
Cost-Sharing in Higher Education in Tanzania: Fact or Fiction?

M. Johnson Ishengoma*

Abstract

In the early 1990s, Tanzania reintroduced a policy of higher educational cost-sharing, designed to slowly move some of the costs of higher education, which in recent years had been borne almost exclusively by the government, toward parents and students as well as toward other nongovernmental parties. This article reports research into the difference this policy seems to have made at Tanzania's major public university, the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM), with particular attention to the enrollment of privately sponsored (i.e., fee-paying) students and other changes discernable in university finances during the early years of this policy implementation. The report concludes that cost sharing in higher education in Tanzania is justified on the grounds of the sheer need for nongovernmental revenue for public higher education institutions because of the declining government appropriations to these institutions, along with the dire need to expand access to higher education; however, its implementation has been lackadaisical.

Resumé

Au début des années 90, la Tanzanie a réintroduit dans l'enseignement supérieur une politique de participation aux coûts. Cette politique vise à faire supporter des coûts relatifs à l'enseignement supérieur (exclusivement supportés par le gouvernement) aux parents, étudiants et autres organisations non gouvernementales. Cet article décrit les différences notées au niveau de la principale université publique

* M. Johnson Ishengoma is a doctoral candidate at the State University of New York at Buffalo, in the Department of Educational Leadership and Policy. He is affiliated with the International Comparative Higher Education Finance and Accessibility Project in the Center for Comparative and Global Studies in Education at SUNY Buffalo and also with the Program for Research on Higher Education (PROPHE) at SUNY Albany. He is a Research Fellow at St. Augustine University of Tanzania and a former Hubert H. Humphrey Fellow at Boston University. This article draws upon his Ph.D. dissertation, a study of the impact of cost sharing upon accessibility and institutional finances at the University of Dar es Salaam. Email: jishengoma@hotmail.com

de Tanzanie, l'Université de Dar-es-Salaam (UDSM), après l'introduction de cette politique, et s'intéresse particulièrement à l'inscription des étudiants qui s'autofinancent (c'est-à-dire ceux qui paient des droits d'inscription), ainsi qu'aux autres changements notables intervenus dans les finances de l'université, quelques années après l'introduction de cette mesure. Ce rapport conclut donc que la participation aux coûts est justifiée, car les institutions de l'enseignement supérieur ont énormément besoin de revenus non gouvernementaux, étant donné que le gouvernement se désengage de plus en plus des ces institutions ; en outre, les institutions concernées ont besoin d'élargir l'accès à l'enseignement supérieur. Cependant, cette mesure a été introduite sans grande rigueur.

Introduction

Cost-sharing in higher education has been defined as “a shift in the burden of higher education costs from being borne exclusively or predominantly by government, or taxpayers, to being shared with parents and students” (Johnstone, 2003a, p. 351). Johnstone (2003a, 2004a) identifies various forms of cost sharing adopted in both developed and developing countries including: (a) the introduction of tuition fees where public higher education was formerly free; (b) sharp increases in tuition fees where public higher education tuition fees has already existed; (c) the imposition of user charges to recover the expenses of formerly subsidized food and accommodations; (d) the diminution of student grants or scholarships; (e) an increase in the effective recovery of student loans; and (f) official encouragement to the tuition fee-dependent private higher education sector to absorb some of the higher educational demand.

A variation on the implementation of tuition fees—especially popular in countries that are ideologically and politically opposed to tuition fees but which nonetheless acknowledge an urgent need for some tuition fee revenue—are policies that preserve free tuition for students admitted at the top of the competitive admission examinations (sometimes referred to as “governmentally sponsored” students), but that allow universities to admit others scoring below the cut-off scores for a fee. These fee-paying students and the programs that admit them—most notably in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania (and also in many of the formerly Communist countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe)—may be called parallel degree, third party, privately sponsored, dual tuition-fee students and/or programs. This form of cost-sharing in higher education—maximizing enrollments of fee-paying students—has been particularly successful at two prominent East African public universities: Makerere University in Uganda and the University of Nairobi in Kenya¹ (Ssebuwufu, 2002; Kiamba, 2003).

Tuition fees in public higher education, as Johnstone (2002a, p. 60) argues, are especially important when: (a) there is an urgent need for additional revenue to upgrade quality and expand capacity; and (b) there is little or no chance for additional governmental, or taxpayer, revenue for the public higher education sector. Tuition fees are generally thought to be equitable when: (c) higher education is partaken of by very few, and disproportionately by the children of more affluent parents; (d) the costs of (public) higher education are overwhelmingly borne by all citizens through direct or indirect taxation; and (e) provision is made for means-tested grants and generally available loans or all truly qualified students. All of these conditions (except “e”) are present in virtually all African countries, making some form of tuition fees in public higher education critical for expanding capacity and promoting more equitable participation. Yet tuition fees as a policy are still extremely controversial and hence absent in most of the countries of the African continent, with the exception mainly of South Africa and of the aforementioned dual (or parallel or privately sponsored) tuition fees in East Africa and Ethiopia.

In this context of slowly emerging cost-sharing in Africa, research was conducted at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania from January to May 2003 to study the implementation of cost-sharing policies in higher education in Tanzania. The University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’s oldest and largest public university, with more than 10 years experience of implementing cost sharing and revenue diversification, served as a case study. Indicators were the government’s professed objectives for reintroducing cost sharing in higher education. The research addressed the following questions:

1. To what extent has the Tanzanian government actually implemented (through the 2002–2003 academic year) its stated cost-sharing objectives of: (a) expanding participation in higher education, (b) requiring that beneficiaries of higher education contribute to its costs, and (c) making student hostels and cafeterias operate more efficiently?
2. What has been the additional nongovernmental income generated by the University of Dar es Salaam from these early steps of cost sharing, and what has been the impact on the institution’s net revenue and capacity expansion?
3. What has been the seeming impact of any net increase in revenue and/or capacity on expanded access to this university?²

Cost Sharing in Higher Education

The conventional rationales for cost sharing and revenue diversification in higher education worldwide are three: (a) greater equity, both through a better

alignment of those who bear the costs and those who reap the benefits as well as through the expanded participation of those who had formerly been left out; (b) improved efficiency of both systems and institutions as well as improved producer responsiveness to both the student and the society; and (c) what may be the most important—and certainly less controversial—rationale: the sheer need for revenue sources other than the government for expanded quality, access, and participation (Johnstone 2002b, 2003a, 20004a, 2004b; World Bank, 1994).

The rationale for expanded participation, and thus improved equity, is based on two propositions: First, the added revenue from additional tuition fees, even after some additional grants or discounts, can expand capacity—both for classroom instruction and for living accommodations—and thereby increase participation. The principal measures of expanded capacity are the numbers and seating capacity of new instructional facilities and the bed space of new living accommodations. Second, the added revenue can be stretched to more students—and thus to even greater participation—by providing loans, which in turn can put more revenue into the hands of needy students (at least for the present value of the dollar) than grants or tuition fee discounts.

The second presumed rationale—the presumption of greater internal efficiency and producer responsiveness (institutional efficiency) with the advent of tuition fees—is thought to come about as the consumers or buyers (i.e., students and their parents) bear more of the higher education costs. This phenomenon infuses into higher education some virtues of the market (Johnstone, 2003a, p. 355). The major assumption is that payment of tuition fees or other related higher education costs will make students and their families more discerning consumers and will also make universities more cost-conscious providers. The notion of producer responsiveness is premised on the assumption that cost-sharing through tuition fees and other related costs would make universities more responsive to the individual, societal, and labor market demands.

Finally, proponents of the sheer need rationale claim that public institutions of higher education must increasingly supplement their governmental revenue through cost-sharing and other revenue diversification activities due to decreasing public resources allocated to these institutions, which are already overwhelmed by the demand pressures for higher education. This demand pressure is a function of demographic increases as well as the expansion in the traditional college-age cohort to include nontraditional students (such as mature-age entrants and private candidates in Tanzania), compounded by the increasing number of secondary school graduates who are academically qualified and who want to pursue higher education. The decline in available tax-based public resources to higher education, especially in developing countries

like Tanzania, may be due to the competition of the public higher education sector with other politically and socially compelling needs such as health care or clean water.

Reinstituting Cost-Sharing in Higher Education in Tanzania

Cost-sharing in higher education is not new to Tanzania. The policy existed during the colonial period and in post-independence Tanzania until 1967 when the government adopted African Socialism. However, during the colonial period and even after independence, students in higher education institutions paid tuition fees, and students from poor families received the assistance of government bursaries (URT, 1998, 75–76).

In 1967, the government decided to grant bursaries to all students admitted to the University College of Dar es Salaam, which was then the only public university. In 1974, the government abolished the bursary system and assumed all of the higher education costs of students admitted to public higher education institutions. (The university continued the practice of charging tuition fees, but charged it only to the government—thus making the tuition fee the accounting equivalent of a per-student governmental appropriation.)

Cost-sharing in higher education in Tanzania was officially reinstated in the late 1980s largely due to the government's inability to finance free public higher education in addition to all of the other pressing public needs. Some movement toward greater cost-sharing was part of the wide-ranging economic and social reforms under the IMF/World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment programs. The government first decided upon a course of cost-sharing in higher education in 1988 but, for reasons of political expedience, made its formal announcement of the policy in January 1992.³ The government's announcement described the introduction of cost-sharing in higher education as necessary to maintain the quality of academic programs, to encourage needy students to attend higher education, and to improve access to higher education, while at the same time containing government expenditures in higher education (URT, 1998, 76).

The new policy was to be implemented in three phases over a number of years:

1. Phase I began in the 1992–1993 academic year. In this phase, students and parents were required to pay the student's transportation, application, registration, entry examination, and student union fees, as well as "caution money" (deposits for covering breakage and other small debts owed to the university). In addition, small numbers of privately sponsored students—admissible but not scoring high enough to qualify for

governmental sponsorship—were admitted on the payment of tuition fees.

2. Phase II was implemented during the 1993-1994 academic year. In addition to Phase I costs, students were required to also pay for food and accommodation. The higher education allowance paid to students in public higher education institutions was also eliminated during this phase, and the government introduced student loans to cover accommodation and meal costs. These loans are accessible by all Tanzanian students admitted to public universities and accredited private universities and colleges.
3. Phase III, which has not yet begun as of the end of 2003 and has no announced official starting date, will require students to pay tuition and examination fees, books and stationery costs, special projects costs, field practice expenses, and medical insurance, in addition to the costs mentioned in Phases I and II. The government at present retains the responsibility of paying for these costs.

To this point, then, higher education cost-sharing in Tanzania consists of the introduction of a very limited tuition fee in public higher education institutions charged only to students not eligible for the official governmentally sponsored tuition-free places (i.e., the so-called dual track tuition program); the imposition of more substantial charges for food and accommodation; the abolition of students' stipends and allowances; official encouragement of the tuition-dependent private higher education sector (as of 2003, still very limited); and the introduction of various revenue diversification activities in public higher education institutions as well as the privatization, or commercialization, of some of the students' and university's municipal services.

Participation and Access at the University of Dar es Salaam

A principal objective of cost-sharing in Tanzania was to increase participation at and accessibility to all institutions of higher education, including the flagship university of Dar es Salaam. However, the past 11 years have shown only a very slight increase in undergraduate admission rates and a modest expansion in total undergraduate enrollments at the University of Dar es Salaam and the other three public universities. The tentative beginnings of cost sharing seem to have had little impact on enrollments, either positive (i.e., from the additional revenue) or negative (i.e., from the increased fees). In fact, however, these slight increases do not reflect even the increasing numbers of high school graduates over the years or the increasing numbers of applicants with minimum qualifications for admission. Furthermore, they do not generally reflect the

Table 1: High School Examination Results by Division, 1991-2001 (Public and Private Schools)^a

Year	Division ^b				Failed (%)	Total # of Candidates	No. Qualified for Admission (Div. I, II, & III)
	I (%)	II (%)	III (%)	IV (%)			
1991	825 (16.3)	1,285 (25.4)	2,038 (40.2)	669 (13.3)	241 (4.8)	5,058	4,148 (82.0)
1992	611 (10.9)	1,221 (21.8)	2,442 (43.6)	924 (16.5)	403 (7.2)	5,601	4,274 (76.3)
1993	547 (8.7)	1,371 (21.8)	3,082 (49.0)	937 (14.9)	352 (5.6)	6,289	5,000 (79.5)
1994	279 (4.7)	747 (12.6)	2,652 (44.7)	1,382 (23.3)	872 (14.7)	5,932	3,678 (62.0)
1995	314 (5.2)	807 (13.4)	2,824 (46.9)	1,146 (20.7)	830 (13.8)	6,021	3,945 (65.5)
1996	518 (9.0)	1,164 (20.2)	2,760 (47.9)	887 (15.4)	449 (7.8)	5,778	4,442 (77.0)
1997	609 (9.4)	1,335 (20.6)	2,935 (45.3)	972 (15.0)	628 (9.7)	6,479	4,879 (75.3)
1998	773 (10.7)	1,488 (20.6)	3,213 (44.5)	1,148 (15.9)	599 (8.3)	7,221	5,474 (76.0)
1999	702 (8.8)	1,733 (21.7)	3,689 (46.2)	1,246 (15.6)	615 (7.7)	7,985	6,124 (77.0)
2000	805 (8.4)	2,223 (23.2)	4,791 (50.0)	1,246 (13.0)	508 (5.3)	9,573*	7,819 (82.0)
2001	1,108 (10.4)	2,910 (27.3)	4,754 (44.6)	1,503 (14.1)	394 (3.7)	10,670*	8,773 (82.2)

Sources: Adapted from United Republic of Tanzania (1996, p. 21); United Republic of Tanzania (1997, p. 24); United Republic of Tanzania (2002c, p. 29).

^aExcludes those who sit for high school final exams as private candidates, outside the formal school system.

^bHigh school final exam results are classified into divisions depending on points obtained from principal and subsidiary subjects examined (A = 5, B = 4, etc.). Division I is the highest, obtained by scoring A's in major subjects. Those in Division I are virtually guaranteed admission to public universities under government sponsorship (free higher education). The figures for examination results by division were given as percentages in the sources cited above, but I recalculated them into numbers.

*Numbers summed across columns may not always equal the totals, due to rounding.

Tanzanian population growth from 23.1 million in 1988 to 34.6 million in 2002. And finally, the current admission rates also do not reflect the increase in total enrollments in high schools, which constitute the potential university entrants, public and private; students in high schools increased from 10,562 in 1991 to 24,807 in 2001 (a 5% increase).

Table 1 shows high school examination results in number and percentages by divisions, or categories of examination scores, from 1991–2001, while Table 2 shows trends in undergraduate admissions vis à vis applicants with minimum entry qualifications (Divisions I, II, and III) at the University of Dar es Salaam from 1989–1990 to 2003–2004. Table 3 shows trends in undergraduate enrollment at the University of Dar es Salaam and other public universities. Table 4 summarizes available data on the number of privately sponsored students from 1992–1993 to 2003–2004.

Table 1 reveals that the total number of high school graduates increased from 5,058 in 1991 to 10,670 in 2001, an increase of 111%. During the same period, the number of high school graduates who were qualified for admission into higher educational institutions increased from 4,148 to 8,773, an increase of 111.4%. The percentage of candidates with minimum and maximum qualifications for admission into higher education institutions—i.e., candidates who passed in Divisions I, II, and III—ranged between 62 and 82.2% of the total candidates graduating from high schools, while the number and percentage of high school graduates obtaining maximum qualifications (Division I) for admission to governmentally sponsored places in public universities declined from 825 (16.4%) in 1991 to 703 (8.8%) in 1999 before marginally increasing from 805 (8.4%) in 2000 to 1,108 (10.4%) in 2001. The declining trend in number and percentages of Division I graduates can be attributed to the increasingly tough examinations set by the National Examination Council of Tanzania (NECTA), ostensibly as a means of improving secondary education quality and standards but in practice (and probably in intent) limiting the costly allocation of expensive tuition-free places.

The more than double increases in the total number of high school graduates reported in Table 1, which reached 10,670 in 2001 over a period of 11 years (for both public and private schools) do not reflect or translate to expanded access to advanced secondary education, a *sine qua non* for access to higher education. In fact, the total number of high school graduates in 2001 was only 0.03% of the total population (33.5 million) of the Tanzania mainland in 2002 (URT, 2003, p. 2). This is not surprising. Tanzania's secondary schools are few (only 1,044 in 2002) and unevenly distributed. Furthermore, the country has abysmally low participation rates in secondary education, even when compared only to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa: only 6% of the

age cohort in 2000 compared to 19% in Uganda and 31% in Kenya (World Bank, 2003, pp. 80–82).

An important question is why, 43 years after independence in 1961, Tanzania still has such a low participation rate in secondary education compared to Kenya and Uganda. There seem to be two major reasons. First, compared to other education sub-sectors such as basic, teacher, tertiary, and higher education, the government has not allocated adequate financial resources to public secondary education. For example, the percentage share of total allocation to the secondary education sub-sector declined from 9.5% in 1994–1995 to 7.6% in 1999–2000. In contrast, the tertiary and higher education sub-sector saw an *increase* from 20.1% to 23.4% (URT, 2002e, p. 70). Interestingly, the inadequate allocation of resources to public secondary education sub-sector has already necessitated the introduction of some forms of cost sharing at this level. The second reason may be that, until the late 1980s when Tanzania abandoned central planning and socialism altogether, secondary school expansion was linked only to the nation's manpower requirements. For this reason, secondary school expansion was deliberately controlled and regulated by the government. The government also controlled access to the first level of public secondary education through a quota system.

Table 2 shows trends in the University of Dar es Salaam undergraduate admissions vis-à-vis applicants with minimum and maximum entry qualifications from 1989–1990 to 2003–2004. These data depict the very low admission rates at the University of Dar es Salaam for the past 15 years. In fact, for some years (e.g., 1989–1990 through 1996–1997), admissions were almost stagnant, hovering slightly above 1,000 students per academic year. The decline of the admission rate from 40.2% in 1989–1990 to 35% in 1990–1991 can be attributed partly to the fact the University of Dar es Salaam was closed for continuing students for the whole 1990–1991 academic year because of a student strike in April 1990. But I cannot explain why admission rates dropped from 41% in 1991–1992 to only 32.6% in 1996–1997. In 2002–2003, 2,555 students were admitted, all of them under government sponsorship following a government directive to the UDSM that the number of candidates to be selected for its sponsorship should not exceed 2,555. Data on the number of candidates admitted under private sponsorship programs for this academic year were not available to me; but if the university had not admitted privately sponsored students in the 2003–2004 academic year, admissions would have declined by 27.6%—from 3,531 undergraduates in 2002–2003 to 2,555.⁴

Table 2: University of Dar es Salaam Undergraduate Applicants with Minimum Entry Qualifications and Those Admitted, 1989–1990 through 2003–2004

Year	Applied	Admitted	% Admitted
1989–1990	2,578	1,037	40.2
1990–1991	2,850	994	35.0
1991–1992	2,644	1,081	41.0
1992–1993	3,407	1,136	33.4
1993–1994	3,711	1,243	33.5
1994–1995	3,058	1,147	37.5
1995–1996	3,800	1,280	33.7
1996–1997	4,100	1,339	32.6
1997–1998	4,233	1,607	38.0
1998–1999	4,992	1,805	36.1
1999–2000	5,132	2,457	48.0
2000–2001	n.a	3,000	n.a
2001–2002	n.a	2,950	n.a
2002–2003	n.a	3,531	n.a
2003–2004	8,000	2,555*	32.0

Sources: Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals in Tanzania (1997, p. 54); University of Dar es Salaam (2003a); University of Dar es Salaam (2002b, p. 13); University of Dar es Salaam (2001b, p. 25); Higher Education Accreditation Council (2001, p. 11).

n.a. = data not available

* = applicants to be admitted on government sponsorship only as per the directive from the chief academic officer (University of Dar es Salaam, 2002c).

Furthermore, the fluctuating admission rates shown in Table 2 do not at all reflect the increase in the total number of high school graduates, which more than doubled from 5,058 in 1991 to 10,670 in 2001. Nor does it show the total number of high school graduates with minimum entry qualifications, which also more than doubled from 4,148 to 8,773 during the same period. The admission rates revealed in Table 2 likewise fail to capture the increasing demand for university education in Tanzania, one sign of which which may be manifested in the increasing number of applicants for admission at the

University of Dar es Salaam, which rose from 2,578 in 1989–1990 to 8,000 in 2003–2004, an increase of 210%.

These above observations bring us to some important questions concerning access to higher education in Tanzania and, in particular, to the flagship University of Dar es Salaam: Where do applicants go who do not get admitted, or who get admitted but do not secure government sponsorship and are unable to pay private sponsorship tuition fees? What could be the possible explanation for low admission rates at the UDSM, given the high and unsatisfied social demand for university education manifested by the increasing number of university places?

There are four possible answers to the first question. First, it is likely that many applicants who are not admitted, or who are admitted but without government funding, apply for admission in less prestigious and cheaper public nonuniversity institutions the following academic year. Second, some may re-apply to join the university in the following academic year after resitting for their high school final examinations to improve their scores above the cut-off points for admission into government-sponsored programs. Third, some may apply at private universities. And fourth, some may simply abandon their plans to pursue higher education.

However, admission rates for public nonuniversity institutions and private universities combined are also very low. For example, in 2001–2002, the 15 public nonuniversity institutions admitted 2,475 students in their undergraduate programs, while the 11 private universities and colleges admitted 787 students. Thus, the number of students who are not admitted either at the UDSM or the other public universities in each academic year is too large to be accommodated by the public nonuniversity institutions and the private universities.

Some possible reasons for the low admission numbers at the UDSM revealed in Table 2 are suggested below. First, the admission criteria, or standards, by which so many of the secondary school test takers are weeded out may simply be too high, given the current realities of poorly paid and poorly motivated teachers in addition to inadequate teaching-learning facilities in many secondary schools in Tanzania, especially public secondary schools.

But a second explanation is that the admissions standards are being pushed higher deliberately to keep the numbers of new enrollments low. In reality, the “cut-off point” on the entrance examination is not driven upward by any true academic standard, but only by the need to limit the number of new students to fit the number of available places—which in turn is constrained by too few hostel and teaching-learning spaces and by too few faculty, compared to the increasing number of potentially qualified applicants. For example, after its establishment as a national university in 1970, the University of Dar es Salaam

did not construct or procure any new student hostels or lecture theaters until 1998. Only that year, the government provided funds for two additional hostels and two additional lecture theaters, and the university procured another student hostel through a private investor. Even with these additional facilities, however, anecdotal reports from students describe residential facilities, classrooms, laboratories, and libraries that are still inadequate and congested. More telling is the fact that the teaching staff at the University of Dar es Salaam's main campus actually declined from 594 in 1997–1998 to 539 in 2001–2002, and at Muhimbili College of Health Sciences (MUCHS) from 198 in 1997–1998 to 180 in 2000–2001 (URT, 2002c, pp. 103–104).

Underlying the rising cut-off point on the entrance examination and the consequent low numbers admitted to the coveted governmentally sponsored (tuition-free) places is the declining ability of the government to sponsor all the qualified students who would formerly have been admitted to these places. At the same time, few households are able to pay the fees for the newly added privately sponsored (fee-paying) places. The mean per-capita household monthly income on the Tanzanian mainland in 2000–2001 was TZS 17,928 (US\$39), or TZS 215,136 (US\$473) per year (National Bureau of Statistics, 2002).⁵ The tuition fee for privately sponsored students at the University of Dar es Salaam had been TZS 1,000,000 (US\$2,198)—clearly far beyond the reach of the average Tanzanian family. In 2003 the university lowered its privately sponsored tuition fees in acknowledgment of this fact (UDSM, 1997, p. 47, UDSM, 2001a, p. 121; UDSM, 2002d, p. 123).

New Admission Policy, Government Sponsorship Criteria, and the Paradox of Expanding Access to Higher Education

The government since the 2002–2003 academic year has imposed a cap (quota) on the number of students to be admitted on its sponsorship at the University of Dar es Salaam in each degree program and faculty. For example, in 2002–2003, a total of 3,531 students were admitted, but the government decided to sponsor only 2,358 students for the main campus, 300 at the Muhimbili University College of Health Sciences, and 270 students at the University College of Lands and Architectural Sciences for a total of only 2,928 students, leaving 603 students without sponsorship. Opposition parties called the government irresponsible, and students threatened to call a massive strike. After an intensive discussions with university administration and pressure from the students' union, the government agreed to sponsor the 603 students on condition that the university lower its per-student charges for governmentally sponsored students (this fee functioned like tuition but was charged only to the government) from a range of TZS 900,000–1,500,000 (US\$1,978–\$3,296) depending on

the academic program to a flat fee of TZS 750,000 (US\$1,648) per student per year (UDSM, 2002a, p. 13; 2002d p. 1). Thus, the university's finances were constrained not only by what was still a limited number of admissions, but also by a reduced per-capita payment for each government-sponsored student.

For the most recent academic year (2003–2004), the government issued a directive that the university could not select more than 2,555 for government sponsorship and that they must be distributed as follows: bachelor of arts (general) 400; bachelor of arts with education 200; bachelor of education 260; bachelor of commerce 290; bachelor of engineering 315; bachelor of science 420; doctor of medicine and related courses 250; and University College of Lands and Architectural Studies 250 (UDSM, 2003a).

In response to this new government policy, the University of Dar es Salaam established criteria for government sponsorship and raised the minimum cut-off points for admission into individual degree programs for students sponsored by the government, effective July 2002. Under this policy, priority for government sponsorship was to be given to:

- sustaining and allowing for the gradual growth of those degree programs that are new and have few students;
- supporting education and training programs of high national priority and professional programs where there is currently a clear national shortfall; and
- encouraging more female candidates (UDSM, 2002c, p. 1).

Consequently, the minimum entry cut-off points, which were 4 to 4.5 for females and 5 for males for direct entrants, have been raised to between 6.5 and 10.5 points depending on the degree program. In the Faculty of Commerce and Management, for example, the cut-off point in 2003–2004 is 8.5 for males and 6.5 for females; in the Faculty of Law, it is 10.5 for males and 9.5 for females; and in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, it is 9 for males and 7.5 for females (UDSM, 2002c, p. 2). The higher minimums for government-sponsored admission cut-offs led to lower admission rates and increasingly restricted access to free higher education.

Table 3 shows trends in total undergraduate student enrollment at the University of Dar es Salaam and other public universities on the Tanzania mainland from 1989–1990 to 2001–2002. Undergraduate student enrollment at the University of Dar es Salaam increased from 2,839 (1989–1990) to 7,801 (2001–2002), an increase of 174.7%. While statistically this increase seems huge, the fact that it occurred over a 13-year period greatly reduces its significance. In fact, the UDSM's total student enrollment of 7,801, reached in 2001–2002

was only 0.02% of the total population of the Tanzania mainland, and UDSM total enrollment plus the total enrollment in other public universities (7,246 students) in 2001–2002 constituted only 0.04% of the population.

Table 3: Undergraduate Student Enrollments at the University of Dar es Salaam and Other Public Universities¹ in Tanzania, 1989–1990 through 2001–2002

Year	UDSM	Other
1989–1990	2,839	n.a
1990–1991 ²	331	n.a
1991–1992	2,801	n.a
1992–1993	2,992	n.a
1993–1994	2,968	n.a
1994–1995	3,869	n.a
1995–1996	4,308	3,996
1996–1997	4,519	4,851
1997–1998	4,920	5,853
1998–1999	5,221	6,848
1999–2000	6,073	6,592
2000–2001	6,674	7,313
2001–2002	7,801	7,246

Sources: United Republic of Tanzania (1998, p. 24); United Republic of Tanzania (2002a, pp. 1–6); United Republic of Tanzania (2000c, pp. 3–7).

¹Other public universities include: Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) and the Open University of Tanzania (OUT). Until 2001–2002 Tanzania had only three public universities.

²The University of Dar es Salaam was closed for this academic year because of student strikes.

The very modest growth in student enrollments at the UDSM, especially from 1998–1999 to 2001–2002, can be attributed mainly to the university's increase in capacity. It purchased two student hostels with government funding (taxes) and constructed a new student hostel funded by an external private investor. The new student hostel was constructed by the National Social Security Fund

(NSSF),⁶ at a cost of TZS 16,473,396,379 (US\$36,200,490) to be recovered at an interest rate of 7.5% annually over a 10-year period beginning in 2002. The new hostel can accommodate 4,309 students, while the two other hostels can accommodate 2,532 (UDSM, 2002b, p. 1; UDSM 1999, p. 16). The three newly acquired student hostels thus have a total capacity of some 6,841 students, although UDSM current enrollments do not reflect any such expanded capacity—and anecdotal evidence shows that student accommodation facilities are still inadequate.

Privately Sponsored Students

The practice of admitting privately sponsored students—at first, mostly foreigners and those with institutional support, rather than students who were either paying their own fees or whose families did—at the University of Dar es Salaam dates back to the early 1980s⁷ when the university started admitting a handful of institutionally sponsored students on a private basis. By 1992–1993 when the cost-sharing policy became officially operational, the university enrolled (106) third party/privately sponsored students (mostly foreigners and those who were institutionally supported) while the Institute of Finance Management (a nonuniversity public higher education institution) had a total enrollment of 560 students under third party/private sponsorship (most of them institutionally supported) (Committee, 1997, p. 65).

The formal and official proposal for admitting privately sponsored Tanzanian students at the undergraduate level at the University of Dar es Salaam was first submitted to the University Council's 121st Meeting on March 7, 1996, and approved on the same date. The council agreed to admit privately sponsored Tanzanian candidates to provide access to university-level education to as many people as possible—a goal in line both with the national higher education policy and with the University of Dar es Salaam's corporate strategic plan to increase the overall student enrollment to 8,000 by the year 2000 (UDSM, 1996, p. 24).

Table 4: Number of Privately Sponsored Students in Undergraduate Studies at UDSM, 1992–1993 through 2001–2002

Year	Number Enrolled	% of Total Enrollment
1992–1993	106	3.5
1993–1994	111	3.9
1994–1995	117	3.0
1995–1996	100	2.3
1996–1997	103	2.3
1997–1998	47	0.9
1998–1999	162	3.1
1999–2000	n.a	n.a
2000–2001	n.a	n.a
2001–2002	289 ^a	3.7

Sources: University of Dar es Salaam (2000b); Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals in Tanzania (1998, p. 65); United Republic of Tanzania (2002c, p. 151).

^aThese figures are for the main campus only. Enrollment figures for the two constituent colleges were not available. These figures also include those who are sponsored by Carnegie Corporation of New York, nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, Human Resources Development Trust Fund administered by the Prospective College of Engineering and Technology, etc.

Following the government's policy of imposing a quota on the number of students it was willing to sponsor each academic year, the university began in 2002–2003 formally to admit two categories of students: those who would be sponsored by the government, and those who would have to find private sponsorship from parents, extended families, self, or other sources. Thus, the university would be able to add students above the limited governmentally sponsored quotas. The 151st University Council meeting on September 6, 2002, officially recommended that the university, after ascertaining the number of governmentally sponsored students, fill any remaining vacancies if possible by privately sponsored, tuition fee-paying students and further recommended that the fee structure be reviewed to attract more privately sponsored students (UDSM, 2002b, p. 33). The university identified the potential clientele for privately sponsored, or dual track, programs as: (a) affluent individual Tanzanian

parents, (b) local government councils, (c) cooperative unions, (d) nongovernmental organizations, (e) private companies, (f) religious organizations, (g) various registered local development organizations, and (h) Tanzania's parastatal organizations (UDSM, 1996, p. 24). In 2002–2003, the university also implemented a different privately sponsored program for the sons, daughters, and spouses of its staff and members of the University Council: exemption from 50% of their tuition fee (UDSM, 1998, pp. 22–23).

The marginal increase in admissions at the UDSM shown in Table 4 cannot be attributed to cost-sharing because of the small number of privately sponsored students. Moreover, most potential students seem to be interested only in admission with government sponsorship. For example, out of 2,757 students in my study sample, only 91 students, or just over 3%, were admitted on a fee-paying basis. Also, there is no evidence that the university deliberately and strategically attempted to implement what Johnstone (2001a) calls “tilting” admissions and enrollments toward students who can pay, or “maximizing the enrollment of fee-paying students,” as Makerere and Nairobi universities have done.

Despite the existence of privately sponsored program for the past 12 years, despite the enormous need for supplemental revenue, and despite the large and increasing numbers of high school graduates who pass the minimal entrance qualifications but who do not qualify for governmental sponsorship, the enrollments in this program have remained very low. In 2001–2002, privately sponsored students at the main campus of the University of Dar es Salaam numbered only 289, or 3.7%. In fact, in all years of admitting privately sponsored students through 2002–2003, the University of Dar es Salaam has enrolled only approximately 1,200 privately sponsored, fee-paying students (Kisembo, 2003). The actual numbers of additional Tanzanian young persons able to attend Dar es Salaam and other institutions of higher education through the privately sponsored programs may be even lower, as reportedly foreigners and institutions rather than parents, households, or individuals purchase most of the privately sponsored slots available.

Enrollments in privately sponsored programs in other public universities and nonuniversity institutions, according to data compiled for the first time in 2001–2002 academic year, are also low. Enrollment at the Muhimbili University College of Health Sciences (MUCHS), one of the university's constituent colleges, is slightly higher at 25, or 8% of first year enrollment, while the newest public university, Mzumbe, elevated from the status of an institute only in 2002, is considerably larger, with 363 students, or 34% of its entering class, entering on a fee-paying, or privately sponsored, basis (URT 2002c, p. 151). Overall, privately sponsored enrollments are greater in the public

nonuniversities—averaging a little more than 12%—but the total number is still small: some 383 out of a total public nonuniversity enrollment of some 3,136 in 2001-2002.

The major reason there is more private sponsorship (cost-sharing) in public nonuniversity higher education institutions than in the University of Dar es Salaam (including its two constituent colleges) and the other Tanzanian universities is probably that the public nonuniversity institutions charge lower tuition fees for both the privately and the governmentally sponsored students. For example, tuition fees in the nonuniversity institutions in 2002-2003 ranged between TZS 217,000 and TZS 1,044,200 (US\$477 and \$ 2,295) per year. In contrast, tuition fees for privately sponsored students at Dar es Salaam and the other public universities (except for the Open University of Tanzania) charged between TZS 600,000 and 1,500,000 (US\$1,319 and \$3,296) per year, the high tuition fee being that charged by Muhimbili University College of Health Sciences (MUCHS) (Higher Education, 2000, pp. 16-28).

Compared to the Makerere and Nairobi success stories of privately sponsored, or parallel, programs elsewhere in East Africa, the numbers of fee-paying enrollments at the University of Dar es Salaam are miniscule. Because some of the privately sponsored vacancies at the University of Dar es Salaam and perhaps in other public universities are reportedly purchased by foreigners or foreign institutions (e.g., the U.S. Carnegie Corporation or Rockefeller Foundation) rather than Tanzanian individuals or households, the number is even lower. In short, the entire policy of cost-sharing through privately sponsored, or dual-track, tuition fees in Tanzanian public universities becomes murky, if not elusive.

This low number of privately sponsored students may be explained in part by the fact that students admitted on a privately sponsored, fee-paying basis must have passed the mandatory matriculation examinations with at least the minimum scores to qualify for admission. (Different degree programs have different cut-off points.) But the low numbers seem to extend beyond limited supply to include limited demand—meaning that most Tanzanians are apparently unwilling to pay for their educations and hence do not enroll under this option. But are they unable to pay? Although circumstances would differ family by family, some Tanzanian parents pay for their children to attend expensive private and international secondary schools and/or the private academies that are mushrooming in urban Tanzania and also pay their children's tuition fees at universities in neighboring countries like Kenya and Uganda, and even in Europe and the United States. However, the majority of Tanzanian parents are evidently not prepared to purchase higher education offered by public universities.⁸

To strengthen Tanzania's emerging policy of cost-sharing in higher education, it seems important to understand why Tanzanians, compared to Kenyans and Ugandans, are purchasing so many fewer privately sponsored places at public universities. Part of the explanation may lie in the different political and economic paths that the three countries took after their independence. Kenya and Uganda maintained free-market economies, which encouraged private entrepreneurship and the establishment of private schools and higher education institutions. In addition, Kenya still maintains a pre-colonial cultural tradition of "*harambee*," meaning: "let us pull together," in which the community contributes funds and labor for school construction and even mobilizes funds for the child of a community member who is admitted to an institution of higher education but whose parents are unable to pay. The concept of cost-sharing in higher education, then, has existed in Kenya and Uganda since colonial times.

Tanzania, on the other hand, maintained a free market economy and free enterprise system for only the first six years after independence (1961–1967). In 1967, Tanzania adopted African Socialism: abolishing free enterprises, nationalizing all privately owned educational institutions and all major means of production, and ending fee payment in schools and publicly owned higher education institutions. The 136 (in 1999) Catholic seminaries and the Nyegezi Social Training Institute, a Catholic tertiary educational institution, which have existed since 1960, were allowed to continue. From 1967 until the late 1980s, when cost-sharing in higher education policy was officially adopted, Tanzanians enjoyed free public higher education in tandem with such free social services as medical care.

While it is true that the majority of Tanzanian households are too poor to pay the fees charged by universities, an even greater hindrance is the cultural values and other socialist remnants of free services that make Tanzanians reluctant to pay tuition fees at public universities. Students also share this expectation. As a result, Prof. Immanuel Baru, former UDSM professor in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences and chairman of the University of Dar es Salaam Council, recently urged all Tanzanians in strong terms, to "cultivate the habit of paying for fees for their children's higher education." He further observed, "If this call goes unheeded, we should not be surprised to see the large number of privately sponsored students coming from outside Tanzania to pursue their higher education in this University" (Kisembo, 2003). The reluctance of Tanzanians to pay for their children's higher education prompted the Executive Secretary of the Inter University Council for East Africa, Chacha Nyaigotti-Chacha (2002), speaking at the conference on university financing in Dar es Salaam in March 2002, to admonish Tanzanians to extend the

“*harambee*” (extravagant) style of weddings in Tanzania to more generous support of education for their children.

In fact, Dar es Salaam University’s Council actually lowered the tuition fees for privately sponsored students in November 2003 ostensibly “to enable more people with an average income to pursue higher education,” thus implying that university fees impeded access to the privately sponsored programs in particular, and to higher education in general (Kisembo, 2003). Yet the university had been charging what was, by most measures, a modest tuition fee of between TZS 600,000 and TZS 1,000,000 (US\$1,319 and \$2,198) per year for privately sponsored students for all academic programs except for doctor of medicine degree (TZS 1,500,000, US\$3,295), in addition to a medical capitation fee of TZS 100,000 (US\$220), a registration fee of TZS 5,000 (US\$11), and examination fee of TZS 12,000 (US\$ 26). While the UDSM charged TZS 1,500,000 (US\$ 3,296) as tuition fees for the doctor of medicine degree, private universities in Tanzania were charging TZS 4,520,000 (US\$9,933) for the same academic program (Higher Education, 2000, pp. 32-33). The International Medical and Technological University, owned by Vighan Foundation of India, required that even Tanzanian students in Tanzania pay in U.S. dollars.

Cost-Sharing and Expanding Access through a Tuition-Fee-Dependent Private Higher Education Sector

The contribution of the private higher education sector to the expansion of enrollments and general access is almost negligible in Tanzania, mainly due to their limited capacity to admit many students and also to their limited infrastructure and lack of academically qualified faculty. The government granted official permission for private universities and colleges to operate only in 1997, and as of 2003, there were 11. Most of them offered first degree and advanced diploma courses in business administration, health sciences, law, journalism and mass communication, education, and religious studies. All except one (Hubert Kairuki Memorial University) are affiliated with religious organizations in Tanzania and abroad. Total enrollment in private universities and colleges increased from 545 in 1997–1998 to 1,793 in 2001–2002 (URT, 2002c, pp. 29–31). But it is not likely that this sector will expand very fast because their financial stability depends on foreign donations and on the fees they collect from students; however, the government must approve their tuition-fee rates, and a private institution cannot raise its tuition fees without applying to and securing the approval of the government. Furthermore, about one-third of the students admitted fail to attend because of lack of sponsorship (Committee, 1997, p. 65). However, students admitted in accredited private universities and colleges are eligible for loans to cover food and lodging from a govern-

ment student loan scheme. These loans constitute a possibly significant, although indirect, governmental subsidy—especially given the government’s apparent inability or disinclination (as of 2003) to collect them.

Cost-Sharing Through “Other Fees”

Cost-sharing may also be pursued through small, “other-than-tuition” fees that cover, or at least contribute to, incidental institutional costs other than basic instruction. However, such student and parental contributions to higher education are currently limited to an array of small “fees” whose impact on institutional net revenue, as shown in Table 5, is negligible. The government still covers all or most of the major costs of instruction, food, lodging, books and stationery, medical insurance, and field practice. In fact, comparable fees in primary and secondary education, as shown in Table 6, are higher (URT, 2002a, p. 49). The average “fee” contribution that parents made toward their children’s education in government secondary schools in 2000 was TZS 156,356 (US\$344), while students and/or parents in public universities averaged contributions of only TZS 93,200 (US\$205). Parents’ contribution in private secondary schools, educational academies, and international schools are even higher.

Table 5: Current Annual Contribution to Higher Education by Students and Parents in Public Universities in Tanzania

Item	Tanzania Shillings	U.S. Dollars
Caution money	2,000	4.40
Student union fee	1,200	2.64
Transportation	47,000*	\$103.00
Application fee	5,000	11.00
Registration fee	5,000	11.00
Matriculation examination fee	15,000	33.00
Examination fee	12,000	26.00
Graduation fee	5,000	11.00
Student ID card	1,000	2.20

Source: Field research conducted between January and May 2003; prospecti of universities.

*Mean expenditure per semester; calculated from students’ responses to a question on how much private money they spend on university education.

Table 6: Estimated Educational Costs Borne by Parents in Government Secondary Schools

Type of Expense	Mean Expenditure
School fees	TZS 60,694 (US\$146)
School uniforms	TZS 16,161 (US\$39)
Pocket money	TZS 12,481 (US\$30)
Transportation	TZS 27,766 (US\$67)
Private tuition	TZS 21,262 (US\$51)
Other expenses	TZS 17,992 (US\$43)
Average total cost	TZS 156,356 (US\$375)

Source: Adapted from Omari (2000, p. 88).

These discrepancies in parental contributions to higher and secondary education support the World Bank's long-time argument that cost-sharing in education in Tanzania (as in most African countries) is currently inequitable and that government funding should give highest priority to primary and secondary education, and not to higher education, which can expand its capacity with revenue generated from more realistic cost-sharing. The practical lesson here is that some Tanzanian households—at least those whose children have graduated from private secondary schools—are almost certainly capable of continuing to pay at least a comparable level of fees at the university, which is, after all, considerably more prestigious and sought-after than the high school diploma and which returns benefits to both the student and the household.

Recovering the Costs of Food and Accommodation

Another important element of the Tanzanian long-range plan for phasing in cost-sharing is the shift from wholly subsidized food and lodging to requiring that students and parents take over all or some of those expenses. Along with shifting some of the costs to students and/or parents may come an effort to require more efficient operation from the hostels, cafeterias, and other auxiliary enterprises, regardless of how the costs are shared.

The very limited data available reveal certain problems among the University of Dar es Salaam's student hostels and cafeterias. For example, some students illegally sublet their rooms/beds to other students to reduce their expenses, even though they pay only TZS 300 per day per bed (US\$66¢) for their on-campus room. As a result, rooms meant to accommodate two students are now ac-

Table 7: University of Dar es Salaam Cafeteria Income and Expenditures, 1995-2000, in TZS

Income / Expenditures	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Sale of meals	134,094,683 US\$448,657	111,029,188 US\$368,280	178,214,441 US\$559,877	86,048,988 US\$248,962	107,944,116 US\$278,7241	27,713,603 US\$306,665
Cost of foodstuffs	196,365,367 US\$657,004	171,555,136 US\$569,043	145,400,169 US\$456,788	91,500,861 US\$264,736	131,560,183 US\$339,703	107,183,735 US\$257,369
Profit or loss	-62,270,684 -US\$208,347	-60,525,948 -US\$200,763	32,814,272 US\$103,089	-5,451,873 -US\$15,774	-23,616,067 - US\$60,979	20,529,868 US\$49,296
Gross margin %	-46.44	-54.51	18.41	-6.34	-21.88	16.07

Source: Adapted from United Republic of Tanzania (2002b, p. 19).

commodating up to five or six, some sleeping on the floors. Also, rooms without facilities for cooking and washing utensils are now heavily used to prepare meals. Electric cookers place heavy demands on the rooms' standard electrical circuits, consume a great deal of electricity, and at times cause short circuits. Because of these problems, the upkeep of hostels has dramatically deteriorated (URT, 2002b, pp. 21-22). The subletting problem is so great that the University Students Accommodation Bureau (USAB), in its ninth meeting held on November 1, 2002, recommended fines and evictions (UDSM, 2002a, p. 1).

A related problem is extensive nonpayments. By September 1995, 380 undergraduate students had defaulted on their room rents. All but 100 paid when the university withheld certificates and academic transcripts. Consequently, beginning in 1995-1996, continuing students could register for classes only if their room rent was not in arrears (UDSM, 1995, p. 10). About 27% of student tenants defaulted on room rents between 1997 and 1999. (UDSM 2000, p. 17).

The University Students Accommodation Bureau (USAB), a semi-autonomous service agency, was established in 1999 because the previous system for collecting room rents had failed; however, this bureau likewise has not worked as efficiently as anticipated. The bureau, which is fully owned by the university and operates under the auspices of the Income Generation Unit (IGU), had to be subsidized by the government at TZS 450,000,000 (US\$988,881) to meet its operational costs in 2002-2003 (UDSM, 2002b, p. 7-8). The USAB is supposed to operate independently and pay for all its operational costs as well as generate income.

One of the major reasons for USAB's failure to operate independently and to generate profit is that it is required to charge very low accommodation fees (TZS 300 per bed per day or U.S. 66¢)—far below market and far below even the expenses of operation—so that it will not exceed the government's accommodation allowances provided to students as part of their student loans (which are not likely to be repaid anyway).

In 2000, USAB had proposed to the University Council that it be permitted to raise accommodation fees from TZS 300 per bed per day to TZS 600 (US 66¢ to US\$1.32) in order to operate profitably. The University Council approved the proposal, but it was not to be implemented until the government raised the amount of loans given to students. In 2001, the government increased the amount of loans granted to students, but the accommodation fees levied for University of Dar es Salaam's student residential facilities remained at TZS 300 (US 66¢) (UDSM, 2002b). Apparently, the USAB will not raise the accommodation fees for fear of possible student strikes; hence, this element of cost-sharing has been badly compromised.

Table 8: Income Generated through Various Activities and Sources at the University of Dar es Salaam, 1995–2000, in TZS

Year	Source of Income				Government	Total	Private % Non-Govt. Tuition
	Private Tuition	Room Rental	Cafeteria	Government			
1995	41,898,950	n.a	134,094,683	4,409,036,715	4,585,030,348	0.9	3.3
	US\$92,073	US\$294,674	US\$9,688,912	US\$10,075,661			
1996	78,285,199	896,950	111,029,188	6,392,281,713	6,582,493,050	1.2	2.9
	US\$172,032	US\$1,971	US\$243,988	US\$14,047,118	US\$14,465,110		
1997	327,407,317	43,354,227	178,214,441	7,410,746,076	7,959,722,061		
	US\$719,481	US\$95,271	US\$391,628	US\$16,285,206	US\$17,491,588	4.1	6.9
1998	393,755,289	46,764,899	86,048,998	6,628,862,803	7,155,431,989	5.5	7.4
	US\$865,282	US\$102,766	US\$189,093	US\$14,567,008	US\$15,724,150		
1999	273,691,653	74,158,633	107,944,116	9,437,749,989	9,545,694,105	2.8	4.8
	US\$601,440	US\$162,964	US\$237,208	US\$20,739,572	US\$20,976,781		
2000	611,977,434	111,870,645	127,713,603	10,908,361,001	11,163,220,908	5.4	7.6
	US\$1,344,828	US\$245,837	US\$280,652	US\$23,971	US\$24,531,316		
Total	1,727,015,842	277,045,354	745,045,029	45,187,038,300	46,991,592,460	3.6	5.8
	US\$3,795,138	US\$608,810	US\$1,637,245	US\$99,299,077	US\$103,264,607		

Source: Adapted from United Republic of Tanzania (2002b, p. 19).

n.a = data not available

The limited available evidence also suggests that the student cafeterias, which are operated by private vendors, have not been generating profits or even breaking even. As Table 7 demonstrates, the cafeterias have lost money in all years surveyed except two, and in those the profits were marginal.

There are two main major reasons why these cafeterias have not been profitable. First, the cafeterias cannot charge the equivalent of a market price on meals sold to students. Rather, prices must correspond to the government's meals allowance: TZS 1,300 (US\$2.86) per day for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. It is feared that charging market prices on student meals would lead to a student strike. Second, most students cook their own meals in their rooms or buy cheaper meals from informal sources (*mama lishe*) located on and around campuses. Thus, neither the cafeteria nor the hostel operations have been able to lessen the university's dependence on governmental revenue.

Evaluating Cost-Sharing and Revenue Supplementation

The purpose of cost-sharing and revenue supplementation is to acknowledge the unlikelihood of significant additional governmental, or taxpayer, revenue and to seek at least some of the additional revenue needed to expand capacity and upgrade quality. These nongovernment sources include parents, students, investors, philanthropists, and other nongovernmental sources. While data on nongovernmental revenue generated by the university has been difficult to obtain because much of it is confidential, the available data, much of it presented in this article, suggest that such revenue is too small to allow for any substantial increase in enrollments or accessibility to Tanzania's flagship University of Dar es Salaam.

Nongovernmental income generated from different revenue diversification activities and coordinated by the University's Income Generation Unit (IGU) is presented in Table 8. Total gross nongovernmental income generated from different sources increased 384%—from TZS 175,993,663 (US\$386,748) in 1995 to TZS 851,561,682 (US\$1,871,317) in 2000. In the same period, income from private tuition fees increased 1,361%—from TZS 41,898,950 (US\$92,073) in 1995 to TZS 611,977,434 (US\$1,345,000) in 2000. However, this increase is not paralleled by an increase in privately sponsored students. Data in Table 8 indicate that private tuition fees could become a major source of nongovernmental revenue for the university if strategically harnessed. Considering the university's annual budget, which from 1993–1994 to 2002–2003 has ranged between TZS 8,149,135,676 (US\$17,907,827) to TZS 14,413,011,824 (US\$31,672,772), the amount of nongovernmental revenue generated each year from 1995 to 2000 is not significant. Neither is the total

gross nongovernmental income of TZS 2,749,106,225 (US\$6,041,195) generated over the same six years.

The income generated from private tuition fees is used for topping up the salaries of faculty who assume extra teaching loads at the department level (UDSM, 1998, p. 21). But this measure has not checked faculty brain drain. For example, between 1990 and 1999 the University of Dar es Salaam lost 85 faculty members, including 5 professors, 5 associate professors, 10 senior lecturers, 25 lecturers, and 40 assistant lecturers (UDSM, 2002d, p. 6). There is no evidence that the nongovernmental income generated by the university over the years surveyed was invested in expanding the number of faculty, especially in fields of very high growth and high student demand such as engineering, computer science, law, and commerce. Available data reveal that in 2002 the university had 308 unfilled faculty vacancies, including 60 at the level of professor, 54 at the level of associate professor, 87 at senior lecturer, 69 at lecturer, and 38 at the level of assistant lecturer (UDSM, 2002d, p. 5). Nor was the net revenue used to expand capacity (for example, building a new student hostel), thus increasing access. Although there are claims that, by 1999–2000, the University of Dar es Salaam was saving approximately TZS 334,446,200 (US\$734,950) per year by shifting expenditures to students and families during Phase I of the cost-sharing plan, there were no indications where any of these savings may have been invested (URT, 2002b, 19).

At the same time, the university has undertaken various capacity expansion activities as part of implementing its Institutional Transformation Program (ITP) by using government and private investor funds. Conceivably, this additional capacity could lead to substantial enrollment expansion, which in turn would suggest the possibility of significant additional cost recovery, depending on the stance taken by the University Council toward all of the cost-sharing potential in such measures as privately sponsored students, more reasonable rents, cafeteria food priced more nearly at the market rate, and other elements that are already part of the future phases of the government's long-range plans for cost-sharing and revenue diversification.

Conclusions and Observations

Although data remain elusive, I can make some observations and tentative conclusions about the implementation of cost-sharing at the University of Dar es Salaam and, by extension, at other public universities and colleges in Tanzania.

Low enrollments in the privately sponsored, tuition-fee-paying programs, the failure to charge break-even fees on the university's cafeteria and hostel

operations, the proposals to give more loans to cover items that were supposed to have been covered by students and/or parents in Phase III of the cost-sharing program, the apparent inability and/or unwillingness to begin serious efforts to collect on these loans, and the government's general reluctance to introduce Phase III of the program are all indications that real cost-sharing in higher education in Tanzania has a long way to go.

Consequently, the University of Dar es Salaam remains almost totally dependent on government subventions for recurrent budgets and foreign donations for capital development. The timidity with which the government has moved toward cost-sharing—including its increasing reliance on making loans that it does not seem seriously inclined to recover—has not benefited the poor or otherwise led to expanded participation in higher education. On the contrary, access to higher education in Tanzania compared to other East African and some other sub-Saharan African countries is still extremely low, as manifested by low cohort participation rate and low total enrollments, given Tanzania's total population of 34.6 million.

The official policy of cost-sharing in higher education in Tanzania is justified on the grounds of sheer need for nongovernmental revenue for public institutions of higher education because of declining government appropriations. Furthermore, the ever-increasing social demand for higher education makes it clear that expanding access to higher education is a necessity (Ishengoma, 2004, p. 226). In short, what is needed is the strong political will to move forward, implementing these already established policies. The government and the public institutions of higher education must cultivate cost-sharing in higher education. If they do not, the universities—even the flagship University of Dar es Salaam—will remain undernourished and unable to participate as fully as it must in the expansion of participation and opportunity for future generations of Tanzanians. While as Luhanga (2003, p. 6) correctly observes that cost-sharing in higher education in Tanzania is a political sensitive issue, it remains a *sine qua non* for expanding participation in higher education.

Notes

- 1 These policies have a counterpart in the United States, which is a country not at all opposed to tuition fees, but in which some tuition-dependent private colleges and universities practice (although without always acknowledging it) "enrollment management," or what Johnstone (2001a, p. 9) calls "tilting admissions and enrollments toward students who can pay."
- 2 An additional question still to be examined in the larger research program, but not reported in this article, concerns access to higher education. The government of Tanzania defines expanded access to higher education as the availabil-

ity and affordability of higher education to more people than hitherto. My further research will look at the socio-economic, regional, and gender impacts of the government's early tentative steps toward the implementation of cost-sharing at the University of Dar es Salaam.

- 3 The first multiparty general elections were held in 1990. Probably the government did not want to give opposition political parties an agenda for their campaign.
- 4 The modest increase in enrollments at the University of Dar es Salaam as revealed in Table 2 may actually be even lower, due to the allegedly increasing number of forged certificates and diplomas submitted by applicants for admission into various programs. Parallel to the submission of forged certificates used for admission purposes, second-, third-, and fourth-year students have also been caught using forged certificates (Kalembo, 2003, p. 16).
- 5 I calculated the conversion from Tanzanian shillings to U.S dollars according to their 2001 purchasing power parity as \$1 = TZS455.06.
- 6 The National Social Security Fund (NSSF) is an autonomous government-owned parastatal organization.
- 7 When I was an undergraduate student at the University of Dar es Salaam in the early 1980s a handful of privately sponsored students were in fields such as education and arts and social sciences, mainly sponsored by the Bukoba Cooperative Union (BCU), which owns a number of private secondary schools in Kagera region. For this reason, BCU had to sponsor teachers at the UDSM to staff for its schools, an arrangement that still continues.
- 8 Student files at the University of Dar es Salaam also revealed that some students—even those from rich and well-placed families whose parents are top civil servants and politicians (both retired and in active service)—who were admitted as self- or privately sponsored students in their first year, were offered government sponsorship in their second year after their parents requested or indirectly pressured top officials at the university and Ministry of Science, Technology, and Higher Education to do so, claiming that both parents had lost their jobs or that their businesses had gone bankrupt.

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