations intermédiaires de l'itinéraire politique des zapatistes depuis 1994, fournit la topographie stratégique du mouvement. La Première s'annonça comme la " déclaration de guerre " au gouvernement mexicain ; la seconde lança un " appel à la solidarité active (indispensable) de la société civile ; la troisième est un plaidoyer pour la " création d'un mouvement de libération nationale ; la quatrième produisit l'acte fondateur du Front Zapatiste de Libération Nationale (FZLN) ; la cinquième conçut le front national pour la " marginalisation des politiques gouvernementales " ; la sixième de juin 2006 insista, entre autres orientations, sur le renforcement de l'" autonomie de gestion dans les municipalités zapatistes " ; et la " Otra Campaña " – " l'Autre Campagne " – qui la suivit lança une vaste opération de recueil et d'analyse des " aspirations profondes du peuple mexicain pour les apprécier à leur juste valeur. Les Zapatistes y désavouent la gauche mexicaine légaliste et y disent " Non aux tentatives de résoudre les problèmes de [la] Nation par le haut ", mais exigent plutôt une construction " par le bas et pour le bas ". Somme toute, les plateformes zapatistes culminent sur la définition d'un nouvel humanisme antilibéral visant à la conservation des modes de vie communautaristes ; les dogmes et rituels des spiritualités ancestrales. Au Mexique comme au Népal, comme ce fut le cas pendant la guerre froide en Guinée-Bissau et comme s'en targuent les Naxalistes indiens, les contours de la fin de la fin de l'histoire apparaissent comme l'affirmation d'une appropriation explicite de la globalisation avec comme axes principaux une réclamation de droits universels à conquérir par la voie politique militante, révolutionnaire ; et la préservation des particularismes culturels, dont le droit au contrôle des modes de production et de consommation des ressources économiques.

Au Chiapas, en février 1995, au moment où les prospections avaient conclu avec certitude à la présence d'immenses gisements de pétrole dans le sous-sol de la jungle Lacandon, les comités des femmes organisèrent plusieurs marches pour la paix après que des éléments de l'armée mexicaine envahirent des campements zapatistes. Elles arboraient des couronnes de fleurs et brûlaient de l'encens durant leurs processions, donnant un caractère sacralisé à leur rejet de l'interdiction faite aux femmes de militer dans les structures politiques de base (Nash août 2001). Un article du *Monde Diplomatique* d'octobre 2009 titrait : " Passés de mode, les zapatistes... " comme pour prendre la mesure d'un certain essoufflement du mouvement surtout après le psychodrame de l'élection contestée de Felipe Calderon par son rival Lopes Obrador qui a laissé l'opinion publique mexicaine désabusée quant à l'espoir de voir les machines électorales de tous bords canaliser des politiques efficaces de changement réel des conditions de vie de la majorité des citoyens. D'un autre point de vue, le poids économique écrasant de l'Asie et les appréhensions liées à son influence sur les grands changements géostratégiques en devenir, occasionnent certainement une obsession plus forte des analystes pour le développement des " idéologies hégémoniques universalistes " (Wallerstein 1983) qui continuent de s'y déployer. La médiatisation à outrance de la figure du leader et porte-parole des zapatistes, le sous-commandant Marcos (alias " Insurgé Marcos " ou " Délégué Zéro " dans le cadre de l'Autre Campagne), bien que celui-ci ne l'ait ni souhaitée ni encouragée, a pu également introduire dans l'engouement académique des premières heures pour l'histoire du mouvement les caractères d'un phénomène de mode passager.

Au Népal, les facteurs qui sont le plus fréquemment cités pour expliquer la percée politique de l'ex rébellion maoïste entre 1990 et 2006 sont les mêmes que ceux qui minent le paysage politique mexicain : corruption endémique au sein de l'appareil d'état, pauvreté, exclusion, racisme, chômage. Cependant, fideles aux dogmes marxistes-léninistes, les communistes népalais exprimaient depuis toujours un objectif stratégique fondamentalement plus radical : renverser la monarchie et le faux parlementarisme des partis par une révolution armée pour le remplacer par un nouveau système dit de " nouvelle démocratie populaire ". Ainsi, on note que si les revendications zapatistes portent sur des thématiques " conciliatoires " par rapport au peuple, les maoïstes népalais, chaque fois que la balance des forces a fortement changé en leur faveur (août-novembre 2001 ; août 2003 ; avril 2006 pour la capitulation du roi ; septembre-décembre 2007 ; mai 2009 par exemples) ont eu tendance à créer des cadres/espaces de confrontation décisive avec les autorités gouvernementales de la monarchie constitutionnelle qu'ils combattaient : conférence nationale, gouvernement de transition, assemblée constituante, limogeages, lancement de la " réforme du Secteur Sécurité ", " démocratisation de l'armée ", démissions pour créer des crises de gouvernance dont le peuple serait témoin-arbitre. Les rebelles maoïstes ont établi leur stratégie de conquête du pouvoir en radicalisant leur discours de sorte à le situer à gauche de la gauche par rapport aux partis communistes " collaborationnistes " qui avaient la sympathie d'une grande partie de l'électorat. Après la restauration de la démocratie en 1990, les maoïstes ont aussi, mieux que tout autre courant politique, réussi à proposer des aménagements structurels convaincants pour l'épanouissement de la diversité ethnico-religieuse dans le cadre de la décentralisation et du fédéralisme. Cependant, la victoire des maoïstes dans leur ambition de provoquer un changement radical dans l'organisation politique de leur pays n'allait pas leur offrir des avantages électoraux à la mesure de leurs " mérites " dans la nouvelle assemblée constituante, car leur percée n'a pas éliminé les reflexes réactionnaires des partis qui participaient aux rouages de la monarchie constitutionnelle :

In the transition from being an armed revolutionary 'outsider' to working within the established Nepali state framework, the Maoists have discovered grave unanticipated dilemmas caused not just by their own mistakes and arrogance, but by the duplicity and machinations of various forces opposed to them.³⁰

Bien que le royaume du Népal fût formé à la fin du dix-huitième siècle, c'est au milieu du dix-neuvième siècle que les iniquités claniques et religieuses furent institutionnalisées et restèrent en vigueur jusqu'à nos jours malgré l'abolition légale de la discrimination de caste en 1963. Les disparités ont favorisé le grossissement de la base de support populaire dont a bénéficié le Parti Communiste Népalais – Maoïste qui prit l'option, à la grande surprise de beaucoup d'observateurs, de lancer la rébellion armée au début des années 1990 (pendant que Francis Fukuyama concoctait sa théorie de " la fin de l'histoire ") avec l'Armée de Libération du Peuple (PLA). Même si l'option de la lutte armée avait l'allure d'un choix anachronique, elle procédait d'une lecture juste des sentiments et convictions de l'électorat quand à la nature de la monarchie, notamment de la dictature du roi Gyanendra dont l'armée sera généreusement financée par New Delhi et Washington entre 2001 et 2005, au prétexte de la lutte contre le terrorisme. Au contraire de l'EZLN qui a une base régionale et utilise la capitale San Cristobal comme une rampe de lancement pour ses campagnes de sensibilisation, les maoïstes avaient conclu dès le milieu de la décennie passée à une occupation transversale du territoire en contrôlant l'immense majorité des zones rurales, en établissant des comités opérationnels dans la quasi totalité des 75 districts administratifs ; développant une véritable structure de gouvernement avec un directoire national de 7 membres, un bureau politique de 15 membres, et un Comité Central de 40 membres qui encadrait les 5 bureaux régionaux de l'Est, du Centre, de l'Ouest,

de Katmandou, et de l'Étranger (Vanaik, fév. 2008 : 62). La pression de la rébellion est le facteur principal qui a changé le destin politique du Népal. Même si, au finish, il a fallu au courant de l'année 2005, l'émergence d'une large coalition de syndicats d'enseignants et autres professions libérales, de l'intelligentsia, des organismes de la société civile dans le cadre du Mouvement des Citoyens pour la Démocratie et la Paix ; la mise sur pied de l'" Alliance des Sept Partis " (Seven-Party Alliance ou SPA) ; et les efforts de médiation tardifs de la communauté internationale, les maoïstes peuvent légitimement se targuer d'être les grands tombeurs du système monarchique conservateur. Les maoïstes népalais, depuis 2006 semblent peu à l'aise dans les giron du pouvoir car les incertitudes se multiplient dans l'horizon politique national. La démission du camarade maoïste Prachandra (" Le Féroce ") de son poste de Premier Ministre en mai 2010 après seulement huit mois de gouvernance, suite au barrage du président l'empêchant de relever le chef d'état major de ses fonctions participe de la stratégie de maintenir l'image de héros révolutionnaire refusant le compromis avec les réactionnaires qui naguère travaillaient pour le compte du roi déchu. Les maoïstes s'appliquent à mériter la confiance des électeurs qui leur ont donné une majorité relative aux élections de 2008. L'échéance du 28 mai 2010 est celle de tous les défis : l'ex Armée Royale Népalaise (NRA) avec un effectif qui dépasse 90,000 membres et l'ex Armée de Libération du peuple (PLA) dont les effectifs atteignent près de 20,000 âmes doivent être entièrement fusionnées avant ce terme et la nouvelle constitution promulguée. Est-ce possible ? Dans l'interim, des forces des Nations Unies régissent les jeunes guérilleros maoïstes " désœuvrés " dans des camps spéciaux en préparation de leur conscription officielle. La bureaucratie onusienne a établi des critères de maintien des individus sur les listes des membres de la guérilla qui sont en droit de rejoindre les rangs de l'armée nationale. En février 2010, plus de 4000 d'entre eux furent, *contre leur gré* et malgré les protestations véhémentes des leaders maoïstes membres de l'Assemblée Constituante, démobilisés et renvoyés à la vie civile avec des promesses de mesures de réinsertion dans le futur. De toute évidence, les maoïstes ne rechigneront pas devant la possibilité, demain, de se prévaloir de la disponibilité de militants armés pour mener des batailles politiques au nom du " *gans, bas, kapas* pour le peuple " (du pain, un abri, et des vêtements). En faisant son discours d'adieu à une cohorte de jeunes guérilleros démobilisés d'un camp des Nations Unies, un commandant de l'ex-rébellion leur expliqua :

*We are connected in our hearts. Until there is a complete social and economic reconstruction of Nepal, and a complete restructuring of Nepal, I hope you will continue to help in the revolution from the outside.*³¹

Pressés par de multiples exigences liées à l'exercice de fonctions exécutives et législatives, les maoïstes népalais ne semblent pas avoir le luxe de la réflexion et des sessions de stratégie à long terme autour du concept de souveraineté populaire à l'instar de ces gauches sud-américaines qui gouvernent. Les discours politiques d'au moins trois présidents sud-américains en exercice, Lula da Silva, Evo Morales, et Hugo Chávez, qui par ailleurs ; tous les trios, font sans nul doute figure de leaders incontournables pour situer l'ampleur du sentiment " anticapitaliste ", semblent capter ce qui manque le plus aux ex rebelles népalais aux commandes qui doivent maintenant apprendre sur le vif à *penser le potentiel opérationnel des promesses de leur révolution*. Les tenants du « réveil des gauches sud-américaines »³² sont, individuellement et collectivement, les représentants officiels du réveil de la « Nueva Izquierda » et ont été liés, en retour, à un concept mal défini de néo-populisme. Je n'entre pas dans ce débat ici. J'attire plutôt l'attention sur le fait qu'ils représentent une trajectoire de rupture, un tournant, dans les destinées politiques, respectivement, du Brésil, de la Bolivie, et du Venezuela. Dans chaque nation, des programmes concrets sont mis en œuvre pour réaliser leurs desseins, avec comme sous texte, des aspirations régionalistes, « bolivariennes ». Ainsi, les constructions discursives de

ces programmes politiques ; leurs fondements idéologiques retiennent l'attention. La notion même de souveraineté n'est pas un axe central des recherches actuelles en sciences politiques ; encore moins, l'analyse des effets sociaux du discours qui s'inscrit comme action dans l'existence politique nationale et internationale. Il serait utile, par exemple, de considérer l'utilisation récurrente du mot « souveraineté » dans le langage politique – avec une attention particulière pour ses présupposés théoriques, idéologiques. On note, en Amérique Latine par exemple, un retour et des emprunts, dans des contextes si différents, avec quatre cent ans d'écart, sur les premiers débats sur le concept de souveraineté hérités de l'Espagne du seizième siècle ; la réinsertion du concept de *pouvoir constitutif*, jusqu'ici associé à la construction de l'état-nation, revu, corrigé pour être lié maintiennent à la refondation totale de l'ordre constitutionnel.

A l'analyse, Lula da Silva, Evo Morales, et Hugo Chávez parlent du pouvoir constitutif de façon variée, comme synonyme de " la multitude ", " le Peuple ", " la Communauté ", " la Nation ", mais ils semblent s'accorder sur au moins deux axes :

1. le pouvoir constitutif est exprimé par l'assemblée constitutionnelle ; il est d'essence législative

2. le pouvoir constitutif est incarné par le peuple lui-même et transcende toutes les lois ;

Ce qui emmène à poser toujours plus de questions : au-delà des particularismes idéologiques, ethniques et culturels, où/qui est exactement « le peuple » pour celui qui se donne pour mission d'exprimer la volonté du peuple ? Quelles institutions sont chargées de gérer le pacte social ? Qui détient le droit de décider de l'exigence de réversibilité des grandes décisions du passé ? Comment verbalise-t-on le concept et la réalité, du pouvoir constitutif ? Amílcar Lopes Cabral est l'unique pôle de notre intercontinentale à avoir formulé dans le champ politique des réponses confiantes à ces questions.

Conclusion

En 1806, Hegel eut la conviction d'être témoin de la fin de l'histoire. Selon ses analyses, la Révolution française (de concert avec la Révolution américaine selon Fukuyama) avait aboli l'éternel conflit entre le maître et l'esclave. L'esclave ontologique avait conquis sa liberté et son désir de reconnaissance, son humanité. Le triomphe théorique et pratique des principes de souveraineté populaire et l'acceptation par l'état des droits des opprimés constituaient aux yeux d'Hegel le summum de la courbe d'évolution de l'histoire universelle. Mis à part sa superficialité euro-centrique, la théorie hégélienne fut mis à mal par tous les grands mouvements de l'histoire globale dans et hors des sphères politiques occidentales pendant toutes la durée du vingtième siècle.

Près de deux cent ans plus tard, les progrès soutenus du modèle la démocratie libérale, l'expansion tous azimuts de l'économie de marché, les avancées remarquables des canaux de reconnaissance des droits des citoyens, et la popularité des principes de l'état de droit ont fait conclure à Fukuyama que cette fois, l'histoire universelle avait vraiment atteint une évolution paroxystique irréversible. Pourtant, la désintégration de l'URSS et de ses satellites d'Europe orientale qui sert à Fukuyama de base empirique justificatrice doit au contraire être perçue comme le début d'une ère de séquestration du monde sur les plans politique et économique plutôt qu'une évolution qualitative ; une reféodalisation orchestrée par les puissances capitalistes du secteur privé imposant leur volonté jusque dans les chambres exécutives et législatives des démocraties occidentales. On peut parler d'une véritable mise en œuvre systémique de la " théorie impériale " contradictoire développée aux USA au début de la Guerre Froide (Ziegler 2005 :74). D'un autre côté, les écrits de penseurs contemporains comme Samir Amin, Noam Chomsky, et Howard Zinn qui dénoncent invariablement le capitalisme politico-militaire américain et européen sont bien connus.

La fin de l'histoire est une grande illusion. *La fin de la fin de l'histoire* est une grande idée ; d'autant plus grande quand on la situe dans le cadre des études sur le sens et la portée des nationalismes d'extrême-gauche car l'historiographie du nationalisme, comme l'a remarqué

Lloyd Kramer, offre une preuve saisissante que l'histoire des idées n'atteint jamais des points de clôture.³³ Comme je l'ai noté dans l'introduction, le problème des sciences historiques, de leur rapport avec la politique et les crispations identitaires, est le problème de la conscience. Niall Ferguson identifie trois grandes chapelles de pensée distinctes pour cerner la nature et le sens évolutif de ces crispations identitaires : l'école religieuse (théocentrée), l'école utopique (ou téléologique qui admet que les historiens sont les seuls vrais créateurs du réel rationnel), et l'école matérialiste qui soumet l'histoire à des méthodes comparables à celles qui gouverne les travaux des chercheurs dans les sciences naturelles.

L'éclosion de nouvelles formes de souverainetés intra-étatiques, la montée des idéologies régionalistes et leur impact dans le champ des sciences sociales, et la continuité historique de l'intercontinentale de la fin de la fin de l'Histoire se résument comme suit : Cabral (de 1950 à 1973) ; Naxal (de 1967 au présent) ; Népal (de 1990 au présent) ; zapatisme, bolivarismes, et réveil des gauches sud-américaines (de 1990 au présent). Le capitalisme à l'occidentale, la méritocratie, l'individualisme, la théorie de la main invisible autocorrective du marché, l'innovation technologique, le culte de l'excellence par la compétitivité, l'intégrité des biens et des personnes par le respect des lois, l'équité, et la défense des droits culturels et religieux constituent un inventaire convaincant des avancées du libéralisme dans le monde depuis la révolution industrielle du dix-neuvième siècle. Pourtant, le système capitaliste, par essence, congratule et rémunère les spéculateurs bien plus que les ingénieurs et les industriels. Les appétits insatiables des spéculateurs – [" *They don't seem to know the meaning of enough* " entend-on dire des affaires de Wall Street à New York et de la City à Londres]- introduisent, partout, des systèmes d'inégalités porteurs de révoltes futures. Aux États-Unis, 30 millions d'individus sont touchés par le chômage en 2009. Pourtant, les spéculateurs ont tiré leur épingle du jeu en assurant la hausse des taux de la bourse ; et les media occidentaux sont fiers de parler de " relance " au début de l'année 2010, même si, apparemment, une des conséquences profondes de la crise financière de 2008 sera le repositionnement, partout, de l'Etat dans le contrôle des grands leviers économiques, et un frein certain à la dérégulation. Cependant, dans des pays pauvres et/ou émergents comme le Brésil, l'Inde, le Mexique, et le Népal, depuis la fin de la Guerre Froide, les réflexes anticapitalistes et antilibéraux se reconnaissent souvent par leur caractère méta-national, un phénomène qui peut être qualifié de : « régionalisation du nationalisme »³⁴ Les prescriptions identitaires, culturelles et politiques de l'intercontinentale de la fin de la fin de l'histoire ; tout autant que leurs codes de transmission fonctionnent comme des valeurs transmises de génération en génération et deviennent progressivement, parties intégrantes du patrimoine communautaire, national, universel. Dans l'amplification à venir de cet article, je m'intéresserai aux aspects magico-religieux de ces transmissions qui, comme les *hadiths* en Islam, complétant le Saint Coran, secrètent et installent des traditions qui sont comprises et suivies ; obéies, gagnant chronologie, affluence et légitimité aux yeux des militants. D'ailleurs, tout en reconnaissant le caractère fondamentalement politique, intellectuel, de l'humanisme antilibéral de l'intercontinentale de la fin de la fin de l'histoire, je partage les projections du rapport récent (novembre 2008) du National Intelligence Council à Washington D.C. selon lesquelles les résidus des conflits idéologiques issus de la guerre Froide vont s'estomper, dans un environnement où les états, essentiellement préoccupés par leurs efforts pour domestiquer les effets de la globalisation, vont céder le terrain idéologique à l'" Islamisme militant ", surtout dans les nations arabes, où la foi musulmane influence habituellement plus les normes sociales et politiques :

*Increasing religious observance and the failures of Arab nationalism will leave Islamic political and social movements best positioned to assert ideological influence over governments and publics in much of the Muslim world over the next 15-20 years.*³⁵

La religion et le sous-nationalisme à caractère ethnique, plus que le radicalisme des mouvements d'extrême-gauche deviennent les grands concurrents de l'idéologie ultralibérale universaliste. La question principale que les analystes posent à l'intercontinentale de la fin de la fin de l'histoire est la suivante : a-t-elle, comme la " société ouverte " du capitalisme, les attributs pour perdurer pendant le 21^e siècle, sans un mythe monolithique qui la soutiendrait et sans une autorité infaillible qui la renforcerait ? L'intercontinentale suppose-t-elle que gouverner, c'est exercer la guerre de la vérité contre l'erreur ? Quelle(s) vérité(s) ?

Notes

¹ *Novus Ordo Seclorum* : formule attribuée à l'homme d'Etat américain (père fondateur) Charles Tompson qui la proposa sur le design du grand sceau national accepté par le Congrès le 20 juin 1782. Elle signifie « Nouvel Ordre pour les Siècles ». Les ingrédients du mirage d'autorité transparaissent dans la lettre officielle d'adieu qu'il adressa aux Forces Armées Américaines le 8 juin 1783. George Washington y déclare : « The foundation of our Empire was not laid in the gloomy age of Ignorance and Superstition, but at an Epocha when the rights of mankind were better understood and more clearly defined, than at any former period ». Arnold Toynbee, membre nostalgique du parti conservateur (Tory) au Royaume Uni, est témoin/analyste de ces événements ; Napoléon Bonaparte en est un protagoniste : « C'est à l'idéologie, à cette ténébreuse métaphysique, qui, en cherchant avec subtilité les causes premières, veut sur ces bases fonder la législation des peuples, au lieu d'approprier les lois à la connaissance du cœur humain et aux leçons de l'histoire, qu'il faut attribuer tous les malheurs de notre belle France. » Cité par Bart, H. (1945) *Warheit un Ideologie* ; Zurich, p. 30. Voir aussi Taine, H. (1898). *Origines de la France contemporaine*. Paris. Vol. 2, pp. 219-220. En d'autres circonstances Napoléon fut plus lapidaire pour dire son dégoût des idéologues : « Les canons ont tué le féodalisme. L'encre tuera la société moderne » [Napoléon Bonaparte (1913). *Pensées*. Paris. p. 43.]

² En dehors des grands changements périodiques, les centres de l'industrie moderne – ateliers, chaînes de productions, usines, extractions, manutentions, services- ne cessent jamais d'attirer et de rejeter les travailleurs. En général, l'industrie attire plus qu'elle ne se sépare de la masse laborieuse ; de sorte que le nombre des ouvriers exploités va toujours croissant, bien qu'il baisse proportionnellement, par rapport à l'ensemble de la production. Quand le régime capitaliste s'est emparé de l'agriculture par exemple, la demande de travail y a chuté de façon nette à mesure que le capital s'y accumule. Une partie importante des masses rurales se trouvent donc, en permanence, en proie à l'attraction des ghettos urbains où elles espèrent se convertir en main d'œuvre manufacturière dans des circonstances rarement favorables. Ce phénomène est devenu banal dans le monde entier.

³ Leader Maoïste Baburam Bhattarai, entretien avec le Mouvement de Résistance Populaire Mondial basé en Grande-Bretagne, le 26 octobre 2009.

⁴ Dans un discours prononcé en janvier 1966 à la Havane dans le cadre de la ' Première Conférence Tricontinentale des Peuples d'Asie, d'Afrique et de l'Amérique Latine Cabral affirme : « Nos cœurs sont émus par une certitude inamovible qui renforce notre courage dans cette lutte difficile mais glorieuse contre l'ennemi commun : aucune puissance au monde ne pourrait venir à bout de cette Révolution Cubaine qui crée dans les campagnes et dans les villes une vie nouvelle, mais aussi, et c'est plus important, un Nouvel Homme, pleinement conscient des ses droits et devoirs nationaux, continentaux et internationaux. [...] Nous savons que le développement d'un phénomène en mouvement, quelles que soient ses manifestations externes, dépend essentiellement de ses caractères internes. »

⁵ Fukuyama, F. (1990). *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York : Free Press.

⁶ Lichtheim, G. (1967). *The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays*. New York : Vintage Books, p. 45.

⁷ Chiang Kai-chek (31 Octobre 1887 – 5 Avril 1975) est un leader politique et militaire de la Chine au siècle dernier. Il était un membre influent du Kouo-Min-Tang (KMT), allié de Sun Yat-sen. Quand Sun Yat-sen meurt en 1925, il le remplace à la tête du Kouo-Min-Tang. Il conduisit les expéditions dans le nord pour unifier le pays et le diriger. Il était le leader de la Chine pendant la seconde guerre sino-japonaise (1937-1945). Les nationalistes chinois conduits par Chiang Kai-chek conduisaient une guerre civile larvée avec les militants du Parti Communiste Chinois (PCC). Après la reddition du Japon en 1945, il chercha à liquider le PCC. Cependant, le PCC, maintenant soutenu et armé par l'URSS, eut raison du pouvoir de Chiang Kai-chek qui s'exila à Taiwan avec son gouvernement ; régnant sur l'île d'une main de fer jusqu'à sa mort, avec les titres de « Président de la République de Chine » et « Directeur Général du Kouo-Min-Tang ».

⁸ Dans la période 1945 - 1948, le montant cumulé de l'aide militaire et économique américaines au gouvernement de Chiang Kai-chek s'élève à quelques 2 milliards de dollars.

⁹ Les pays suivants ont fortement marié leur destin (sources de dividendes pétroliers) aux compagnies signalées : Angola (ELF-Aquitaine), Ghana (Exxon), Guinée Équatoriale (Chevron), Iraq (British Petroleum, Shell), Nigeria (Shell), Gabon (ELF-Total), Congo Brazzaville (ELF-Total). A contrario, le 8 mai 2009, le président Vénézuélien a conclu la nationalisation des compagnies pétrolières privées au bénéfice exclusif de *Petróleos de Venezuela* (PDVSA). L'Assemblée nationale du Venezuela a approuvé la loi permettant au gouvernement d'« exproprier intégralement ou en partie les entreprises privées fournissant des services et contribuant à la stabilité de la production de pétrole ». La loi a été signée le jour même par Chavez, qui a indiqué que cette décision faisait partie du programme d'« édification du socialisme ». Le président a ordonné de procéder sans délai à la nationalisation, en ignorant les *vitupérations* de la bourgeoisie pro-capitaliste. L'expropriation des actifs des compagnies pétrolières privées devrait permettre au PDVSA d'économiser jusqu'à US \$ 700 millions. Selon le ministre vénézuélien de l'Énergie

et du Pétrole Rafael Ramírez, président du PDVSA, la réorganisation de l'entreprise permettra de créer 8000 emplois.

- ¹⁰ Khudori, D., Ed. (2005). *Rethinking Solidarity in Global Society. The Challenge of Globalisation for Social and Solidarity Movements*. Bandung Spirit Book Series. (ISBN : 983-378213-2).
- ¹¹ Voir le plaidoyer de Ziegler, J. (2007). *L'Empire de la honte*. Paris : Fayard.
- ¹² L'indice de Gini (du statisticien italien Corrado Gini qui en développa l'application en 1912 dans une étude intitulée « Variabilité et Mutabilité ») mesure les écarts dans la distribution des revenus. On estime que l'index Gini pour l'ensemble des pays de la planète se situe entre 56 et 66. La plupart des pays riches européens affichent des indices Gini entre 24 et 36, alors que les USA et le Mexique se situent à plus de 40, montrant que les inégalités y sont plus aigües. Les mesures de l'index Gini permettent d'isoler les variations philosophiques et politiques entre pays, telles qu'elles affectent la sécurité sociale et les salaires. Pour le cas spécifique de la Chine on note les chiffres (ONU) suivants : 2004=46,9, 2008=60.
- ¹³ Fukuyama F. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York : Free Press. p. 344.
- ¹⁴ Les principes des accords de Bandung: La condamnation du colonialisme et l'encouragement à l'émancipation du monde ; Le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes (principe des 14 points de Wilson en 1918) ; Égale souveraineté de toutes les nations ; Respect des Droits de l'Homme et de la Charte de l'ONU ; Non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des états, notamment de la part des grandes puissances (anciennes métropoles coloniales, et Les Deux Grands : USA et URSS) ; Désarmement, interdiction des armes nucléaires ; Règlement pacifique des différends et Coexistence Pacifique des nations ; Solidarité afro-asiatique de l'ensemble des nations : soutien et coopération politique, économique, culturelle...
- ¹⁵ Voir Setiawan, H. (2007). « Learning From History : The Bandung Spirit » in (Khudori : 2007). Op. cit. p. 27.
- ¹⁶ FAO. *Rapport sur l'insécurité alimentaire*. Octobre 2009.
- ¹⁷ Ziegler, J. (2007). *L'Empire de la honte*. Op. Cit.
- ¹⁸ Voir Lauseig, J (décembre 1999). « Quand la Malaisie joue la carte Sud-Sud en Afrique subsaharienne ». In *Politique Africaine*. No 76. pp. 63-75.
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- ²⁰ Voir par exemple, Bialer, S. Ed. (1977). *Radicalism in the Contemporary Age Vol. 2. Radical Visions for the Future*. Boulder, CL : Westview Press.
- ²¹ Meisner, M. (1977). « Utopian and Dystopian Elements in the Maoist Vision of the Future » in *Radicalism in the Contemporary Age Vol. 2. Radical Visions for the Future*. Op. cit. pp. 111.
- ²² Cette déclaration date de 1971 dans un tract intitulé « Combat Left Adventurism ». Un cadre du CPI (M-L), Sushital Ray Chowdhury se fit ainsi le porte-parole d'une tendance, à l'intérieur du parti qui émettait de sérieux doutes quant à la spontanéité irréfléchie des méthodes d'action. Cite par Banerjee, S. (1984). *India's Simmering Revolution : The Naxalite Uprising*. London : Zed Books. p. 199.
- ²³ Zakaria, F. (2008). *The Post-American World*. New York : W.W. Norton & Co. p. 141.
- ²⁴ Zakaria, F. (2008). Op. Cit. p. 139.
- ²⁵ Chabal, P. (1983). *Amílcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War*. Cambridge University Press. p. 213.
- ²⁶ Traduit de l'anglais par l'auteur. Cabral, A. (1972). *Identity and dignity in the context of the national liberation struggle in Return to the Source*. New York : Monthly Review Press. pp. 62-3. Extrait d'une allocution lue par Cabral le 15 octobre 1972 à Lincoln University (Pennsylvanie, USA) à l'occasion de la réception du titre de Docteur Honoris Causa. Cité par Patrick Chabal. Op. Cit. p. 46.
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- Davidson, B. (1969). *The Liberation of Guinea: Aspects of an African Revolution*. Harmondsworth : Penguin.
- Davidson, B. (1981). *No Fist is Big enough to Hide the Sky: The Liberation of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde*. London: Zed Press.
- ²⁷ Chabal, P. (1983). Op. cit. pp. 115-6.
- ²⁸ Hilbert, S. (1997). « For Whom the Nation ? Internationalization, Zapatismo, and the Struggle over Mexican Modernity » in *Antipode* 29:2. p. 118.
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- ³⁰ Vanaik A. (feb. 2008). « The New Himalaya Republic ». *New Left Review* [#49 pp. 46-72]. pp. 49-50.
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Democracy And Election After Democratization in South Korea

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Résumé

Démocratie et élections après la démocratisation en Corée du sud

Il est généralement admis que la démocratie coréenne a désormais réussi à faire ses preuves et qu'elle s'est enracinée fermement. Certains spécialistes affirment même que la démocratie en Corée est sur la voie de la consolidation. Cette contribution fait valoir que la démocratie coréenne a de graves défauts qui découlent des caractères acquis lors de la transition démocratique. Les forces démocratiques et les dirigeants politiques coréens ont échoué à les surmonter à cause du régionalisme, du parti autoritaire, de la faiblesse du droit et de l'acceptation aveugle du néolibéralisme. En raison de ces problèmes, les gouvernements démocratiques n'ont pas réussi à consolider la démocratie en Corée. Ils ont ainsi contribué involontairement au retour au gouvernement des anciens groupes autoritaires, qui tentent de faire revenir la société coréenne à la situation pré démocratique.

Abstract

It is commonly said that Korean democracy has already passed the first 'turnover test', and that democracy has taken root firmly in Korean society. Some scholars even argue that Korea's democracy is on the road to full consolidation. It is, however, argued here that Korean democracy has had serious defects stemming from the distinctive nature of democratic transition, and that democratic forces and political leaders failed to overcome them largely due to those problems they possessed – regionalism, authoritarian party organization, weak rule of law, and mindless acceptance of neoliberalism. As a result of these problems, democratic governments have failed to consolidate Korea's democracy, and contributed unintentionally to the comeback to government of the old authoritarian groups, which attempt to put Korean society back to the pre-democracy conditions.

Recently, South Korea held a National Assembly election in April 2008.¹ It was the 6th election for the National Assembly, and the 15th election, if presidential and local elections included, since the founding election in 1987. During the election, there occurred no serious electoral frauds except for minor violations of election laws, let alone no dispute over the election outcome. Moreover, already in December 1997, an opposition party candidate, Kim Dae Jung, took over power by winning the 15th Presidential election for the first time in almost 50 years after independence. For this reason, it is said that Korean democracy has already passed the first 'turnover test' (Huntington, 1991) and that democracy has taken root firmly in Korean society. Some scholars even argue that Korea's democracy is on the road to full consolidation (Diamond and Shin, 2000 : 3).

It is argued here that since 1987 Korean democracy has had serious defects stemming from the distinctive nature of democratic transition, and it is also argued that democratic forces and political leaders failed to overcome them largely due to the limitations they possessed – regionalism, authoritarian party organization, weak rule of law, and mindless acceptance of neoliberalism. As a result of these problems, democratic governments have failed to consolidate Korea's democracy, and finally, contributed unintentionally to the comeback to government of the old authoritarian groups, which attempt to put Korean society back to the pre-democracy conditions.

Pre-1987 period – ‘ Transplanted, but failed ’ democracy

In September 1945, when American troops entered the southern part of Korea after the surrender of Japanese armed forces, they found a country with no experience of a democracy. Before Japan annexed the Kingdom of Joseon in 1910, the political model was an absolute monarchy. The social and cultural system was deeply penetrated by Neo-Confucian philosophy, and the economic system was predominated by feudalism, with a rudimentary market system based on agriculture and almost with no modern industrial structure (Nahm, 1993). Due to the internal schism between domestic social-political groups and also to the rise of the Cold War during the American occupation, Korea ended up with the establishment of a separate government in the southern part of the Korean peninsula.

Although the U.S. helped lawmakers to transplant various institutions of ‘ American democracy ’, the young Korean democracy faced highly unfavorable conditions (Lee, 1990 : 19). The vast majority of Korean citizens had little understanding of democratic idea itself and its institutions. The political party system was highly fragmented and polarized. Most of political parties were at best proto-parties, founded by and grounded in a few charismatic leaders as political machines. The division of Korea into two hostile states and the subsequent Korean War (1950-53) seriously hampered the development of a stable party system composed of ideologically diversified parties. Given the hegemony of anti-Communism and rightist nationalism, even liberal or centrist, let alone moderate socialist, parties were suspected of supporting North Korean regime, and for that reason, they were brutally oppressed.

During the 1950s, President Rhee Syng Man gradually consolidated his one-man rule. In 1960, he was expelled from the presidency by those students and urban dwellers, who got angry at a widespread election fraud, and went into exile. A new constitution, which provided for a cabinet system and a bicameral parliament, was passed in June 1960, and subsequently, the Second Republic was inaugurated. However, the new Chang Myon government, which originated from the former opposition party, became widely corrupt and, moreover, was incapable of managing popular political-economic demands. In consequence, Korean democracy became uncontrollable and, finally, a group of military officers led by General Park Chung-hee led a coup and took over government power in May 1961. The same military officers stepped down from duty and became politicians, and they wrote a new constitution, which restored the presidential system. It was approved by a referendum in December 1962, and under the new constitution, civilian-turned Park was elected as president in October 1963.

He was reelected for another four-year term in 1967, and during his second term, amended the constitution so as to serve a third term. In the 1971 presidential election Park barely defeated the candidate of the opposition party, Kim Dae-jung, despite of massive election fraud. Park declared martial law and suspended the constitution in October 1972, mainly because he was afraid that he might be unable to win the next election under the current constitution which stipulated the direct election by popular vote. After dissolving the National Assembly and banning the activities of political parties, he drafted a constitutional amendment

with the advice of a handful scholars and lawyers. In December 1972, the notorious *Yushin* (reform) Constitution was legitimized through the national referendum. It allowed Park to stay in power as president indefinitely by abrogating the three-term limit, and institutionalize indirect election of president through the National Council for Reunification (*Tongil Juche Kukmin Hoiui*). It gave extraordinary power to the president, such as the right to dissolve the National Assembly, the extra-constitutional power to enact special measures, and the right to nominate one third of the NA members. As a result, the power of the NA was considerably weakened, especially with the power of legislative oversight over the executive branch being eliminated. The *Yushin* system was legitimized by the necessity for strong leadership, which, it was argued, would help stave off the heightened military threat from North Korea amid an eroding American military security commitment and promote economic prosperity by getting rid of 'luxury and inefficiency' of parliamentary politics.

However, as Korean economy went into a deep recession at the end of 1970s and as students' and workers' protest spread over, President *Park* was in big trouble and was finally assassinated by his close aide in October 1979. President *Park*'s death did not lead to democratic opening and consolidation. A brief democratic opening in the spring of 1980 was intercepted by another round of military intervention. Several factors – such as weak political leadership of the transitional government, internal division among political leaders, and economic crisis – provided the military with an opportunity to intervene in politics, as in 1960. After controlling the military through a mutiny on 12 December 1979, a new military group led by General *Chun Doo Hwan* imposed a ban on political activity and brutally repressed the *Kwangju* uprising and other popular protests by massacring a few hundreds of innocent citizens including junior high school girls. They wrote a new constitution and enacted it through national referendum on 27 October 1980. The new constitution explicitly limited the presidency to a seven-year singly term, but gave strong powers to the president, such as the power to disband the NA, impose extraordinary measures, and submit constitutional amendment bills as well as laws.

Transition to democracy in South Korea

Like his predecessors, *Chun* also attempted to extend his term through a constitutional manoeuvre. However, his plots were revealed and triggered an avalanche of mass protests. Faced with a unexpectedly strong resistance, President *Chun* changed his mind so that he could control the government behind the scene by supporting his successor through the existing constitutional rule of indirect election of president. Opposition parties and civil society did not accept it, and instead, pushed very hard for a direct election of president after the revision of the existing constitution. A couple of incidents intensified popular protests. In May 1986, four Seoul National University students burned themselves to death, calling for the " overthrow of the Fifth Republic regime ". In January 1987, a Catholic priest disclosed the fact that a college student, *Park Jong-chul* was tortured to death. In May 1987, another college student from Yonsei University, *Lee Han-yol*, died during the anti-government demonstration. At this point, the middle class people began to join the anti-dictatorship demonstration (Kil, 2001: 49-50). The *Chun* government seriously deliberated on the deployment of military force to suppress popular protests. However, the U. S. government warned against it, and President *Chun* succumbed and *Roh Tae-woo*, the candidate of the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP), made the June 29 Declaration, in which *Roh* acceded to all of the opposition's demands, thereby defusing the political crisis and providing for the first direct election of the president in 16 years. The June Declaration paved the way for a ' transition by pact ' to democracy (Adesnik and Kim, 2008).

Korea's path of democratic transition consists of two compromises between authoritarian groups and the opposition (Lee, 2007). The first compromise occurred when the old authori-

tarian elites and their political opposition reached the agreement on the development of a democratic procedure in order to avoid mutual catastrophe. They were afraid of interference by extremists on both the right and the left, namely, the military and the students (Saxer, 2003 : 51). The first compromise gave birth to a new constitution and, subsequently, two founding elections – 13th Presidential election in December 1987 and 13th NA election in April 1988. In the 13th presidential election, *Roh Tae-woo*, candidate of the old guard (DJP), won the presidency, one of the most important reasons being the failure of two opposition leaders, *Kim Young-sam* and *Kim Dae-jung*, to form a united front. The 13th NA election ended up with the situation in which no single party, including the ruling party, occupied an absolute majority, thereby being unable to pass legislation.

The second compromise was made possible under the circumstances that no political party took an absolute majority in the National Assembly. President *Roh's* ruling party, Democratic Justice Party (DJP), took only 42 percent of 299 seats in the National Assembly election in 1988. The first opposition party, Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) led by *Kim Dae-jung* won 71 seats, and the second opposition party, Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) led by *Kim Young-sam* and the third opposition party, New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) led by *Kim Jong-pil*, took 59 and 35 seats each. President *Roh* needed cooperation from opposition parties in order to pass legislation or to implement policy. Moreover, he was lack of legitimacy because he was also a member of a military regime although he was elected by popular vote. As a result, he could not meet the expectations of the public, particularly, their desires for political and economic democracy and lost control of social unrest caused by students' demonstrations and workers' strikes. Opposition leaders, *Kim Dae-jung*, *Kim Young-sam* and *Kim Jong-pil*, had strong ambitions to be the next president but none of them could assure that they would secure sufficient votes to win the election. It was under these circumstances that in February 1990 President *Roh* and two opposition leaders, *Kim Young-sam* and *Kim Jong-pil*, agreed to combine their parties into a new party, Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) in order to form a "grand conservative coalition" (*Bosu-dae-yonhap*) (Lee, 2007 : 111).

Korea's path of democratic transition consisted of two rounds of compromises between the old authoritarian groups and the oppositions. The first one happened in 1987, after DJP's new leader *Roh Tai-woo* announced June Declaration, and the second occurring in 1990, when the ruling party and two opposition parties agreed to merge into a new party, as shown above. The first political pact between the old authoritarian and opposition parties made it possible to prevent the head-on clash between the old authoritarian groups and the oppositions. The second compromise between the two groups provided an important chance for the first genuine civilian government to be given birth to, by peacefully taking power from authoritarian elites. But, at the same time, the same elite pacts left the old authoritarian groups' resources and power bases intact, thereby making the consolidation and deepening of Korean democracy.

From the perspective of the old authoritarian groups, one of the most important benefits accrued from two rounds of political pact was that they could get access to government institutions such as presidency and National Assembly, and also exert a considerable influence on public policy making, especially on the rule-of-game related to election of legislators. Since the mid-1990s, civic organizations or new social movement organizations continually demanded reform in electoral system – for example, a radical increase in proportional representation from the current 20~25 percent to 33~50 percent – so that new parties could have a better chance to get access to government power. However, as shown in Table 1 and Table 2, by adhering to the old system, they successfully resisted such an electoral reform which might lead to a loss in NA seats.

Table 1. The Electoral system as of November 2009

Assembly	No. of ballots per elector	Tier	Electoral formula	District magnitude	No. of districts	Assembly size	Party threshold
13 th (1988)	1	L ¹	Plurality	1	224	299	5 constituency seat
13 th (1988)	1	H ²	LR-Hare	75	1 ⁵	299	5 constituency seats
14 th (1992)	1	L	Plurality	1	237	299	3% of valid votes or 5 constituency seats
14 th (1992)	1	H	LR-Hare	65	1 ⁶	299	3% of valid votes or 5 constituency seats
15 th (1996)	1	L	Plurality	1	253	299	5% or 5 district seats
15 th (1996)	1	H	LR-Hare	46	1 ⁷	299	5% or 5 district seats
16 th (2000)	1	L	Plurality	1	227	273	~
16 th (2000)	1	H	LR-Hare	46	1 ⁷	273	~
17 th (2004)	2	L	Plurality	1	243 ³	299	3% or 5 district seats
17 th (2004)	2	H	LR-Hare	56	1 ⁸	299	3% or 5 district seats
18 th (2008)	2	L	Plurality	1	245	299	~
18 th (2008)	2	H	LR-Hare	54	1 ⁸	299	~

1. L - largest remainder

2. H - Hare quota

3. Ratio of voters, largest to average constituency size, was reduced to 3:1.

4. Voting age was lowered to 19.

5. If one party wins at least half of constituency seats, proportional representation seats are allocated to all the parties which obtained at least 5 seats, according to the portion of each party's seats in the constituency; if all the parties gain less than half of constituency seats, the strongest party is awarded half of the national list seats. The remaining seats are allocated to the parties which obtain at least 5 seats in the NA.

6. Proportional representation seats are allocated to the parties, which obtain at least 5 seats in the NA or at least 3 percent of the total valid constituency votes, in proportion to the seats they obtain.

7. Both in the 15th and 16th NA elections, after one seat was allocated to those parties which obtained 3~5% of constituency votes, the remaining proportional representation seats were allocated to the parties, which obtain at least 5 seats in the NA or at least 5 percent of the total valid constituency votes, in proportion to the seats they obtain.

8. From the 17th NA election, the number of seats on proportional representation is 54. These seats are divided proportionately among the political parties based upon their votes obtained in the districts, on condition that they have obtained at least 3% of the total valid votes cast or secured five district constituency seats or more.

Source : Kim and Park (2009)

Table 2. Parliamentary Elections (1988~2008)

Party	1988		1992		1996		2000		2004 ²		2008	
	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes
Total	299	100	299	100	299	100	273	100	299	100	299	100
DJP	125	34.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PPD	70	19.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RDP	59	23.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NDRP	35	15.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hankyoreh DP	1	1.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DLP	-	-	149	38.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DP	-	-	97	29.2	15	11.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
UPP	-	-	31	17.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NPRP	-	-	1	1.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NKP	-	-	-	-	139	34.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
NCNP	-	-	-	-	79	25.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
ULD	-	-	-	-	50	16.2	17	9.8	4	3.0	-	-
ULD	-	-	-	-	50	16.2	17	9.8	0	3.0	-	-
GNP	-	-	-	-	-	-	133	39.0	100	38.0	131	43.5
GNP	-	-	-	-	-	-	133	39.0	21	36.0	22	37.7
MDP	-	-	-	-	-	-	115	35.9	5	8.0	-	-
MDP	-	-	-	-	-	-	115	35.9	4	7.0	-	-
DPP	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3.7	-	-	-	-
KNP	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.0 ¹	-	-	-	-
Uri-Party	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	129	42.0	-	-
Uri-Party	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23	38.0	-	-
United DP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	66	28.9
United DP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	25.2
KDLP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	4.0	2	3.4
KDLP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	13.0	3	5.7
New Progressive Party									-	-	0	1.3
New Progressive Party									-	-	0	2.9
National Unity Party21									1	0.0	-	-
National Unity Party21									0	0.0	-	-
Pro-Park	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	3.7
Pro-Park	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	13.2
LFP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	5.7
LFP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	6.8
CKP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.4
CKP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3.8
Independents	9	4.8	21	11.5	16	11.8	5	9.4	2	5.0	25	11.1

1. One seat from *Chungchongnam-do*. 2. Electoral formula changed from one vote to two vote per person. The upper column for seats in constituencies while the lower for seats in party-list representation.

At any rate, it was only after the inauguration of President *Kim Young-sam* in February 1993 that the first step of democratization – that is, democratic transition – completed and the second step of democratization – that is, democratic consolidation – began. However, it was neither smooth nor successful. Largely due to the nature of the grand coalition, President *Kim Young-sam*, the first civilian president in 32 years of Korea's political history, had to meet many

difficulties in implementing social, political reforms which were needed to consolidate a fledgling democracy. Among other things, he had to confront internal division and conflict between democratic and authoritarian groups. President *Kim* found himself being squeezed in between, on the one hand, the need for implementing reform policies consistently, and, on the other hand, the need for maintaining the coalition (Lee, 2007). In addition, he had not secured popular support which was urgently needed for successful implementation of democratic reforms. For many social groups, especially trade unions and civic organizations, were hesitant to support President *Kim* mainly due to his past political decision, i.e., his collaboration with anti-democratic, authoritarian groups. Thus, without popular support, he had to confront the old guard within his party (DLP) and push his reform efforts on his own. President *Kim*'s reform efforts were made in many areas, such as the military and national security agency's influence on or interference in politics, electoral laws, industrial relations system, education, and judicial system.

Thus, despite of such unfavorable conditions, President *Kim Young-sam* contributed to the democratic consolidation. First of all, he succeeded in re-establishing the supremacy of civilian control over the military apparatus and national security agency. Immediately after inauguration, he took decisive action to disband the politicized clique of military officers that had served as a pillar of military and as a national security apparatus under the old authoritarian regimes. Then, he proceeded to push the National Assembly to revise laws on major intelligence agencies, that is, Korean CIA and Military Security Command, which would oblige them to disengage from politics and put them under congressional oversight with respect to their expenditure, personnel management and intelligence gathering. The new law prohibited these intelligence agencies from conducting surveillance of government officials, professional politicians, and private persons. President *Kim* went even further. He prosecuted two former presidents, ex-generals *Chun* and *Roh*, on charges of corruption, military mutiny, treason for staging the December 1979 coup, and the massacre of civilians during the *Kwangju* uprising in 1980. Such measures and actions helped South Korea being liberated from its authoritarian past (Im, 2004 : 183-184).

On the other hand, President *Kim* failed in most of other areas. Since there was neither parliamentary nor popular support, reform efforts in these areas were driven by *Kim*'s will, and, what was worse, they were implemented inconsistently. As a result, he failed not only in implementing most of reform policies, but also in securing popular support. As a result, his popularity plummeted at the end of his tenure when a corruption scandal involving his own son and close advisors broke out. His approval rate dropped sharply from 70.9 percent to 6.1 percent in December 1997.

In short, President *Kim Young-sam*, who took power through a grand coalition with the old authoritarian groups, did not succeed in consolidating Korean democracy. This task was naturally given to President *Kim Dae-jung*, an opposition leader excluded from the previous ruling coalition in 1990. He took a chance to be elected as the 15th president, only by aligning with the leader of *Chungchong* – based conservative party(ULD), *Kim Jong-pil*. What was worse, President *Kim*'s ruling coalition, National Congress for New Politics(NCNP) and United Liberal Democrats(ULD), occupied a few seats less than a majority in the National Assembly during most of his presidential term. Despite such unfavorable conditions, President *Kim Dae-jung* contributed much to the consolidation of democracy.

First of all, his inauguration as president made Korean democracy pass the first 'turnover test' (Huntington, 1991) and put it on the road to full consolidation(Diamond and Shin, 2000 : 3). In addition, during his presidency, civil society expanded widely and developed rapidly, thereby improving political accountability. Between 1997 and 2000, the number of civil associations increased from 3,500 to 6,000. If local branches being included, the number doubled, from 10,000 to 20,000, respectively. These civil associations regularly monitored behaviors of

government officials and politicians, making public and taking to the court a variety of illegal, corrupt, or irrational (anti-democratic) behaviors (Im, 2004 : 186). Furthermore, President *Kim Dae-jung* contributed much to improving and expanding South-North Korea relationship, by realizing the historical summit meeting with *Kim Jong-il*, North Korean leader in June 2000. Lastly, he successfully managed the financial crisis, which broke out at the end of President *Kim Young-sam*'s term, by implementing free trade policies and by introducing tripartite consultation and social safety nets system. What is most important was the June 2000 Summit Meeting of South and North Korean Leaders, which transformed a up-to-then confrontational South-North Korean relations into a more cooperative and friendly one.

Despite these contributions, President *Kim Dae-jung* also left a few of negative legacies which had impacts on the democratic consolidation. First, *Kim Dae-jung* government was inaugurated through and sustained by a political pact between two political parties, each of which had its stronghold in *Jeolla* provinces and in *Chungchong* provinces respectively although they rarely shared ideological or policy stances. Moreover, it was a minority government even if two coalition partners' seats were added up. As a result, President *Kim Dae-jung* and his party had to compromise with conservative anti-communist parties to pass its legislations. One of the most prominent examples is the National Security Act.² As a victim of the notorious NSA, President *Kim* avowed to revise it if he inaugurated as president. However, largely due to the intransigent opposition from conservative politicians, including Grand Korea Party and United Liberal Democrats, which occupied the majority of seats in the National Assembly, he failed to keep his promise. As well known, NSA has been one of the most 'efficient' institutions, with which anti-communist authoritarian groups could maintain their vested interests by suppressing social or political forces of socialist or even liberal kind (Choi, 2003).

Second, IMF and other international financial institutes – World Bank and ADB – imposed very harsh conditions for their emergency loans. Terms of loan included financial market liberalization, labor market flexibility, high interest rate, cut in government expenditure, corporate tax reduction, and so on. Such policy prescriptions were said to originate from neo-liberalism or Anglo-American model of capitalism, and led to a skyrocketing bankruptcy of especially small – and medium-size firms, a high unemployment rate, a sharp increase in non-standard employment, and even neoliberal restructuring (i.e., downsizing or rationalizing) of state apparatus and policies. In doing so, President *Kim* eroded his traditional power basis – especially, workers and middle classes (Jung, 2005).

Third, lastly, like his precedent, his son was also involved in political corruption. Although the amount of illegal contributions collected by his son was much smaller, compared to those of *Chun Doo-hwan* and *Roh Tae-woo*, former presidents, corruption scandals by his son turned out to be a fatal blow to the authority and leadership of President *Kim* and his government.

Let me summarize legacies which two President *Kim*'s handed down to the next generation of Korean democracy. Concerning positive legacies, first, during a decade under the two *Kim*'s presidencies, electoral competition was institutionalized, political rights and civil liberties were restored to some extent, and governments became more or less accountable and functional. As mentioned in the first part of this paper, since the founding election of South Korea's new democracy in 1987 through the end of President *Kim Dae-jung*'s tenure, Koreans elected three presidents in consecutive five-year intervals and four National Assemblies in four-year intervals. Elections at the sub-national level to choose both heads of local government and councilors of local council were also held three times, that is, in 1995, 1998, and 2002. In addition, losers in the elections at various levels never called into question the fairness and free atmosphere of electoral process. Some political rights and civil liberties were also restored by amending some clauses in the notorious National Security Law, which had very often been abused for the political interests of conservative authoritarian groups.

Despite of these contributions to South Korea's democratic consolidation, two President Kim's left some legacies which had negative impacts on the next generation of Korean democracy.

First, the two Kim's were incapacitated in the second half of their presidencies because of corruption scandals that involved their families and close associates. In this respect, they were not much different from their precedents. It is true that the amount of illegal contributions collected by the sons of *Kim Young-sam* and *Kim Dae-jung* were much smaller than those of *Chun Doo-hwan* and *Roh Tae-woo*. In addition, as party bosses, they might have needed to raise money through informal political rings with businessmen so as to distribute political funds to their followers. Nonetheless, the corruption scandals involving their sons hit a fatal blow on the authority and leadership of the democratic governments of the two Kim's. (Im, 2004: 191-2). Transparency International (TI) has placed South Korea as the most corrupt country among OECD members, although it slowly improved. CPI for South Korea was 4.2 in 1998, 4.0 in 2000, and 4.5 in 2002. It ranked 43rd in 1998, 48th in 2000, and 40th in 2002.

A rampant corruption has had negative impacts on the rule of law. According to a public opinion polls conducted by Sejong Research Institute in 1995, respondents who believed keeping laws and rules would mean a loss amounted to 67.7 percent (Sejong Research Institute, 1995). A recent survey conducted in 2008 shows that this does not change much. According to it, a majority (62.8%) of respondents answered that laws were not well observed in our society, and as a reason for it, a third of them (34.3%) mentioned law-keeping rather causes a loss, while a fifth (20.1%) citing other people do not keep laws (Korea Legislation Research Institute, 2008).

Another negative legacy of two democratic governments is regionalism. In South Korea, voters tended to vote according to their hometown self-identification, and contenders for presidency and National Assembly mobilized regionalist interests and sentiments as the main vehicle for obtaining votes. Regionalist voting and mobilization was also present under the authoritarian *Park Chung-hee* and *Chun Doo-hwan*, but it was not dominant. The dominant cleavage was a urban-rural division, where rural residents voted for the ruling party and its candidates while urbanites voting for the opposition party and its candidates. Such voting behavior and mobilization based on a rural-urban cleavage was transformed into regionalist one during the founding elections held in 1987 and in 1988. Three factors contributed to regionalist politics in South Korea.

First, as two prominent opposition leaders, representing two different regions, *Kim Young-sam* and *Kim Dae-jung*, co-operated in their struggle against authoritarian regimes until June 1987 Declaration, but thereafter they failed to form a united front acceptable to all democrats. Instead, they ran and competed for presidency. Second, since they shared democratic credibility and almost the same ideological and policy stances, they chose to appeal to voters as a favorite son of their respective home provinces. Third, it was in a sense inevitable for them to employ regionalist mobilization strategy, largely due to the fact that other strategies, for example, ones based on class or religious divisions were long time suppressed and institutionalized in NSA by the authoritarian regimes. Under such circumstances, a regionalist mobilization strategy was less risky and more efficient than others, which might be considered as more controversial and therefore more risky. Moreover, the old authoritarian groups represented by *Roh Tai-woo*, candidate of the ruling party (DJP), intentionally encouraged the rivalry between the two opposition leaders by instigating regionalist sentiments.

Accordingly, voters were divided along the regional division and since then, the pattern continues to occur until now. For example, as shown Table 3, in the 13th Presidential election,

Kim Dae-jung received an absolute majority (87%) of votes in his home province – *Cholla*, whereas in *Kyungsang* province he received only 3 percent. *Kim Young-sam* won the majority of votes (53.7%) in his home province (South *Kyungsang*) while obtaining only 1.2 percent in *Cholla* province in 1987 Presidential election. *Roh Tai-woo* won more than two thirds of votes in his home province (North *Kyungsang*) while obtaining only one third in South *Kyungsang* and 9.9 percent of votes in *Cholla*. *Kim Jong-pil* received the most votes (34.6%) in his home province (*Choongcheong*) whereas obtaining only less than 10 percent in other provinces. This pattern of regionalist voting was, though to a smaller degree, reproduced in the 13th NA election held in April 1988. *Kim Young-sam*'s South *Kyungsang* based party (RDP) received the more numerous votes than other parties, *Kim Dae-jung*'s *Cholla* based party (PPD) winning more than two thirds of votes in *Cholla*, *Kim Jong-pil*'s *Choongchung* based party (NDRP) 42 percent of votes in *Choongcheong* province, and *Roh*'s North *Kyungsang* based party (DJP) 50 percent of votes in North *Kyungsang* province, respectively.

Once installed in the founding elections in 1987 and in 1988, regionalist voting pattern was reproduced and even expanded especially after February 1990 when three parties merged – DJP, RDP, and NDRP – to form a hegemonic party – DLP. The three-party merger was based on a grand regional coalition – North and South *Kyungsang* and *Chungcheong* – and brought about a grand regionalism aiming to isolate and exclude a small minority region – *Cholla*. Since then, regional hostilities, mostly between *Kyungsang* and *Cholla* province while *Choongcheong* province switching its coalition partners from election to election, have become rampant and threatening to national integrity, and in every round of national election regionalist voting pattern recurred, as seen in Table 3. The 15th Presidential election was the high time because *Kim Dae-jung*, who had lost two consecutive presidential elections since 1987, formed another political pact with a conservative but regionalist party (UDP), by opening advocating the so-called defensive regionalism.

To summarize, both *Kim Young-sam* and *Kim Dae-jung*, together with other major politicians such as *Roh Tai-woo* and *Kim Jong-pil*, were to be blamed for a rampant and divisive regionalism in South Korean politics. Like previous presidents, in the presidency, each of them appointed ministers and other high-ranking political appointees on the basis of regionalism and continued to rely on support from regionalist parties or party coalitions, thereby reinforcing regionalist tendency of politics (Im, 2005 : 188-9). Moreover, in 1996, *Kim Dae-jung*, who was desperate to win the 15th Presidential election, openly proclaimed and made a region-based political pact with an anti-communist conservative party leader⁴ (*Kim Jong-pil* of United Liberal Democrats, ULP) which had a stronghold in *Choongcheong* province (Hwang, 1996). It was for this reason that President *Kim Dae-jung* and his party was blamed for divisive regionalism although he successfully held a historic North-South Korea summit meeting and contributed much to coping with an economic crisis.

It was under these circumstances that *Noh Moo-hyun* and his Uri-Party succeeded in winning both presidency in 2002 and the NA in 2004. *Noh* and Uri-Party members stood for anti-regionalism and party democracy, and the public responded. Both the 16th Presidential election and the 17th NA election, held in 2002 and in 2004 respectively, were the occasions in which regionalist election campaigns and voting behaviors were the weakest since 1987. However, unfortunately, it turned out to be an episode. The subsequent elections proved that regionalism was still lingering. *Kyungsang* based GNP and its presidential candidate, *Lee Myung-bak*, won the majority of votes in their home province, while *Cholla* based DP and its candidate, *Chung Dong-young*, winning the majority of votes in their home province.

Table 3. Regional Voting Pattern in South Korea


Election	Province	DJP ¹	RDP	NDRP ²	PPD ³
13 th President (1987)	Kyungsang South	36.6	53.7	6.9	2.1
	North	68.1	26.6	2.5	2.4
	Cholla	9.9	1.2	0.5	88.4
	Choongcheong	33.1	20.1	34.6	11.9
13 th NA (1988)	Kyungsang South	36.1	45.7	8.6	1.5
	North	49.9	26.1	14.9	7.2
	Cholla	23.0	0.9	1.6	69.1
	Choongcheong	34.7	15.3	42.1	3.0
14 th NA (1992)	Kyungsang			48.0	12.0
	Cholla			24.0	62.0
	Choongcheong			40.0	23.0
14 th President (1992)	Kyungsang			65.0	10.0
	Cholla			4.0	91.0
	Choongcheong			36.0	27.0
15 th NA (1996)	Kyungsang		48.0	14.0	4.0
	Cholla		18.0	0.0	72.0
	Choongcheong		28.0	47.0	8.0
15 th President (1997)	Kyungsang			58.0	13.0
	Cholla			3.0	93.0
	Choongcheong			27.0	43.0
16 th NA (2000)	Kyungsang		56.0	7.0	13.0
	Cholla		4.0	2.0	67.0
	Choongcheong		23.0	35.0	30.0
16 th President (2002)	Kyungsang			58.0	25.0
	Cholla			5.0	92.0
	Choongcheong			31.0	52.0
17 th NA (2004)	Kyungsang		52.0	0.0	0.0 (32.0) ⁴
	Cholla		0.0	0.0	31.0 (55.0)
	Choongcheong		23.0	23.0	3.0 (45.0)
17 th President (2007)	Kyungsang			62.0	10.0
	Cholla			9.0	80.0
	Choongcheong			37.0	22.0
18 th NA (2008)	Kyungsang		52.0	2.0	6.0
	Cholla		6.0	0.0	59.0
	Choongcheong		32.0	34.0	23.0

Note : **1** - Kyungsang Province based parties (DJP, DLP, NKP, GNP) or candidates ; **2** - Choongchung Province based parties (NDRP, ULD, LFP) or candidates ; **3** - Cholla Province based parties (PPD, DP, NCNP, MDP, DP) or candidates ; **4** - Uri-Party (An anti-regionalist party, splintered from MDP and having a stronger support in Cholla province than in any other region.

Source : NEC, General Election, Presidential Election, each year

Third, still another negative legacy that two presidents of democratic government left is 'personalized' political parties and 'underdeveloped' party system. Since 1987, two Kim's created their own parties, then dissolved and merged with other parties, and split and recreated new parties, to meet their personal ambition or political needs, as shown in Table 4. To be specific, in 1987, *Kim Young-sam* created Reunification and Democratic Party (RDP) to run for president while *Kim Dae-jung* formed Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD). After losing the election, the former dissolved his party to join a grand regional coalition party (Democratic Liberal Party, DLP) in 1990, while the latter formed a new party (Democratic Party, DP) in 1990, by incorporating a minority of RDP who chose to remain after a majority of RDP members joined a new DLP. *Kim Young-sam*, once in power, reformulated the ruling DLP into NKP (New Korea Party) in 1996 after former NDRP members left DLP to form a new party called ULD (United Liberal Democrats) in early 1995. *Kim Dae-jung* left South Korea in 1992 to travel U.K. and the U.S.A. after being defeated in the 14th Presidential election, and in 1995 returned to form a new party (NCNP, National Congress for New Politics). Then, he won the presidency in 1997, through a political pact with *Kim Jong-pil*, Choongchung - based party leader.

Figure 1. Party system and Coalition-building (1960-2008)



Source : Kim, Youngmi. 2008, " Intra-party politics and minority coalition government in South Korea, " *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 367-398.

Such a frequent formation and dissolution of political parties would be made possible only if a party leader held a strong authority or charisma. Each of them, *Kim Young-sam* and *Kim Dae-jung*, was such a charismatic leader largely because of their long-time leadership in democratization movement since the early 1970s.

They ran their respective parties autocratically as if they were 'feudal lords'. They controlled almost every aspect of party life. They nearly handpicked candidates for elected officials (i.e., parliamentary members), appointed party secretaries and officials, and distributed political funds to their followers in return for their loyalty. Such an autocratic leadership could be somewhat justified under the old authoritarian regimes. Since opposition parties were continually under heavy and close surveillance by the police and the national security agency, they would need a strong leadership to maintain organizational integrity. However, they tried to keep a firm control over their party even after the transition to democracy, thereby impeding the rise of new leadership fit for democratic society and the development of a responsive and accountable party system based on policy difference, which, in turn, would arise from other social cleavages such as class, gender, or generation (Im, 2005: 189).

Table 4. Life cycle of Korea's political parties (1981~2009)

Party ¹	Existed	Status	NA elections ²	Presidential elections ³	Durability (unit: months)
DJP	1/81-2/90	Merged into DLP	3	1	109
RDP	5/87-2/90	Merged into DLP	1	1	33
NDRP	11/87-2/90	Merged into DLP	1	1	27
DLP	2/90-2/96	Renamed NKP	2	1	72
NKP	2/96-11/97	Renamed GNP	1	-	21
DP(2)	9/90-11/97	Merged with GNP	2	1	86
GNP	11/97-11/09		3	3	145
PPC	9/07-11/09	Most of members merged with GNP	1	1	27
UPP	2/92-5/96	Dissolved	1	1	25
ULD	2/95-9/07	Merged with GNP	1	-	152
PFP	1/06-2/08	Merged with LFP	-	1	26
LFP	2/08-11/09		1	-	14
KNP	1/81-5/88	Merged into NKDP	3	1	49
DKP	1/81-5/88	Merged into NKDP	3	1	49
NKDP	1/85-5/88	Dissolved	2	-	49
PPD	11/87-4/90	Renamed NDP	1	1	29
DP(1)	6/90-9/90	Merged with DP(2)	-	-	4
NDP	4/90-9/90	Merged with DP(2)	-	-	6
NCNP	9/95-1/00	Renamed MDP	1	1	52
NPP	11/97-9/98	Merged with NCNP	-	1	11
MDP	1/00-2/08	Renamed as DP, then merged with DP(3)	2	2	86
Uri-Party	11/03-8/07	Merged with NUDP	1	-	46
NUDP	8/07-2/08	Merged with DP(3)	-	1	7
DP(3)	2/08-11/09		1	-	14
CKP	10/07-11/09		1	1	26
Hankyereh DP	3/88-7/90	Dissolved	1	-	33
PP(1)	3/88-9/88	Dissolved	1	-	7
PP(2)	11/90-92/5	Dissolved	1	-	19
KDLP	1/00-11/09		3	2	119
NPP	3/08-11/09		1	-	14
Geometric means					46.1

Note : For full names of the above parties, see Appendix 1.

Source : National Election Commission, *White Papers on National Assembly Election (Kukhoiuiwon-seongeo-chongnam)* and *Presidential Election (Daetongnyong-seongeo-chongnam)* (each election), and *Reports on the established parties and preparatory committees for new parties (Jeongdang-deungnok-mit-changdangjunbiwiwonhoi-gyolseong-shingo-hyonhwang)*

Fourth, both *Kim Young-sam* and *Kim Dae-jung* appeared to have no knowledge whatsoever of the potential threat that globalization or neo-liberal reform might pose to democracy or, to be more specific, democratic deepening and consolidation. *Kim Young-sam* was much more interested in obtaining OECD membership or in enhancing South Korean firms' international competitiveness⁴ than in negative effects of globalization. *Kim Dae-jung* had a more concern about borrowing loans from international financial institutes – such as IMF, World Bank, and ADB – and foreign private banks than about the terms of loan. As a result, the former implemented financial market liberalization and labor market reform very quickly without preparing safeguards against speculative capital, while the latter adopted Anglo-American model of capitalism without paying attention to the possible incompatibility of neo-liberal economic policy and social welfare.

However, it was well-known that time that by the mid-1980s, international financial institutes as well as OECD member countries had already been dominated by international financial capital (Robinson, 1996). And international financial capital sought to diffuse Anglo-American model of capitalism, its core element being free capital movement across national borders which required a restructuring of government organization and policy as well as of labor and inter-firm relations (Scott, 1997 ; Crouch and Streek, 1997 ; Kitschelt, et al. 1999). Once implemented in their full force, these policies inevitably accompanied many social problems – for example, increase in irregular employment and in youth unemployment, reduced social welfare benefits, widening (intra- and inter-state) economic inequality, and so on – as well as fierce inter-firm and/or inter-state competition. Most of Latin American countries, which implemented neo-liberal economic policies since the late 1970s and the early 1980s, experienced many problems and difficulties just explained. As a result, these same countries showed many democratic deficiencies (Kleinberg and Clark, 2000 ; Oxhorn and Ducatzenzeiler, 1998).

Despite the seriousness of negative impacts which neoliberalism has, the two democratic governments implemented neoliberal policies wholeheartedly without any doubt. As a result, at the second half of *Kim Dae-jung* president's tenure, many problems began to arise, as in many Latin American countries. As shown in Table 5, per capita income (GDP) continued to rise since 1980, from US\$ 1,645 in 1980 to US\$ 11,176 in 1997. In 1998, it plummeted largely due to Korean currency devaluation to US dollar, to US\$ 7,355, but rose up again from 1999, reaching US\$ 11,493 at the end of President *Kim Dae-jung*'s tenure.

However, quality of life deteriorated. Unemployment, especially for youth of 15-25 years olds, ran high during the democratic governments, compared to the previous period. As seen in Table 5, irregular employment increased, especially after President *Kim Dae-jung* inaugurated in 1998, from 45.5 percent of the total employment in 1987 to 46.9 percent in 1998, and again to 51.7 percent at the end of his term in 2002. Accordingly, economic inequality widened. Gini's coefficient rose from 0.304 in 1989 to 0.312 in 2002.

Table 5. Trends in per capita GDP and economic income inequality

	1980	1985	1987	1991	1993	1995	1997	1998	2000	2001	2002
(1)	1645	2309	3321	4435	8177	11432	11176	7355	10841	10162	11493
(2)	5.2 (9.4)	4.0 (7.6)	3.1 (5.9)	2.5 (5.5)	2.9 (6.8)	2.1 (4.6)	2.6 (5.7)	7.0 (12.2)	4.1 (7.6)	3.8 (7.5)	3.1 (6.6)
(3)	-	-	45.5	44.4	41.1	41.9	45.7	46.9	52.1	50.8	51.7
(4)	-	-	0.304*	0.287	0.281	0.284	0.283	0.316	0.317	0.319	0.312

Note : (1) per capita GDP (US\$) (2) Unemployment rate(%) (.) - youth(15~29 years old) unemployment rate(%) (3) Irregular job (temporary + daily) - % of total employment (4) Gini's coefficient * 1989

Source : Korea Labor Institute. 2006. *KLI Labor Statistics 2006*.

Fifth, lastly, those problems such as political corruption, regionalism, personalized political parties, and economic inequality, which arose during democratic governments of two *Kim*'s, contributed to declining trust in democracy.⁵ According to Doh Chull Shin's survey published in 2001, 46 percent of respondents were very much in favor of democracy, while 45 percent being somewhat in favor of it. An overwhelming majority (91%) were in favor of democracy in principle. However, when asked whether 'democracy is always preferable to other form of government', only 45 percent endorsed democracy unconditionally. This is contrasting to previous survey results. An unconditional support for democracy decreased from 70 percent in 1996, to 69 percent in 1997, then, again 54 percent in 1998 and 55 percent in 1999. In addition, more than a third of Korean people speculated the possibility that an authoritarian regime might sometimes be preferable to democracy. Less than a half answered affirmatively that democracy was working satisfactorily, and approval rate declined from 49 percent in 1997 to 45 percent in 1999(Chu, Diamond and Shin, 2001 : 129).

Hong and Cho's analysis (2006) shows a similar result. As shown in Table 6, although there had been more people who gave priority to economic development than those giving priority to democracy, the proportion increased toward the end of President *Kim Dae-jung*' term. What is worse, as in Table 7, less people tended to believe that democracy mattered for solving economic difficulties. And, people who believe in democratic government's capacity to solve national problems also decreased between 1999 and 2001, as in Table 8. However, distrust in democracy, it is worthwhile to note, does not necessarily mean that South Korea has to abandon democracy altogether (Hong and Cho, 2006 : 128). Nevertheless, it is evident that more people were ready to accept authoritarian government (or national leader) if the circumstances dictated. As shown in Table 9, those who believe democracy is better all the time regardless of circumstances decreased from 68.6 percent in 1997 to 44.6 percent in 2001.

Table 6. Policy priority : economic development vs. democracy (unit : %)

	1997	1998	1999	2001
Economic development	51.2	65.2	49.9	62.6
Democracy	8.8	7.8	14.1	9.8
The same priority	37.7	25.7	35.5	27.3
Don't know	0.4	1.4	0.5	0.4
Number of respondents	1119	1010	1007	1005

Source : Hong and Cho (2006), p. 124

Table 7. How much does democracy contribute to the economic problem-solving

	1999	2001
Very much helpful	4.8	1.8
more or less helpful	40.3	19.2
No difference	44.7	54.1
more or less harmful	8.2	17.6
Very much harmful	2.0	3.8
Don't know/no response	1.0	3.5
Number of respondents	1007	1005

Source : Hong and Cho (2006), p. 126

Table 8. Which form of government is more suitable for problem-solving, democratic or authoritarian government ?

	1997	1999	2001
Democratic	44.0	51.8	38.3
Authoritarian	50.8	42.4	37.1
Not different	N.A	N.A	20.0
Don't know	5.2	5.8	4.6
Number of respondents	1010	1007	1005

Source : Hong and Cho (2006), p. 128

Table 9. Preference in political system

	1997	1998	1999	2001
Democracy is better under all the circumstances	68.6	53.7	55.1	44.6
Authoritarianism is acceptable under certain circumstances	20.6	31.4	30.2	36.9
Don't care	10.8	14.9	14.7	18.5
Number of respondents	1113	1010	1007	1005

Source : Hong and Cho (2006), p. 129

Another failure by a new generation of democrats

It was under these circumstances that *Noh Moo-hyun*, a political outsider and not much influential politician, won the presidency in December 2002. He rose as a hero during the hearings which put former two presidents – *Chun Doo-hwan* and *Roh Tai-woo* – on trial for their mutinies in 1979-1980 and illegal political funds. Afterwards, *Noh*, born in *Kimhae*, *Kyungsang* province, became a symbol of anti-regionalist politics and anti-corruption, by running as a NA candidate of Cholla-based party. In addition, in 2002 when the 16th Presidential election was held, there occurred many important events, including *Busan Asian Games* (where North Korean sports team and cheer leaders took part), *World Cup Games*, and death of two junior-high school girls due to accident by American tanks. These events or accidents made South Korean people take pride in mother country and have sympathy in and solidarity with Korean people. No other politicians within the ruling party (MDP) and candidates of opposition parties (i.e., GNP) could not beat him in patriotism (or anti-Americanism), anti-corruption and anti-regionalism.

Despite such advantages and popular support, he made a fatal mistake at the beginning of his tenure. He broke one of the most important campaign platforms. During the campaign, he promised not to send South Korean troop to Iraq, but he changed his mind and agreed to send them after a summit meeting with American President Bush. Since he owed very much to young generations – so-called the 386 generation – who were said to hold anti-American attitude, his supporters were disillusioned and began to stay aloof from him when President *Noh* betrayed them. In addition, his party took less than a half of NA seats. Furthermore, not a few politicians in his party did not pay due respect to him. As a result, he could not initiate any reform smoothly without resistance from old-generation NA members. There was no choice but to act like 'imperial president' until the 2004 NA election, when his new party (Uri-Party) won a majority of seats.

Uri-Party was a splinter party from Millennium Democratic Party(MDP), which legislators and politicians, sympathetic with President *Noh's* reform policy, formed in November 2003. At

the time of its formation, it was only a minority of 47 out of 299 NA members, but they pushed very hard for reform agendas, for example, anti-regionalism and party democracy, in alignment with President Noh. Moreover, President Noh, being head of minority government, behaved very aggressively, mostly without any meaningful outcome in the concrete form of legislation.


Such behavior of President Noh and Uri-Party aroused strong criticism and anger from opposition parties, finally leading to the impeachment by opposition parties. Three opposition parties agreed to impeach him, and they took action for it in March 2004, when it was about one month before the 17th NA election. Many Korean people, especially the younger generations, rose to protest impeachment by opposition parties, which were perceived as corrupt, regionalist, and anti-democratic by. The 16th NA election held in 2004 ended up with a complete victory of Noh's party, obtaining an absolute majority of seats in the NA. Noh became the first president of democratic governments who enjoyed a majority in the NA. (See Table 2)

Despite of such advantage, President Noh also failed to consolidate Korean democracy. First of all, as his precedent democratic governments, his government pursued apparently contradictory policies. His foreign and economic policies were on the same track of pro-American and neoliberal ideology, while social policy and political reform were more or less progressive, more specifically egalitarian and liberal-individualist. As mentioned above, he changed his stance toward the U.S. already at the beginning of his presidency, and he continued his predecessor's capital and labor market policy based on market liberalism while putting patched on social welfare system. In addition, his government gave a high priority to political reform which aimed to make South Korea a full-blown liberal democracy, through revision of notorious National Security Act, Law of Private Schools, Law on Gender Equality, and so on.

As a result, President Noh and Uri-Party contributed to the expanding or deepening of democracy, but at the same time, they undermined the very social base of democracy, failing to consolidate it.

Toward the end of President Noh's presidential term, South Korean people came to see the slowdown of economic growth and the shrinking middle class or the increasing economic inequality.

Four decades ago, as shown in Figure 2, GDP per capita was comparable with levels in the poorer countries of Africa and Asia. It sustained double-digit economic growth for decades, growing faster than any other major economy in the 20th century. As a result, today the economy of Korea is a highly developed trillion dollar economy that is the fourth largest in Asia and 13th in the world, and its GDP per capita is roughly the same as that of Greece and Spain. Although the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, however, forced the economic growth rate to plunge by 6.9% in 1998, it recovered by 9.5% in 1999 and 8.5% in 2000. Growth fell back to 3.3% in 2001 because of the slowing global economy, and falling exports. Led by consumer spending and exports, growth in 2002 was an impressive 7%. That was the last to see the growth rate rising above 5%. Between 2003 and 2007, growth moderated to about 4-5% annually. Compared to other high-income economies, this is still high. And per capita GDP continued to rise during Noh Moo-hyun government, showing a 80 percent increase from US\$ 12,100 in 2002 to US\$ 21,695 in 2007. See Table 9. However, since Korean voters were used to a two-digit growth rate, they considered a growth lower than 5 percent as economic stagnation. Moreover, benefits of economic growth were not distributed among the populace. In other words, as we will see soon, only a small portion benefited from it.

Figure 2. Economic growth rate

Source : National Statistics Office

Moreover, economic inequality deteriorated since 1997. As shown in Table 10, Gini's coefficient for two and more member urban households rose from 0.285 in 1996, to 0.298 in 2002, and then, to 0.306 in 2007. The absolutely poor increased from 4.6% in 1996 to 8.6% in 1998, dropping to 4.7% in 2002 and rising again to 6.9% in 2005. Especially, according to National Statistics Office, during the period from 2003 to 2007, average annual incomes of bottom 10% in income distribution increased from 9.3 million won to 11.81 million won, showing a 25.8% rise, while those of top 10% rising from 83.83 million won to 106.59 million won, a 27.2% increase. It means that economic growth benefited more the wealthy than the poor. When the value of real estate, like the price of home and land, is taken into account, then economic inequality became bigger. The Gini's coefficient of housing rose from 0.489 in 1993 to 0.568 in 2006.

Table 10. Trends in per capita GDP and economic income inequality

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
(1)	12,100	13,480	15,082	17,531	19,722	21,695	19,231
(2)	3.3 7.0	3.6 8.0	3.7 8.3	3.7 8.0	3.5 7.9	3.2 7.2	3.2 7.2
(3)	51.7	49.5	48.8	47.9	47.3	46.0	44.4
(4)	0.298	0.298	0.304	0.304	0.303	0.306	0.306

Note : (1) per capita GDP (US\$) (2) Unemployment rate(%), () - youth(15~29 years old) unemployment rate(%) (3) Irregular job (temporary + daily) - % of total employment (4) Gini's coefficient

Source : Korea Labor Institute. 2006. *KLI Labor Statistics 2008*.


Recognizing the seriousness of economic inequality, Noh Moo-hyun government expanded some redistributive policies, including social safety nets, which Kim Dae-jung government introduced systematically for the first time in the history of South Korea's social welfare policy. Despite the distribution-oriented policy of the past 10 years, Korea's level of rectifying income inequality through redistribution stood at a mere one fourth the level of the average of the OECD member countries in the 1990s. The nation's immature social security system had failed to redistribute by way of taxation and other public transfers. As a result, two thirds of the middle class have sunk into poverty with only one third climbing up the income ladder to join rich groups. In addition, the number of poor people getting even poorer has rapidly increased, driving more and more people into absolute poverty. A special mention has to be made. Noh Moo-Hyun government introduced a comprehensive real estate tax system, which imposed

more burden on the rich. This infuriated the upper class, especially residing in the “Kangnam” area, the southern part of Han River in Seoul, where typical rich people lived.

In contrast to conservative policies in the realms of economy and foreign relations, Noh's government, like *Kim Dae-jung*, posed a more or less progressive stance in politics and foreign relations. He recruited many progressive NGO activists and scholars in government posts and attempted to reform some non-democratic political institutions. In addition, he continued President *Kim*'s engagement policy toward North Korea, and, at the same time attempting to change the tone in the Korea-US relations. His neoliberal economic policies and pro-America foreign policy undermined their traditional strongholds, while political reform efforts and pro-North Korea policy stirring up the conservative part of society.


In consequence, President Noh was alienated from social, political forces on both sides of ideological spectrum. His approval rate and public support for Uri-Party dropped at end of 2004, and continued to be sluggish. According to a joint polls conducted by *Hankook Daily* and Media Research, as seen in Figure 3, 89 percent of respondents expected at time of his election that President-elect Noh would perform his job well. However, after 100 days in his job, his approval rate dropped to 52.3 percent. Afterwards it continued to fall until the impeachment in March 2004. But, it again fell after the impeachment, and stayed low throughout the period of March 2004-December 2006. Since then, it recovered the level of the first year of his term up to 43 percent. In the case of the ruling Uri-Party, as shown Figure 4, its public support at the polls recorded highest (50.1%) in March 2004, when President Noh was impeached by opposition parties, and then, dropped to 43.5 percent in May 2004, afterwards continuing to fall and finally reaching 4.7 percent in August 2007.

Figure 3. Approval Rate of President Noh Moo-hyun, 2003-2007



Source : *Hankook Daily* & Media Research.

Figure 4. Trend in Public Support for Uri-Party



Source : Lee 2008, *Hankyoreh* 21, December 10, 2008.


Note : Uri-Party (*Yollinwoori-dang*), GNP (Grand National Party, *Hannara-dang*), DLP (Democratic Labor Party, *Minjunodong-dang*), DP (Millennium Democratic Party, *Minju-dang*)

Comeback of the old authoritarian parties in the form of authoritarian neoliberalism

17th Presidential election and the 18th NA election took place under these circumstances. The 17th Presidential election was held on December 19, 2007, and *Lee Myung-bak*, conservative GNP's candidate, won the presidency. As a result, GNP became to occupy the Blue House for the first time in ten years. Although most of the pre-election polls anticipated his election, it came up as a shock to many Koreans. For GNP's presidential candidate, *Lee Myung-bak*, was suspected of illegal business activities, and he was also criticized for neoliberal policies, hazardous project, and authoritarian leadership style.⁶ Both his career – as CEO of a big conglomerate and as politician – and his policy stances, South Korean democrats suspected, would put Korean democracy in jeopardy. For, it was argued that his neoliberal policies and his authoritarian leadership style would definitely undermine the foundation of democracy, for example, civil liberties and political rights. The fact that despite various allegations and criticisms, he safely won the election by a large margin of 22 percent, was ominous to Korean democracy.

It was more so because President Lee's party, GNP, seized a lion's share of seats in the National Assembly election held four months later. For GNP gained a majority of seats in the election, despite of the increasing popular disillusion with President Lee and his ruling party. President Lee's popularity dropped sharply since he took office in February, as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Approval rate of President Lee since December 2007



Source : Hankook Daily, February 24, 2009.

For, first, he failed to immediately make good on his " get-the-job-done " image, and second, many of his Cabinet nominees proved to be among the wealthiest in Korea society, several of whom resigned over the alleged ethical lapses. Third, President Lee was also the target of angry rhetoric from North Korea over his tougher stance toward it, saying further cooperation between the two would only come after the North was to resolve the international standoff over its nuclear weapons and to launch a transformative reform from state-controlled to liberal market economy.

It was under these circumstances that the 18th NA election was held. It could happen that opposition parties, especially Democratic Party, would take a substantial portion of NA seats. However, it did not really occur. Rather, the 18th NA elections ended with the safe victory of the conservative GNP, which won a total of 153 seats, including 22 seats with 37.5 percent on the party vote. The previous majority party, United Democratic Party, was diminished to a minority status, taking 81 seats including 15 seats with 25.1% on the party vote. Liberty Forward

Party, the *Chungcheong* based conservative party led by *Lee Hoi-Chang*, gained a total of 18 seats. Pro-Park Keun-Hye Coalition, an improvised party separated itself from Grand National Party due to nomination conflict, came fourth, receiving 14 seats. Democratic Labor Party, which had succeeded in winning seats in National Assembly for the first time in Korea's electoral history since 1960, lost five from the previous ten seats.

The outcome of the 18th NA election made it very difficult for opposition parties to prevent the ruling party from passing undemocratic or anti-democratic legislation and from checking the authoritarian president. The liberal-democratic or progressive forces – which once occupied around 170 seats including liberal UDP's 161 seats, leftist LDP's 10 seats – were reduced to a minority in the National Assembly. On the other hand, the conservative political parties together took a lion's share, 185 seats in total – GNP 153 seats, LFP 18 seats, Pro-Park Coalition 14 seats. It is well known that conservatives are much more pro-US but anti-North Korea in foreign policy, pro-market but anti-statist in economic-social policy, and restrictive in civil rights and political freedom than progressives. So, it was expected already at the time of the election that there would be a radical retreat of democracy in South Korean society. In other words, since conservative parties and politicians, after the election in 2008, controlled both the Presidency and the National Assembly, popular sectors would be excluded, more often than before, from public policy making process. Conservatives would also attempt to curtail political influence of NGOs and individual citizens as well, especially those critical of government policies, by restricting individuals' and groups' freedom of expression and association.

In fact, all of these have been happening almost every day not just in parliament but also on the street. Korean democracy has been retreating after the inauguration of President Lee, especially after the NA election.

At any rate, the 18th NA election completed the comeback of South Korea's old authoritarianism to political center. At the same time, it signaled the retreat of new democrats to the back stage of South Korean politics. As seen before, it happened partly because of the peculiar nature of democratic transition itself, partly because of the strategic mistakes from the part of democrats. They were progressive in politics but conservative in economic policy. They pursued economic liberalization and applied market principles to all the realms of society, even to party organization and election system, without any due caution, while taking a progressive stance toward domestic politics and, to a lesser degree, foreign affairs. Their neoliberal economic policies, by dwindling the middle classes and enlarging the poor, alienated the middle and lower classes, while the latter political strategies infuriating the politically conservative constituencies.

Then, is there any prospect of making Korean democracy revive in the near future? It appears to be pessimistic. Progressives – liberal DP and leftist DLP – are still in disarray. They have not yet found any viable alternative programs for renovation of Korean economy and society. Moreover, they have not yet found a new competent leadership. As a result, they have not yet succeeded in regaining public trust. NGO's, which once played a very important role in democratizing Korean society and politics, are also in difficulty. The recent 'candle light demonstration' evidently showed that Korea's political parties and NGO's have to find new policy programs and strategies fit with the changing public attitudes and expectations. The public are now more pragmatic, individualistic, and participatory than before. The future of Korea's democracy will depend on how democratic parties and civic organizations can effectively mobilize them not just in the elections but also in everyday life.

Endnotes

- ¹ The National Assembly of South Korea is a unicameral legislature composed of 299 members. Single-member constituencies comprise 245 of the National Assembly's seats, while the remaining 54 are allocated by proportional representation on the basis of party list voting. Members serve four-year terms.
- ² The law has the avowed purpose "to restrict anti-state acts that endanger national security and to protect [the] nation's safety and its people's life and freedom." Based on the Law for Maintenance of the Public Security of the Japanese Korea, it was passed in 1948, and made illegal both communism and recognition of North Korea as a political entity. It has been reformed and strengthened with the passing of the times. The Anti-communism Law was merged into the National Security Law during the 1980s. This law is acknowledged by some South Korean politicians and activists as a symbol of the anti-communism of South Korea's First Republic and its dictatorial period of 1964-1987. In 2004, legislators of the Uri Party, then with a majority, made a gesture as to annul the law, but failed owing to Grand National Party opposition. Many recent poll results show that more than half of the Korean people are against the abolition of the act, and the dispute continues. This law has been regularly blamed for restricting freedom of speech: Citizens may not join an organization with aims to overthrow the government; Citizens may not create, distribute or possess materials that promote anti-government ideas; Citizens may not neglect to report others who violate this law. The number of persons put in jail due to violation of NSA was 1,730 under the Roh Tai-woo presidency, 1,972 under the Kim Young-sam presidency, and around 1,000 even under the Kim Dae-jung presidency, respectively. <http://www.vop.co.kr/view.php?i=18037&mode=print>; <http://lawtimes.co.kr/LawNews/NewsAccs/ArticlePrint.aspx?serial=14301>
- ³ It is worthy to note that around the 14th Presidential election of 1992 Kim Dae-jung sought support from a leftist political movement organization, which was perceived as pro-North Korea and pro-unification. But after the election, it was said that he found such political alliance of no use. Then, it is evident that he might have changed his mind during his trip to U.K. and the U.S. In other words, in order to win the presidential election, he might have decided to give up, and stay away from, leftist social-political groups, and instead, pursue a conservative alliance – a region-based coalition.
- ⁴ President Kim Young-sam tried very hard to persuade South Korea's businessmen that main targets of his reform for clean politics were not big conglomerates – which were suspected of providing illegal political funds – but political parties and politicians – who were suspected of receiving them from big businesses. After meeting individually major business leaders in summer 1993, he switched his economic policy from regulation- to liberalization-centered one. It included liberalizing financial market, increasing labor market flexibility, and so on.
- ⁵ There exist different explanations about this. Im (2005) contributes to rampant corruption for public distrust in democracy, while Hong (2006) and Hwang (2003) attempted to explain this from the perspective of incumbent government's economic performance.
- ⁶ Lee was accused of profiting from illegal speculation on land owned in Dogok-dong, an expensive ward in Seoul, and he was allegedly involved in the BBK scandal, in which the prosecutor charged the legal owner of an electronic financial service company for a large-scale embezzlement and stock price-fixing schemes. There were many other allegations raised by his rival Park Keun-hye and also by Democratic Party. During his campaign, he proposed several platforms which aroused a hot controversy. Among them was included the Grand Korean Waterway project, which was criticized for being too costly and devastating the environment. Concerning economic policy, he proclaimed to be a business friendly president, by further de-regulating the economy further and privatizing public health system, for example, expanding private health insurance and commercial medical service. What was most concerned about him had to do with his leadership style. He was well-known for his bulldoze style leadership, which had a negative implication for democratic consolidation. He tried to portray himself as a new Park Chung-hee, who is admired for his achievement in Korea's rapid economic development with a strong, but authoritarian leadership. One may be tempted to compare him to UK Prime minister Thatcher, but he is more close to President Park than her. For he is attempting to destroy parliamentary democracy as well as democratic civic organizations, while Mrs Thatcher respected democratic rule of game in parliament. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lee_Myung_Bak

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Appendix 1. Abbreviations of Korean party names

- CKP - Creative Korea Party (*Changjo-hankuk-dang*)
- DJP - Democratic Justice Party (*Minju-jeongui-dang*)
- DKP - Democratic Korea Party (*Minju-hankuk-dang*)
- DKP - Democratic Korea Party (*Minju-Hankuk-dang*)
- DLP - Democratic Liberal Party (*Minju-jayu-dang*)
- DP(1) - Democratic Party (*Minju-dang*)
- DP(2) - Democratic Party (*Minju-dang*)
- DP(3) - United Democratic Party (*Tonghap-minju-dang*, since July 2008, Koreanname changed to *Minju-dang*)

GNP - Grand National Party (*Han-nara-dang*)
 Hankyereh DP - Hankyereh Democratic Party (*Hankyereh-minju-dang*)
 KDLP - Korea Democratic Labor Party (*Minju-nodong-dang*)
 KNP - Korean National Party (*Hankuk-Kukmin-dang*)
 LFP - Liberal Forward Party (*Jayu-seonjin-dang*)
 MDP - Millenium Democratic Party (*Saecheonyon-minju-dang*)
 NCNP - National Congress of New Politics (*Sae-jeongchi-kukmin-hoiui*)
 NDP - New Democratic Alliance Party (*Shin-minju-ynhap-dang*)
 NDRP - New Democratic Republican Party (*Shin-minju-konghwa-dang*)
 NKDP - New Korea Democratic Party (*Shin-hankuk-minju-dang*)
 NKP - New Korea Party (*Shin-Hankuk-dang*)
 NPP - New Progressive Party (*Jinbo-shin-dang*)
 NUDP - New United Democratic Party (*Dae-tonghap-minju-dang*)
 PFP - People First Party (*Kukmin-jungsim-dang*)
 PP(1) - Party of People (*Minjung-ui-dang*)
 PP(2) - People's party (*Minjung-dang*)
 PPC - Pro-Park Geun-hye Coalition (*Chin-Park-yondae*)
 PPD - Party of Peace and Democracy (*Pyeonghwa-minju-dang*)
 RDP - Reunification Democratic Party (*Tongil-minju-dang*)
 ULD - United Liberal Democrats (*Jayu-minju-ynhap*)
 UPP - Unification People's Party (*Tongil-kukmin-dang*)
 Uri-Party - Open Our Party (*Yollin-uri-dang*)

Developing Sustainable Communities in Africa : Components for a Framework

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Résumé

Développer des collectivités durables en Afrique: éléments d'un débat

Cet article présente les composantes d'un cadre pour le développement d'une communauté durable. Les éléments sont tirés de la littérature. Dans la plupart des tentatives visant à fournir un cadre pour le développement en Afrique, peu de considération est accordée pour des variables cruciales telles que la culture. Ces tentatives ont tourné court ce qui a causé des retournements dans les pratiques. L'une des premières se situe dans le hiatus entre le monde universitaire et le bras pensant de la Banque mondiale et du Fonds monétaire international. Ensuite viennent les groupes des décideurs politiques et les organisations non gouvernementales. La « durabilité » est devenue un point de référence inévitable depuis sa popularisation par la Commission mondiale sur l'environnement et le développement (rapport Brundtland) en 1987. Le terme est toutefois utilisé plus par rapport à l'environnement et l'économie que par rapport à la communauté. L'idée d'une communauté durable met l'accent sur la durabilité au niveau local, ce qui oblige à prendre en compte les difficultés politiques et surtout culturelles associées à des tentatives d'atteindre la durabilité au niveau mondial. Cette contribution soutient que pour le développement de communautés durables, nous devons commencer par prendre au sérieux l'utilisation des pratiques et des systèmes qui maintiennent ou améliorent la capacité des gens à subvenir à leurs problèmes sociaux et à leur bien-être culturel, la viabilité économique de l'agriculture, la base naturelle des ressources de l'agriculture, les écosystèmes influencés par les activités agricoles et la qualité et la sécurité des aliments.

Abstract

This paper puts forward components for a framework for the development of a sustainable community. The components of the framework are drawn from the literature. The premise of the task is the absence of crucial variables, such as culture, in most attempts to provide a framework for development in Africa. These attempts have seen theoretical 'turns', which have been matched by twists in 'practice'. The former is in the academy and the 'thinking arm' of the World Bank/International Monetary Fund. The latter is among socio-political decision makers and Non-Governmental Organisations. "Sustainability" has become an almost unavoidable point of reference in this attempt since its popularity by the World Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland Report) in 1987. The term is, however, used more in relation to the environment and the economy than it is to the community. The idea of a sustainable community, as is well known, signalled a shift of focus on sustainability to the local level, which reflects the political and indeed cultural difficulties associated with the attempts to achieve sustainability at a global level. This paper argues that for the development of sustainable communities, we must begin to take seriously the use of practices and systems which maintain or enhance the ability of people to provide for their social and cultural well-being, the economic viability of agriculture, the natural resource base of agriculture, the ecosystems influenced by agricultural activities and the quality and safety of food and fibre.

Since the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), also known as the Brundtland Report, the concept of sustainable development has become an influential and widely used term. It became the new planning agenda and was given considerable weight following the Earth Summit in Rio where the concept 'sustainability' was embodied in the resulting United Nations Framework Convention on Sustainable Development. The concept is now well-rooted in development discourse and within the discourse, has come the suggestion by some commentators that because of the less efficiency of sustainability planning in a large region, the focus is now on sustainable community where the community is seen as a "complex system of humans and natural environment" (Chang and Huang 2004). Those who concentrate on the socio-political and cultural aspects of development discourse suggest that the shift in focus to the local level reflects the political and cultural difficulties associated with attempts to achieve sustainability on a global level. The implication is that with the focus on the level of the community, development policies, with its tendency to focus primarily on national sustainable development, will be richer in the sense of being sensitive to the opportunities and constraints inherent in communities which differ in "terms of environmental problems, natural and human resource endowments, levels of economic and social development and physical (i.e. geological and geographical) and climatic conditions" (Wilkinson, 1991).

A cursory look at the literature reveals that the concept 'sustainability' is used more in relation to the environment and the economy than it is in relation to the community. In fact if we went back to the Brundtland Report and the Agenda 21 (the United Nations Conference of Environment and Development at Rio de Janeiro 1992), we would see how this came about. As Fricker (1998) noted, the concept dates back to the 1970s but with the Brundtland Report, it "exploded into the global arena" with what is now one of the most quoted sentences in development discourse, sustainable development as *development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs* (Brundtland, 1987 : 43). This classic definition contains two key concepts : "the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which the overriding priority should be given ; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs" (Brundtland, 1987 : 4). The Rio document, as summed up by Perrings (1994), requires of government to address the causes of poverty, hunger, the inequitable distribution of income and low human resource development. The emphasis on environment in the document dealt with limiting its further degradation. The social was emphasised to give priority to the provision of the capacity for people to feed, clothe and house themselves. Governments were thus charged through Agenda 21 with the responsibility towards a more equitable division of wealth. A great number of commentators took their cue from this focusing on environment and the economy. In some of the ensuing commentaries, particularly those that focus on community, the notion of a sustainable community, tends to refer to, as Salfiel (1994), rightly observed, the rural context. This is understandable given the fact that the bulk of the population in most African countries reside in the rural areas.

However, in relation to the rural context, a significant number of rural sociologists have noted that it is highly heterogeneous and resistant to generalisation. For example Scott et al (2000) emphasise its diversity in terms of class, ethnicity and occupational status. They arrived at this based on their observation of the Mangakahia Valley in the North Island of New Zealand, which reveals ethnicity as cutting-across or aligning with class to create deep if often unrecognised difference. Nevertheless, I would argue that such diversity is not as significant as it would appear because, in most cases, the rural areas, especially in Africa seem more homogenous in terms of ethnic composition.

In general, rural areas constitute the space where human settlements and infrastructure occupy only small patches of the landscape, most of which are dominated by fields and pastures, woods, forest, water, mountains and hills. Rural people tend to live in farmsteads, settlements and villages. However as Ashley and Maxwell (2001) rightly point out, beyond these, are core features, which are related to natural resources and population density. We can, in the case of Africa, characterise the rural areas as places where most people spend most of their working time on farms ; they are places with abundance of land, which is relatively cheap ; the rural areas in Africa, arguably with no exception, are characterised by high transaction costs, associated with long distance and poor infrastructure and geographical conditions that increase political transaction costs and magnify the possibility of elite capture and urban bias.

It is against these characteristics that the frameworks for a sustainable community have been variously developed. However, a significant variable that seems absent in such frameworks is culture. What follows elaborates on this. As the discussion unfolds, it would be clear what I mean by culture ; however, at this junction, I need to point out that culture should not be seen to be confined to ' ideas and understandings people simply have or can acquire – it is rooted in realities people experience over time which therefore has a real and continuing history. It should not be seen, as has been rightly noted, to be a dimension that exists separate and apart from the other domains of economic and social existence. And in relation to infrastructural development, it should not be seen as anachronistic. ' Culture ' was invoked in the attempt by the Thatcher government to deal with the lack of development in the British economy, indicated by its poor performance in comparison to major competitors and a growing number of a sufficiently ' enterprising ' culture. The argument then was that Britain lacked the ' enterprise culture '. As Day (1998) noted, " while the meaning of ' enterprise culture ' was vague and confused, and inclined to melt away under close scrutiny, its focus was clear enough : it was concerned with the content of people's consciousness, the understandings and meanings which they brought to their behaviour, especially their economic behaviour, and the goals which they choose to pursue ". The ' enterprise culture ' of Thatcher years has the goal of transformation of values and attitudes, to free the spirit of competition and unlock economic regeneration in the UK. In terms of sustainable communities in Africa, the issue is recognising the values and attitudes of the community in unlocking its development and sustainability. This is a radically different position despite the point of contact – the relevance of culture.

This brings me to the key point of departure in the discussion : that one cannot begin to regenerate a community for infrastructural development without taking into account, fully, the whole set of relationships, social, political and cultural, with which the regeneration will occur. Many who have applied their minds to the issue of sustainable communities would agree with this point. In attempting such a task, which is the objective in this paper, it becomes essential that one clarifies the notion of community; the immediate section that follows does that.

The Idea of a Community

The literature reveals that the word, community, which became rooted in everyday language [in English since the 14th century (Williams, 1983)] has been interpreted loosely resulting in a high level of use, but a low level of meaning (Walmsley, 2000). As far back as 1922, Giddings wrote about community as constructed around what he called a " consciousness of kind ". Community, according to him, evokes the explicit recognition of common and exclusive interests that rests on communal foundations (Giddings, 1922). The " consciousness of kind ", which Giddings wrote of acts to develop self-consciousness, taking the form of a distinguishing label, ' a symbol of community ', which is an " essential part of the development of communal affinity ". Holcombe (2004) cites Parkin (1982) as noting that related to this notion of communal affinity

is 'social closure', which, according to him, was suggested by Weber to mean "the process by which social collectivities seek to maximise rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of eligibles".

In summing up the literature, almost exactly two decades ago, Bell and Newby (1976) point out that community has been used as a simple description of the boundaries of a settlement; to denote a local system centred around interaction between people and institutions and as a communion, what Urry (1995) refers to as a particular kind of human association founded on personal ties and a sense of belonging. This still holds for what we know as community to day; though, of recent, there has been a growing discussion of the changing nature of community. This derives from studies of the social implication of advanced technology. Spender (1995) wrote about new communities on the net and new human values being forged. Negroponte (1995) went to the extreme by suggesting that socialising in digital neighbourhoods will make physical space irrelevant. As far back as 1963, Webber (1963) observed that instead of individuals having their greatest involvement (sense of community) with those among whom they lived (as defined on the bases of propinquity), a situation was arising where at least for professional and managerial groups, communities might be spatially far-flung, but nevertheless close-knit, intimate and held together by shared interests and values (communities based on common interest rather than propinquity).

As noted by Walmsley (2000), cyberspace might have annihilated distance but not place and this applies when referring to rural communities; in this context, it implies a locality, a geographically defined place where people interact. For most Africans, the locality and locality-derived relationships are still important in terms of their existence. The community is the primary setting and point of contact between the individual and society. As Bridger and Luloff (1999) remarked "the community continues to be an important factor in peoples' lives because it is fundamentally implicated in the social construction of meanings". However, it is a dynamic interplay of historic process and complex relationships acted out in environments. As Jones (1995) suggests, it is not enough to describe it as a sense of place or as a product of relationships between individuals or as a social system. Rather, it comes into existence and defines its own form, out of the interaction of the participatory elements, in environments and over time.

In simple terms and for the purpose of the present discussion, community would denote people of a locality, common people, organised society, with something in common, a sense of identity. In common with the traditional usage, it is a whole pattern of life in which members are engaged and in which various aspects and dimensions of social existence are woven together in a kind of seamless web (Day, 1998). It strikes a particular resonance in most part of Africa. When invoked, as is often the case, it serves to differentiate or to draw a 'symbolic' boundary – one of belonging and non-belonging. One sees an African's experience of localities as imbued with meaning and shared values. As a matter of fact, remarked Kearns and Joseph (1997), the existence of territorial identity and its attendant institutional frameworks within local places imposes a structural context on everyday life. Human agency tends to flourish within this.

With this clarification, the building block of my discussion becomes clear. The question that immediately arises, therefore, is: What is it that we really want to sustain? Other related questions are: In the African context, are communities sufficiently developed to warrant sustainability? Are we not jumping the gun, so to say, if we focus on sustainability? Should we rather not focus on community development, which in its broadest is about involving people in a community in educating themselves to improve the circumstances of their lives through health, agriculture, civic education and attention to their natural and social, economic and political environments? The fact of my raising these questions should not be interpreted as devaluing sustainability but as a caution to any presumed economically reductionist approach, which one finds in very many discussions on sustainability. For example, traditional environmental economics perceives environmental problems in terms of a deteriorating local environment. Solutions are

then cast in terms of finding efficient trade-offs between economic growth and environmental quality and finding policy instruments that will internalize the costs (Roseland, 2000). The focus is thus on " unchecked development " and its negative consequences. Such discussions develop sustainability criteria, which tend to inform policy on sustainability in Africa. A look at government policies in Africa reveals policy prescriptions as founded on, to borrow Scott et al's (2000) general critique of sustainable development, the interpretation of sustainable development that accepts both the legitimacy and efficacy of the conventional economic growth model.

The adoption of the sustainability criteria informed by such economic growth model is misguided in many ways because communities in Africa face distinctly different challenges than those faced by the communities in Europe and America. From the perspective of development, the basic problem that communities face in Africa is one of underdevelopment – many cannot meet their basic needs for food, clean water, clean air and an environment free of disease-causing agent. Poverty is still one of the basic obstacles that must be overcome to maintain development and indeed sustain communities. In fact, it is deepening and given this, agricultural growth still remains the 'critical engine' of its reduction. The centrality of agriculture, as we know, goes back to the 1960s. Agriculture was seen then as a source of wage goods for the manufacturing industrial sector, source of inputs, foreign exchange and support.

Specifically, in relation to rural development, agriculture as an engine of rural development sprang from the dual-economy theories of development as espoused by Lewis (1955) who suggested that the subsistence sector, as possessing negligible prospects for rising productivity or growth, could play a passive role in the process of economic development, supplying resources to the modern sector until the latter expanded to take its place. This influenced the large-scale, highly mechanized farming of the late 1950s and 1960s in many countries of Africa (Oloyede, 2002). Nevertheless, one still has to deal with sustainability and sustainable communities in Africa. What is sustainability ? What is a sustainable community ? How can we develop sustainable communities for infrastructural development in Africa ?

Sustainability and Sustainable Communities

As Bell and Morse (2003) point out, within the academic literature, sustainability is considered a highly contested concept. There are competing conceptions of ' strong ' and ' weak ' sustainability (Pearce, 1998), with the former differentiating between assets, which are " natural " and those, which are not and the latter aggregating all types of assets. The ' strong ' conception puts forward the argument that whatever the level of human-made assets, an adequate stock of environmental (or natural) assets alone is critical in securing sustainability (Daly, 1989). The ' weak ' sustainability interpretation derives from the neoclassical economic interpretation that natural and non-natural assets are substitutable and that natural assets can be liquidated as long as subsequent investment provides an equivalent endowment to the next generation. Critics have been quick to point out that natural and non-natural assets are not substitutable. Roseland, (2000) for example, stated that a sawmill cannot be substituted for a forest since the sawmill (non-natural capital) needs the forest (natural) in order to function.

In general, sustainable communities are regarded as those communities that meet the economic needs of the community residents, enhance and protect their environment and promote " more humane local societies ". The economy still remains what is emphasised though the focus is on a smaller scale. What is critical is increasing local economic diversity. Related to this is self-reliant, which entails the development of local markets, local production and greater co-operation among local economic entities. The environment is then coupled with the emphasis on the reduction in the use of energy and the careful management and recycling of waste products. Berry (1993) sums up sustainable community as a :

" neighbourhood of humans in a place, plus the place itself : its soil, its water, its air, and all the families and tribes of nonhuman creatures that belong to it... a complex connection not only among human beings and their homeland but also between the human economy and nature, between forest and field or orchard, and between troublesome creatures and pleasant ones. "

However, those who emphasise sustainable communities as a development practice see it as a more context-sensitive approach (Van der Ploeg and Long, 1994). To work towards a sustainable community is to be sensitive to context – in the sense in which differences in ways of life and social values are recognised. If what define a community, as discussed earlier, are shared understanding, values and belief, then, it is these that we need to pay attention to in developing for the purpose of infrastructural development. The goal therefore is to stimulate active participation of the community through commitment to the values of the community. What this means in other words is that sufficient attention has to be given to social and cultural prerequisites in developing sustainable communities.

To bring back culture in development is ironic because it has always been seen, as evidenced in Eisenstadt's (1970) well known discussion of development, to be an impediment to progress and development. This has often applied to Africa; as is widely acknowledged, development thinking, in general, is influenced by Weber's Protestant ethic thesis, which explains why capitalism developed in the West and not in the East. He sees particular type of culture favouring development. However unappealing the idea that shared understanding, meanings and values, (what effectively would be defined as culture), is to economists, it is hardly denied. As I did mention earlier, it did not stop the same economists from invoking it in explaining lack of development in the British economy in the 1980s. On both the left and right of British politics, some argued that Britain had never really had a full-bodied ' entrepreneurial ' revolution ; that it was too wedded still to the values and assumptions of a pre-industrial and landowning aristocracy. So, a prerequisite for development in the West is the values and attitudes of its people. The opposite is the case for Africa : values and attitudes impede development.

However, as Day (1998) observed, with the failure of development efforts, we are beginning to see a new thinking. Keane (1990 : 291) puts it sharply when he writes:

" What were held previously to be limitations upon development may even be regarded now, given the right circumstances as potential sources of strength ; and this is leading to new efforts to harness them within more effective strategies for change, directed not just at the economic considerations, but at development of the total human conditions of rural places ? "

We see in the thinking of instrumentalists the idea that the manner in which people act ' economically ', and therefore the extent to which they can undertake expansive or ' developmental ' action, is wrapped up with kinds of social relationships to which they belong, and that this in turn is connected intimately to the way in which they understand the world. Hence cultural meanings and social bonds are part and parcel of economic action, which as Granovetter (1985) has argued is 'embedded' in social practices and institutional arrangements and cannot be understood apart from them. As a result, we can scarcely separate culture from economic action and treat both as the cause of each other – they have to be seen as fused together, within a framework of established social relationship. We begin to see the significant components for a more useful framework for sustainable communities in the preceeding discussion. These components are brought together in the section that follows

Components for a framework for sustainable development

Table 1. Suggested components of a framework for the development of sustainable communities in Africa

Cultural

- Indigenous ways of knowing
- Shared social universe of individuals with strong community root
- Cultural bonds of shared commitments, identity and belief (these generate stable interaction, reduce uncertainty, enable resources to be mobilized, encourage learning and permit the development of long-term vision)

Ecological

- Prevention of land degradation soil preservation through the harnessing of local and scientific knowledge for the prevention of soil health and fertility ; crop rotation based on indigenous ways of doing it ; management of organic matter ; soil acidification or pollution ; minimization of erosion
- Maintain the ecosystem (encouraging and supporting indigenous ways of maintaining the eco-system)
- Protecting biological diversity (of indigenous species)

Economic

- Poverty reduction (livelihood opportunities-rural economy, reduction of landlessness, food security, productivity)
- Security of land tenure (investments in land-productivity)
- Access to resources [capital : credit availability] (Rural inhabitants access to credit for long-term investments and conservation of natural resources)
- Rural economy (diversification of farm operations and livelihood strategies)
- Market information (information on markets ; access to markets)

Socio-political

- Facilitate learning and knowledge sharing (exchange in the community, e.g. farmer-to-farmer ; participatory experimentation; technical assistance)
 - Indigenous knowledge promotion (promotion of indigenous ways of knowing)
 - Resource mobilization (support and assist communities in mobilizing local resources in material, human, political and cultural toward building a sustainable community)
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As is by now clear, the framework under discussion here is informed by the discussion in the preceding sections and is based upon a review of the literature on sustainability and sustainable development summarised in Table 1. What is listed in the Table are in no particular order. They are important components of sustainability and provide a baseline for sustainable communities. However, the cultural, though fused with the economic dimensions, remains central because as Sawyer and Walker (1992) indicated, individuals are imbricated in a social fabric of practices and institutions, outlooks and morals, which it is impossible to dissolve. It has been suggested that the cultural bonds of shared commitment ; identity and belief can sustain a community. The point is that with strong cultural bonds will come movements of ideas, skills and individuals through networks that result from the cultural bonds and these enable common identity, which sustain the economy and helps it to grow (Day, 1998).

In the African context, a sustainable community would be a community that draws from its ways of knowing, its cosmology, its anthropology, its social practices and social arrangements to utilise resources to meet their current needs while ensuring that adequate resources are available for future members of the community. A sustainable community in Africa would seek to use external resources that best suit its needs and within their control to foster a better life for the community. When a community can influence the processes affecting its various activities in order to improve the quality of life of its members in an enduring way, then, such a community

is on the path to sustainability. For Africa, this is what is critical. The ability to pursue strategies based on the ways of knowing is very crucial.

Concluding remarks

What is suggested here in this paper adds the cultural, the ways of knowing and 'doing' to make sustainable community more meaningful and relevant in African. It derives from the assumption that the activities that the rural communities in Africa can sustain and which they want and can afford are quite different from the activities of the communities in Europe and America. It is this fundamental assumption that informed my focus on the rural area, which still remains where majority of Africans live. Most discussion of sustainable communities focuses on the urban. The concern has chiefly been with reduction of energy budgets, reduction of material consumption, a call for more compact urban pattern interspersed with productive areas to collect energy, grow crops and recycle wastes. Roseland (2000), for example, designed a framework for sustainable community, which basically emphasises efficient use of space, on minimizing the consumption of essential natural capital, on multiplying social capital and on mobilizing citizens and their governments toward these ends. In the African context, we must not lose sight of the fact of poverty, diseases and all the ills of underdevelopment. To develop sustainable communities in Africa for the purpose of infrastructural development, we need to derive the ingredients of the 'development' from the situation, identify the cultural, social and economic characteristics of the community, and examine the interactions of these characteristics. Central in this, are the sets of shared understandings, meanings and values.

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Sri Lanka on the Verge on Non-Violence : Can Violence lead to a Stable Peace ?

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Résumé

Sri Lanka, vers la non-violence : la violence peut elle mener à une paix stable ?

Des années de carnage et de destruction ont terni la réputation touristique de l'île d'émeraude que fut le Sri Lanka. Cette contribution essaie de déterminer la structure des conflits et des crises au Sri Lanka. Elle analyse la construction de la paix, autant défis auxquels le pays devra faire face. L'une des conclusions est que la communauté internationale n'est pas monolithique et les acteurs variés qui ont joué différents rôles dans le conflit, ont des hypothèses et des priorités différentes. Le gouvernement doit adopter une approche humaine pour instaurer la confiance pour qu'un nouveau Prabhakaran ne survienne et les gens doivent apprendre à renforcer le mouvement en faveur de la paix en transformant la douleur et la rage en courage.

Abstract

Years of carnage and destruction turned Sri Lanka- the emerald isle of Tourists' literature blood red. While trying to determine the conflict structure where the Sri Lankan civil war fits and analyzing the peace building challenges the country will face, one of the useful findings is that the international community is not monolithic and different actors have different assumptions and priorities and have played different roles in the conflict. Now the government has to adopt a humane approach to implement different confidence building measures to that no future Prabhakaran is born and the people have to learn how to arm peace movement i.e. how grief and rage could be turned into courage.

It is ironic that one of the most unfortunate ethnic wars of recent times occurred in Sri Lanka, an island reputed to have had a peaceful transition from 'model colony' to a stable Third World state achieving international praise for its excellent quality of life and democratic institutions. These were the factors that attracted aid donors and after 1977, increased private foreign investment in Sri Lanka. All these expectations were seriously eroded by years of carnage and destruction when the *emerald isle* of tourists' literature turned blood red. The civil war killed thousands of innocent people (Sinhala, Tamil, and Muslim), brutalized civil society, gave rise to a climate of chauvinist hysteria and intolerance and paved the way for outside intervention. It is argued by many whether after this civil war peace keeping and peace building is possible in this multi-ethnic country. Again the problem lies in the term *multi-ethnic*. Among the 20 million inhabitants, the majority are Buddhists. There are also a significant number of Hindus, Christians and Muslims as well as smaller communities like the Burghers (descendents of European colonials) and the Veddas (aboriginals).¹

Sri Lanka has long been mired in ethnic violence between the Sinhalese-dominated national army and the Tamil Tiger rebels who want a separate homeland in the north of the island nation. The armed conflict that had been on and off since 1983, has claimed approxi-

mately tens of thousands of lives and was considered one of the deadliest in the world. Now that the civil war is over with the defeat of the Tamil Tigers, with their leader dead and second-in-command captured from Thailand, the situation becomes interesting when we analyze the conflict dynamics and the prospects of stable peace in the island nation. The paper aims to do three things : *first*, to provide an analysis of the structures and dynamics of conflict and peace in Sri Lanka since 2000 ; *second*, to examine how international engagement has interacted with conflict and peace dynamics, with a particular focus on aid donors during this period and *third*, to identify how the strategies and approaches of international donors can best engage with and help strengthen domestic peace building efforts.

Tracing the origins of the Sri Lankan conflict (colonial period)

While trying to sketch the origin of the civil war, the important question that needs to be answered is who are the Tamils and what are the major causes of the rift between the Sinhalese and Tamils. The second one that follows is, if there was always a demand for a separate Tamil homeland and if not, when did the demand take root. Is LTTE the only armed Tamil group ? If not, what happened to the others ? How did it become the dominant group ? Let us begin with the first one.

Social and economic developments during the early colonial period under the Portuguese and then the Dutch, commercialization of agriculture, the registration of title to land, registration of births and deaths – contributed towards a freezing of ethnic boundaries. Added to this was economic development during the occupation of the island by the British. The divide and rule policy adopted by the British made the ethnic picture in Sri Lanka more complex. The coffee plantations established by the British in the 19th century brought to Sri Lanka, as plantation labor, a population of over one million Tamil workers from South India. They were at first seasonal migrants but with the development of tea plantations, the majority became permanently domiciled on the plantations. The question of their citizenship rights became an issue that subsequently soured relationships between India and Sri Lanka. Economic developments during this period were mainly in the central and western areas of the island. This left the Tamil community in a disadvantaged position. They sought to overcome this by moving in large numbers to employment in the state services, in the private sector and by entering the learned professions. This process was helped by the growth of educational facilities in English in the Tamil regions, particularly in the Jaffna peninsula. Thus Tamil students from missionary schools were better equipped for university admissions than those from Sinhalese schools. The consequences were that large numbers of Tamils migrated to the southern and central regions for purposes of employment and Tamil traders established themselves in these regions.

The **affirmative actions** taken by the Sri Lankan government were the much criticized 1954 Education Ordinance and the 1956 Official Language Act. These steps were aimed to bring an end to the Tamil entrenchment in the civil service and in the ranks of doctors and engineers. The legislation was later revoked, either under pressure or because its purpose was fulfilled of opening opportunities to the majority. But the seeds of violence were already sown.

The plantations transformed the economy of Sri Lanka and created opportunities for the indigenous entrepreneurs to make large fortunes; some of them converted to Christianity and sent their children to Britain for education. These filled the expanding needs of the state services as well as the need for doctors, engineers, lawyers etc. The local bourgeoisie thus created was multi-ethnic.

CONFLICT ANALYSIS

The history of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka can be said to be the history of emergence of consciousness among the majority community, the Sinhalese, which defined the Sri Lankan society as Sinhala-Buddhist, thus denying its multi-ethnic character. The Sinhala or Sinhalese

(74%) constitute the major ethnic group; the Sri Lankan Tamils, who inhabit the north and east form 12.6%, the group known as Indian Tamils (19th century migrants for work on plantations) 5.6% and Muslims constitute the third largest ethnic group (7.4%).² The interesting observation here is that each ethnic group has a distinct identity with strongly held myths of origin. The Sinhalese believe that they are Aryans from Bengal, the Tamils claim pure Dravidian origin, and the Muslims aspire to decent from Arabs. Among the other factors, Religion played a dominant ideological role in ethnic consolidation. All these contributed to the growth of a consciousness impinged on the minorities in Sri Lanka to the extent that internal resolution of the problems became impossible.

The Sinhala-Buddhist identity

Buddhism, introduced from India in the third century B.C., became the religion of the Sinhalese as well as the state religion. Hinduism remained the religion of the Tamils. Apart from the conversion of a section of both Sinhalese and Tamils to Christianity during the colonial period, the congruence between Sinhalese and Buddhist on the one hand and Tamil and Hindu on the other was total.

Sri Lanka at one point became the land of the Sinhalese and the land of **Dharma** – the Buddhist doctrine. The belief was that the survival of the Buddhist religion was dependent on the survival of the Sinhalese people and the people would survive as long as they espoused the doctrine and controlled the land consecrated to the religion.³ Thus the religion, the people and the land were bound together in an indissoluble unity.

Such a revivalist ideology that attempted to establish a Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony of the island antagonistic to non-Sinhalese and non-Buddhist groups was responsible for the denial of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious character of the Sri Lankan society and for the refusal to accept the collective rights of other minority groups. This consciousness was counterpoised by its ideologues against the British imperial state, which was seen as foreign and Christian ; the revival was thus more anti-Western than anti-imperialist, asserting a Sinhala-Buddhist identity against all foreigners and minorities.

Political reforms and the Tamils

When Sri Lanka was ruled as Ceylon by the British, most Sri Lankans regarded the Tamil minority as collaborators with imperial rule and resented the Tamil's perceived preferential treatment. But since Sri Lanka became independent in 1948, the Sinhalese majority has dominated the country. The Tamil ethnic group sought to counter this growing discrimination by demands at a political level. Before independence, the Tamil Congress unsuccessfully demanded balanced representation – 50% seats for the Sinhala and 50% for the combined minority ethnic groups. Later, in the face of continuing discrimination, a Federal Party emerged which asked for a federal political structure that would give Tamils a degree of autonomy in the areas inhabited by them, as well as adequate representation at the centre. But Sinhalese political hegemony was becoming institutionalized and the republican Constitution of 1972, while proclaiming Sinhalese as the official language, declared that Buddhism had the 'foremost place' in Sri Lanka, thus almost affirming a Sinhala-Buddhist state. It is precisely this history that persuaded the Tamils that co-existence with the Sinhalese in a single polity was no longer possible.

It was in this period of accelerated demands and rejection that the Tamil political leaders concluded in 1976 that only a separate state could ensure the security and welfare of the Tamil people, a state carved out of the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka to be called Tamil Eelam. The Tamils say that despite historical evidence to the contrary, the Sinhalese look upon them as interlopers. The Tamils say the Sinhalese have tried in a number of ways to :

- Disenfranchise them ;
- Alter the demographics of Tamil-dominated areas ;
- Remove them from government employment ;
- Reduce their access to higher education ;
- Isolate Tamils from any support they might get from their brethren in India ;
- Separate Sinhalese and Tamils ;
- Ethnically cleanse Sri Lanka of Tamils.

While discrimination against the Tamil-speaking people was growing in the period after independence in the fields of employment and education, there was another sphere in which the Tamil ethnic group felt itself imperiled, in the field of land colonization. The north central areas which had been served by an irrigation system had reverted back to jungle. The British initiated a program of repairing and restoring these irrigation reservoirs and settling people in the reclaimed areas. The peasants thus settled were mainly Sinhalese from densely populated south-western and central areas. This process was accelerated after 1930 and soon Sinhalese settlements began to appear in the predominantly Tamil eastern province as well.

Strategies of the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam)

Initially, the LTTE co-operated with the others in their attacks on Sri Lankan army and government targets. In April 1984, the LTTE joined other major armed groups – the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS), and the Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) – to form the Eelam National Liberation Front.

However, in February 1986, the LTTE launched a military attack on the TELO, the largest of the other armed Tamil groups. Over the next few months, the entire TELO leadership and several hundred volunteers were hunted down, and the group ceased to be a potent force. A few months later, the LTTE attacked training camps of the EPRLF, forcing it to withdraw entirely from the Jaffna peninsula.

There are differing opinions about the reasons for the LTTE taking on other Tamil groups. Some analysts have suggested that the rift was caused by its unhappiness over the fact that most of the funding from Tamils overseas went to the TELO. The LTTE claimed that the rift was caused because of the close links the other groups had with India. However, all the Tamil groups, including the LTTE, had received varying degrees of support from India including help in setting up training camps.

From the very beginning, the LTTE looked at India with suspicion, believing that in supporting the Tamil rebels it was only furthering its own agenda. It was particularly apprehensive that RAW, an Indian intelligence agency, had infiltrated TELO and EPRLF and was exploiting these groups.

The LTTE also believed that the struggle for a separate or independent homeland would only be effective if the other groups, who were much more willing to compromise, were not around.

After cowing down others, the LTTE consolidated its position as the main armed group fighting for the cause of Tamil Eelam. Factors that aided the LTTE in gaining pre-eminence were its tough leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran ; LTTE's strong ideological base, discipline and efficiency.

Muslim Politics

A bipolar model of conflict resolution marginalized the Muslims. These contributed to growing tension, and sometimes open violence, between the Muslim and Tamil communities in

the East. It also exposed divisions within the Muslim polity, hardening fault lines between Muslims in the southeast (who form a relative majority), the North-East (who form a fragile minority) and areas less affected by the war (central hill country, south coast, Colombo). A further set of tensions has grown between the political leadership and an increasingly radicalized constituency of societal leaders and Muslim youth in the southeast. There is a striking parallel between the growth of Tamil nationalism in the 1970s and present day Muslim radicalization

Government policies at Home & Abroad

The process of state-aided colonization can be seen not only as a threat to the political status of Tamils in the affected areas, but also as a threat to existence of the Tamils as a community with its own linguistic and cultural identity. Therefore, at the beginning, the main political parties were not totally insensitive to the Tamil demands. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Prime Minister and leader of the SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) arrived at an understanding with the leader of the Federal Party (the Bandaranaike – Chelvanayakam Pact of 1958) that gave Tamils a degree of regional autonomy, including control of the land settlement in their areas. However, Bandaranaike had to abandon the pact in the face of opposition from the United National Party (UNP) and was killed by a monk in 1959. Likewise, when the UNP was again in power, Dudley Senanayake, the Prime Minister, worked out a somewhat similar understanding in 1967; this too was scuttled in the face of opposition, this time mainly from the SLFP. The demands of the Tamil people had by this time become a major factor in Sinhalese Politics.

From 1956 to 1977, Sri Lanka had followed an economic policy that was characterized by state regulation of both local and foreign investment; emphasis was given on the public sector as the favored means of growth and fiscal policies directed towards an egalitarian distribution of wealth, welfare policies that sought to ensure to all citizens basic needs of food, health and education. The foreign policy was one of non-alignment, with a tilt to the 'socialist' bloc in terms of assistance for public sector industry. Sri Lanka was a strong member of the non-aligned, anti-imperialist Third World. During this period, Sri Lanka's foreign policy was totally congruent with that of India. There seemed to be hardly any divergence between India's and Sri Lanka's interests, and the last areas of disagreement (the question of an island, Katchativu in the Palk Straits, and the citizenship of plantation workers) had been solved.

However, these economic and social policies were accompanied by very slow economic growth rates. Unemployment soared and scarcities began to appear as foreign exchange became difficult to obtain. Dissatisfaction mounted and in 1977, the people defeated Sirima Bandaranaike and voted in the government of J.R. Jayawardene which was committed to a different set of policies. The changes in the economic sphere were drastic. Most regulations were scrapped; foreign investment was encouraged and Free Trade Zones established. Most subsidies were removed and the market place became the determining factor in investment. In contrast to earlier policies, private investment and entrepreneurship were encouraged and some parts of the public sector were privatized. Moreover power, irrigation, transport and communication facilities serving the interests of private capital were strengthened. Although the earlier welfare measures were retained, the new emphasis was on growth, not distribution. This economic policy had important foreign relation implications.

Foreign investment had to be sought from abroad and massive infrastructure needs of the public sector had to be obtained as grants and loans – mainly from the western countries. This whole process also required close collaboration with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In short, the Sri Lankan economy became firmly bonded with the capitalist world market. This swing away from an inward-looking regulated economy to an open, export-oriented economy had a determining influence on the country's foreign policy.

Professedly, Sri Lanka continued to follow a policy of non-alignment, but the imperatives of the economic strategies she had adopted pushed her in the direction of the Western camp. The principal aid donors became the industrialized countries of the West and Japan and their foreign policy needs came to the fore. To give an example, Sri Lanka was one of the very few Third World countries to vote with the UK on the Falklands issue, influenced no doubt by the fact that Britain is a major donor to the government's irrigation and hydro-power program.

These tendencies away from a non-aligned stance were strengthened after 1983 by the course of the ethnic conflict. The Tamil militants were based in India ; their presence was tolerated by the state and central governments. Though officially denied, it was obvious that the training and staging grounds of the militants were in India. During the latter days of the conflict, the patronage given by the Tamilnadu government to the militants was demonstrated by open financial gifts. In this situation, the government looked to non-Indian sources for weapons, equipment and training. Thus links grew with Pakistan that became the main center for the training of the security forces. Weapons and ammunition were obtained from Pakistan, Israel, South Africa and various commercial organizations. The services of Israel were obtained for improving and expanding the government's intelligence apparatus and Israel was allowed to open Special Interests section in the US Embassy in Colombo. Thus the Government began to build up links with many governments and organizations seen as hostile to India-links that many suspect may have matured into strategic relationships.

Contemporary home politics took a massive turn when in November 2005 national elections, candidate Ranil Wickremasinghe of the governing United National Party (UNP) lost narrowly to anti-LTTE hard-liner Mahinda Rajapaksa. Rajapaksa allied his Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) with two staunchly anti-LTTE political parties : the radical Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, People's Liberation Front) and the nationalist Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU, National Heritage Party) controlled by Buddhist monks. Muslim parliamentarians have also sided with this alliance against the militants. It was inevitable that the present government would attack LTTE strongholds in the north and east and in 2006 a military campaign to root out the LTTE was launched. The governing coalition forged a partnership with the pro-government splinter of the LTTE, Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), and installed the leader of that party as chief minister of the newly created Eastern Provincial Council after May 2008 elections. However, rights groups allege the TMVP commits human rights abuses with impunity because of support from the central government. Now it would be a challenge for the government to maintain their coalition as the common enemy is defeated and the major objective is achieved with the death of the leader of the Tamil Tigers.

Conflict structures

While trying to determine the conflict structure where the Sri Lankan civil war fits, one of the useful findings was that the international community is not monolithic and different actors have different assumptions and priorities and have played different roles in the conflict. As we already know the fact that support for democratization, conflict resolution and peace building have become important components of international development assistance programs in countries affected by civil conflict – Sri Lanka is no exception where nearly a quarter century of civil war has taken a high toll in terms of lives and economic opportunities particularly among the poorest and most disadvantaged. Sri Lanka's economy has managed to grow at a respectable rate despite years of civil war but this resilience merely underscores the much higher growth potential the country has, if peace is restored. This would significantly reduce poverty and propel Sri Lanka into the upper ranks of middle income countries within a generation. From the above realization, we see that there have been many ceasefire agreements between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE but all of them collapsed for one reason or the other.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord

The first major agreement was signed on July 29, 1987 by Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India, Junius Jayawardane, the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. According to this pact, the Sri Lankan government agreed to create a separate administrative unit for the northern and eastern Tamil-dominated areas.

This Tamil province was to have its own governor and elect its own provincial council with a chief minister and cabinet of ministers. The Sri Lankan Government also agreed to declare a general amnesty and lift the state of emergency. In return, the armed Tamil groups were to surrender their weapons and return to the political fold. The Indian government in turn agreed not to give any further aid to Tamil fighters and to deploy a peacekeeping force (the IPKF) to supervise the disarming of Tamil groups. The accord collapsed almost immediately after its signing and the IPKF quickly became embroiled in the civil war instead of merely acting as peacekeepers. It pulled out of Sri Lanka in 1990 after three years of conflict.

India's intervention in the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka began as a genuinely mediatory role. The conflict had become significant factor in the politics of Tamilnadu and it was necessary that its influence on the inflammatory Tamil separatist tendencies be minimized. However, the course of developments during the escalation of the conflict was instrumental in pushing Indian security concerns to the fore. These were the growing military relationship between Sri Lanka and Pakistan, Israel and certain Western countries, the growing influence of such countries on Sri Lankan security forces, the linkages seen to be developing between Sri Lanka, Pakistan and China. Taken together these indicated a security threat on India's southern flank, an area which had previously appeared secure. Thus the resolution of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka became bound up with the safeguarding of India's security interests.

It is the contention of many that India's security interests played a larger role in the accord than the actual resolution of the ethnic conflict. There have been equally vehement attacks on the Agreement from the Sinhalese side. The Jayawardena government has been accused of accommodating Indian security concerns to the extent of seriously compromising Sri Lanka's sovereignty and independence. The South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (**SAARC**) excludes from consideration purely bilateral issues. Sri Lanka, however, has on many occasions attempted to override this and bring up the ethnic issue for discussion. These efforts have generally been supported by other members like Pakistan, who have also argued that the SAARC forum should be open to the consideration of bilateral issues. India has always opposed this view, maintaining that issues between any two countries of the region could best be settled on a bilateral basis and not be allowed to cloud issues of regional co-operation.

Another area of concern on which the Agreement may have some impact is the project to keep the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, free from naval deployments by the superpowers.

The Norway Mediation

The ceasefire agreement that lasted the longest was the pact between the LTTE and the government, signed on February 22, 2002 through Norwegian mediation. Under this agreement, Norway and the other Nordic countries agreed to jointly monitor the ceasefire through the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. Despite scores of violations by both sides, the ceasefire lasted for almost five years but finally collapsed on December 3, 2006 when Norway refused to be an intermediary.

Tensions continued to rise until the December 2004 earthquake and tsunami, which killed more than 30,000 people in Sri Lanka⁴ and brought relative peace between the rebels and the government. But the August 2005 assassination of Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar disrupted the peace and once again put the LTTE at odds with the Sri Lankan government.

By July 2006, fighting had reached its worst levels since the period before the 2002 ceasefire. Hundreds have been killed in the most recent wave of violence, and the United Nations reports tens of thousands of people have been forced to flee their homes. The Sri Lankan government unilaterally pulled out of the 2002 cease-fire agreement in January 2008 and Nordic cease-fire monitors withdrew from the country. The government increased military operations against the Tigers and by February 2009 it had driven the rebels out of the country's east and had pushed the militants out of the last of their strongholds in the north.

Analysis of the Conflict & Peace Structures in Sri Lanka

The entire architecture of the peace process in Sri Lanka had been built around international engagement. Norway could play the mediator role as it was seen as an acceptable, neutral and non-threatening facilitator by the main protagonists. Some of the observations in this peace process are as follows :

First, the constellation of factors that contributed to the outbreak and sustenance of violent conflict – including the nature of the state, its political culture and the institutional framework of policy, uneven development patterns and competing nationalisms – remains largely unaffected by the peace process. In many respects the **peace** that followed the signing of the CFA (Cease Fire Agreements) has had the effect of freezing the structural impediments to conflict resolution.

Second, negotiations were based on a bilateral model of the conflict and sought to forge an elite pact between the main protagonists. Arguably, the exclusion of key stakeholders provoked spoiler behavior.

Third, there was a constant tension between the imperatives of conflict management and human rights concerns. The perception that the international community was prepared to soft pedal on human rights issues, particularly in relation to the LTTE, played a role in undermining the credibility of the government in the eyes of India and the southern electorate.

Fourth, there was a growing perception that the peace process changed from being internationally supported to internationally driven, shaped by the priorities and time-frames of external rather than domestic actors. International actors, devoid of local and regional knowledge cannot simply engineer peace; rather make the socio-political realities more complex.

Fifth, a critical challenge appears to be one of building a more robust architecture for peace building that will strengthen confidence building measures.

Sixth, there has been a significant change in the external context at both the regional and international levels. The global **war on terror**, growing international engagement in post-conflict contexts and Sri Lanka's integration into a dynamic and increasingly assertive wider Asian region have together created new (and sometimes competing) incentives for domestic actors. Though these changes in the external context may have helped create the preconditions for peace talks, they have not yet led to a radical reordering of political forces inside the country. However, there is always hope that the international peace movements will have a **spill-over** effect on the national level.

Finally, viewing through feminine eyes, peace could look very different than it does from the masculine perspective that has determined general perceptions and policies of the conflicting parties.

With the changing form of global interdependence, to undermine the power of the non-state, people have to learn how to arm peace movement i.e. how grief and rage could be turned into courage.

Conflict and Peace Dynamics

According to conflict theorists, conflicts contribute positively to the functioning of society. The question then arises, if conditions of peace ensures human security, how we justify the occurrence of conflicts in a society. It is argued by theoreticians like Lewis A. Coser that conflicts as well as the violent actions stem from not being accepted in society⁶ that ultimately leads to loss of dignity, denial of political access and power. The consequence is insecurity. This is what had happened in Sri Lanka - the response to Sinhalese chauvinism was the emergence of Tamil chauvinism and extreme forms of nationalist mythmaking.

The internationalization of peace building has changed the political landscape by introducing two trends. First, there has been a more robust and multi-faceted international response to conflict and peace dynamics that has included security guarantees, ceasefire monitoring, facilitation of peace negotiations and humanitarian/development aid provision. Second, there have been changes in the division of roles between various policy instruments and actors. Reflecting contemporary trends in liberal peace building, there has been a blurring of the traditional distinction between conflict resolution and the economic aspects of peace building.

By 2001, the conflict had reached a hurting stalemate but various peace talks went in vein as it failed to deliver a lasting or even interim settlement. Various reasons are responsible for this.

First, the CFA froze rather than transformed security dynamics. Both parties continued to re-arm and strengthen their military capabilities. Although no-war, no-peace has meant an end to large-scale militarized conflict, there have been high levels of political violence, including over 3,000 ceasefire violations. Insecurity has grown in the East since the emergence of the Karuna break-away faction of the LTTE.

Second, although there was a peace dividend, it has been unevenly distributed and its impacts attenuated. Reconstruction funding was caught up in the politics of the peace process, thus limiting the peace dividend in the North-East. In the South, macro economic reforms introduced by the government undermined the economic dividend and led to the perception that the government was unconcerned with the plight of the poor.

Third, the step-by-step approach was based on the assumption that a limited peace could ultimately lead to a transformative peace. With hindsight, however, there could never be complete « normalization » until the core political issues were addressed. It proved impossible to circumnavigate or deal indirectly with the pivotal core of the conflict, this being the question of power sharing and LTTE hegemony in the North East. Without a clear road map for peace talks, the nature of the end goal was always unclear, which created anxieties among external and internal stakeholders. The peace process acted as a lightning rod for wider political and societal tensions, exposing the multi-polar and multi-dimensional nature of conflict in Sri Lanka.

Finally, according to Radhika Coomaraswamy, there is a myth that the Tamils are pure Dravidian by race, that they are heirs to the Mohenjadaró and Harappa civilizations of India, that they are the original inhabitants of Sri Lanka, that the Tamil language in its purest forms is spoken only in Sri Lanka and that the Saiva Siddhanta form of Hinduism has a special homeland in Sri Lanka [Coomaraswamy 1987 : 79]. Many of the Tamil militant groups have also been sustained by such ideologies and expressions like Dravidian Drive and Chola Charisma have been used in their literature to mobilize support for armed struggle.

Tsunami & National Crisis Management

The tsunami accentuated rather than ameliorated the conflict dynamics described above. In spite of initial hopes that the tsunami response would provide a space to re-energize peace negotiations, it had the opposite effect, deepening political fault lines. Protracted negotiations about the institutional arrangements for delivering tsunami assistance to the North-East mirrored earlier peace talks and exposed the deep underlying problems of flawed governance, entrenched positions and patronage politics. Collaborative crisis management further undermined trust between the two sides.

Humanitarian Disaster and the IDPs

As the Government ended the decades-long military battle, analysts say how it deals with the displaced and long-standing Tamil grievances, may determine whether or not the conflict shifts to urban terrorism. Vinayagamóorthi Muralitharan, a former rebel commander who was known as Colonel Karuna, told the BBC he hoped the Tamil people would be involved in the future political process.

More than 70,000 people have been killed in the conflict and thousands displaced.⁶ There is still widespread international concern about civilians who may have been caught up in the fighting. Traumatized children, half-starved families and injured civilians are now escaping Sri Lanka's former conflict zone, seeking relative security of newly assembled refugee camps. Several aid groups are working to avert a humanitarian crisis.

Aside from food and water, the displaced people need medical attention. Many are injured and have not had access to treatment for some time. It's also important to get children into a safe place where they can start recovering from their trauma. After the Sri Lankan government declared victory over the weekend against the LTTE following a 26-year conflict, Save the Children called for increased humanitarian efforts to urgently supply aid to the wounded and displaced and *permanent humanitarian access* to the estimated 40 government-controlled camps. As refugee camps become inundated with new people, particular attention needs to be paid to children who often arrive severely traumatized, injured, or malnourished. Many are orphaned as well, or have been separated from loved ones.

Refugee camps in the region are already stretched to capacity. Many are being housed in already overstretched camps struggling to provide access to decent water, sanitation and sufficient food. Overcrowding is raising concerns about aid distribution and disease control. The end of the fighting has led to a massive influx of new people and we are worried that the camps will not be able to cope. The majority of the IDPs are now in more than 40 temporary transit centres/welfare villages – primarily in Vavuniya and they are currently completely dependent upon humanitarian assistance to meet their basic needs.

Can violence lead to Peace ?

It is natural to meet violence with violence, as an attempt to give the apathetic, self-deprecating individual a chance to feel that he is something, is someone to whom the oppo-

nent must pay attention. It is probably this that Frantz Fanon has in mind when he emphasizes the liberating effect of violence upon the oppressed and underprivileged. He says :

At the level of individuals violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect.⁷ The methods of non-violence are rightly associated with the name of Mahatma Gandhi. His originality in this field is unique, although some of his methods have been rediscovered independently of him. His experiment consisted in systematically developing and consistently following the voice of conscience-following it completely and relentlessly, and using no other guideline, religious or otherwise.

The whole gamut of man's activities today constitutes an indivisible whole. You cannot divide social, economic, political and purely religious work into watertight compartments.⁸

It is true that truth leads to conflict but it does not confuse. A crucial point, however, is the question of how the battle between groups is to be carried out, when both sides are relentlessly pursuing the voice of conscience. Many will conclude that the use of violence is the only effective and the only right course of action after an honest and profound appraisal of themselves and the situation. But it is also true that violence is an evil, whether it is one's own or that of another, and must be fought. Therefore, one must seek the root of the conflict, must go to where violence is beginning or has begun. Gandhi distinguishes between condemnation of an act and condemnation of the person who has carried out the act. Acts of violence are always wrong and evil. But this does not justify us in immediately condemning the person who acts violently. If we want to talk about stable peace in Sri Lanka, I think this approach needs to be adopted by the hardliners as there is no alternative to peace.

Mastery of one's own destiny is only to be achieved by positive measures based on inner strength. Therefore, requirements of self-respect and human dignity cannot be satisfied through violent means. At that point, retreat from the political to the more fundamental ethical and humanitarian level is necessary. It is against this backdrop, peace building in Sri Lanka should be considered with a humane approach and with fierce love for humanity.

Furthermore, for a lasting peace, experts say the government will need to find a political solution to the ethnic conflict between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils that has plagued the country and a political settlement requires state reform and thus constitutional change. The conflict in Sri Lanka not only changed the regional security concerns and dimensions but also brought to the fore various challenges of peace restoration. The issue has become very politicized but the future of the island nation will depend on how the Government now treats the Tamils.

In a victory speech May 19, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa called for political compromise to unify the country after the defeat of the Tamil Tigers. To heal the wounds created by terrorism, the government is required to work toward building a democratic and economically viable nation that is tolerant and united and works for social justice for all its citizens.

The future of peace

Has Sri Lanka achieved stable peace ? To find an answer to this question is on the one hand challenging and on the other pre-mature.

The public mood in Sri Lanka is more divided than in many years, like an old scratch that has festered into a gaping wound. Therefore, there is a need to rethink the current consensus on harmonization. De-Westernizing the international peace building concept is another major task. Sri Lanka is an exception with regards to geography, demographic features, tradition and culture. Therefore, it would be unwise and a failed attempt if peace building methods are applied without considering its uniqueness.

There is also scope to think more creatively about the interfaces between diplomatic, development, humanitarian, and human rights actors, so that the distinctive approaches of each reinforce and complement (rather than undercut) one another. Will the moderate Tamils pluck

up courage, claim (probably correctly) to speak for the war-weary majority and accept a form of devolution that guarantees provincial councils a range of powers over education, language, religion and taxing powers ? The answers can be found only in time. One fact is certain : Sri Lanka faces an exceptional opportunity to end this appalling conflict and the government should expend as much energy and communication skills on the Tamil Diaspora, to persuade those in Toronto, London and elsewhere that it is sincerely intent on a peace fair to all.

A key lesson from Sri Lanka is that peace conditionality may have limited traction when the broader framework of aid conditionality remains unchanged – especially when some of these conditions may be inimical to peace building. The larger donors in particular can have a significant impact upon the structural dimensions of conflict by working in a conflict sensitive way on areas like governance, economic reform, and poverty. This however may mean (depending on the donor) a significant reorientation of current strategies and approaches. Becoming more conflict sensitive necessarily means becoming more political, in the sense of being more attuned to the political context and governance structures within Sri Lanka. Some of the implications of this are outlined below :

• **Governance**

Conflict in Sri Lanka is conceptualized as a crisis of the state. In seeking to address this crisis, internationally supported « good governance » programs have often hindered rather than helped. There is a need to develop more conflict sensitive governance programs based upon a careful analysis of actually existing politics and the key drivers of change within the country. There is scope to work on governance issues more imaginatively. For example, exploring Asian models of developmental states that may be more applicable to Sri Lanka than Western models ; engaging more proactively with political parties in a range of areas including policy dialogue and institutional development; initiating dialogue with a more diverse group of actors – including the JVP – on different options and models of governance; focusing more on governance at the provincial and local levels in order to improve delivery and accountability at the community level.

• **Civil society**

To some extent, donors have engaged with civil society as an antidote or alternative to the state. In practice this has meant avoiding the core governance and peace building challenge of how civil society can engage with and hold the state accountable. Some donors have begun to realize this, but more could still be done to support the political, as well as the service delivery role of civil society actors.

• **Economic reform**

The Sri Lankan case does raise serious questions about the scope, sequencing, mix, and speed of reform programs in fragile transition contexts. If peace building is an overriding priority, then there may be a need to rethink models based purely on a calculation of optimum economic efficiency. More thought could have been given to the political impacts and the distributional effects of economic reforms. There is also scope to draw upon and learn from comparative regional experiences in the area of macro economic reform.

• **Poverty**

Poverty eradication is a declared priority of the Sri Lankan government and donors alike. But the growth of relative poverty and the expansion of pockets of exclusion in the North-East and South have had the effect of undermining faith in the government, the development project, and the peace process. Re-energizing efforts to address poverty and social exclusion would have a wider pay off in relation to the peace process.

Concluding remarks

In a country where years of conflict have established a deeply rooted ethnic divide, an attitudinal and behavioral change in the lives of the people is crucial. This is an attempt to encourage peace building and emphasize harmonious cross-cultural connections in the midst of the current conflict.

The Sri Lankan history of bloody ethnic conflicts has kept on repeating itself with tragic consequences for the whole population and successive Sri Lankan governments failed to perceive the danger that the ethnic issue, if aggravated, could undermine the whole democratic process. Sometimes it appears to me that we, the south Asians have forgotten our glorious and peaceful past where people of this region shared a regional identity. Now the politically constructed modern states have lost their will to support and nurture the material aspirations of their people. It is time for the majority of people and the policy-makers to rethink concepts, like conflict, peace and development and to find ways to ensure a living condition for all the citizens.

Many, too many analysts and writers have opted for the simplistic bipolar description of the Sri Lankan conflict – at one pole the Sri Lankan government, dominated by Sinhalese ministers and heavily influenced by Buddhist priests and at the other the minority Tamil population, who have suffered discrimination culturally and economically since independence in 1948.

It really wasn't a difficult task to demolish this bipolar model. Hardly any conflict situation is that simple. In the case of Sri Lanka, what we needed was only to mention the third ethnic group, the Moors of Muslim faith. In the recent war, as the military pushed harder into the north, attacks on civilian targets in the capital have been more frequent. One of the most chilling came in early February, when a suicide bomber blew her up at a crowded Colombo railway station, killing 16 people, including members of a high school baseball team.

The attacks sowed fear and sent a powerful message : the insurgents had people and explosives ready in the heart of the heavily fortified capital, despite its many checkpoints. All over Colombo are posters calling for public vigilance. They show a map of the island nation, with an eye wide open in the middle.

" Are you alert ? " it asks. " If you are, your village and your country are safe. "

Endnotes

¹ Adele Balasingham : *The Will to Freedom - An Inside View of Tamil Resistance*. Fairmax Publishing Ltd, 2nd ed. 2003; p-7.

² M. R. Narayan Swamy: *Tigers of Lanka: from Boys to Guerrillas*. Konark Publishers; 3rd ed. 2002; p-44.

³ S. Gamage and I. B. Watson: *Conflict and Community in Contemporary Sri Lanka*. Sage, New Delhi 1999; p-21

⁴ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7766378.stm

⁵ Peter Wallensteen: *Understanding Conflict Resolution-War, Peace & the Global System*. . Sage, New Delhi, 2nd ed. 2007; p-37.

⁶ <http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/4211>.

⁷ Frantz Fanon: *The Wretched of the Earth*. Penguin, London, 1967; p-35.

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Freedom, Race, and Francophonie : Gandhi and The Construction of Peoplehood¹

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Resumé

Liberté, Race et francophonie: Gandhi et la construction de la notion de peuple.

Gandhi (1869-1948) a vécu en Afrique du Sud pendant 21 ans (1893-1914). Durant ces années, ses combats ont été menés contre les lois affectant la condition des Asiatiques. Mais il ne s'est pas confiné dans l'ethnicité. Cet article explore l'évolution des idées de Gandhi sur les questions raciales au-delà des luttes immédiates auxquelles il a participé. C'est au cours de ses années en Afrique du Sud que Gandhi s'est familiarisé avec le travail de pionniers tels que l'intellectuel français, Jean Finot. Cet article rend hommage à l'influence auparavant négligée de Finot sur les conceptions de Gandhi à propos des préjugés raciaux. Cette influence a favorisé la maturation du point de vue de Gandhi sur la race. En 1908, en Afrique du Sud, Gandhi en est venu à envisager une représentation non raciale de l'Afrique du Sud. Un point de vue similaire, non racial et non-confessionnel de « peuple » et /ou de « nation » influença la vision de Gandhi sur l'Inde et même sur d'autres zones comme la Guyane. Tout comme il a été influencé par des penseurs comme Finot, Gandhi lui-même a eu une influence lors des débats d'idées dans le monde francophone en particulier en Afrique. Cette contribution évoque également les réseaux de Gandhi au sein des militants anticolonialistes dans la France coloniale.

Abstract

Gandhi (1869-1948) was in South Africa for a period spanning 21 years (1893-1914). During these years his struggles were, of course, centred on laws directed against and affecting the condition of Asians. This does not mean, however, that his ideas remained ethnographically limited or confined. This article explores the evolution of Gandhi's ideas on racial issues beyond the immediate struggles with which he was involved. It was during his years in South Africa that Gandhi first encountered the pioneering work of such thinkers as the French intellectual, Jean Finot. It is suggested here that the influence on Gandhi of Finot's work on racial prejudice has been much neglected. This influence was an important factor in the maturing of Gandhi's views on race. By 1908, while still in South Africa, Gandhi came to envision a non-racial concept of South African peoplehood. A similar non-racial and non-denominational view of "people" and "nation" would influence Gandhi's definition of India and even his view of developments in other countries like Guyana. Just as he was influenced by thinkers like Finot, Gandhi himself had an ideational influence in the Francophone sphere which is also examined with particular reference to Africa. His interface with colonial France and some of its policies is also considered.

1889

A couple of years before he qualified for the Bar in England, M K Gandhi [1869-1948] went across for a week to Paris to see the Exposition Universelle of 1889 organised in commemoration of the centenary of the French Revolution. [Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, (CW), Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New

Delhi, 1958-1994, Vol 1, p. 344]². The exhibition show-cased, among other things, tableaux from Francophone Africa. The colonial section was described by a contemporary journal as the "main attraction" of the exhibition after the Eiffel Tower and the Gallery of Machines.³ There were North African pavilions and also pavilions relating to Senegal and other Francophone areas. Forty years later Gandhi recalled that "there was a map of and guide to the Exhibition" but "I remember nothing of the Exhibition excepting its magnitude and variety". (*Autobiography*, CW, Vol 39, p. 68) Possibly the exposition created a mixed impression; and even of the Eiffel Tower which had been constructed to mark the occasion, Gandhi wrote that "in no way can it be said to have contributed to the real beauty of the Exhibition". (*Ibid.*, p. 69) There had been complaints that some of the colonial people who had been brought across for the exhibition were made part of displays that lacked dignity.⁴

In May 1893 Gandhi went to South Africa and, apart from some trips mainly to India and England, would stay for 21 years. In the course of these years he witnessed and participated, within the framework of loyalty to the British crown, in medical relief activities in the South African War at the turn of the century and the Bambatha rebellion in Natal in 1906, attending, especially on the latter occasion also to the Zulus. These aspects of Gandhi's work in South Africa are well-known and not repeated here. The South African years were formative. Many influences converged on Gandhi. These included, apart from his own upbringing and Indian influences, the writings of John Ruskin (1819-1900), Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910) and Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862). He was appreciative also of the examples of Mazzini (1805-1872), Garibaldi (1807-1882), Karl Blind (1826-1907), Egypt's Mustafa Kemal Pasha (1874-1908), the African-American educationist Booker T. Washington (1856-1915), the Women's Suffrage Movement for Parliamentary rights led by Emmeline Pankhurst (1858-1928) in England, the Sinn Fein in Ireland and Hungary's statesman Francis Deak (1803-1876). On the Sinn Fein in Ireland and on the Hungarian passive resistance and non-co-operation with Austria, Gandhi wrote in Gujarati. (*Indian Opinion*, September 7, 1907, CW, Vol 7, p. 214⁵)

These influences inculcated ideas of simple living, civil disobedience, patriotic protest, freedom of conscience and establishment of institutions for educational advancement and industrial skills. In his tribute to the death of Karl Blind, Gandhi recalled Blind's endeavours "in the cause of freedom and for the rights of others". (*Indian Opinion*, June 8, 1907, CW, Vol 7, p. 28). Gandhi's admiration for Booker T. Washington's work in Tuskegee, Alabama extended in South Africa to appreciation for the work done by John Dube, the African educationist and leader, who, inspired by Washington, ran an industrial training institute close to Durban and not far from where Gandhi set up his Phoenix settlement. (*Indian Opinion*, September 2, 1905, CW, Vol 5, p. 55) Dube would in 1912 be the first President-General of the African National Congress (initially known as the South African Native National Congress). Likewise, Gandhi appreciated the efforts of a senior African educationist and leader, John Tengo Jabavu, Editor of *Imvo Zabantsundu* ("Native Opinion"), also influenced by Booker T. Washington, to establish "an Inter-State Native College with the present Lovedale Institute as its nucleus." (*Indian Opinion*, March 17, 1906, CW, Vol 5, p. 234) Inhaling these diverse influences and precepts before him, Gandhi came to project a distinctive style of political mobilisation which emerged in struggles launched during these years against the various restrictive enactments and practices that he, as an Asian lawyer, encountered in southern Africa.

French Influence on Gandhi : Jean Finot's Work on Racial Prejudice

Gandhi's familiarity with and admiration for Voltaire (1694-1778), Rousseau (1712-1778) and Victor Hugo (1802-1885) is known. [For Gandhi's reference to Voltaire and Rousseau, see CW, Supplementary Vol II, p. 281 (December 5, 1931). For Gandhi on Rousseau and Victor Hugo,

see *Young India*, October 1, 1931, CW, Vol 47, p. 420 ; again on Rousseau in *Harijan*, April 4, 1936, CW, Vol 62, p. 311 and again on Hugo on December 20, 1946, CW, Vol 86, p. 246]

An important French influence dating from his South Africa years, which on matters of race was perhaps more pointed and therefore efficacious than that of any of the other writers he had read till then, is, oddly enough, less widely known. This is that of Jean Finot (1858-1922) whose work " *Race Prejudice* " had been commended in Gandhi's journal *Indian Opinion* on September 7, 1907. Earlier, on March 9, 1907, *The New York Times* had described Finot as a " French iconoclast on race prejudice ". Finot's work against racial prejudice had a significant impact on Gandhi ; it accelerated his transformation in South Africa from one who was seeking equality with Europeans to one who spoke in terms of equality for all. This is an element in the sources of his intellectual make-up that has not received adequate attention, even if Gandhi's mind was already working in this direction. Gandhi had appreciated the Governor of Pondicherry in French India for his telling Indians : " A representative of the Republic is bound to regard all [citizens] as equals and there is only one thing between us, viz., the laws ". (*Indian Opinion*, April 27, 1907, CW, Vol 6, p. 439).⁶ Likewise, Gandhi had criticised the racist element in the jury system in South Africa. In June 1907 he had deprecated the trial of an African, Mtonga, and described the jury system in South Africa as " about the worst, that could be devised " and which left much to be desired especially " when the question is as between whites and blacks ". (*Juries on Trial, Indian Opinion*, June 1, 1907, CW, Vol 7, pp. 1-2) . He despaired of obtaining " any satisfaction out of jurymen in a place like South Africa, where different nationalities are still in the melting pot, and a South African nation has yet to rise... " in the " dim and distant " future. (*Idem*) But, declared Gandhi, " equality in the eye of the law " was something " that can reasonably be claimed ". (*Idem*).

By 1907, the northern end of the African continent, like Natal and the Transvaal, was also in ferment. A serious conflict was on in Morocco and, in the note written for the Gujarati edition of his journal, Gandhi described it as a " conflagration " and " a fierce fire " ; there was " plunder and rapine " in Tangier, he wrote, and in Casablanca there was " complete anarchy ". (*Indian Opinion*, August 17, 1907, CW, Vol 7, p. 167) He referred to killings, rape, and the arrest of two hundred women, describing Raisooli⁷, the leader of the rebellion, as having " created terror " , but nevertheless being according to reports " a brave and handsome soldier " who was also " alert and quick ". (*Idem*) It would appear that with his experiences of the 1906 Bambatha rebellion in Natal, Gandhi had begun more clearly to distinguish between the cause of a conflict and the mode of its expression and between the justice of a case and the means employed both to press and to suppress it.

He hoped later to give his readers " an account of why such chaos reigns in Morocco ". (*Idem*) That occasion did not come as the demands of his struggle in Transvaal were pressing in. A few weeks earlier, in July 1907, Indian passive resistance had begun in the Transvaal against the Asiatic Registration Act. The struggle required sacrifices from Indians, many of whom would lose their earnings and even wealth and temporarily their freedom by plunging into it. But Gandhi did manage to make a brief record of, and draw some lessons from, the " excellent bravery " of the Moors whose struggles in North-Western Africa against the French and the Spanish were much in the news at the time (*Indian Opinion*, August 31, 1907, CW, Vol 7, p. 203). According to the press reports of one incident in Casablanca that reached Gandhi, the Moors made a " galloping charge " , paying " no heed to the shower of bullets and shell-splinters raining on them " , and such " was their fervour that the French gunners did not have the heart to fire on such brave warriors " and instead " greeted them " and " clapped their hands in admiration " ; and the warriors thereupon " saluted them and turned back " (*Idem*) Whatever the veracity of the report, the idea had made an impression on Gandhi. " Such brave people " remarked Gandhi, " may be emulated by the whole world ". (*Idem*) He added, initiating also an

interrogation of the concept of civilisation that was to occupy a significant place in his thought : " Without doubt the Transvaal Indians will win if there is in them a hundredth part of the bravery of these Moors who are regarded as uncivilised. Here no one has to die. No one has to kill. Only money has to be sacrificed. " (*Idem*) Such instances reinforced the various historical and contemporary sources of Gandhi's inspiration.

Arrested in the course of his struggles on October 7, 1908, Gandhi declined to offer bail, and was charged and sentenced on October 14, 1908 to two months imprisonment with hard labour for failing to give thumb and finger impressions under the registration laws and not producing a certificate of voluntary registration ; imprisoned in Volksrust prison, he referred to it as " King Edward's Hotel ". (CW, Vol 9, p. 89, p.89n, pp 103-104 and pp. 120-121) He remained in prison till December 12, 1908.

To Jean Finot's unjustly neglected work, and its influence on Gandhi in matters connected with race, must be added the influence of the writer Olive Schreiner (1855-1920). Soon after Gandhi's release from prison, an article by Olive Schreiner appeared in *The Transvaal Leader* arguing against racial prejudice and envisaging a non-racist South Africa. It was then reprinted with some editorial appreciation in Gandhi's journal. Schreiner wrote : " We cannot hope ultimately to equal the men of our own race living in more wholly enlightened and humanised communities, if our existence is passed among millions of non-free subjected peoples. " (' Olive Schreiner ' on Colour, *Indian Opinion*, January 2, 1909). In the same issue Gandhi's journal expressed its admiration for Schreiner and enthusiastically endorsed her remarks. Like Finot, Olive Schreiner had made a deep impact on Gandhi. He would repeatedly refer to her lack of racial prejudice and made a specific reference to it at the session of the Indian National Congress in Kanpur (India) when Dr A Abdurahman attended it at the head of a delegation in 1925. Both Finot and Olive Schreiner were vital influences that entered into the transformation and broadening of outlook that Gandhi experienced in South Africa on the question of race, particularly from mid-1908.

Towards a Commingling of Races

As Gandhi had noticed in 1907, South African peoplehood was also under construction and he presently threw his weight behind a commingling and equality of races. The African races, Gandhi told a meeting of the Young Men's Christian Association in Johannesburg on May 18, 1908, " are entitled to justice, a fair field and no favour. Immediately you give that to them, you will find no difficulty. " (*Indian Opinion*, June 6, 1908 and June 13, 1908, CW, Vol 8, p. 245). South Africa, he declared, " would probably be a howling wilderness without the Africans " (*Ibid.*, p. 242). He continued, expressly using the term " Coloured People " so as " to include the Coloured people proper – the Africans and the Asiatics ", to declare that : " The majority of people in South Africa, the majority of people in most of the Colonies, have become impatient of colour, and it behoves every right-minded man and woman to think twice before he or she jumps to the conclusion that the Coloured people are a menace and that, therefore, they ought to be got rid of with the greatest possible despatch. " (*Ibid.*, pp 242-243).

And further : " We hear nowadays a great deal of the segregation policy, as if it were possible to put people in water-tight compartments. " (*Ibid.* p. 243). In this speech Gandhi put forth his vision for the future South Africa : " If we look into the future, is it not a heritage we have to leave to posterity, that all the different races commingle and produce a civilisation that perhaps the world has not yet seen ? " (*Ibid.*, p. 246).

He had already been imprisoned in the Indian struggle in South Africa once at the beginning of 1908 and would go to prison four times more before returning to India six years later. Likewise, Kasturba, his wife, would be incarcerated in 1913 and sons Harilal and Manilal would be imprisoned six times each. While Gandhi's struggles were centred on discriminatory

statutes directed at Asians (the Chinese in South Africa too had joined the struggle), his concerns progressively widened. He became increasingly critical of the conditions in which African labour was made to work on the continent. For example, early in the year 1909, Gandhi referred to the need for avoidance as far as possible of tea, coffee and cocoa, which "are produced through the labour of men who work more or less in conditions of slavery". Cocoa, he observed, was produced in the Congo where indentured Africans were "made to work beyond all limits of endurance". (From Gujarati, *Indian Opinion*, January 9, 1909, CW, Vol 9, p. 136). This was a theme to which he would return.

The question of the Passive Resistance campaigns affecting the Africans evidently arose repeatedly in the South African Press at the time. Gandhi dealt with it in a speech on "The Ethics of Passive Resistance" at Germiston on June 7, 1909, a few weeks before his leaving on a visit to England: "The Colonists would, therefore, see that no exception could be taken to Indians making use of this force in order to obtain a redress of their grievances. Nor could such a weapon, if used by the Natives, do the slightest harm. On the contrary, if the Natives could rise so high as to understand and utilize this force, there would probably be no native question left to be solved." (*Indian Opinion*, June 12, 1909, CW, Vol 9, p. 244). Some four years after Gandhi's Germiston speech, African women in the Orange Free State would in fact take to passive resistance.

Obviously, the methods of struggle envisaged by Gandhi were becoming more intensive and defiant. Though he sought to join forces in 1909 with W P Schreiner in lobbying efforts in England to secure greater rights for Asians and Africans in South Africa, Gandhi had reached the end of the petitioning road. In a note Gandhi sent in Gujarati for his journal he wrote: "I see the time drawing nearer everyday when no one, whether black or white, will succeed in obtaining a hearing by merely making petitions. If I am right, then no force in the world can compare with soul force, that is to say, satyagraha. I therefore wish that Indians should fill the gaols if, by the time this letter is published, there has been no decision or solution." (*Indian Opinion*, August 28, 1909, CW, Vol 9, pp. 317-318). The same issue of *Indian Opinion* carried yet another appreciative reference to Jean Finot's work "Race Prejudice": "In England and America, in France and Germany, and in the other civilised countries, it is the 'anthropologists' who have lent the most constant and active support to the false doctrines of caste and race; but they are at last thoroughly discredited. Among others the French writer Finot, in his book 'Race Prejudice,' has shown the utterly untenable position of this pseudo-anthropology, even though it has filled thousands of volumes of more or less 'scientific research'. The book has already had a remarkable reception, and must exert a great influence for the truth. It has the triple value of summing up the theories of race prejudice, of showing their essential futility, and of proving the fundamental unity of the human race." (*Indian Opinion*, August 28, 1909) Finot's work against race prejudice, *Les Prejugés des Races* was published in Paris in 1905. The English language version *Race Prejudice* (translated by Florence Wade-Evans) was published in the following year from New York.

As has been noticed above, this work was earlier commended in Gandhi's *Indian Opinion* on September 7, 1907. Gandhi would also refer to Finot's work a few months before the Universal Races Congress held in 1911. (See Gandhi's letters to L. W. Ritch, April 12 and 18, 1911, CW, Vol 11, p. 22 and p. 29). The Polish-born Finot had become a French citizen in 1897. In France he founded and edited *La Revue des Revues* which brought him into contact with writers like Tolstoy. Interestingly, as one scholar, Jennifer Hecht, has remarked, Finot's "indictment of race prejudice was broadly conceived, including discussion of American blacks, animosity between the English and the French and Aryan supremacy"⁷. Thus Gandhi had a timely exposure not only to a scientific critique of race conceived on colour but also that conceived on Aryan glorification. It is significant that, as editor of *La Revue*, Finot, like Gandhi, had come into

contact with Tolstoy. While the coincidence may be a matter of chance, there may have been a more basic intellectual bridge between Gandhi and Finot's work. It has been suggested by Hecht that "Finot's central interest, and the central interest of his journal, was the promotion of pacificism through internationalism" and that since "nations were understood as representing different races, the cause of pacificism was well served by an attack on racialism" (*Idem*)

Though Gandhi's struggles in South Africa were organised around the Asian causes that more immediately affected Indians, his long-term vision for a non-racial South Africa was by now clear enough, as evidenced by his speech in May 1908, referred to above. By 1910, Gandhi took voluntarily to third class travel. One of the reasons for this, according to him was that he "shuddered to read the account of the hardships" faced by Africans in the third-class carriages in the Cape: "I wanted to experience the same hardships myself". (Letter to M P Fancy, March 16, 1910, CW, Vol 10, p. 183) The practice of third class travel that he would continue in India evidently had this African origin. For such Europeans as were able to rise above colour prejudice, he usually had a word of praise. When Woodhead, a veteran journalist with *The Natal Mercury*, passed away in an accident, Gandhi recalled in his tribute: "During the time he was Managing Editor, *The Mercury* has in all matters relating to the Coloured communities of the Colony, maintained a high standard and has on many occasions struck the note of warning against race hatred and colour prejudice". (*Indian Opinion*, April 16, 1910, CW, Vol 10, pp. 220-221).

Introduction of racial considerations in electoral laws would, according to Gandhi, prevent the coming into being of "real" nationhood in South Africa. In 1910 the African leader, Rev. Dr Walter Rubusana, (who was later to be a Vice President of the ANC or the South African Native National Congress, as it was initially known, in January 1912) was elected to the Cape Provincial Council. Gandhi, in whose journal Dr Rubusana had figured prominently as early as in 1904, warmly welcomed his election to the Provincial Council. The colour provisions of the latest Union legislation had anomalously made Dr Rubusana ineligible to sit in the Union Parliament. Gandhi warned against such legislative anomalies on which the Colonialists were seeking to build the South African nation, declaring that such provisions would prevent South Africa from becoming a "real nation":

"The election of the Rev. Dr Rubusana as a member of the Cape Provincial Council for Tembuland by a majority of 25 over his two opponents is an event of great importance. The election is really a challenge to the Union Parliament with reference to the colour clause. That Dr Rubusana can sit in the Provincial Council but not in the Union Parliament is a glaring anomaly which must disappear if South Africans are to become a real nation in the near future. We congratulate Dr Rubusana and the Coloured races on his victory and trust that his career in the Council will do credit to him and those he represents." (*Indian Opinion*, September 24, 1910, CW, Vol 10, p. 325)

The Universal Races Congress was organised in London in 1911. Gandhi did not himself attend but sent his associate H S L Polak. Gandhi, Olive Schreiner, the Coloured Peoples' leader Dr A Abdurahman and the African lawyer Alfred Mangena (who would be one of the founders of the future African National Congress), among others, were among those from South Africa who were on the Honorary General Committee of the Universal Races Congress. With all of them Gandhi was well-acquainted and of all of them Gandhi's journal had already taken early appreciative note. Also on the committee were E.W. Blyden, the famous African intellectual from Sierra Leone, and Dr W E B DuBois, who was later known as the pioneering force behind the Pan-African movement.⁸ One contribution to the deliberations was from Finot whose work, "Race Prejudice", Gandhi recommended to another earlier in the year, in April, and would refer to again in India. The work had been favourably reviewed four years earlier in Gandhi's journal by A Chessel Piquet, a likely pseudonym for Henry, that is "H.S.L.", Polak. (*Indian Opinion*, September 7, 1907) Dr DuBois, whose contribution to the 1911 Congress was praised highly in

Gandhi's journal, had also invoked Finot in his paper presented at the Congress. How significant the impact of Finot's work had been on Gandhi may be seen from the fact that he invoked Finot even later in the mid-twenties, after he had been back in India for nearly a decade. When Marcus Garvey, as Chairman of the Fourth Annual International Convention of the Negro Peoples of the World, greeted Gandhi on behalf of " the Negroes of the world " for the " fight for the freedom of your people and country ", adding " (w)e are with you ", Gandhi, who had been released in early 1924 after spending nearly two years in prison, published the message from Garvey along with a note in which he referred again to Finot :

" Theirs is perhaps a task more difficult than ours. But they have some very fine workers among them. They have fine physique. They have a glorious imagination. They are as simple as they are brave. M. Finot has shown by his scientific researches that there is in them no inherent inferiority as is commonly supposed to be the case. All they need is opportunity. I know that if they have caught the spirit of the Indian movement, their progress must be rapid. " (*Young India* on August 21, 1924, CW, Vol 25, p. 26).

Nation Formation Processes

As the process of nation formation was undergoing a constricted construction in South Africa, it was underway also in other countries and regions. With some of these Gandhi had occasion to deal, particularly if these were countries to which Indians had migrated. British Guiana (now Guyana) in South America was one such site where Gandhi sought to inculcate an inclusive notion of peoplehood. When his opinion was sought in a matter that would have ramifications for nation-construction in Guyana his advice was in accord with the non-racial character of nationhood he had sought in South Africa and in India. In March 1924, Gandhi had been approached by Mahadeo Panday and Caramat Ali Macdoom who wrote to him about the prospect of an African influx in British Guiana and expressed their anxiety about the Africans seeking the same entitlements as were offered to Indians there. Gandhi, who was then convalescing in Bombay after a surgery, replied on March 28, 1924 : " You state that the Negroes are clamouring for the conditions offered to our Indian colonists. Personally I do not mind it, nor need our countrymen in British Guiana fear the proposed influx of the Negroes. If the 1,30,000 Indians give a good account of themselves, they will bless themselves and bless the Negroes and everyone else who goes there. " (CW, Vol 23, p.332).

Non-cooperation in India (1920)

If Gandhi's struggle against race had some French intellectual inspiration, his striving against British-allied classes accustomed to receiving colonial favours was supported by French historical precedent. As in South Africa, he would be imprisoned again in India. The non-cooperation movement against British rule in India was initiated by Gandhi in 1920. In the course of the struggle, in which he would later be arrested in 1922, Gandhi cited certain events of the French Revolution as an example. Asking for the rejection of titles conferred by the British, he said non-co-operation was not possible " unless the masses themselves reject the classes and take up non-cooperation in their own hands and are able to fight that battle even as the men of the French Revolution were able to take the reins of Government in their own hands leaving aside the leaders and marched to the banner of victory. " (*The Hindu*, August 13, 1920, CW, Vol 18, p. 152)

For his part, Gandhi was prepared even in his non-co-operation, to provide the English with an honourable exit. What he sought was equality among the white, brown and black races and, if this could not be achieved under the English, he was, of course, prepared to end that connection. He defined his objective in a letter to his English friend and associate C F Andrews : " It may be that the English temperament is not responsive to a status of perfect equality with

the black and the brown races. Then the English must be made to retire from India. But I am not prepared to reject the possibility of an honourable equality. The connection must end on the clearest possible proof that the English have hopelessly failed to realize the first principle of religion, namely, brotherhood of man." (Letter dated November 23, 1920, CW, Vol 19, p. 14)

René Maran (1887-1960)

Articulate sections of Francophone Africa had also been taking a keen interest in Gandhi. For example, *Les Continents*, a monthly journal established in Paris in 1924 by the Dahomeyan Kojo Tovalou Houenou had been carrying extracts on Gandhi's ideas and movements.⁹ There were reverberations among leading Afro-Caribbean intellectuals as well. René Maran (1887-1960), the poet and writer who was Vice President of *Les Continents*, wrote an article in the mid-1920s on Gandhi as an apostle of militant nonviolence; an English translation of Maran's article by Edna Worthley Underwood was published by the New York based National Urban League's journal, *Opportunity*, in February 1925. Born in Martinique to Guyanese parents, Maran grew up in Gabon in Africa and was in the French colonial service in Ubangi-Shari (later the Central African Republic) and Chad. In Paris he was associated also with the *Ligue universelle pour la defense de la race negre*.¹⁰ In 1922 Maran had written the acclaimed novel *Batouala* in which he had denounced the injustices of the colonial system in French Equatorial Africa in what is seen as a seminal Francophone African critique of colonialism. René Maran's article on Gandhi was quite well informed, especially on his South African years¹¹. Indeed Maran chided Romain Rolland, who had recently produced a biography of Gandhi, for having paid insufficient attention to Gandhi's struggle in South Africa. Rolland, Maran observed, had written a "perfect" biography which would have been "altogether perfect if he had not forgotten entirely" Gandhi's early years which were "likewise noblest and most lovable" as it was "the time when he was groping to find THE PATH – and had not yet touched it". (Capitals as in original)¹². The journal *Opportunity* in which Maran wrote was founded by the African-American sociologist Charles Spurgeon Johnson and brought out by the National Urban League, New York which focussed on African-American issues. René Maran, a crucial trans-Atlantic link between Francophone Africans, Afro-Caribbeans and African-Americans, was himself co-editor of *Les Continents*, the first African paper in Paris. Maran referred to Gandhi as "one of the most distinguished martyrs of the races that have suffered – have been forced to suffer from the civilizations of the occident – the most representative of all."¹³ In his article Maran displayed a familiarity with Gandhi's life apart from the material available in Rolland's book which appears to have circulated widely among French language readers.

In a prose work written in 1925 and inspired by René Maran's *Batouala*, the Malagasy litterateur, Jean-Joseph Rabearivelo (1903-1937), a pioneering and major poet in the French Colonial empire, referred to the imprisonment of Gandhi and of the Madagascar anti-colonialist Jean Ralaimongo (1884-1942). In this work, which is considered more explicit in its anti-colonialism than his poetry, Rabearivelo asserted that the imprisonment of Gandhi and Ralaimongo had resulted from their being 'contemptuous' of the predominant political "thirst for lucre and material gain"; he condemned the treatment meted out to them as also to Marcus Garvey in America as "barbarism in the midst of the 20th century".¹⁴

The Riff War

The international struggle against racial discrimination, in turn, continued to receive Gandhi's attention. He saw French conduct in this respect fall short of what he considered the ideals of the French revolution and the great French minds with whose writings he was acquainted. Atrocities perpetrated in the French Congo were being replicated by France in Syria against the Druses and also elsewhere. Referring to the treatment meted out by the French to the Riffs

in Morocco, Gandhi remarked of France that "there is little fraternity between her and the Riffs". (*Young India*, November 12, 1925, CW, Vol 28, p. 441). He saw early the futility of raising such matters with the League of Nations. "And what is the League of Nations? Is it not in reality merely England and France? Do the other powers count? Is it any use appealing to France which is denying her motto of Fraternity, Equality and Justice?" (*Idem*) Similarly, to appeal to England "is to appeal to Caesar against Augustus". (*Idem*) The answer, according to him, lay in one's own self – "perceive the truth in its nakedness and learn to appeal to the nation to do her duty"; this consisted in either fighting "to the bitter end, even as our brothers the four-footed animals often do" or in demonstrating the "uselessness, nay, the sinfulness of exploitation of those weaker than ourselves". (*Idem*) It was in this sense that he said of Syria as he would often say, in various ways, of Africa: "Relief of Syria lies through India". (*Idem*) A month earlier there had been a general strike in France in protest against French policies connected with the North African Rif.¹⁵ At this time the Surrealists in France had also become active in their expressions of solidarity with the Riffs in the North African Riff War (1921-26).¹⁶ In May 1926 the combined forces of the French and the Spanish defeated the Riffs and their leader Abd el-Krim gave himself up.¹⁷ Gandhi's journal highlighted the Riff and Abyssinian conflicts with an article by C F Andrews criticising the League of Nations for its silence in the face of the "overthrow of the Riffs and the continued crushing of the Druses".¹⁸

This denunciation was ratified by Gandhi, who had already criticised France a year earlier for its role in the Riff, the region on the north-eastern edge of the Atlas Range. The significance of this may be seen from the fact, as noted by a pioneering scholar of Francophone African literature, that Gandhi's prestige was already great by the time the impulses for political independence, as in the Riff, appeared.¹⁹ Gandhi now followed with an article entitled "Race Arrogance" referring to information "showing the wrong done by white Europe to the Abyssinians and the Riffs" and pointing also to "the injustice that is being daily perpetrated against the Negro in the United States of America in the name of and for the sake of maintaining white superiority". (*Young India*, October 14, 1926, CW, Vol 31, pp. 492-493)

It was not as though Gandhi had singled out France. As in the case of French external policies, he noticed racism rampant in England's actions both within and without. Pointing to certain racial disabilities in Glasgow, Gandhi had made, earlier in the year, a world-wide projection of his concept of non-violent non-co-operation which he had introduced in India in 1920. Citing the racial disabilities within Britain, he wrote: "The question therefore that is agitating South Africa is not a local one but it is a tremendous world problem... There is however no hope of avoiding the catastrophe unless the spirit of exploitation that at present dominates the nations of the West is transmuted into that of real helpful service, or unless the Asiatic and African races understand that they cannot be exploited without their co-operation, to a large extent voluntary, and thus understanding, withdraw such co-operation". (*Young India*, March 18, 1926, CW, Vol 30, pp. 135-136)

The international aspect of the struggle came still further into focus with the invitation to Gandhi to attend the Brussels International Congress Against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism, or the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities, which was to be held in February 1927. In his message sent before February 7, 1927, Gandhi thanked it "very cordially" for its invitation, and while regretting that his work in India prevented him from participating, he added in his message: "I wish you, however, from the depths of my heart, every success in your deliberations". (CW, Supplementary Volume I, p. 411) In December 1926 the Indian National Congress, at its Guwahati (Assam) session, appointed Jawaharlal Nehru, who was already in Europe at the time, as its representative to the Congress in Brussels.²⁰ Along with Gandhi, Albert Einstein and Romain Rolland sent messages of goodwill to the Brussels Congress.²¹⁻²² The Brussels Congress gave birth to the League Against Imperialism. Nehru was made one of the honorary presidents

of the General Council of the League and a member of the Executive Committee. Among the three elected secretaries was the African trade unionist Lamine Senghor. Belonging to Senegal in French West Africa, Lamine Senghor was then resident in Paris and was Chairman of the *Ligue pour la Defense de la Race Nègre*.²³ Houenou had become directly involved in Dahomey (now Benin) and Senegal politics and had even been arrested in Togo. In succession to Houenou's *Ligue Universelle de Defense de la Race Negre*, Lamine Senghor came to lead the *Comite de Defense de la Race Negre* [CDRN] which was later reconstituted as *Ligue de Defense de la Race Negre* [LDRN].²⁴ Nehru reported back to the Congress Working Committee in India that Lamine Senghor's speech at the Brussels Congress appears to have led to the latter's arrest in France for "high treason".²⁵ The journal *La Race Negre* "had been clamoring since July 1927 for complete and immediate independence" and Garan Tiemoko Kouyate from French Sudan (the later Mali) and Lamine Senghor, "the two West Africans who had launched upon this radical course", referred not to "black internationalism" but to Gandhi, the socialist revolutions and Woodrow Wilson in support of their claim for national self-government.²⁶

That Gandhi should have sent a message to the Brussels Congress is significant for he was not especially enamoured of international conferences and it was not often that he would associate himself with them, his emphasis being on strengthening the struggle at hand, then ongoing in his own country. The message was important also as the Brussels Congress represented, at this stage, the coalescing of, or an alliance between, groups seeking, in the first instance, freedom from colonial rule and those focussing on change in the social and economic structure. Participants at the Brussels Congress had a wide canvas before them. The German editor, feminist and socialist, Dr Helene Stocker, who attended the Brussels Congress, "explained the merits of Gandhi's doctrine of non-co-operation and passive resistance" and "classified women among the oppressed classes of the world".²⁷ The problem, as Gandhi noted later in the year, was the idea of inequality itself: "The false and rigid doctrine of inequality has led to the insolent exploitation of the nations of Asia and Africa." (*Young India*, August 11, 1927, CW, Vol. 34, p. 315).

While Gandhi was sought out by writers and organisations outside India on questions concerning racial harmony and international peace, he did not consider racial harmony as being possible without confronting head-on the causes that led to disharmony. Gandhi was requested by the France-based Syndicalist Marcelle Cappy for a message, "however short", for a proposed "Review *Interraciale*" to promote human brotherhood and to be written in by "friends of all countries and all races: Africans, Americans, Asiatics and Europeans"; she sought also Gandhi's consent for him to be included in a 'Comite d'Honneur' for the journal.²⁸ Partially answering her request, Gandhi in his reply drew attention to what he saw as the real factor underlying the tension: "There can be no living harmony between races and nations unless the main cause is removed, namely, exploitation of the weak by the strong." (March 20, 1928, CW, Vol 36, p. 121)

By the turn of the decade, awareness of the movements and techniques of Gandhi, who had himself written early enough on Moroccan events, came to figure also in the struggles constitutive of Moroccan nationalism.²⁹

1931 : Revisiting France and England

At the end of August 1931 Gandhi sailed for Europe to attend the Round Table Conference called in London by the British Government to discuss the future constitutional development of India. Disembarking at Marseilles on Sept 11, 1931, he passed through Paris on the next day before going on to London.³⁰ Interestingly, at this time the Exposition Coloniale, a celebration of the French Colonial Empire, was on in Paris.³¹ The Surrealists had started a campaign against visiting the exhibition as it was considered imperial propaganda and dero-

gatory in its depiction of colonial peoples.³² Significantly, Gandhi appears not only to have ignored the Exposition on his onward journey to England but also to have made no reference to it in December 1931 when he addressed some meetings in Paris. This was unlike more than four decades earlier, when he had come across from London to visit the Exposition Universelle held in Paris in 1889.

There was considerable interest in Gandhi in France by the 1920s and early 1930s. The celebrated journalist Albert Londres is believed to have had personal experience of some of Gandhi's campaigns in the early 1920s. On December 4, 1926, the Bar Association in Paris invited Juliette Veillier, a versatile woman who was also a rising lawyer, to deliver its annual lecture ; she chose to speak on Gandhi and his movement in India.³³ France's international role and its domestic scene provided a study in some contrasts. The Indian nationalist, scholar and diplomat, K M Panikkar in his autobiography published in 1954 in Malayalam and in English translation in 1977 gives an account of Paris in the 1920s. " Only in Paris do we find a complete absence of colour bar. Everyone knows that the British look down on coloured people. The reverse was true of Paris. Negro or Mongol, Hindu or Briton, each man was respected according to his education and status... People come like pilgrims to Paris not only from all European countries but from China, Japan, Siam, Africa and America ; everyone gets the same welcome ".³⁴

An International Study Group was formed in Paris after Gandhi's visit in 1931 and it brought out the bulletin *Nouvelles de l'Inde* with Romain Rolland and his sister as well as Edmond Privat and Jawaharlal Nehru among the contributors ; from this group emerged the Friends of Gandhi Association, headed until her death in 1949 by Louise Guieyette who had hosted Gandhi in Paris during the 1931 visit.³⁵

Struggles in Madagascar

Yet, the French authorities must have viewed Gandhi's visit to Paris with some apprehension. In Francophone African territories on and near the African mainland, resistance against colonialism was gathering momentum. The events in North and Central Africa have already been mentioned. Elsewhere too, the prospects for holding on to colonial conquest did not appear bright. Developments in France-dominated Madagascar have been referred to above. Jean Ralaimongo (1884-1942), who has been described as the real founder of the national movement in that country, " encouraged the peasants to engage in the type of resistance practised by Gandhi in India ".³⁶

Leaving England on December 5, 1931, Gandhi passed through France, addressing meetings and resting the night in Paris, before spending a few days in Switzerland and Italy. Gandhi had arrived in Paris on December 5 and addressed some meetings. He also gave some press interviews. It would have been natural for the representatives of the French colonies living in Paris to be curious about what Gandhi had to say. We have at least one confirmation of the presence of North African and other such representatives at the meeting that Gandhi addressed at Magic City Hall on December 5, 1931³⁷ . One meeting, organised, according to a note by the editors of Gandhi's *Collected Works*, by " local intellectuals ", was attended by some 2000 persons (CW, Vol 48, p.391n). The interest generated in Gandhi's visit to Europe in 1931 among non-European peoples was to be expected. Francophone African writers and activists in and from the Caribbean too had, at least since the 1920s, become increasingly aware of Gandhi and his struggles. As we have seen, the Martinican-born Guyanese author, Rene Maran, who was based in Paris, had written at length about Gandhi in 1925. The Haitian Jacques Roumain (1907-1944), of mixed-race descent, who had achieved prominence as a writer and political activist and who would found Haiti's Communist Party, had followed with a series of articles in March 1928 and also in May 1930 after Gandhi's arrest.³⁸ In Afro-Caribbean literature, Gandhi's struggles were referred to and invoked ; Claude McKay, the Jamaican-born writer who had

studied at Tuskegee, was in Marseilles when he produced his second novel, *Banjo* in 1929.⁴⁰ Writing in April 1930, the month in which Gandhi launched country-wide civil disobedience in India and initiated the breaking of the salt laws, Paulette Nardal, the Martinican editor and activist, wrote stressing the significant involvement of women in Gandhi's campaigns.⁴¹ In Villeneuve, Geneva, Gandhi spent time with his biographer, the literary giant, Romain Rolland. While there, Gandhi sought out also Pierre Ceresole to whom he gave an account of his South African experience.⁴² Dr Edmond Privat, then teaching at a Swiss university, and his wife Yvonne Privat, had been persuaded by Gandhi to accompany him on his return journey to India on the ship from Brindisi. Privat, who had during the First World War advocated the cause of Polish independence, described what happened at the Egyptian port : " There are big crowds on the piers of Port Said and a big delegation invades the ship. But the police surround the boat, prevent the journey to Cairo and put a stop to the grand reception arranged over there ".⁴³ As the ship entered the Suez Canal, Edmond Privat and Gandhi discussed the struggles ahead. Based on this conversation, Dr Privat has provided us with insights into Gandhi's mind and the place Africa occupied in his thoughts even as regards the future course for India. On relations between India and Britain, Dr Privat noted : " It is Gandhi's dream to have a voluntary association between the two. If he still holds on to the link with Britain, as amongst equals, it is to save the coloured races. Canada dominates the English attitude towards America. Gandhi desires that India should similarly have her say in favour of the oppressed Africans. The liberation of his own country is only the first stage for him. He wishes then to use that power to deliver the others and to add... its moral conscience to the practical genius of the English. A united India would be able to put pressure like Canada under threat of separation. Imperialism and colonialism would have a decided enemy. For India, such an ambition demands a humane conduct. It has to win its cause by irreproachable methods and has to cure herself of her own faults ".⁴⁴ Arrested in India soon after his return, Gandhi's life was spent in and out of jail for some years. He focussed his attention on social reform within India. In early 1934 when he visited Karaikal, a territory in French India, and addressed a meeting, Gandhi observed : " It can be said that it was France that first gave the world the three significant words, ' Liberty, Equality and Fraternity ' ". (*The Hindu*, February 17, 1934, CW, Vol 57, p. 167). Yet, he said, it was " not given to all to enforce the three things in practice ", and, turning the searchlight inwards, he found the prevailing discriminatory social practices among Hindus to be most wanting in this respect.

Tunisia : Confirming a Gandhian Tenet

There was a strong emphasis in Gandhi's world-view on constructive work and efforts to regain economic self-sufficiency. In the thirties, Gandhi's journal typically carried a lengthy article by V L Mehta on " Handicrafts in Tunisia ".⁴⁵ It was a review of a monograph by Roger Plissard of the International Labour Office. Associated closely with Gandhi's economic perspectives, Mehta, who went on to become the first finance minister of Bombay state after Indian independence, pointed out that there was no conflict between modern industry and the protection of handicrafts even in the industrialised world ; in a non-industrialised country like Tunisia, whose situation was similar to that prevailing in India, handicrafts had a vital place in the national economy.

Mehta found confirmation of an important Gandhian tenet from the North African experience which may also have some contemporary resonance : " it is of interest to learn that, in Tunisia, protection in the form of tariffs and taxation is recommended for these products on the ground that for social reasons the handicraftsman has a moral right to retain his trade, when, as is usually the case – in Tunisia and India as well – there is no alternative employment available ".⁴⁶ Yet it was politics that would soon take precedence and years of political struggle were again

to follow. In these difficult years, there were, as in the past, diverse strands in the sources for inspiration and intellectual strength for the Indian movement.

Quit India : A Prelude to Quit Africa

In a series of statements before the launch of the famous Quit India movement against British rule in 1942, Gandhi stressed that the Western powers must withdraw not only from India but also thereafter from Africa. In an article dated July 18, 1942, under the title " *To Every Japanese* ", Gandhi wrote : " Even if you win it will not prove that you were in the right ; it will only prove that your power of destruction was greater. This applies obviously to the Allies too, unless they perform now the just and righteous act of freeing India as an earnest and promise of similarly freeing all other subject peoples in Asia and Africa. " (*Harijan*, July 26, 1942, CW, Vol 76, p. 311) These moves were followed with the adoption of the famous Quit India Resolution by the All India Congress Committee at its Bombay session on August 8, 1942.

Although Gandhi was not an unqualified admirer of what successive French regimes had made of the French Revolution and its legacy, he sought also to invoke and derive inspiration also from its political philosophy which he had come to regard as a heritage for the world. Shortly before initiating the Quit India movement in August 1942, Gandhi wrote : " The French have a noble motto in Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. It is a heritage not for the French only but for all mankind... What the French never realized it is open to us to do. " (*Harijan*, August 2, 1942, CW, Vol 76, p. 336) In his speech on August 7, 1942, at the All India Congress Committee meeting in Bombay to launch the movement calling upon British power to quit India, Gandhi would express his "great admiration for the French people" and refer to the French and Russian revolutions as struggles on behalf of the people while also distinguishing the Indian movement for its non-violent character. (CW, Vol 76, pp. 380-381) As often in the past, Gandhi also invoked, in an article that would coincide with his own arrest, the writings of Thoreau, Ruskin and Tolstoy. (*Harijan*, August 9, 1942, CW, Vol 76, p. 358)

Assimilation : Bourguiba / Senghor

Gandhi's work was being watched with interest by diverse groups in various parts of the colonial world, particularly Africa. Tunisia's Habib Bourguiba, who has been described as one of North Africa's most creative leaders, became a close observer of Gandhi's ideas and methods and believed like him that the struggle against colonialism was essentially the task of recovering the power of independent thinking and that the main thing was to rid the colonised mind of its servility.⁴⁷ By the time of the framing of the still-born April 1946 Constitution in France, not only Soviet ideas but those of Gandhi and Leopold Senghor, who ' wanted to assimilate, not be assimilated '⁴⁸, had begun to influence the section of opinion which had hitherto thought that non-white races could be dealt with in French overseas policy " by simply treating them as Frenchmen " ; as such it began increasingly to be understood that such peoples " should be free, but free to accept or reject French civilisation – or to accept parts of it and reject others ".⁴⁹ But it would still take much time, and encounter much resistance within France, before such a right could in fact be realised.

In the midst of everything, the struggle in South Africa, and the need for a non-racial definition of nationhood, continued to occupy Gandhi's attention. In the past Gandhi, while favouring co-operation with other oppressed peoples in South Africa, had not been sanguine about possibilities of complete identity on all issues, or about an *amalgamated* struggle, considering that the laws governing Indians and other oppressed peoples within South Africa had been different and the points of attack were therefore not identical. (See *Indian Opinion*, July 27, 1907, CW, Vol 7, p. 125 and *Harijan*, February 18, 1939, CW, Vol 68, pp. 272-273) With the changed situation in South Africa, where a new South Africa-born Indian generation had come

to the fore, Gandhi endorsed a joint struggle including within it all racial categories. However, he did maintain that it ought to be non-violent. A deputation from South Africa led by Sorabji Rustomji came to India in 1946 (CW, Vol 83, pp 352-354). It was protesting against racial legislation in South Africa. A member of the delegation asked Gandhi : " You have said we should associate with Zulus and Bantus. Does it not mean joining them in a common anti-white front ? " Gandhi replied : " Yes, I have said that we should associate with the Zulus, Bantus, etc.... It will be good, if you can fire them with the spirit of non-violence ". (CW, Vol 83, p 353) Gandhi remarked of the deputationists' cause on May 27, 1946: "The cause is the cause of the honour of India and through her of all the exploited coloured races of the earth, whether they be brown, yellow or black. It is worth all the suffering of which they are capable ". (CW, Vol 84, p. 215).

While on a peace mission in East Bengal, on February 28, 1947 Gandhi endorsed the decision of the African National Congress, the Coloured People's Organisation, the Natal Indian Congress and the Transvaal Indian Congress in South Africa to refrain from assisting the celebrations of and to boycott a Royal visit to that country " in view of the disabilities imposed upon the Asiatics and Africans and other Coloured people ". He wrote : " I take this opportunity of publicly endorsing the abstention as a natural and dignified step by any self-respecting body of people. " (*The Hindu*, March 1, 1947, CW, Vol 87, p. 28). [This was in accordance with what he had earlier written on October 25, 1946 (CW, Vol 86, pp 28-30)]

The on-going struggle in Vietnam, where France was seeking to re-assert its control after the War, did not escape Gandhi's attention. Since December 1946 the struggle for freedom had been renewed, the French having gone back on a March 1946 agreement with Ho Chi Minh involving acceptance of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as " a free state with its own government, parliament, army and finances, forming part of the Indo-Chinese Federation and the French Union ".⁵⁰ Vietnam's delegates to the Inter-Asian Relations Conference held in Delhi called on Gandhi on April 6, 1947. Through the leader of the delegation, Tran Van Heun, Gandhi sent a message to the people of Vietnam : " My heart is always with the oppressed peoples of the world, and I have full sympathy with the cause for which the people of Viet Nam are fighting ". (*The Hindu*, April 10, 1947, CW, Vol 87, p. 220).

Indian Independence

Indian independence from British rule was achieved in August 1947. In an act of friendship and reconciliation with Britain, Indian leaders asked the British Viceroy, Mountbatten of Burma, to stay on as Governor General for the time-being. There was some opposition within India to this decision. In Gandhi's comment one may detect a touch of optimism with regard to British officialdom, but he sketched also an emphatically non-racist conception of India : " I shall say that under the scheme that will come into effect on August 15, it does not matter whether the Governor-General is an Englishman, a Frenchman or a Dutchman, whether he is a brown-skinned Indian or a White or a Negro. If I had my way a Harijan girl would be the Governor General. So if Lord Mountbatten becomes Governor General he will still be a servant of India. " (Speech at a Prayer Meeting, July 12, 1947, CW, Vol 88, p. 322) Another controversy erupted in relation to certain French settlements that still remained in India ; pointing the way forward in a written speech delivered on November 9, 1947, Gandhi said it was no longer possible for these settlements " to remain under servility " and, connecting this with the worldwide struggle, gave expression to his hope " that the great French nation would never identify itself with the suppression of people, whether black or brown, in India or elsewhere " (*Harijan*, November 16, 1947, CW, Vol 89, p. 514).

He set the same non-racial standards for the newly independent India. In an article published less than two weeks before his assassination, Gandhi wrote of Delhi, the capital of India where there had been inter-community strife, and of the peoples inhabiting the subcon-

continent : " (Delhi) is the heart of India. It would be the limit of foolishness to regard it as belonging only to the Hindus or the Sikhs. It may sound harsh but there is no exaggeration in it. It is the literal truth. All Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Parsis, Christians and Jews who people this country from Kanyakumari to Kashmir and from Karachi to Dibrugarh in Assam and who have lovingly and in a spirit of service adopted it as their dear motherland, have an equal right to it. No one can say that it has place only for the majority and the minority should be dishonoured. Whoever serves it with the purest devotion must have the first right over it. Therefore, anyone who seeks to drive out the Muslims is Delhi's enemy number one and therefore India's enemy number one. (*Harijanbandhu*, January 18, 1948, CW, Vol 90, p. 419). Gandhi was assassinated soon thereafter on January 30, 1948. Among the causes that led to his assassination was precisely his non-racial and non-denominational definition of Indian peoplehood.

Francophone Africa and the Posthumous Gandhi

We may conclude with a broad overview of Gandhi's posthumous reception in Francophone Africa. With the Algerian war having started in 1954, the struggle in Algeria received increased international attention. It was inevitable that there would be an intensification of the debates on methods of struggle. Though diverse tactics would be available for adoption there and in other parts of Africa, Gandhi's struggle continued to inspire activists and thinkers in and from the continent. There were also other parts of Francophone Africa where Gandhi struck a chord. In the Ivory Coast Felix Houphouët-Boigny (1905?-1993), for example, regarded Gandhi as a source of inspiration and was himself spoken of as the " Gandhi of Africa ".⁵¹ Houphouët-Boigny was associated with the *Parti Democratique de la Cote d'Ivoire* (PDCI) and persuaded the French Constituent Assembly in 1946 to support legislation " to outlaw the forced labour system in all of France's colonies ", a measure which ensured wide support for him among the people of Francophone West Africa.⁵² Other scholars have made reference to the influence of Gandhi's passive resistance in sections of *Afrique Equatoriale Française* [AEF].⁵³

The political goodwill of Gandhi was tapped into even by those in Francophone Africa who may have been inclined to a somewhat different path. The Algerian freedom fighter M'hamed Yazid, who came to prominence at the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in April 1955 as the representative of the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN), would record the inspiration that his generation received from " Mustafa Kemal, Gandhi and the Irish rebels of the First World War ".⁵⁴ The three sources named by the Algerian were significant, the first indicated a struggle rooted in the region itself and the last two showed that peaceful mass struggles and more violent forms of protest were both open for consideration. Some hoped nevertheless that peaceful methods would have preference. Soon after Bandung, the Algeria-born Albert Camus⁵⁵ would write of Gandhi as " the greatest man in our history ".⁵⁶ Later Camus would observe that " Gandhi proved that it is possible to fight for one's people and win without for a moment losing the world's respect ".⁵⁷ It is passive resistance, it has been suggested, that Camus " would undoubtedly have liked to see applied by the Algerian nationalists ".⁵⁸ The Camus position on the Algerian struggle engendered debates with Jean-Paul Sartre and also within Africa.

But with the tide of repression in Africa on the rise, particularly since the fifties as the anti-colonial struggle sharpened, the search for multiple strategies can be understood. In the course of the struggle in India, too, other methods of struggle had not been absent. Even so, as Sartre recognised, the non-violent strand remained a vital element in African struggles. Congo's Patrice Lumumba, released from prison just in time to attend the Round Table Conference called by the Belgian government in Brussels, observed on the eve of the independence of his country : " We have wrought our freedom by applying the principle of non-violent action in our fight against Colonialism. This we owe to Mahatma Gandhi. "⁵⁹ This was not merely lip-service. Jean-Paul Sartre wrote of Lumumba and of the Congolese National Movement (MNC) : " On countless

occasions he said that the movement he was organising, and whose uncontested leader he became, would be *non-violent*, and apart from the provocations or a few local initiatives of which he always disapproved, it was by non-violent means that the MNC established itself".⁶⁰

There was another aspect of Gandhi – his strategy for national rejuvenation and reconstruction – which, as we have seen, often interested Africans, such as Bourguiba, in the Francophone area. In Cameroon, for example, intellectuals closely studied Gandhi's ideological resistance to colonialism. The influential journal *Abbia*, was guided by Bernard Nsokika Fonlon who was "quite explicit" in his "resort to writings against imposed forms of education by Ireland's Padraic Pearse and India's Mohandas Gandhi, nationalist rebels who made those descents from elite to mass surroundings Fonlon called for and were respectively executed and jailed for their efforts".⁶¹ "Their resistance served Fonlon as models for Africa's leaders".⁶² A leading Algerian intellectual and Islamic scholar who came under Gandhi's influence was Malek Bennabi.⁶³ Gandhi's approach to decolonisation held appeal for Bennabi. The latter emphasised, in a manner that may be equated with Gandhi's attitude, that in dealing with the colonisation process it was not enough to tackle the exterior (colonising) force and that it was necessary also to end the "colonisability" of the colonised. In contrast, the Fanonian approach to the reception of Gandhian influence in northern Africa was more reluctant, being focussed mainly on the question of violence, which Fanon saw as liberative, versus the non-violence associated with Gandhi's struggles.

Yet clearly, the extent to which Gandhian non-violent struggles came to draw upon the emphasis Gandhi placed on a non-racist construction of peoplehood, especially and expressly from May 1908 onwards, the influences which served to bring this about, and Gandhi's repercussions in the Francophone sphere remain a promising area for further extensive study.

END NOTES

¹ This is a revised and somewhat expanded version of a paper which was initially presented at the Centre for French and Francophone Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi on March 19, 2008. I have benefited from comments by E S Reddy on the penultimate draft of this article. My thanks also to Brent Hayes Edwards, Charles Larson, Geetha Ganapathy-Dore and Roland Lardinois and who helped me obtain certain materials I needed. I am grateful to Asha Puri, Roberta Shapiro and Swati Dasgupta for enabling me to reach into some of the French language writings.

² For reading convenience, references to material from the *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* are given within the main text while other references are in the notes at the foot of each page.

³ See Lynn E. Palermo, *Identity Under Construction: Representing the Colonies at the Paris Exposition Universelle of 1889* in Sue Peabody and Tyler Stovall (eds.), *The Color of Liberty: Histories of Race in France*, Duke University Press, Durham, 2003, p. 285

⁴ Palermo in Peabody and Stovall (eds.) *op. cit.*, p. 291

⁵ Deak's name is mis-spelt in the English translation.

⁶ A year later Gandhi would give expression to a similar long-term vision for South Africa even as he participated in struggles with more limited immediate or medium-term objectives.

⁷ Also known as Raisuli, his full name was Mulai Ahmed Raisuni. He continued to be active till much later, in the 1920s, in the Riff unrest to which Gandhi would have occasion to refer again in 1925 and 1926.

⁸ See Jennifer Michael Hecht, *The Solvency of Metaphysics: The Debate Over Racial Science and Moral Philosophy in France (1890-1919)*, *Isis*, Vol 90, No. 1, (March 1999), pp 1-24

⁹ G. Spiller (ed.), *Papers on Inter-Racial Problems Communicated to the First Universal Races Congress*, P.S. King & Son, London, 1911, p. xxxvii

¹⁰ J. Ayo Langley, Pan-Africanism in Paris, 1924-36, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol 7, No 1, (April 1969), pp 74-75

¹¹ See Alice L Conklin, "Who Speaks For Africa? : The Rene Maran—Blaise Diagne Trial in 1920s Paris", in Sue Peabody and Tyler Stovall (eds.) *The Color of Liberty: Histories of Race in France*, Duke University Press, Durham, 2003, p. 310 and Jeffrey B. Perry, (ed.) *op. cit.* p. 334; see also Kwame Anthony Appiah and Henry Louis Gates, Jr., (eds.) *Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African and African-American Experience*, Basic Civitas Books, Perseus Books Group, New York, 1999, p. 1250

¹² There is however an error, probably typographical, in the article as published in *Opportunity* where the date of the resolution on passive resistance is given as "September eleven, 1916" instead of ten years earlier; that Indians are referred to interchangeably as "Hindoos" is a more frequent error found in Spanish and French writings of the period.

¹³ Rene Maran, "Gandhi", *Opportunity*, February 1925, pp 40-42.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 42

¹⁵ 'Preliminary note' to *L'Aube Rouge* (Red Dawn), cited in Moradewun Adejunmobi, "History and Ideology in Jean-Joseph Rabearivelo's Prose Works", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Volume 28, No 2, (1994), pp 219-235, at p. 224

¹⁶ Jonathan Derrick, *The Dissenters : Anti-Colonialism in France, c. 1900-40* in Tony Chafer and Amanda Sackur (eds.) *Promoting the Colonial Idea : Propaganda and Visions of Empire in France*, Palgrave, New York, 2002, p. 59

¹⁷ See Nicholas Hewitt, *Les Annees Folles*, in Jill Forbes and Michael Kelly, (ed.) *French Cultural Studies : An Introduction*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995, p. 68; see also David Drake, *French Intellectuals and Politics from the Dreyfus Affair to the Occupation*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005, p. 89

¹⁸ See Albert Guerard, *France : A Modern History*, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1959, p. 400

¹⁹ C F Andrews, *The Riffs, the Druses, Abyssinia, Young India*, September 16, 1926.

²⁰ Lilian Kesteloot, *Histoire de la Litterature Negro-Africaine*, Editions Karthala, Paris, 2001, p.9

²¹ *Indian Annual Register*, 1926, Volume 2, p. 322.

²² *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, Volume 2, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, D.K Publishers Distributors, Delhi 1988, (first published 1974), p. 280; see also *Indian Annual Register*, 1927, Volume 2, p. 152.

²³ According to Nehru, among those who attended were representatives of the South African Trade Union Congress and of the "Natal Native Council". (*Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, op. cit., p. 281). Josiah T Gumede, President-General of the African National Congress (1927-30) was present at the Brussels Congress; earlier, at the onset of the twentieth century, Gumede, along with Martin Luthuli and John Dube, had established the Natal Native Congress. (See Freda Troup, *South Africa: An Historical Introduction*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1975, p. 208) Also present at the Brussels Congress was James La Guma, a Coloured activist, who, apart from being a communist, was secretary of the ANC's Cape branch. (See Troup, op. cit., p. 248). The South African Trade Union Congress was represented at the Brussels meeting by D Colrairie.

²⁴ *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, op.cit., p. 286n

²⁵ See J.Ayo Langley, op. cit., pp. 79-84

²⁶ *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, op. cit., p.317

²⁷ Martin Steins, *Brown France versus Black Africa : The Tide Turned in 1932*, *Research in African Literatures*, Volume 14, No 4, special issue on African Literary History, Winter, 1983, pp. 474- 497

²⁸ *Indian Annual Register*, 1927, Vol. 1, p. 207

²⁹ Letter dated February 20, 1928 to Gandhi from Marcelle Cappy, [Sabarmati S.No. 14243]

³⁰ See, for instance, Michael Brett's contribution, *The Maghrib*, in A. D. Roberts, *The Cambridge History of Africa*, Volume 7, Cambridge University Press, London, 1986, p. 315

³¹ C B Dalal, *Gandhi 1915-1948: A Detailed Chronology*, Gandhi Peace Foundation, New Delhi, 1971, p. 92

³² Jonathan Derrick, *The Dissenters : Anti-Colonialism in France, c. 1900-40* in Chafer and Sackur (eds.) op. cit., p. 53. According to Derrick's account the Exposition was on from May 6 to November 15, 1931. A counter exhibition was held by anti-colonialists between September 19 and December 2, 1931.

³³ As in the case of the 1889 Exposition, in 1931 too some persons had been brought from the colonies to the respective pavilions; there were restrictions on the movement of such 'natives' outside the Exposition. [See Christopher L Miller, *Nationalists and Nomads : Essays on Francophone Literature and Culture*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998, p. 72. Miller indicates the duration of the Exposition as having been from May 1931 to at least January 1932 (*Ibid.*, pp. 67-68)] Presumably some portions of the exhibition were continued longer than others. In that case it would have been still on, possibly in part, even when Gandhi returned to Paris on December 5 and 6, 1931 on his journey home. If so, on the occasion of his return journey too Gandhi appears to have set aside no time for the Exposition or what remained of it; he arrived on the evening of December 5, addressed some meetings, and left Paris on the morning of the following day. The British were also to have participated in the Exposition but are understood to have withdrawn for fear of the Indian reaction. Nicola Savorese writes : "The declared intent of the Exposition – exhibiting alongside the newest European inventions and products the best examples of the races and cultures subjected to colonization (the triumphant protagonist of the great event) – was not fully realized. The Exposition could not eclipse the turmoil underway in the colonial world. In order to avoid inflaming Gandhi's campaign of civil disobedience in India, England at the last minute unexpectedly withdrew from the exhibition." [Nicola Savarese, 1931: Antonin Artaud Sees Balinese Theatre at the Paris Colonial Exposition, *The Drama Review*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Autumn, 2001), p. 54]

³⁴ K M Pannikar, *An Autobiography*, Oxford University Press, Madras, 1977, p. 65. Pannikar mentions the name as Juliet Duray, but the text of the lecture, *Une Politique d'Ideal au XXth Siecle*, published by the Barreau de Paris in 1927 has the name as Juliette Veillier.

³⁵ K M Pannikar, op. cit., p. 61

³⁶ See Bhabani Bhattacharya, *Gandhi : The Writer*, National Book Trust, New Delhi, pp 150-151

- ³⁷ M. Esoavelomandroso, *Madagascar, 1880s-1930s: African Initiatives and reaction to colonial conquest and domination*, in A. Adu Boahen (ed.) *General History of Africa : VII : Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935*, Unesco (Paris) and Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1985, p. 248; see also p. 246
- ³⁸ See D. Guérin, in *La Revolution Proletarienne*, N 122, December 1931, pp. 306-309. *La Revolution Proletarienne* was the syndicalist revolutionary journal of Pierre Monatte, Robert Louzon and others. The Guérin interview was much appreciated by Romain Rolland. "These revolutionaries", wrote Rolland, were "more intelligent than the regimented Communists of *L'Humanite*" and "instead of passing judgement on the value of Gandhi's tactics, hold back and wait for the supreme test of action". [Extract from Rolland's Diary, December 1931, in *Romain Rolland and Gandhi Correspondence*, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi, 1976, p. 239] Another French Syndicalist, Andre Philip, had spent some months in India in 1929. For Philip's very perceptive account, as recorded by Rolland in April 1930, see *Romain Rolland and Gandhi Correspondence*, pp. 134-135.
- ³⁹ See Jacques Roumain, *Un Homme Contre Un Empire : Mahatma Gandhi, Le Petit Impartial*, March 3, 7, 10, 14, 21 and 28, 1928, and Mahatma Gandhi, *Haiti Journal*, May 14, 1930 reproduced in Jacques Roumain, *Oeuvres Completes*, Edition Critique, Leon-Francois Hoffman (Co-ordinator), Collection Archivos, ALLCA XX, Université Paris X, Paris, pp. 453-460 and pp. 629-631
- ⁴⁰ See Lilian Kesteloot, *Anthologie Negro-Africaine*, Marabout, Aleur, 1987, pp. 28-30 for a reading from Banjo and Wayne Cooper, Claude McKay and the New Negro of the 1920s in C. W. E. Bigsby (ed.) *The Black American Writer : Volume II : Poetry and Drama*, Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1969, pp. 53-65. A character in Claude McKay's Banjo offers the exhortation: Vous apprendriez tout ce que vous pourriez sur Gandhi et sur ce qu'il est en train de faire pour les masses populaires de l'Inde [You shall learn as much as you can about Gandhi and what he is doing for the people of India].
- ⁴¹ Paulette Nardal, *Les Femmes de couleur dans l'ordre social*, *Le Soir*, April 21, 1930, cited by Brent Hayes Edwards in *Small Axe*, March 2005, p. 138.
- ⁴² Muriel Lester, *Entertaining Gandhi*, Ivor Nicholson & Watson, publishers, London, 1932, pp. 159-161
- ⁴³ Edmond Privat, *Aux Indes Avec Gandhi*, Editions Denoel, Paris, 1960, p. 16; passage translated and quoted in P. C. Roy Chaudhury, *Edmond Privat : A Forgotten Friend of India*, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1976, p. 27
- ⁴⁴ Privat, *op. cit.*, p. 17; passage translated and quoted in P. C. Roy Chaudhury, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29; this and the previous passage from Privat have been translated by Leelavathy Rao.
- ⁴⁵ *Harijan*, November 14, 1936.
- ⁴⁶ *Idem*
- ⁴⁷ Felix Garas, *Bourguiba: La Naissance d'une Nation*, Rene Julliard, Paris, 1956, pp. 9-11 and pp. 65-67
- ⁴⁸ Compare Gandhi : "I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all the lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any." [*Young India*, June 1, 1921, CW, Vol 20, p. 159]
- ⁴⁹ Edward Mortimer, *France and the Africans 1944-1960 : A Political History*, Faber and Faber Ltd, London, 1969, p. 80; see *ibid.*, p. 70 for Senghor's phrase on assimilation.
- ⁵⁰ William Warbey, *Ho Chi Minh and the Struggle for an Independent Vietnam*, Rupa & Co., Calcutta, 1972, p. 66 et seq.
- ⁵¹ K. Madhu Panikkar, *Revolution in Africa*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1961, p. 10; see also Ali A. Mazrui, *Africa Between Gandhi and Nehru : An Afro-Asian Interaction*, *Africa Quarterly*, Vol 39, No. 2, 1999, pp. 1-20, at p. 1
- ⁵² See Kwame Anthony Appiah and Henry Louis Gates, Jr., (eds.) *Africana : The Encyclopedia of the African and African-American Experience*, Basic Civitas Books, Perseus Books Group, New York, 1999, p. 969
- ⁵³ See Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa*, Stanford University Press, California, 1960, p. 309
- ⁵⁴ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace : Algeria 1954-1962*, Macmillan, London, 1977, p. 61
- ⁵⁵ In Camus' words : "plus grand homme de notre histoire".
- ⁵⁶ Albert Camus in *L'Express*, November 22, 1955, reproduced in *Cahiers Albert Camus*, Vol 6, Gallimard, Paris, 1987, pp. 105-107; see also Jeanyves Guérin in Edward J. Hughes (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Camus*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 88
- ⁵⁷ Albert Camus, *Preface to Algerian Reports* (March-April 1958); tr. from the French by Justin O'Brien and reprinted in Camus, *Resistance, Rebellion and Death*, Vintage Books, New York, 1995, p. 115
- ⁵⁸ Philip Thody, *Albert Camus 1913-1960*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1961, p. 200
- ⁵⁹ *The Times of India*, January 29, 1960, cited in *Africa Quarterly*, Vol II, No 2, July-September 1962, p. 91.
- ⁶⁰ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism*, Routledge, London, 2001 (first published in 1964 in French as *Situations V*), pp. 156-157
- ⁶¹ Milton Krieger, *Building the Republic Through Letters : "Abbia : Cameroon Cultural Review"*, 1963-82 and its Legacy, *Research in African Literatures*, Vol 27, No 2, (Summer 1996), pp. 155-177, at p. 16
- ⁶² *Idem*
- ⁶³ See Phillip Naylor, *The Formative Influence of French Colonialism and the Life and Thought of Malek Bennabi (1905-73)*, *French Colonial History*, Vol 7, 2006, p. 141.

Darwis Khudori (Ed.), *Rethinking solidarity in global society. The challenge of globalisation for social and solidarity movements. 50 years after Bandung Asian-African Conference 1955*, Ed. SIRD, Malaysia, 2007, 202

Par Lazare Ki-Zerbo, Comité international Joseph Ki-Zerbo, Paris

En 2008, nous avons rendu visite à Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ancien Secrétaire général des Nations-Unies (1992-1997) puis de la Francophonie (1997-2002). C'est d'ailleurs dans ses bureaux de la Francophonie, rue de Bourgogne dans le septième arrondissement à Paris, que l'illustre personnage nous a reçu sans protocole particulier.

Nous souhaitions l'interroger sur le regard qu'il portait sur le non-alignement, Bandung. Il est tout de même l'auteur de l'ouvrage de référence *Le Mouvement afro-asiatique* publié aux Presses universitaires de France en 1969, dans lequel les grands moments de l'Asiatisme, du Panislamisme et du Panafricanisme étaient retracés avec précision. La réponse fut sans équivoque : la guerre froide étant terminée, le non-alignement n'avait plus sa raison d'être. En outre l'Asie et l'Afrique n'avaient pas connu la même trajectoire postcoloniale, si bien que le mouvement des Non-alignés n'était qu'une survivance diplomatique sans contenu objectif.

Était soulevée une question qui nous interpellait personnellement car nous venions nous-mêmes d'organiser un forum international à Ouagadougou commémorant le cinquantenaire de la *Conférence des peuples africains*, organisée par Kwamé Nkrumah au Ghana en décembre 1958². Et si nous tombions tous, Darwis Khudori et nous-mêmes dans cet historicisme d'antiquaire que Nietzsche prend vigoureusement à partie dans la seconde de ses *Considérations intempestives* ? Le philosophe célèbre le devenir, l'enthousiasme des commencements créateurs.

L'écrivain indonésien Hersi Setiawan, soixante-dix ans au moment de la publication, prisonnier politique du second président indonésien Soeharto, semble partager le point de vue de Boutros-Ghali, lorsqu'il conclut son texte, le premier d'une série de vingt contributions rédigés par autant d'auteurs dont six Asiatiques, six Européens, deux Africains, un Arabe, un Iranien et un Latino-Américain, et deux organisations.

Ce texte intitulé "*Learning from history: the Bandung spirit*" s'achève sur ces propos : "*I look at the activities to commemorate the Bandung Spirit which were carried out officially by several countries just like the activity of returning home to the villages in the past and making a devotional visit to the grave of ancestors. It is a sort of nostalgic activity. It is only an activity of moral values and not of political ones. No matter how honourable it might be, it will not be able to play a historical role.*" (RS [27]).

Cette affirmation résonne comme une injonction aux nostalgiques du nationalisme des années cinquante de sortir de ce schéma inhérent à une certaine époque du monde pour explorer d'autres horizons, ceux du présent et du futur. Pour employer le vocabulaire de Soekarno lui-même, identifier les nouvelles forces émergentes ou *nefos* (*new emerging forces*).

Pourtant la centaine d'intellectuels et militants attendus en Indonésie en 2005, à l'occasion du cinquantenaire de la Conférence organisée du 18 au 24 avril 1955 à Bandung³, étaient sensés trouver dans cet événement tellurique (Senghor le compara à la Renaissance) des éléments de cadrage, une « boîte à outils » si l'on peut dire pour tous ceux qui recherchent une alternative progressiste à la globalisation néolibérale sans disposer d'une perception claire des voies à suivre, au-delà des contestations sporadiques (RS [12]).

Le tsunami du 26 décembre 2004 conduisit les organisateurs à se contenter d'un ouvrage collectif sans organiser la rencontre proprement dite.

Selon le directeur du volume, six champs ont été abordés : la politique (réforme économique, démocratisation des Nations-Unies, les politiques économiques, l'exigence d'une nouvelle écologie des cultures en rapport avec les mouvements sociaux, la spiritualité, le don ; l'écologie, l'éducation, la communication et les NTIC.

La tonalité générale des contributions consacrées à ces thématiques est qu'elles proposent une rupture avec le néo-libéralisme et la prise en compte de la diversité culturelle et religieuse du monde. L'esprit de Bandung c'est, outre un refus de l'autoritarisme propre aux alignements idéologiques de la Guerre froide, l'esprit de cette alliance historique dans l'Europe des années cinquante et soixante entre un christianisme ou un islam social, le communisme et l'anticolonialisme. Le bloc historique *Nationalistes-Religieux-Communistes* (" Nasakom " en Indonésie RS [25]) est une illustration de cette orientation sous-jacente à l'époque de Bandung. On pense ici au Père Lebreux et aux courants du catholicisme social ou même du socialisme chrétien, dont la pensée est représentée dans l'ouvrage par Boutros Labaki et Yves Berthelot, ou aux différents tiers-mondismes plus ou moins inspirés du marxisme.

Le spectre des positions est cependant si large, et c'est heureux notamment en ce qui concerne le rôle de l'éducation dans les transformations sociales nécessaires (Parichart Suwanbubha) ou le féminisme (Kaarina Kailo et Siti Musdah Mulia), qu'il est évident que la valeur paradigmatique de Bandung n'apparaît pas sinon à travers les valeurs de paix et de tolérance et d'équité dans les rapports internationaux.

Surtout l'absence d'un regard rétrospectif sur l'évolution du Sud depuis Bandung (indépendance et trajectoires postcoloniales) aura sans doute empêché de prendre toute la mesure des divergences telles que par exemple l'intégration du Japon et de la Corée du Sud dans le camp du capitalisme mondial. La contribution d'Andreosso et de Bassino sur *La convergences socio-économiques entre les Etats présents à Bandung* (RS [54-59]) montrent plutôt les divergences dans l'évolution économique de l'Asie et de l'Afrique souvent signalées et étudiées.

Le neutralisme inhérent à l'esprit de Bandung aidant, des communications d'orientation quasiment opposées telle que celle de Norman Mlambo (qui considère par exemple la disponibilité des terres en Afrique comme une opportunité à exploiter par l'Asie) et de Bernard Founou-Tchigouia, ou Rémy Herrera, qui adoptent des positions anti-impérialistes cohabitent sans qu'une décision théorique ne soit prise.

Cette situation est symptomatique de l'ambiguïté du recours à l'histoire, car Bandung correspond à un âge d'or du nationalisme africain et asiatique, dans lequel un consensus réel existait contre l'Ennemi commun : le Colonisateur.

Aujourd'hui la solidarité afro-asiatique se manifeste toujours dans le discours, mais sur un monde plus contrasté, selon la puissance des Etats partenaires, mais elle est surtout marquée par la prépondérance des intérêts économiques et la violence crue de leur expression.

Les contributions que Darwis Khudori s'est donné la peine d'assembler constituent un bréviaire utile pour toutes celles et ceux qui recherchent de nouvelles grilles analytiques, transnationales et progressistes pouvant déboucher sur une refondation du Tiers-mondisme, pour la consolidation et la maturation d'un mouvement altermondialiste il faut le reconnaître en crise. Elles appellent cependant, pour les lecteurs peu informés de la réalité historique de Bandung 1955, un bilan historiographique plus spécifique et de même pour le panafricanisme : les publications annoncées pour 2010 des Actes d'un séminaire organisé par Christopher Lee à Stanford en mai 1955⁴, et de ceux du Campus annuel des sciences sociales suscités complèteront donc cet ouvrage.

En outre l'intérêt de ces contributions est de mettre en exergue la diversité des « troisièmes voies » et leur actualité : en effet même si le socialisme chrétien, autogestionnaire d'Em-

manuel Mounier, d'Ordre nouveau (Alexandre Marc, Arnaud Dandieu⁵...) n'est plus évoqué, il demeure l'horizon des bonnes pratiques décrites, y compris lorsqu'il s'agit d'une Indonésie très majoritairement musulmane, le point commun étant l'articulation de la foi, du progrès social et d'une forme presque utopiste de pacifisme. Le chapitre sur le don par exemple n'est pas sans rappeler les positions d'Arnaud Dandieu (*La Révolution nécessaire*, 1933).

Alors la question se pose : Jésus, Mahomet, Tito...et Sukarno même combat : mais quel sujet *historique* puisque les peuples sont désormais décolonisés et libérés de la Guerre froide ? Quelle forme d'agencement politique ou métapolitique pour construire une stratégie internationale entre les différentes cultures politiques convoquées ?

Notes

¹ L'ouvrage sera cité dans le texte sous le RS.

² Cf. *L'idéal panafricain contemporain : fondements historiques, perspectives futures*, à paraître au CODESRIA.

³ Y ont pris part, sur l'initiative de la Birmanie, de Ceylan (actuel Sri Lanka), de l'Inde, de l'Indonésie et du Pakistan les Etats suivants : Afghanistan, Cambodge, Chine populaire, Egypte, Ethiopie, Gold Coast (actuel Ghana), Iran, Irak, Japon, Jordanie, Laos, Liban, Liberia, Libye, Népal, Philippines, Arabie saoudite, Soudan, Syrie, Siam (Laos), Turquie, Vietnam, Yémen.

⁴ C. Lee (ed.) *Making a World after Empire. The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives*, Ohio University Press, juin 2010; pour le panafricanisme cf. note 2.

⁵ Groupe des Anticonformistes des années 30.

Charles Renel, (1866-1925), *L'oncle d'Afrique ou La Métisse*, annoté et commenté par Claude Bavoux; Avant-propos de Jean François Reverzy. Coédition ORPHIE, Grand Océan, 218 p. 2005.

Par Dominique Bois, Laboratoire SEDET, Paris

Né le 8 mai 1866 à Strasbourg dans le département du Haut Rhin, Charles Renel est titulaire de l'Agrégation de Lettres au sortir d'un cursus à l'Ecole Normale Supérieure. Maître de conférence à la Faculté des Lettres de Besançon en 1898, il publia cette année là sa thèse de doctorat sur l'évolution d'un mythe (comparaison d'une légende védique avec le mythe grec des Dioscures) il enseigne ensuite la philologie à la Faculté des Lettres de Lyon.

Renel est appelé à Madagascar en 1906 par Victor Augagneur député-maire de Lyon, gouverneur de la Grande Île de 1905 à 1910. Dix ans après la conquête de l'île par les Français, il y dirige, l'enseignement avec pour objectif de réduire l'influence des missions religieuses dans le domaine de l'éducation. Il met en place un enseignement primaire, transposition de celui qui existe dans la métropole et il en favorise l'accès aux Malgaches. Il conduit parallèlement une carrière d'homme de lettres qui comprend deux volets : des essais sur les coutumes et les traditions malgaches, en grande partie informés par les instituteurs autochtones qu'il a en charge mais également par les enquêtes qu'il conduit lors de ses tournées d'inspection (*les amulettes malgaches, Ody et sampy* (1915), *anciennes religions de Madagascar, ancêtres et dieux* (1923). A la charnière de la recherche ethnographique et de la littérature se situent les recueils de contes (*Les contes de Madagascar* en deux volumes publiés en 1910 et 1930). D'autre part, il publie à partir de 1908 des romans et des nouvelles qui ont pour cadre Madagascar : *La Race inconnue* (1910), *La coutume des ancêtres* (1913), *Le « décivilisé »* (1923), *La fille de l'Île rouge* (1924).

Le roman *L'oncle d'Afrique ou La Métisse* se présente sous la forme du parcours initiatique qu'effectue un jeune métropolitain du nom de Leporchois, lancé à la recherche de son

oncle, parti à Madagascar en 1896, dans l'espoir de faire fortune. Son mentor est Herbel, un jeune administrateur qui prend son poste dans une bourgade de la Côte est, Vatomandry¹, où réside une jeune et riche métisse, convoitée par les deux hommes. Cette intrigue assez mince et dépourvue de rebondissements (sauf celui, qui à la fin du roman, en justifie le titre)² est le prétexte à une alternance de scènes de genre propre à la littérature exotique (on peut citer à titre d'exemple, dans le premier chapitre, la description d'Ambile, ou encore le départ en pirogue de l'héroïne) et de passages didactiques plus ou moins lourds, sur des sujets variés qui vont de la culture du café au concubinage avec de jeunes indigènes, qui sont la justification des romans coloniaux³.

Le roman fut tout d'abord annoncé en 1924 avec le titre primitif « *La Métisse* », mais sera publié à titre posthume en 1926 avec un titre plus accrocheur (?), mais sans doute moins pertinent de « *l'oncle d'Afrique* ». Comme le souligne le critique littéraire de la *Dépêche coloniale* cité par Claude Bavoux, « il s'agit d'un titre trompeur. » Il faut convenir que les explications données à la disparition du thème principal dans le titre de l'ouvrage esquissées dans la préface de cette édition, pour astucieuses qu'elles soient, nous laissent un peu sur notre faim.

Cette question du métissage touche Renel au plus près : il est lui-même le père de trois enfants métis conçus hors mariage et il a adhéré à la Société d'Assistance et de Protection des Enfants métis fondée dès 1900 pour secourir les enfants métis non reconnus et leur assurer une formation professionnelle⁴. Même si les métis sont pratiquement absents de ses précédents romans⁵, elle rejoint une problématique récurrente dans son œuvre. Dans *Le décivilisé*, son roman sans doute le plus connu⁶, Renel décrit la trajectoire d'Adhémar Foliquet, qui après avoir échoué à l'Agrégation s'embarque à destination de Madagascar. S'étant ruiné à la suite d'opérations malheureuses, il se retrouve enseignant dans l'école d'un petit village de la Côte est. Alors qu'il initie les jeunes betsimisaraka⁷ aux rudiments de « la » Civilisation, il suit la trajectoire inverse de celle parcourue par la métisse : séduit par les coutumes et les pratiques de la société dans laquelle il vit, éloigné de ses compatriotes, il « se décivilise » et atteint ainsi une certaine forme du bonheur. Mais la question du métissage ne renvoie pas seulement à l'histoire personnelle de l'auteur : en amont on trouve une pratique du concubinage ancienne et généralisée sur les côtes de Madagascar (et en particulier sur la Côte est) très antérieure à la conquête coloniale ; elle est alors le fait de traitants et de colons qui l'instrumentalisent pour exploiter les terres, les esclaves et le réseau familial de leur partenaire féminine qualifiée de « ménagère »⁸. En retour, celle-ci tire prestige et argent de cette relation. Ce métissage traditionnel s'amplifie avec l'arrivée, après 1896, de colons de plus en plus nombreux ; il devient ensuite un véritable problème aux yeux de l'administration coloniale qui le condamne sans toutefois l'empêcher. En effet il est en contradiction avec l'idéologie du cloisonnement qui sous-tend l'organisation de la société issue de la conquête. Le concubinage est également un obstacle à la bonne administration quand ce sont les fonctionnaires qui l'adoptent. On les accuse alors couramment d'accorder des faveurs ou des places aux membres de leur « belle famille. » Par ailleurs les métis ne sont pas nécessairement bien acceptés dans la société « indigène » ; les Malgaches des Hautes terres centrales et de la capitale font à leur égard preuve de la plus grande méfiance⁹.

Comme ses autres œuvres romanesques, celle-ci se nourrit des observations faites par l'auteur sur le terrain, lors de ses tournées d'inspection, et qu'il consignait avec soin sur des carnets que l'on peut désormais consulter aux Archives d'Outre-mer à Aix en Provence¹⁰. Certaines scènes sont même la transcription de pages tirées de ceux-ci : la séance d'exercice illégale de la médecine effectuée dans le roman par l'administrateur Herbel a été pratiquée par l'auteur lors d'une tournée sur la Côte Est en août 1921¹¹. Ces observations de première main permettent d'informer le roman. C'est ainsi que nombre de personnages peuvent être considérés comme la cristallisation de plusieurs personnalités de la société coloniale malgache

dans laquelle Renel a évolué et ils font de *la métisse* un roman à clefs dont l'appareil critique établi par Claude Bavoux livre au lecteur tout les secrets¹².

Le roman peint un tableau de la société coloniale malgache à l'intention de lecteurs métropolitains ; le résultat est à la fois précis et incomplet. Les personnages principaux demeurent avant tout les incarnations des conventions de la littérature exotique (officiers coureurs de jupon, jeune héroïne plus ou moins romantique, jeune bourgeois métropolitain, blanc-bec à peine sympathique). Ce sont peut-être les personnages secondaires qui illustrent le mieux les réalités coloniales. La scène d'ouverture, qui se déroule dans un wagon de première classe entre Tamatave, principal centre urbanisé de la côte et premier port de la Grande Ile et la capitale, Tananarive, permet de dresser un tableau assez complet et tout à fait convainquant des deux principales catégories de *vazaha*¹³ résidant à Madagascar : les colons proprement dit et les fonctionnaires coloniaux. A titre d'exemple le parcours du colon de Vatomandry, Brice, est conforme à celui de nombre de traitants de la côte est installés avant la conquête coloniale¹⁴, à ceci près que tous ne s'enrichissaient pas, loin de là. Relégué en brousse par les colons plus anciens qui résident à Tamatave, il se livre à la fois aux activités de planteurs et de commerçant. Bien des exemples, à Tamatave et dans ses alentours, ont pu inspirer à Renel la figure de Bô, la femme betsimisaraka dont les héros croisent le tombeau. Ménagère d'un colon de Vatomandry, elle est devenue par sa descendance l'ancêtre de la bonne société de cette bourgade¹⁵. Même le point de départ de l'intrigue, la recherche de l'oncle d'Afrique, ne doit pas tout au romanesque ; l'administration coloniale en effet a reçu dans ses débuts des demandes de renseignements émanant de familles à la recherche d'un membre disparu dont elles supposaient qu'il s'était dirigé vers Madagascar et auquel dans bien des cas on prêtait des fortunes. Pourtant d'autres éléments de la peinture de cette société coloniale peuvent nourrir le scepticisme du lecteur ; à commencer par l'héroïne : la figure d'une jeune métisse merina de dix-neuf ans qui gère une plantation sur la côte est pour le moins improbable. Mais des pans entiers de cette société sont pour ainsi dire absents du roman, ou du moins, réduits à quelques silhouettes. Paradoxalement, les Malgaches sont peu représentés et c'est aux métisses (car ce sont uniquement des femmes) qu'échoit de figurer l'autochtonie. Les rares Malgaches de sexe masculin sont des domestiques¹⁶ ou des porteurs.

L'intérêt principal du roman réside en effet dans la défense ambiguë qu'il présente du métissage, thème d'ailleurs généralement abordé avec beaucoup de circonspection par cette littérature¹⁷. Renel convoque à cet effet les dernières découvertes de l'anthropologie préhistorique : le métissage est universel et au fondement même de l'aventure humaine puisqu'il a existé dès l'époque de Neandertal. Cependant à l'intérieur même de ce discours opère la hiérarchie des races ; le métissage entrecroise une race « inférieure » à une race « supérieure ». Dès lors il importe de savoir quel est l'élément qui domine dans le mélange ; comme toujours ce type de discours opère une confusion permanente entre le biologique et le culturel. Ici, nous dit-on, il ne s'agit pas d'un racisme biologique : l'écart entre Malgache et colon est imputé à un « retard » dans le processus de « civilisation »¹⁸. Cependant, lorsqu'il s'agit d'expliquer le comportement des Malgaches ou celui des métis, c'est bien l'hérédité qui est constamment sollicitée. A cet égard on peut supposer que les convictions que l'auteur place dans la bouche de Leporchois sont siennes : « je persiste à dire que le milieu et l'éducation façonnent l'individu plus que la race. Une métisse ou une quarteronne élevée à Paris, parmi les Français est une Française¹⁹. » L'éducation subvertit l'hérédité : propos digne d'un fonctionnaire de l'enseignement colonial, franc-maçon de surcroît. Mais Herbel, l'homme de terrain, est convaincu, au contraire, de la supériorité de l'hérédité sur l'éducation : « ... Moi je sais que les obscures traces héréditaires, surtout quand il s'agit d'ancêtres proches subsistent et agissent fortement sur un être humain et je ne pense pas que Zette ni les autres femmes teintées de Vatoumandry soient vraiment des Françaises... »²⁰.

En outre, pour Renel, l'hérédité malgache se résume en une sensualité débridée²¹: lorsque Madame X, fille de Bô se précipite sur l'administrateur pour tromper son mari dans le quart d'heure dont elle dispose, c'est parce qu'en elle « sommeillait Bô la Betsimisarakà [...] L'hérédité malgache avait prévalu ce jour-là sur la femme d'apparence française ». Mais c'est surtout Marie Deroisy qui retient l'attention. Bien plus que sa vertueuse sœur, la courtisane à la peau claire en effet incarne les ambiguïtés des femmes métisses dans une société fondée sur le clivage et la hiérarchie ; elle s'habille de modèles de la dernière mode parisienne, et se comporte en maîtresse de maison accomplie, mais son rire révèle l'autre part d'elle-même ²² Il n'est pas indifférent que se soit ce rire incontrôlable qui libère sa nature « sauvage » car, du coup, la similitude avec la « française » apparaît comme un simulacre qui repose sur l'effort et l'artifice. Lorsque Zette, l'héroïne, déplore le genre de vie que mène sa sœur, elle le fait en ces termes : « Pourquoi Marie, au carrefour des chemins, a-t-elle choisi le sentier malgache ? » et d'ajouter « suis-je prédestinée à la suivre, moi aussi ? »²³ Car chez elle aussi « l'hérédité malgache » ne se rend pas sans une âpre lutte²⁴. Sur ce thème, la littérature de Renel rejoint les stéréotypes les plus éculés de la littérature coloniale²⁵ dans le fond comme dans le style²⁶.

Or le dénouement de l'intrigue ne résout en rien les ambiguïtés du roman. Il est en effet également conventionnel : la métisse opte pour un métis réunionnais né comme elle à Madagascar. L'ordre colonial est ainsi préservé²⁷.

Alors qu'elle pourrait figurer comme l'avant-garde de l'œuvre civilisatrice dont se réclame l'idéologie coloniale, par sa capacité à intégrer les comportements et les rituels sociaux des colonisateurs²⁸, la femme métisse apparaît comme l'incarnation de son aporie. Si parfaite que soit son intégration elle n'est qu'apparente : « l'hérédité noire peut revenir brusquement » diagnostique Herbel²⁹. En ce sens, elle est également trompeuse car le phénotype, pas plus que l'éducation n'est un critère fiable et toujours selon le jeune administrateur des « signes infaillibles » perceptibles seulement pour « les gens avertis » permettent de ne pas s'en laisser compter³⁰. La métisse est également l'emblème de l'enracinement alors que les colons, dans le roman représentés surtout par l'administration, sont, eux, de passage. Cette dualité renvoie peut-être aux contradictions de l'auteur lui-même. Y aurait-il, chez Renel, la tentation ou la crainte de l'enracinement à Madagascar interprété comme une menace de décolonisation³¹ ?

Les éditions *Orphie* nous propose une réédition de *L'Oncle d'Afrique* enrichie d'un avant propos de Jean François Reverzy, mais surtout d'une présentation et d'un appareil critique très étoffé de Claude Bavoux ; ce dernier, spécialiste de littérature autant qu'historien réinsère l'œuvre de Renel à la fois dans son contexte historique et dans son environnement littéraire. Ce travail éditorial est donc particulièrement important car il permet d'explicitier certains aspects de la vie matérielle et du quotidien qui constituent l'arrière fond de la narration ; on peut se demander toutefois si certaines notes tout à fait savantes ne tentent pas plus tôt d'instaurer un dialogue direct avec le lecteur en concurrence avec le texte dont elles sont supposées enrichir la lecture.

Notes

¹ Situé à une cinquantaine de Kilomètres au Sud de Brickaville (station de chemin de fer la plus proche, Vatomandry est au centre d'une région où vivent des colons petits planteurs créoles pour la plupart cf J. Fremigacci : « La colonisation à Vatomandry-Mahanoro, espérances et désillusions » in *Omalysy Anio*, n°3-4, Janvier juin/juillet Décembre 1976.

² Mais le roman semble être laissé inachevé à la mort de son auteur le 9 novembre 1925.

³ Sur la distinction entre « roman exotique » qui dépayse seulement et « littérature coloniale » qui prétend instruire, voir A. Tirefort « Femmes et métisses malgaches dans la trilogie de Charles Renel... » in *littérature et histoire coloniale*, Actes du colloque de Nantes publiés sous la direction de J. Weber, les Indes Savantes, 2005, 374p.

⁴Fara Rajaonah « Enquêtes sur les métis à Antananarivo pendant la période coloniale » in *Annuaire des Pays de l'Océan Indien*, T. XVI (2001-2002, publié par Les presses universitaires d'Aix-Marseille (2003), p.73-86.

⁵ *Le décivilisé* (1923) , *La fille de l'île rouge* (1924), cf.l' article de Tirefort.

⁶ Il existe deux rééditions récentes de ce roman : l'une figure dans l'anthologie *Océan indien, Madagascar, La Réunion, Maurice* de Serge Meitinger et JC Carpanin Marimoutou, Omnibus, 1988, l'autre aux éditions du Grand Océan, préface de Nivo Galibert, postface de Jean-Pierre Dominichini, 1998.

⁷Nom d'un peuple de la Côte Est

⁸Voir à ce sujet, D. Bois « Tamatave, la cité des femmes » in *Clio* n°6-1997 Femmes d'Afrique ; en ligne : <http://clio.revues.org/index376.html>.

⁹Fara Rajaonah art.cité.

¹⁰Et qui mériteraient également une édition critique.

¹¹Cité dans « Charles Renel et le culte traditionnel »Delphine Burget, *Taloha* n° 14-15, 28 sept 2005 <http://www.taloha.info/document.php?id=57>

¹²Par exemple dans la note 8 du chapitre 1, p.19

¹³ Nom donné aux étrangers à Madagascar, et plus particulièrement à ceux d'origine européenne.

¹⁴Ils sont plusieurs centaines dès la fin des années 1870 et bien plus nombreux encore après la première guerre franco merina de 1883-1885.

¹⁵ *L'oncle d'Afrique*, p. 103 et seq.; Claude Bavoux cite les plus connues de ces femmes (note 34, p.111) mais il en existe beaucoup d'autres.

¹⁶ Domesticité assimilée presque constamment à l'esclavage cf soirée chez Sartier.

¹⁷Cf Tirefort art. cit.

¹⁸ Renel dans un discours prononcé en 1924 devant les instituteurs malgache, déclare : « il n'y a pas de races inférieures , mais des races inégalement développées, et nous, Français, prétendons seulement être vos aînés » *L'oncle d'Afrique*, note 6 p. 164

¹⁹ *L'oncle d'Afrique*, p. 108

²⁰ *L'oncle d'Afrique*, p. 108.

²¹Le type le plus abouti de cette sensualité s'incarne pour Renel chez les Betsimisaraka, associée chez eux à la paresse. Il est bizarre de constater que cette sensualité l'emporte à tout coup sur les siècles de civilisation accumulés par l'hérédité européenne (la civilisation vaincue par la barbarie ?)

²²« Ce rire exagérât l'épaisseur de ses lèvres sensuelles, lui donnait une vulgarité presque bestiale. Tout à l'heure Leporchois était frappé de son air européen ; la comparait à une Française un peu brunie par le soleil ; maintenant il avait la révélation de son autre hérédité, la vision des aïeules demi sauvages, qui riaient, elle (sic) aussi, de toutes leurs dents saines aux joies simples de l'animalité.» *L'oncle d'Afrique*, p. 55

²³*L'oncle d'Afrique*, p.159

²⁴*L'oncle d'Afrique* p.138-139.

²⁵Voir à ce sujet A. Ruscio, *Le credo de l'homme blanc*, Editions Complexe, 1996, 409p.

²⁶A propos de Marie Deroisy : « c'était vraiment un bel être de joie, fait pour l'amour ardent des tropiques, pour les nuits lumineuses d'Iarivo, emplies du parfum des daturas » (*L'oncle d'Afrique* p.53)

²⁷On remarquera que, de la même façon, le héros du *Décivilisé* est arraché in extremis à l'ensauvagement par la déclaration de guerre qui l'oblige à regagner la mère patrie.

²⁸C'est le cas de Mme Rougier, p.122

²⁹*L'oncle d'Afrique*, p.122

³⁰Discussion sur la « teinte » des métisses et des métis de Vatoumandry qui montrent bien que l'insertion dans la société coloniale relève du parcours initiatique, *L'oncle d'Afrique*, p122-123

³¹A sa manière son œuvre reflète ce problème par sa nature double : les carnets ethnologiques d'une part, les romans exotiques de l'autre.

Deepak K. Singh, *Stateless in South Asia ; The Chakmas between Bangladesh and India*, Sage Publication, India, 2010, Page; 289,

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The *Stateless in South Asia* by Deepak K. Singh complied with nine chapters is the only book I could say from India on stateless refugees as a central theme. It is forwarded by Ramchandra Guha, suggest that, most of the people who are writing on the issue related to northeast are mainly outsider and never born in the particular state. Indian scholars have tended to work on their linguistic or geographical regions. This book focus on the Myron Weiner, thesis on how Chakmas become rejected people in Chittagong Hill Tract (Bangladesh) and unwanted people in Arunachal Pradesh (India)². The study is mainly examines the interactions between the displaced Chakmas and the tribes of Arunachal Pradesh. Book historically explored the human predicament of one of the earliest episode of mass displacement in the history of modern South Asia which made a very holistic study of what turned out to be one of the most intractable refugee issues.

India has been the home for a large number and different types of refugees throughout the past². India has dealt with the issues of refugees on a bilateral basis. India's refugee regime generally confirms to the international instruments on the subject without, however, giving a formal shape to all practices adopted by in a form of separate statute. The current position in India is that they are dealt with under the existing Indian laws, both general as well as special, which is applicable to all the foreigners who came to India over a period of time. This is only because there is no separate law and policies to deal with refugees. India does not have on its statute book a specific and separate law to govern refugees.

The Chakma influx into India can be traced to the partition of the sub-continent from the beginning, inconsistency and political expediency governed India's CHT policy. Until the 1970's, its policy vis-à-vis Chakmas was lackadaisical and short-sighted. The first influx of the refugees took place shortly after partition when 40,000 Chakma families fled to India. Having housed and absorbed a large number of non-Muslims Chakmas from East-Pakistan. India rehabilitated them first in North Indian states and latter to the North Eastern states of India. The manageable number of the Chakmas, their widespread dispersal in the sparsely populated Northeast and their ethnic proximity largely mitigated any potential for opposition from the state government and civil society groups. Further more, absorption was feasible partly because ethnic consciousness in the Northeast was still in its infancy. In the region human rights violation is also in peak, and very common. For example Chakmas children have no right to get admission in schools, not allowed to get government jobs, public distribution system properly stopped, trading license being cancelled, markets are not allowed to sell their goods, medical facilities completely stopped, as well as electricity, drinking water roads etc are completely blocked³. India's refugee regime is yet to evolve a transparent framework linking rights, laws and policies. It results in great prevarication between policies and practices. Treatment of refugees widely differs in India from state to state and is subject to much pressure from civil society groups.

Though Singh by training is a Political Scientist but he also draws innovatively upon the work of anthropologists, sociologist and historian. His first take is to show the case of Chakmas as the first victims of environmental/developmental displacements. He mainly focuses on the political and religious persecutions which effecting the lives of displaced persons. This book shows that how the issue of citizenship is being played in the democratic country like India. Book suggests very strongly the Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh do not want to be the second class citizens like the Dalits, Adivasis and Muslims⁴. Equally important on the issue of hosting Arunachalees relating

to their growing fears of cultural annihilation in the wake of Chakmas are politically glorified in the region. Chakmas are largely settled in the three districts of Arunachal Pradesh particularly, Changlang, Papumpare and Lohit sub-divisions. In 2004 some 1,497 Chakmas were included in the voter list during BJP regime but latter withdrawn by the Congress regime due to All Arunachal Pradesh Student Union (AAPSU's) protest⁵. In 2002, the State Government of Arunachal Pradesh granted citizenship to the ninety Tibetan refugees' families of Shyo village living in Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh bordering China who came very late then Chakmas. The State government cites the East Bengal Regulation Act of 1873 for forcible deportation of the Chakmas and Hajongs. The 1873 Act requires taking of prior permission before entering into Arunachal Pradesh. However, the Chakmas who fled from CHT did not go to Arunachal Pradesh on their own. They were taken to NEFA (present Arunachal Pradesh) by the Central Government with a view to permanently settle there⁶.

Most of the refugee studies rarely go beyond the concerns of the displaced people who are doubtless of genuine care and understanding. However, the fact is that it is rarely acknowledge and assume centre stage in all dialogue and negotiation with the states from where the refugees arrive. Some of the very key issue of the study shows that the stateless peoples and refugees in South Asia in general and Arunachal Pradesh in particular are solely responsible for the status of refugees in the region. Today modern nation-state in South Asia rarely gives any attention to solve the problem to restore peace in the region and allow both the groups to live with dignity. Singh provides in all his chapters the detail account of the conflicts between the Chakmas and the Arunachalees. The authenticity of the book is mainly lies with the methodology particularly the primary data's, personal interviews, reports published and court cases.

One can disassociate from the book by saying that, the data work is not done properly or some where missing in the whole chapters of the book. It is lacking on the part of the issue related to citizenship and various citizenship amendments. It does not have any comparative study of other stateless refugees within India and Bangladesh. He also did not touched much upon the role of UNHRCR and NHRC on the issue related to the Chakmas and their rights in the region. Newcomers may get lost in the sophistication, subtleties and details of chapters that sometimes lose touch with Indian realities. But some time this type of study brings a very concrete and clear understanding about the excluded community in relation to the issue of citizenship.

What ever the case may be I have a firm belief that this book defiantly going to help researchers of different streams and subjects to explore and know the areas which always isolated and unknown to other parts of the states of northeast India. He wrote this book, keeping in mind to be useful resources for scholars and students of politics, international relations, sociology, anthropology, history, policy makers and lawyers to critically think on the issue related to statelessness, citizenship, migration, displacement and so on so forth. Also as an outsiders point of view Singh effectively accomplished the task of hopes to both the Chakmas and Arunachalees and open a very strong debate by questioning why there is no solution even after 50 years of refugee hood. However, the book remains very rich which illuminates the real aspects of Indian society, past and present particularly to the India's Arunachal Pradesh is concerned.

End Notes

¹ Weiner, Myron (1993), Rejected Peoples and Unwanted Migrants in South Asia, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 38 (34): 1737-1746.

²UNHCR (2000), *The State's of the World Refugees*, Oxford University Press.

³ Judgment of Supreme Court of India (1996), Original Civil Jurisdiction, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 720 of 1995, Between NHRC versus State of Arunachal Pradesh, 9th January, New Delhi.

⁴ Guru, Gopal (2005), *Citizenship in Exile : A Dalit Case in* (Ed.) book by Rajiv Bhargava and Helmut Reifeld, Civil Society, Public Sphere and Citizenship: Dialogues and Perspectives, Sage Publication, New Delhi, Pp. 260-276.

⁵ Prasad, Chunnu (2006), *Migration and the Question of Citizenship: People of Chittagong Hill Tract in Arunachal Pradesh*", *Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. LXVII, No. 3, July-September, Pp. 471-490.

⁶ Prasad, Chunnu (2007), *Student Movement In Arunachal Pradesh: A Case of Chakma-Hajong Refugee Problem* " *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XLII, No.15, April 14-20, Pp.1373-1379.



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