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The Changing Face of Redress in South African Higher Education (1990–2005)

Teboho Moja* and Fred M. Hayward**

Abstract

This study focuses on fifteen years of redress policies designed to redress past inequalities in South African higher education, particularly as reflected in funding. Attempts to reverse past injustices included measures to address racial inequities for individuals with limited access to higher education at one level, and at another focused on institutional discrimination through unequal funding of institutions based on the racial groupings they were designated to serve. This led to policies to provide institutional redress. Two periods are examined under two different Ministers of Education and provide information on different strategies, levels of commitment, and degrees of success. The pre-democracy period to 1994 shaped the debate around redress and acceptance of policies to establish equity in society. Political realities post-1994 reshaped the debate, institutional redress faltered, and the focus on individual redress was prioritised with the establishment of a student financial aid scheme. The new funding formula implemented in 2005 includes some redress elements. It remains to be seen if they will be effective.

Résumé

Cette étude porte sur quinze ans de politique de redressement en Afrique du Sud (politique conçue pour remédier aux inégalités qu'a connu l'enseignement supérieur sud africain dans le passé, comme le montrent les statistiques sur le financement). Parmi les efforts de correction des injustices connues dans le passé figurent des mesures visant à faire face aux inégalités raciales auxquelles sont confrontés les individus ayant un accès limité à l'enseignement supérieur, d'une part, et d'autre part, des mesures axées sur la discrimination institutionnelle à travers le financement inégal d'institutions, basé sur les groupes raciaux. Deux périodes sont analysées sous la tutelle de deux différents Ministères de l'Éducation, et fournissent diverses informations sur des stratégies, des niveaux d'engagement et des degrés de réussite

* Teboho Moja, Higher Education, New York University, USA. Email: Tm45@nyu.edu
** Fred M. Hayward, Independent Higher Education Consultant. Email: hayward.fred@att.net

différents. La période de pré-démocratie qui s'étend jusqu'à 1994 a donné lieu au débat sur les besoins de redressement de la situation et sur l'acceptation de politiques visant à rétablir l'égalité au sein de la société. Les réalités politiques post-1994 ont redéfini le débat, la réforme institutionnelle a échoué et la priorité a été accordée à un système de réforme individuel, avec la mise en place d'un programme d'aide financière aux étudiants. La nouvelle formule de financement introduite en 2005 englobe certains éléments de changement. Reste à savoir si ces derniers sauront prouver leur efficacité

Introduction

In the waning days of apartheid in the early 1990s, redress came to be seen as a major mechanism to overcome the legacies of apartheid. Activists in the higher education sector viewed redress as providing a foundation for equal access and equal opportunities for black students – the elimination of racial discrimination in education policies, a chance for high quality education as a matter of justice, and financial assistance for disadvantaged students otherwise unable to attend universities and technikons. While redress was a central theme of the struggle and part of the core goals of transformation policy, preparing and implementing these policies would be a major undertaking since the structure of the apartheid higher education system was profoundly defined by racism and so fully enshrined in the nation's public policy and funding mechanisms.

The struggle against apartheid in South Africa exemplifies a larger struggle in human history for justice and equality, reflected in the decades of opposition to slavery, caste, racism, ethnic and class conflicts. It is in this context that the idea of redress became a powerful force for social and political equality during the struggle in South Africa. The success of the struggle for majority rule, ending in 1994, marked the beginning of the effort to convert that victory into public policy. For our purposes the focus is on redress through educational policy.[1] We want to examine its development, its successes, its failures, and its consequences after more than fifteen years. A number of questions are raised in relation to the evolution of redress. Have the efforts to foster redress lived up to expectations? Has redress helped overcome the 'major inequalities that the apartheid education system has created' (NECC 1992: 49)? Has it fostered greater equality of opportunity in higher education? Did it improve access to higher education for black students, assist the disadvantaged, and increase the numbers of black graduates? What difference has it made? Did it foster justice? Is redress continuing to be a significant factor now that the apartheid-era funding plan has finally been replaced with a new funding formula for higher education? Is redress provided for in the new funding formula? Through document analysis and discussions with some of the key higher education policy

makers and researchers we try to answer these questions. At the time this study was undertaken, the new funding formula had just been implemented. While our assessments of it are tentative, we draw some conclusions about its possible consequences for redress.

The concept of 'redress' goes back to at least the sixth century in Athens. It refers to making amends for wrongs done; to remedy or rectify; to make fair adjustments; to see that justice is done.[2] In England, the right of redress was a Parliamentary power from the 1600s which allowed Parliament to provide redress to individuals (usually from the elite) for crimes of the king and nobles. In the United States it relates especially to the right of citizens to petition government to rectify a wrong and is enshrined in the first amendment of the US Constitution, 'Congress shall make no laws respecting ... the right of the people to petition the government for a redress of grievances'. Currently there are calls to redress past social justices through reparations lawsuits, for example, for Jews and slaves.

Redress in South Africa was seen by policy makers in two ways: as a method to provide justice in the future for those who had been the victims of discrimination and injustice under apartheid, and as a mechanism for establishing the institutional conditions and changes needed to insure equal opportunities and fairness. Redress was not seen as punitive – a way of punishing those responsible – nor was it conceptualised as a mechanism to right every wrong of the past. Redress was prescriptive in focusing on equality of opportunity[3] – but not in respect to stipulating equal outcomes. Redress was individual for those who were victims of discrimination as part of a category of victims (for example, black, coloured, Indian) who could have individual redress in the future through equal educational opportunity. But it was not enough to have access to any tertiary education, it was to be *quality* education and that would require insuring that the institutions most likely to be the sources of opportunity, the historically black universities and technikons, be brought to acceptable (though undefined) levels of quality (NCHE 1996: 72) through institutional redress.[4] In this context the notion of institutional redress was forward-looking rather than seeking reparations for past wrongs.

In devising public policy for the post-apartheid period, the framers focused on those features of the system that could be changed quickly as well as those that were the most offensive features of higher education policy during the apartheid period. At the forefront was restricted access to higher education for black [5] students – almost total in the beginning. During this period blacks could no longer attend white universities.[6] The Extension of University Education Act (1959) made provision for setting up of separate 'tribal colleges' for university students. Thereafter black enrolment was limited primarily to histori-

cally black institutions. Nonetheless, only 9 per cent of Africans of college age were enrolled in higher education, 11 per cent of coloured students, and 33 per cent of Indian students, while 60 per cent of that age cohort of white students (Bunting 1994: 39) was enrolled even though they represented only 11 per cent of the population.[7] Policies needed to be developed that would help reverse this discrimination, provide access to black students, and insure that the disadvantaged would have access to funds to assist with their education.

Given the history of discrimination against the historically disadvantaged institutions (HDIs) when compared to the historically advantaged institutions (HAIs)[8] – including inadequate facilities, lower salaries and benefits for the teaching staff, and restricted curricula – the planners and policy makers thinking about a transformed system focused on ways to ensure equity and educational quality throughout the system. Increased access without improved quality would be a pyrrhic victory. The reality was that the historically black universities and technikons had received significantly less funding during apartheid than the white institutions per FTE. The funding formula [9] was designed to enshrine these inequities between the HAIs and the HDIs. Students at the HDIs were to focus on subjects thought appropriate to their origins, in particular the arts and religious studies. The apartheid funding formula insured that the HAIs and the HDIs were not of equal quality.[10] Policy makers recognised the need for a differentiated system with a diverse range of institutions and that differentiation was not to be based on race but rather on institutional missions. As planning continued in the 1990s, rectifying these inequities became a major focus of the planning and preparation of public policy.

Planning Redress in Higher Education

Plans to transform the higher education system were articulated by a number of organisations that were part of the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), such as the Union of Democratic Universities Staff Associations (UDUSA), the National Education Coordinating Committee (NECC), and statutory bodies such as the South African Universities Vice Chancellors Association, then known as the Committee of University Principals (CUP), and the Committee of Technikon Principals (CTP). For example, policy research and recommendations were prepared by the Union of Democratic University Staff Associations' (UDUSA) policy forum and by the Centre for Education Policy Development (CEPD).[11] In January 1994 the African National Congress drafted a policy framework for education and training presenting a vision for higher education and principles for a new system. This work was to set the stage for wide-ranging discussions and development of a transformation policy for higher education. At its core would be a commitment not only to eliminate apartheid's

discriminatory legislation, but also to find ways to provide redress for those who were its victims and to insure equal educational opportunities (including in education quality) for all those who qualified for tertiary education. Both institutional and individual redress became central themes of policy making in preparation for majority rule. For individual redress in particular, there was strong stakeholder advocacy primarily from the students who got it on the agenda. Students proved to be especially effective stakeholders who put individual redress, in the form of student loans and bursaries/grants, on the table early and successfully.

Much of the work of these organisations became the basis for discussion and recommendation for the National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI) as it began to take the first steps in preparing public policy options in 1992. The NEPI report highlights the importance of redress:

> Redress is a key NEPI principle which must be taken into account when policy options for a new PSE system are being considered. Because redress issues arise from the need to compensate for and to correct the major inequalities that the apartheid education system has created in South Africa, the main outcome of the process of redress will be the establishment of an equitable society (NECC 1992: 49).

For NEPI redress was seen as essential to both 'compensate for and to correct' the inequities of apartheid. Redress was needed to insure equal opportunity. The Research Group noted: 'Redress in these circumstances will involve ensuring that opportunities are equalized; that the competition for the scarce resources of a society becomes a fair one' (NECC 1992: 49-50). The Research Group emphasised the 'unjustifiable inequalities' in the post-secondary system in South Africa.

For South Africa, redress in education is a central provision of the Constitution. Education is a right. In order to provide education it is essential to take into account 'the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices' (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act. 108 of 1996, ss. 29 (2) (c)). The clause on education as a 'right' refers specifically to basic education, adult basic education and further education. It is important to note that higher education is not mentioned and that redress is not provided for in the same sense that it has been debated in higher education policy research.

Major goals for a transformed post-apartheid higher education system included: narrowing the gap in institutional inequalities, grants and loans to help disadvantaged students, a democratic structure consistent with the aims of universities and technikons, development opportunities for disadvantaged students and staff, an end to staffing inequities, a development focus, and emphasis on

quality (NECC 1992: 49–58). All this was in the context of national goals of establishing a system that was just, non-racist, non-sexist, fostered equality, and provided equal opportunities to all its citizens. The task of writing policies to achieve these goals was a daunting one. While some vestiges of apartheid could be eliminated by changing the law (for example governance structures), others related to attitudes, and still others focused on 'who' would be offered new opportunities such as scholarships and loans. These problems were complex and required careful analysis of the problems, consultations with stakeholders, and discussion of a variety of possible solutions before recommendations for policy could be made.

An early effort to provide institutional redress was launched by the Committee of Technikon Principals (CTP) in 1993. Frustrated by the failure of government to provide funding that would allow the black technikons to improve quality, the technikon principals decided to set up their own redress programme. Working through the CTP they agreed to transfer funds from historically advantaged technikons to historically disadvantaged technikons. That changed the government contribution to 80:10 for the white institutions and to 90:10 for the black institutions. This amounted to R207,847,000 between 1993 and 1998.[12] It allowed the historically black technikons to make improvements in their infrastructure and programmes. In addition, it strengthened the links between the historically black and historically white technikons and made the CTP a stronger, more unified organisation. That was in contrast to the Committee of University Principals (CUP), which suffered through a series of conflicts and divisions between many of the historically black and historically white institutions. The internal redress established by the CTP was a remarkable commitment to begin the process of institutional redress.

Developing Post-1994 Higher Education Redress Policy

The 1994 elections set the stage for policy making and implementation. President Mandela promised to transform South Africa. In his inaugural address, he stated: 'The people of South Africa have spoken in these elections. They want change! And change is what they will get' (Mandela 1994).

Change and transformation were the order of the day in education. Pre-election research on higher education suggested that the key to both national development and individual success was access to knowledge (See also World Bank 2002). This theme was found in much of the work by individuals and by organisations such as the Centre for Educational Policy Development (CEPD) and the Union of Democratic Universities Staff Associations (UDUSA). Perhaps the most comprehensive example of this work can be seen in the National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI) reports, of which that on higher educa-

tion was typical. The NEPI post-secondary education research group emphasised the problem of access and worked on ways to respond in post-apartheid South Africa. The research group noted: 'The most visible contestation around knowledge in South Africa has been about access. The majority does not have equal access to PSE' (NECC 1992: 7).[13] A powerful case for redress was made in the 1992 NEPI documents which regarded redress as a 'key principle' of the transformation project. The researchers concluded: 'A major task facing any future government will be finding ways to redress these inequalities' (NECC 1992: 7). These themes were to be picked up by the National Commission on Higher Education four years later as they laid out a framework for transformation (NCHE 1996: ch. 8). The NCHE members were able to build on the research, analysis, and thinking of those who preceded them, in particular the work done during the NEPI process.[14] In addition some of the members of the NCHE had gained experience developing higher education policy while serving in earlier organisations involved in research and policy recommendations including CEPD, NEPI, and UDUSA.

In spite of general agreement about the problem of access and the need for redress, the path to a redress policy for higher education was difficult. In 1996 the NCHE described the existing system as 'fundamentally flawed by inequities, imbalances and distortions' – as one that 'perpetuates an inequitable distribution of access and opportunity for students and staff along axes of race, gender, class and geographic discrimination'. They noted that 'discriminatory practices have limited the access of black students and women students into fields such as science, engineering, technology and commerce and this has been detrimental to economic and social development'. In addition, they pointed out that because of the '... tendency for higher education institutions to replicate the ethnic, racial and gender divisions in the wider society' during apartheid, higher education had a limited role in establishing a tolerant civil society and culture of accommodation (NCHE 1996: 1–3).

The NCHE regarded redress as part of the solution to the inequities of apartheid. The Commission recommended both institutional redress and individual redress. Institutional redress would be carried out through earmarked funding provided to disadvantaged institutions (NECC 1992: 241). Institutional redress funding would be allocated on the basis of need and as the result of application for the funds. The NCHE envisioned its use for new land to expand cramped campuses, upgrade buildings, purchase laboratory and other essential equipment, and improve library holdings. In addition, institutional redress funds would be allocated for staff development, academic development, and enhanced research capacity, among other things. The goal was to improve the quality of instruction and infrastructure at the historically disad-

vantaged institutions (NECC 1992: 241) to insure that students had access to quality education.

With the election victory and majority rule in 1994, individual redress was given a high priority by the Minister of Education. Student unrests sparked by financial exclusions of students at the beginning of each academic year increased the urgency of policy reform. The Minister appointed the Cheryl Carolus Committee in late 1994 to advise the Minister on potential problems (Bengu 1995). The NCHE was requested to investigate the viability of a National Student Loan/Bursary Scheme and present a report as a matter of urgency. The Carolus committee presented a report with proposals on student funding and also embarked on a fund-raising mission. As a result, R200 million was raised and distributed to students in 1996. The proposed individual redress funds would go to disadvantaged students regardless of the type of institution attended or its history under apartheid.

The NCHE recognised the financial limits facing the newly elected government and understood that there would not be enough money to overcome the vast range of inequities created by apartheid. They understood that there would not be enough institutional redress to allow the historically black institutions to completely catch up with the historically white institutions. Nonetheless, the majority of the committee members saw redress funding as a start in the direction of equity and quality. For example, in their final report the NCHE urged government to fund the HBIs 'at higher ratios' of library funding than the HWIs (NCHE 1996: 372). The NCHE was committed to the idea that institutional redress funding should be allocated on the basis of need, that redress allocations should be subject to audit, and that institutional redress would have a limited time frame (NCHE 1996: 243).

The formal response of the Ministry to the NCHE report was set out in a Green Paper with strong support for the major principles developed by the NCHE and the proposal for redress funding as well as expressing concerns about some of its recommendations, such as those in the area of governance. Redress funding was enthusiastically supported in the Green Paper. Both the CUP and the CTP endorsed these recommendations for redress funding for the historically disadvantaged institutions.

Following public discussion of the Green Paper, a draft White Paper was prepared by the Department. It was expected to build on the Green Paper and the consultations that had taken place with the public, the universities and technikons, and other interested parties. In contrast to expectations, the White Paper produced by the Department differed significantly from the recommendations of the NCHE Report and the Green Paper. Principles such as equality, justice, and redress had been left out. Therefore the Minister allowed it to be

released only as a draft of the White Paper. The final revised version of the White Paper of 1997 included those principles originally excluded.[15] In the areas of redress there was specific emphasis on student financial assistance for disadvantaged students (White Paper 1997: 4.39-4.49). Both institutional and individual redress were to be funded by earmarked funding in the new formula (White Paper 1997: 4.12 & 4.33). The White Paper 3 and the companion Higher Education Bill were approved by Parliament on August 15, 1997.

Implementing Redress Policy

The Minister's Individual Redress/Student Financial Aid

The successful prioritisation of redress for students was a result of groundwork done prior to elections, such as the South African Student's Congress' (SASCO) policy positions, other research about policy options, a post-election consensus building conference on student financial aid, very well-organised student stakeholders, and the Minister's commitment to individual redress.

During the first year of the Mandela government, the Minister of Education allocated R20 million for financial aid for disadvantaged students and began a major effort to raise additional funds from donors. R300 million was raised and allocated in 1996. The funding was administered through the Tertiary Education Fund of South Africa (TEFSA), now incorporated into the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS). This support marked the initial government allocation for individual redress.

As the student loan fund developed over the next few years, it included substantial returns from student payments on their loans, which added to the total pool of funds available. R515,401,240 had been recycled in this way through 2003. By 2003 the fund had attracted a total of more than R4.6 billion, 72 per cent from government, 23 per cent from donors, 4 per cent from institutions, and 1 per cent from the private sector. These funds provided more than 797,000 awards that allowed 352,523 students to attend universities and technikons, most of whom would otherwise have been denied the opportunity (See Table 1). In 2004 the Department of Education contributed more than R565 million out of a total of the almost R985 million available.[16]

The nearly R5 billion in total awards from 1991 to 2003 represents a very significant amount of individual redress both in providing opportunities for higher education through loans and the potential for grant funding for those who did well. It should be noted that 97 per cent (NSFAS 2002) of graduates are employed and that total includes students who were funded through the NSFAS. Of the total amount of funding provided since the beginning of the programme 28 per cent of the funds, on average, have been in the form of

Table 1: Student loans and bursaries (1991–2003)

Loan Year	Total Award Value	Recycled Funds	Dept of Education Contribution	Other Funds (Incl Dept of Labour)	Total Bursary Value	Percent of Bursary by year	No. of Awards	No. of Students	No. of First Time Beneficiaries	Average Award
1991	R 21,497,995.74			R 21,497,995.74	R 1,898.00	0.01%	7,239	7,220	7,220	R 2,969.75
1992	R 41,313,528.02			R 41,313,528.02	R 8,009.29	0.02%	14,162	13,945	10,828	R 2,917.21
1993	R 55,163,999.62			R 55,163,999.62	R 14,269.73	0.03%	20,805	20,247	13,399	R 2,651.48
1994	R 70,480,838.03		R 10,345,478.49	R 60,135,359.54	R 43,729.77	0.06%	28,254	25,581	14,970	R 2,494.54
1995	R 154,322,565.89		R 57,131,879.74	R 97,190,686.15	R 39,731,331.18	25.75%	43,877	40,009	24,331	R 3,517.16
1996	R 333,358,019.90		R 283,767,824.82	R 49,590,195.08	R 88,514,912.75	26.55%	72,771	67,658	41,706	R 4,580.92
1997	R 350,997,798.06	R 1,525,381.04	R 198,357,875.38	R 151,114,541.64	R 101,503,233.39	28.92%	70,574	63,279	28,121	R 4,973.47
1998	R 394,497,977.92	R 22,679,312.30	R 296,554,682.66	R 75,263,982.96	R 116,084,070.97	29.43%	75,764	67,569	29,897	R 5,206.93
1999	R 441,054,768.41	R 13,706,901.91	R 384,889,001.90	R 42,458,864.60	R 127,938,019.49	29.01%	75,335	68,363	29,191	R 5,854.58
2000	R 510,829,288.31	R 9,255,796.25	R 437,389,349.55	R 64,184,142.51	R 149,963,130.35	29.36%	83,251	72,043	31,921	R 6,136.01
2001	R 635,091,084.88	R 149,372,315.38	R 439,948,284.40	R 45,770,485.10	R 183,768,183.40	28.94%	93,532	80,526	38,278	R 6,790.09
2002	R 733,474,559.16	R 149,992,399.04	R 491,094,264.51	R 92,387,895.61	R 210,353,259.44	28.68%	99,873	86,154	38,335	R 7,344.07
2003	R 893,672,471.50	R 168,869,134.76	R 534,053,363.84	R 190,749,972.90	R 251,637,731.62	28.16%	112,264	96,554	44,326	R 7,960.45
Total	**R 4,635,754,895.44**	**R 515,401,240.68**	**R 3,133,532,005.29**	**R 986,821,649.47**	**R 1,269,561,779.39**	**27.39%**	**797,701**	**709,148**	**352,523**	**R 5,811.39**

Total capital awards 1991 2003	R 4,635,754,895.44
Total bursary write-off 1991 2003	R 1,269,561,779.39
Total No. of students 1991 2003	352,523
Average student award 1991 2003	R 13,150.22
Average student capital debt 1991 2003	R 9,548.86

Total amount outstanding 31 March 2004 (Including Interest)	R 4,135,197,657.69
Total No. of students with unsettled accounts	306,557
Average student debt (Including Interest)	R 13,489.16

Note: We are indebted to Sandra Hoole, Information analyst, National Student Financial Aid Scheme, for putting this information together in February 2005.

grants with the individual amount reflecting student academic success. That is an enormous contribution to redress and reduces the potential debt burden for these students considerably. Successful implementation of individual redress has resulted in an average annual growth rate of 7 per cent for African students in the last decade compared with 2 per cent for white students (Stumpf 2004) based on enrolment figures.

There is a sense in which NSFAS also provides a level of institutional redress in that it allows HDIs to attract students who might not otherwise be able to attend and thus produces income in tuition, fees, and other student expenditures that allow institutions, especially the HDIs, to function. A draft working paper prepared by the Department of Education has shown that the level of student support by NSFAS to those attending the HBUs and HBTs in 2002 was respectively 34 per cent and 38 per cent – a very significant contribution. This same paper shows that the largest percentage of total NSFAS funding went to the HBUs and HBTs, though that percentage has been declining in recent years while the percentage going to the white institutions has been increasing.[17]

Institutional Redress

To move institutional redress forward quickly, in 1997 Minister Bengu allocated R27 million from other areas of the budget to create a fund for an 'interim redress' programme for historically disadvantaged institutions. The Minister planned to have the funds allocated on a competitive basis and invited all of the HDIs to submit requests for redress funding in one or more of the following areas: ICT for administrative proposals; ICT for instructional support and development; science laboratory infrastructure development; and library capacity development and holdings (which later was dropped when European Union funding became available for libraries). The Minister notified HDI principals about the interim redress competition on 14 September 1997 along the lines noted above. All sixteen HDIs submitted proposals totalling R287,230,380.[18] These were reviewed in the Ministry with R24,360,000 recommended for projects and the remainder held back to cover costs associated with the project. However, the Department disregarded the competition and recommendations and allocated the R27 million to the HDIs on an FTE basis. The Minister also recommended that R150 million for redress be allocated in the 1998–2000 budgets as an interim measure until funding could be obtained through the usual budget process. This funding was not forthcoming.

Expectations about government redress funding had been high following Parliamentary approval of the White Paper and Higher Education Bill. While some critics had suggested that the HDIs could not absorb the funding effectively, that argument was blunted by the fact that the technikons had used the

CTP redress funding effectively from 1993. People looked at the themes of redress, equity, transparency, a single coordinated system, quality, and a new equitable funding formula with high hopes. During the pre-election planning period there was a great deal of talk about including redress considerations in funding applications, review of projects, and as a general focus of policy – but no specific policy in this regard was developed.

Redress and the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF)

The sum of R100 million per year was provisionally allocated for redress for 1999–2001 as part of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework for the Ministry of Education. Most of that money was used by the Department to pay the debts of three historically black universities and for audits of six HDIs. An additional R3 million was used to pay for the merger investigation at Natal Technikon and ML Sultan Technikon and R1.5 million for the country fee for EBSCO[19] subscriptions that gave all libraries access to the full text of journals. The remaining R40 million was used for individual redress.[20] The Department allocated these funds to NSFAS for student loans and grants – individual rather than institutional redress but redress nonetheless. Were other alternatives explored for covering the debt of these HDUs, such as using the Department's budget, which was shared by all institutions? Surely this should not have been a case of creating collective racial responsibility for debts or fiscal mismanagement at some HDIs? When funding problems arose for a white institution the shortfall was covered from department funds.[21] Some of the redress money was also used for the benefit of all institutions in the system rather than the HDIs. All this suggests that commitment to institutional redress during this period had started to shift from HDIs to focusing on non-redress expenditures.

The Department received only R30 million in 2000–2001 of the expected R100 million for redress, and none of a similar amount expected in the next year. Of those funds R2 million was used to deal with the debt of one HDI, another R23.4 million for academic development, and R4 million for journal licenses. Once again what had been intended as funds for the historically disadvantaged institutions went to deal with debt and other expenses. Academic development funding might be considered redress, both institutional and individual. We do not know which institutions had access to those funds.

In the second term of the democratic government a new Minister of Education was appointed. The Minister was not enthusiastic about redress and thus the redress efforts begun by his predecessor languished. The Minister was not a champion of the HDIs and regarded them as of poor quality, troublesome, and apartheid relics that should be eliminated or absorbed into other institutions. In 1999 the Minister complained to *Business Day* (12 March 1999) that

'... some of our vice-chancellors [of HDIs] are still using historical disadvantage as an unconvincing cover for the mess they've caused in their education institutions'.

Part of his solution was mergers, which he argued would make the universities and technikons better able to meet the needs of the modern job market, improve access for all, and improve quality. The goals set were laudable but none of the policy documents indicated how those mergers would help achieve these goals (See Moja 2002). Lack of information about how the goals were to be achieved left many stakeholders in higher education suspicious of intentions. HDIs interpreted those moves as a direct attack on them. The case is made especially well in a piece by former Vice Chancellor Daniel J. Ncayiyana (2004) who writes:

> However, there clearly are tacit subtexts beyond the formal motivations [for merger]. These include the desire
>
> - to deal with perceived incompetence at the HDIs;
> - to blunt the tensions between HDIs and the more successful historically white institutions, and
> - to deal with the conundrum of Afrikaans medium universities.

Under this formulation of the HDIs, there would be no need for redress.

The New Funding Plan and Policy Implications for Redress (2004–2005)

The old funding formula had been in place more than twenty years (since 1982–83) and included a number of complex formulas to determine the subsidy for each institution. The formula mechanism reflected the apartheid mentality of those who governed and worked to the distinct disadvantage of the historically black universities and technikons. It was one of the major tools of apartheid producing major inequities in funding between historically black and historically white universities and technikons.[22]

A review of the history of the funding formula illustrates the magnitude of the inequities it enshrined for the historically black institutions. By 1990 the black universities were receiving only 50 per cent of the funding per FTE of the white institutions (Bunting 1994: 160). There were major disparities between the historically white and historically black technikons with the latter receiving about 18 per cent less than the white institutions per FTE. The inequalities were created primarily by two aspects of the formula: (i) the formula penalty for failure in the context of the lower success rates of black students and (ii) the funding weight for humanities versus the sciences.

In the immediate post-election period the Ministry of Education was expected to move quickly to change the funding formula to eliminate its racist aspects and inequities between funding for historically white and historically black institutions. The task proved more difficult than expected. In 1998 Minister Bengu lamented the fact that the apartheid era funding formula was still in place and said he found it personally embarrassing.[23] While work had begun on changing the formula soon after Professor Bengu took office in 1994, he learned how difficult the process of change had become.

The Ministry circulated two documents about the new funding formula in March 2001 and in November 2002 (Ministry of Education 2001 & 2002). Its development had the benefit of a great deal of stakeholder input including a joint committee of SAUVCA and the CTP. In the end, SAUVCA and the CTP did not accept the final proposals and recommended to the Minister that the new framework should not be implemented and that a new technical committee, consisting of members of the Ministry and of SAUVCA/CTP, should be asked to revise the proposed new framework. The Minister rejected this recommendation and the framework was implemented in the 2004 academic year. The new academic framework was formally approved by the Ministers of Education and of Finance and was published in a *Government Gazette* in December 2003. SAUVCA/CTP have continued to voice objections and in June 2004 expressed their concerns in a presentation to the Parliamentary Committee on Education (SAUVCA 2004).

Assessing the impact of the new funding formula will take time and experience with it. Nonetheless, we are struck by what appear to be aspects of redress in the new formula at both the institutional and individual levels. The new funding formula is a combination of formula funding and earmarked funding. In 2005, 85 per cent of the government appropriation for higher education was allocated through formulas as institutional block grants. The balance of 15 per cent was used for student financial aid, for foundation grants, and for institutional restructuring and re-capitalisation including HDIs not affected by mergers (Ministry of Education 2005). We do not propose to carry out an analysis of the whole new funding formula here but rather discuss some provisions that seem to have the effect (intended or not) of redress funding or provide greater equity where the previous formula was discriminatory.

Block Grants

Teaching inputs. These inputs are calculated on the basis of FTE students weighted by subject matter as in the previous funding formula but with four categories instead of two. The old formula disadvantaged the HDIs, set up primarily to teach arts and humanities subjects which had lower funding multipliers

than science and technology (the ratios were science 2.67, humanities 1.0). In the post-1994 years the HDUs broadened their science and technology offerings. However, increasing the numbers of students who qualify for science is a slow process given the weak preparation provided in most primary and secondary schools serving black communities. In areas such as fine arts, the HDUs will finally be receiving the real costs of instruction. The HDTs have always focused on science and technology though they too were disadvantaged by the formula. Since the four funding categories are a more accurate reflection of costs, the HDIs should do much better under the new funding formula, which redresses the discrimination built into the old formula.

Teaching outputs. Two separate funding calculations are made for teaching outputs. The first determines a normative total (the outputs an institution ought to produce) using a formula that combines different weightings for different types of degrees (for example, certificates, bachelor's degree, masters) multiplied by the headcount of enrolled students adjusted for benchmarks ('Statement on Funding' 2003: 6). The second calculation determines an institution's actual teaching output using the same weighting of graduates actually produced. It is expected that for some years, the normative total of teaching outputs will be higher than the actual total. In the short run an institution will not be penalised for outputs below the norm and will be eligible for a teaching development grant based on the difference between their normative and actual teaching output totals ('Funding Framework' 2004: 10-12). That should protect institutions with the largest number of disadvantaged students, primarily the historically black universities and technikons, at least in the short run.

Under the old formula the pass rate was factored into the formula in a way that significantly reduced the subsidy to institutions with a high failure rate. Funds were allocated based on a combination of the FTE student enrolment and the student success rate for the institution (Bunting 1994: 154-55). Institutions were penalised for student failure in that those students were not counted in calculating the subsidy.[24] Since the failure rate for students at HDIs was higher than that for students at HAIs, institutions with large numbers of black students were severely penalised. In some HDIs the failure rate in year one was as high as 50 per cent of students. The irony is that the HDIs bore the cost of education for those students who failed even though they were denied funding for them. Few of these students dropped out. Most returned to repeat the year. A number of recommendations were made to the Ministry by the Pilot Project institutions in 2001 to remedy this situation including alternative ways of funding first entry first year disadvantaged students. Several of the Pilot Project recommendations seem to have been implemented in the new formula.[25]

The new funding formula remedies one of the worst and most punitive aspects of the old formula and thus appears to redress a major injustice. Teaching outputs are calculated using two factors, (i) the headcount of student enrolled, not pass rates, and (ii) the degrees, diplomas, and certificates awarded. The headcount does not differentiate between students who have failed and are retaking a year (as long as they are enrolled) and those who have passed. That change will be a significant advantage to institutions with large numbers of disadvantaged students. On the other hand, the calculation of actual graduates or degree recipients will reflect the pass rate. That is potentially costly to institutions with a lower throughput than others. However, in an ingenious effort to not to harm institutions (at least in the short run), the difference between their expected completion/graduation rate and the actual rate will result in supplementary funding equal to that difference. That amount will be available for teaching development, very loosely defined, at the outset.[26] This change goes a long way to overcoming one of the biggest inequities in the system.

Institutional factors

There are other aspects of the new funding formula that seem to have redress implications, both individual and institutional. Among them are grants for institutions with large proportions of disadvantaged students. Institutions that qualify will have up to 10 per cent added to their teaching input allocation based on the proportion of disadvantaged contact students above a minimum of 40 per cent (See 'Statement'1993: 9). The HDIs should benefit substantially, along with some of the merged institutions and several that have made major efforts to recruit disadvantaged students. In 2005-2006 all the technikons qualified for disadvantaged factor grants. All the HDUs qualified as did the other universities except UCT, Natal, Potchefstroom, Pretoria, RAU, Rhodes, and Stellenbosch.

The new formula attempts to deal with the special costs and lack of economies of scale faced by small universities and technikons. An additional 15 per cent is added to the teaching funds of institutions with 4,000 or fewer FTE students with the additional teaching subsidy decreasing as student numbers increase up to 25,000 FTE, where it will cease. This funding may also serve as a mechanism for institutional redress for those HDIs that are not merged since they tend to be small, often with higher costs as a consequence of their locations and restrictions that were products of apartheid.

Research outputs. In the new formula research outputs include research publications (books and journals) and research masters and doctoral graduates. Two separate funding calculations are made for research outputs. The first determines a normative total – a total of the numbers of research outputs an

institution ought to produce. The second calculation determines an institution's actual research output; using the same output weightings as are used in the normative calculations. The normative total for the system is at present higher than the actual total of research outputs produced, and is expected to continue to be higher for some years. For those institutions that do not meet the normative totals, some research development funding will be available. The HDIs, in the short run, should not see a substantial loss of research funding. In the long run however, we expect the HDIs to lose significant amounts of research funding because they will not be as competitive as the HAIs.

Earmarked Funding

Earmarked funding, other than institutional restructuring and re-capitalisation funding, is projected to be about 10 per cent of the total government higher education budget until the 2007/08 funding year. These funds are primarily intended for student assistance administered by NSFAS, repayment of interest and redemption of approved long-term loans, and foundation programmes.

Student loans and grants (TEFSA & NSFAS). The primary source of financial assistance for disadvantaged students from 1991 was the Tertiary Education Fund of South Africa (TEFSA), incorporated in 1999 into the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) by Act 56 of Parliament. Most of this funding is allocated through the Department of Education as noted earlier. Some government funds were also allocated through the Department of Labour. Loans and grants have been a major source of redress demonstrated in increased enrolments, higher throughput, and graduation rates of black students.

As important as the loans have become for disadvantaged students, we are concerned about the long-term implications of these loans in terms of the growing debt burden on disadvantaged students. The current average debt is R13,486 per student.[27] By March 30, 2004 more than R500 million of debt had been repaid and 45,966 students had paid off all their debts. The total outstanding debt at the end of 2003 was R4,135,197,657. As students start work after graduation, often with a family to support, they may find the task impossible given the burden of debt.[28]

The long-term debt problem after graduation has the potential to create a class of disadvantaged students who are hobbled by the debt amassed while getting an education. Graduates may continue to struggle with the debt burden for decades while their advantaged counterparts thrive. The long-term consequences of student debt need to be studied and ways found to ensure that these

debts do not leave the students permanently in an underclass haunted by a cycle of debt.

Foundation programmes. An important change in the new funding framework is the addition of funds for foundation programmes for disadvantaged students – something unavailable through the previous formula. Given the poor quality of preparation provided black students in many primary and secondary schools, large numbers of students arrived at universities and technikons poorly prepared, especially in English, maths and science. Foundation programmes provide a significant mechanism for bringing them up to appropriate levels. A total of about R280 million in foundation grants has been allocated to institutions for the three-year period 2004–2006. A further R300 million will be allocated during 2007–2009 (Ministry of Education 2005). The student development programmes should increase the pass rate for disadvantaged students especially in year one, giving meaning to equal opportunities and thus providing a measure of redress.

Institutional restructuring. This funding is designed to cover most extra costs associated with the mergers of higher education institutions now underway. The funds appropriated under this heading in the national budget are also being used for the re-capitalisation of merging institutions as well as those not involved in mergers. While the merger process is race-neutral in one sense, as structured it seems likely to negatively affect the former HDIs where there is currently an infrastructure backlog in terms of provision and maintenance as well as human resource shortages. This will be especially true in those cases in which an HAI is the dominant partner. In most cases we suspect that the merged HDI will find its autonomy eliminated or substantially limited (perhaps as a campus of the new entity), its sense of community lost, and its identity weakened. To the extent that these institutions become subsidiaries of the larger institutions with which they are merged, they are likely to be second-class citizens. This seems to have already happened as a result of several mergers. It would be a disservice to those teaching and working at these institutions, and to the struggle for equity and justice, if the new campuses (former HDIs) come to be seen as places of last resort for disadvantaged and marginal students. This is the opposite of what was intended through institutional redress.

Redress Assessed

To what extent have the goals for redress spelled out by the National Commission, the NEPI Report, and other advocates of redress, been realised? In the case of institutional redress, as we have seen, very little redress was achieved

because the programme was killed in its infancy. The only real exceptions were those organised by the CTP in the R208 million internal redress programme which they funded themselves from 1993-1998, and Minister Bengu's R27 million Interim Redress programme in 1998. Beyond these early initiatives, there were no efforts by Government '... to compensate for and to correct the major inequalities that the apartheid education system has created...' (NECC 1992: 49). There may be some redress in the new funding formula. While not targeting HDIs, in the short run they seem to be protected from cuts in teaching and research funds, though they may face cuts after the transition period. At minimum, the new formula eliminates some of the worst inequities of the old formula.

Overall, only limited institutional redress occurred. We believe a tremendous opportunity was missed to upgrade the HDIs, help them attract and keep staff members, provide higher quality education, and add the computing and laboratory faculties they needed. Most had at least adequate physical plants and basic infrastructures that were relatively new. It would not have been difficult to make significant improvements. It remains to be seen if in practice the new formula will have the institutional redress effects we hope it will.

The record is much better for individual redress. Significant progress was made to improve individual opportunities – to meet some of the NEPI goals. 'Redress in these circumstances will involve ensuring that opportunities are equalized; that the competition for the scarce resources of society becomes a fair one' (NECC 1992: 29-50). As we have reported, since 1994 over 352,000 disadvantaged students have received over R4 billion in support with R1.2 billion of that being bursaries or grants.[29] This is one piece of evidence of the benefits of more equal access and demonstrates an important contribution to equity and justice through individual redress. The NSFAS has also attracted contributions from foundations and other donors. Individual redress in the form of scholarships to disadvantaged students attempts to rectify the 'unjustifiable inequalities' in educational opportunities by providing access to funds to those who would not otherwise enjoy it. While loan funds do not 'equalise' opportunities, they go a long way to closing the gap in funding opportunities between advantaged and disadvantaged students.

Why have the individual redress programmes attracted so much more government support than the institutional redress efforts? There are a number of reasons. Treasury seems to have had qualms about institutional redress for the HDIs from the outset. The overall shift from RDP strategies to GEAR signalled the shift of department officials from a redress emphasis to market-driven strategies underpinned by a focus on the efficient use of resources.[30]

Secondly, the change in leadership from a minister who was a former HDI vice-chancellor to a minister committed to changing the apartheid landscape through mergers also shifted the emphasis from redress to creating new institutions. Thirdly, there was less opposition to individual redress than institutional redress by the historically advantaged institutions. Their opposition was quiet and subtle and tended to take the form of institutional redress, which is all right if the funds are not *top-sliced* from the education budget. Individual redress, on the other hand, was loan and grant money for tuition and other costs. Some of that money would go to the advantaged institution for the disadvantaged students they admitted. A redress programme that did not limit funding to HDIs would be of benefit to the historically advantaged institutions too. Finally, the student loan scheme had strong and active student support.

What are the prospects for redress in the future? We conclude that the introduction of a new funding formula brings to an end redress as it was originally conceptualised in the earlier policy documents. Redress in its new face no longer targets HDIs but may have some advantages for them, at least in the short run. What should be emphasised is that this is not additional money to the higher education budget but rather funds generated through the prioritisation of some transformation goals (Stumpf 2004: 4).

There are two additional aspects of redress that were discussed in the policy planning documents that received little or no attention in policy implementation. One is redress for academic staff and administrators at the HDIs. There was severe under-representation of black staff among the faculty and administrators of South African universities and technikons generally. The HDIs had fewer staff with MAs and PhDs than the historically white institutions, less money was available for staff development at the HDIs, and there was less funding for research and thus for academic growth for teaching staff, researchers, and administrators. This is one of the major aspects of redress discussed in the NEPI *Post-Secondary Education* study (NECC: 113–14). Similarly, the NCHE suggested that 'Current redress funds would be allocated for redress expenditure in areas such as staff development ... research capacity development, etc.' (NCHE 1996: 241–42).[31] These concerns about the need for staff development at the HDIs never rose to the level of public policy-making. In the period from 1995 to the present no specific funding was allocated for it. This may have been an unintended casualty of the failure to allocate significant institutional redress money.

The second issue was gender equity. A lot has been made of the centrality of gender equity to development in South Africa. The idea of creating a non-sexist, non-racist society was a mantra of the struggle. Problems of gender inequity figure extensively in the NCHE Report, which suggested that indi-

vidual redress should be used for student financial aid and '... in addressing equity issues such as capacity building of women...' (NCHE 1996: 241–42). They proposed to end 'gender-biased policies, structures and practices', and establish '... a programme of transformation with a view to redress' (NCHE 1996: 70–1). That did not happen – at least under the mantle of redress. Some institutions made phenomenal progress in approaching gender equity among students based on their own commitment to the principle. It did not happen for faculty for the most part, despite some limited efforts at the institutional level. Reaching gender equity in the faculty is a slower process than gender equity in student admission. Nonetheless, we sense a lack of will – at least the kind of will that results in educational policy and redress funding for gender equity and faculty and administrator development. We emphasise these two additional aspects of redress because gender equity and staff development for black teaching staff and administrators and women are largely unfulfilled promises of the struggle and the post-election years.

As we look back on the redress policy debates, consultations, discussions, and policy-making, it is clear that the stakeholders pushing for individual student redress were much more effective than those talking about institutional redress or other forms of individual redress. The former were primarily students, the latter were vice chancellors, university staff, and representatives of NGOs. Individual redress happened sooner and on a larger scale because of a vocal and organised stakeholder constituency as compared with institutional redress where stakeholder attention was divided between demands of individual institutions and collective needs.

In the early policy research documents, redress was high on the list of key principles. However, by the time the national plan document was produced, redress was listed at the bottom. The place of redress as a principle in those documents indicates a subtle change to redress commitments that coincides with the national government economic policy shift from redress through the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to a policy that emphasised growth before redistribution, namely the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy adopted in 1996.

One striking aspect of redress planning and policy in South Africa was its future orientation, rather than looking back at inequities and providing redress for specific injustices. Institutional redress was designed to remedy a class of inequities and discrimination by fixing the problems – by bringing the historically black institutions to a level at which they would be competitive with other institutions. Individual redress identified a class of people (African, coloured, and Indian) who were the victims of discrimination and provided op-

portunities for those of college age who could meet entrance requirements to attend. This did not deny the discrimination experienced by the parents of these students or that of others who had suffered. It was a practical way to move as quickly as possible to ensure that all South Africans would have equal access to higher education.

Conclusions

Overall, have the efforts to foster redress lived up to expectations? Has redress helped overcome the major inequalities that the apartheid education system has created? What difference has it made? Has redress continued to be a factor since 2004–5 now that the apartheid funding plan has finally been replaced by a new funding formula for higher education? Reviewing the expectations for redress in documents such as the NEPI Report and the NCHE Report, it is clear that expectations have been met only partially. Institutional redress got off to a good start but was undermined by the Department and not pursued under Kadar Asmal's leadership of the Ministry of Education when the limited funding available was used for other purposes and for individual redress. To the extent that there was institutional redress, and it was minimal, it did not make much of a dent in the 'major inequalities' of apartheid, nor did foster the quality improvement envisioned at the HDIs. Substantial success was achieved through NSFAS with opportunities provided to more than 350,000 disadvantaged students since its inception and is reflected in increased enrolments of black students. On the other hand, the high failure and dropout rates remain. They are symptomatic of the tension between redress and efficiency. In the last few years there has been a slight shift of government's focus from equity to efficiency in the system.[32] Most of these students otherwise would not have been able to attend technikons or universities. Proof of the value of their training is that almost all of these students are getting jobs. Individual redress has made a major impact on access and equalisation of opportunities for black South Africans, although its effect on gender equity and staff development at HDIs was disappointing. We need more experience with the new funding formula to judge its impact on redress. Only time will tell if redress opportunities have helped overcome the legacies of apartheid in the long run, but our assessment of the last fifteen years suggests that they do.

Notes

1. Because redress also focused on other legacies of apartheid including political, economic and social inequities, there has always been a tension between redress and development. For further reading see Cloete, N. and Moja, T., 'Transformation Tensions in Higher Education: Equity, Efficiency, and Development', *So-*

cial Science Journal, Fall 2005, Vol. 72, No. 3.

2. See 'redress' defined in the *American Heritage Dictionary* and in *Webster's New World Dictionary*.
3. In the sense of the *formal* equality principle that Aristotle formulated in reference to Plato: 'treat like cases as like' (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*) in at least one respect, in this case opportunity for tertiary education.
4. It is important to note that those who argued against institutional redress based their arguments in part on lack of capacity at those institutions to use the resources in a meaningful way and proposed that they be closed down.
5. Black in this context is used to refer to part of the population of South Africa that was discriminated against. Historically the group was divided into African, coloured, and Indian.
6. A few students were admitted with permission of the Minister of Education or through other dispensations, but by 1953 only 1064 Africans had graduated from a university since 1652 (Moleah 1993: 415–6).
7. The population was: blacks 77 per cent, whites 11 per cent, coloureds 9 per cent, and Indians 3 per cent (Wikipedia Electronic Encyclopedia 2004).
8. Throughout this piece we use other common acronyms to categorise tertiary institutions including HBU for historically black university, HBT for historically black technikon, HDT for historically disadvantaged technikon and HDU referring to historically disadvantaged university. Technikons are post-school institutions that focus on career and vocational education and were recently granted permission to offer degree qualifications. Currently they have been renamed Universities of Technology.
9. The South African Post-Secondary Education (SAPSE) formula was introduced in 1983 for historically white universities but later revised to include all universities and technikons.
10. To cite two examples, their through-put (pass) rate was lower given the poor quality of black primary and secondary schools and lack of funding to assist disadvantaged students with academic development. The result was lower funding to HDIs per FTE because of the lower pass rates. Second, the formula provided differentiated funding amounts by subject matter. By design the HBUs taught primarily arts and humanities. The sciences and technology subjects generated higher funding per FTE. Thus the historically black universities also generated less funding on average per FTE than the historically white universities on the basis of subjects taught.
11. This period is discussed in more detail in Moja and Hayward (2001: 112–6).
12. We are indebted to Mauritz Slabbert for providing these data. Personal communication, August 1998.
13. PSE refers to post-secondary education.
14. While the influence of the NEPI report on the work of the NCHE was substantial and critical, translating some of its recommendation into policy demonstrated their impracticality. Some of the costing was equally problematic. For an

excellent discussion of the problems see Jansen (2001: 18).

15. For a more detailed discussion of this process and the debate over the Green and White Papers see Moja and Hayward (2001).
16. We are indebted to Sandra Hoole, Information Analyst, National Student Financial Aid Scheme, for providing these data on 2 February 2005.
17. We are grateful to the Department of Education for providing us a copy of the draft working paper (dated March 2004).
18. There was one submission from a HAI arguing that it had substantial numbers of disadvantaged students over the years. That argument was not accepted and it was not considered.
19. A subscription agency providing online subscription services, for continent-wide access with offices in South Africa and international headquarters in the US.
20. We are grateful to the Department of Education for providing this information on January 31, 2005.
21. In one case of such a deficit of a historically white institution, the bailout was a precondition of a merger. Information gathered through informal conversations with participants.
22. For an excellent description and analysis of many of the inequities that resulted, see Ian Bunting (1994).
23. Personal communication with the authors.
24. In 1998 a pilot study by four universities and technikons began to examine the implications of a number of aspects of the SAPSE funding formula. The study proposed changes based on analysis of the existing budgets of the four institutions. As a result, suggestions for policy changes were made to the Minister and the Department of Education. These included elimination of the 'cost of failure' – the budget penalty for student failure. See: University of Durban-Westville et al., *Implications* (2001), especially pp. 17-24.
25. These were: (i) exempt first-year first entry disadvantaged students from the SAPSE penalty; (ii) provide funding for academic development; and (iii) use the same test of 'disadvantaged' as employed for the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS). See: *Implications* (2001: 22-23).
26. We are very grateful to Ian Bunting for his thoughtful explanations and comments on the new funding process.
27. Sandra Hoole, of NSFAS provided us with this information.
28. This has been a growing concern in the United States where the average student debt is now $28,500 with 40 per cent of students delaying major purchases because of their student debt. Debts are higher in medicine, law, and business with 40 per cent having debt levels exceeding their current salaries (Baum and Saunders 2004).
29. The authors recognise the need to assess individual redress success using throughput rates but there were no segregated data for NSFAS recipients. However, 'according to a senior official in the Ministry of Education, the numbers and

types of graduates produced can not be regarded as having improved significantly' (Bunting 2002). There was a 50 per cent drop-out rate by 2003 from a cohort that entered the system in 2000 and a broad scope of reasons for failure.

30. Interview with Trevor Coombe for this piece by one of the authors.
31. This was discussed under institutional redress though it is clear the Commission understood that its benefits were primarily to the individual and were transportable.
32. A study of the funding of higher education is currently underway, conducted jointly by the Departments of Treasury and Education to address the underfunding of education and efficiency in the system.

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